Lining up the different services’ aircraft alongside each other—here, F-15 Strike Eagles, F-14 Tomcats, A-6 Intruders, and other aircraft cover the runway at the Roswell Industrial Air Center, New Mexico, during Exercise Roving Sands in April 1995—does not make for joint air operations. Instead, it illustrates the seams that exist among the services, where the enemy can hurt us and we can kill ourselves.
The recently published Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and Control of Joint Air Operations,” is an excellent benchmark for just how far the Department of Defense has come in its quest for jointness. This document is the first of what might be described as contentious doctrine publications to see the light of day, produced under the new joint system. It focuses on the joint force air component commander (JFACC), a functional component commander whose responsibilities transcend (or trespass upon) traditional service component boundaries. Each of the services has had similar reservations about this primarily Air Force effort:
- How much support will the JFACC provide the ground forces?
- Who will command the interdiction effort?
- Will the JFACC concept violate the integrity of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force?
- Does it have to be an airman?
- Will the JFACC steal my fleet defense assets?
- Who will control this guy?
- Do I have to fly the air-tasking order as written?
- When do I get “my” airplanes?
The concept that someone out there has the authority to direct all of the air assets of a joint force is a threat to what has been a service-oriented structure, because no one wants to give up an asset they might need later. FM 100-20 of 1943 attempted to solve this problem by putting the air forces under an air guy and making him responsible to the theater commander. The idea was to make sure that the theater commander (or joint force commander, as we now call him) would have air power to mass to achieve a decisive effect. The scare in this massing of air assets under one boss is that occasionally we get in trouble out there on the battlefield, and those in trouble really would like for an airplane to come along and get them out of it. But the truth of the matter is that air power is a scarce asset. Even with the 2,000 sorties a day that we flew in the Gulf War, only about 800 sorties actually were dropping bombs. The rest were supporting in some manner through combat air patrols, refueling, electronic warfare, surface-to-air missile suppression, and a lot of other important things. Every service has recognized the need for a unified control mechanism to control its air assets and ensure they are used decisively. The problem begins when we add the joint level command. We need another individual to be in charge of joint air operations. This is the conflict that makes the success of Joint Pub 3- 56.1 so necessary—and so difficult.
The publication has some definite high points:
- It defines a set of responsibilities for the JFACC in a joint force. His responsibilities for planning and targeting are combined into a detailed process that helps to focus and to coordinate joint air operations.
- It covers in detail the problems and procedures for transition from one JFACC to another JFACC.
- It defines the organization of the JFACC staff and the joint air operations center, with their responsibilities and duties.
- It describes the responsibilities of the various liaison elements in the JFACC.
- It details the instruction that all sorties, fixed-wing and helicopter, regardless of service, will be in the air-tasking order during military operations other than war.
- It describes the level of agreement the services have been able to reach and creates a high-water mark for joint operations.
The publication also has some serious shortcomings—e.g., in its definition of apportionment: “By priority or percentage of effort into geographic areas, against mission-type orders and/or by categories significant to the campaign.” Apportionment always has been a staff officer gimmick to show that they only were getting 19.875% of the promised 20% of support. But percentage of what? Sorties? Are we to compare a B-52 to an F/A-18 to a A-10 to an F-111 to an F-16? Effort? What are we counting here, throw weight? Geographic areas? At 600 knots, a guy can cover quite a few of them in no time at all. Significant categories? Who decides what those are or provides a clear definition to all components?
Apportionment is bean counting at its finest. Commanders are concerned with mission accomplishment: specifically how long it will take and what it will cost. They are concerned with achieving effects. Joint force commanders can give the JFACC forces and guidance and then let him use his experience to achieve the desired effect. Apportionment also has been one of the ways to divvy up the Air Force. No one ever told me that the close-air support target was a mission-essential one, but they all wanted confirmation that when “their” aircraft arrived, they could send it where the problem was. Apportionment has turned into a control issue. We do not need this concept now (if ever we did), so let’s put it out of our misery. If yours is the most important fight on the battlefield, the Air Force will be there.
The short format of current joint publications omits some useful guidance and direction for joint staffs. Two such concepts that could be expanded are the joint target coordination board and interdiction. The joint target coordination board should be done away with, because it always will be concerned with too much or too little. It will meet too often, delay and extend the air-tasking order time line, and probably serve as another way to parcel out the Air Force. Its sole useful function will be to add 24 hours to the air-tasking order process and 30 clerks to the staff. Unfortunately, however, it is not going to go away.
Targeting should be the JFACC’s responsibility, because he and his staff are the joint target coordination board. The forces in Korea do a great job giving the JFACC (called the joint force interdiction coordinator) this mission. All the components bring their long-range or interdiction-capable assets to the table, and the best tool for the job gets used. They do more than parcel out the Air Force. Such procedures would add some useful detail to our own sketchy joint publication. To quote the Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report: “the result [of the JFACC as targeting authority] was probably a more coherent application of air power than would have resulted from the compromises required by a stronger joint targeting authority.”
Interdiction is not just for air force bubbas; special operations and sea guys can do it too—and have serious roles to play. Interdiction is a subject that any doctrine publication on control of joint air operations needs to discuss in detail. General Colin L. Powell’s paper entitled “A Doctrinal Statement on Selected Joint Operational Concepts” had some superb ideas on integration and synchronization of interdiction and maneuver that should be integrated into Joint Pub 3-56.1.
What about using air forces as a maneuver element? They are not just flying artillery. General George Patton understood that air forces could be used like cavalry. They screened his flank on the drive across France. He knew that they could scout, harass, disrupt, and delay the enemy from crossing the battlefield. They could provide the crushing shock effect of cuirassiers when necessary to tip a battle in his direction. The XIX Tactical Air Force did all these to perfection under General Patton’s specific guidance and loose reins. These concepts also should be in 3-56.1—to educate the air folks to their own capabilities as much as the ground and sea guys.
The more I read Joint Pub 3-56.1, the more I wondered if the JFACC had an identity of his own. I envisioned a couple of three-star generals at the joint force picnic running the three-legged race. The services’ fear of the omnipotent JFACC has lead us to this literary slight of hand. I recall a quote from Lieutenant General Moore, the Marine Air Component Commander for Desert Storm:
General Horner, Admiral Arthur, and General Boomer are reasonable individuals. When reasonable men come to a course of action, they can work out reasonable solutions. Yes, it wasn’t always right with doctrine on either side, either green doctrine or blue doctrine, but we made it work.
That really is how it works. The joint force is formed to win quickly at minimal cost. Everyone will do everything in his power to accomplish the joint force commander’s mission with the assets available as soon as possible, and that includes the JFACC. There are no independent wars going on (or there better not be), and there are no agendas superior to that of the joint force commander. No other component commander or staff officer on the staff of the joint force commander has to be tied to him by doctrine the way the JFACC does.
The joint force commander also is unlikely to take over the mission of running the air war with his own staff, as Joint Pub 3-56.1 suggests, because it is far too complex an operation. Running an air war requires training and an experienced and dedicated focus. The JFACC staff is not just pilots; it is logisticians and targeteers, weaponeers and intelligence, air controllers and communications geniuses. The absence of a joint force air component commander and an experienced staff would result in duplication, missed opportunity, and chaos.
The time has come to separate the joint force air component commander from the joint force commander. The JFACC has defined responsibilities and tasks; we must give him a job to do, the assets to do it, and then turn him lose to do it. The air-tasking order is not some conspiracy to steal control of aircraft. It is a way to direct, order, and coordinate the use of what really is a scarce asset. The air-tasking order in Desert Storm did not stop any component from doing what it wanted to do. It provided order and direction to the process of fighting a war from the air. With all the sorties that flew before and after the war—nearly half-a-million—there was not a single mid-air collision, and no one ran out of fuel.
We still do not know what a joint attitude is. Consider this quote from the joint publication: “Joint air operations are those air operations performed with air cap- abilities/forces made available by components, in support of the JFC’s [joint force commander’s] operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts in direct support of itself.” I never realized that the components had assets they were holding back from the joint force commander. I was of the mistaken opinion that unity of command was a principle of war. “Made available”? The components exist because there is a joint force commander! He owns it all. In fact, he lets them use it.
This manner of thinking points toward a trend to create more seams with joint doctrine rather than fewer. Even the Air Force talks about a separation between its air-tasking order and the joint air-tasking order. We are starting to lose the bubble. Every sortie—including direct support sorties—are in support of the joint force commander. I have listened to seven JFACCs speak in peacetime exercises and in one war, and they all started out with the same line: “We are going to do what the Commander-in-Chief (joint force commander) wants.” Jointness is fighting together and getting rid of the seams. We have to break down the urge to fight in “close proximity.” We no longer have the luxury of fighting in anything else but a joint manner, because we do not have the money, and we cannot afford the casualties. The seams are where the enemy can hurt us and where we kill ourselves.
Joint Pub 3-56.1 reads as if there are lots of different component wars going on with a joint war superimposed on top. We have to change the mind set that thinks of jointness as a welding process that puts individual pieces together. Joint doctrine should be forged as a single piece—not welded from separate pieces. General Charles Horner once said that there were no Army targets, no Air Force targets, and no Marine targets, just Commander-in-Chief targets. We have to be able to combine the Navy F/A-18 squadron with the Air Force F-15E squadron, with a Army Apache battalion, with a Marine air command element and have them all work together in a synergistic effect—without the seams. And since that is what is required to do the job, we need the doctrine with which to do it. Jointness is putting all the service and functional- components marbles into one joint bag, not just creating a new purple marble to put in the circle.
Joint Pub 3-56.1 gives us a chance to see just how far the services have come in their quest for jointness. It accurately describes the currently agreed-upon status of the joint force air component commander, but the joint publication still requires some dramatic changes in the next rewrite, including the addition of more detail and the omission of outdated concepts. Most important, however. Joint Pub 3-56.1 needs an attitude adjustment before the rewrite. For a subject with as many questions and service fears as the joint force air component commander, we need more than 66 pages with a lot of pictures of airplanes. The focus must be on joint air operations, not just service air operations alongside each other.
Colonel Welch retired after a 20-year career in the field artillery. He is currently employed at an auction gallery in Phoebus, Virginia.