Significant changes have been made in the roles and authority of DoD leadership over the past 50 years. With more power being transferred to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff— here, Secretary of Defense William Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Shalikashvili—have the service secretariats outlived their usefulness?
On 24 May 1995, Chairman John P. White submitted the “Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces—Directions for Defense” to Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Tasked to review the “current allocations of roles, missions, and functions among the Armed Forces,”1 the commission concluded, among other things, that “the advantages of separate headquarters staffs are outweighed by disadvantages.”2 It therefore recommended that the secretariat and service staffs be combined.3
Background
Since World War II, two major laws have fundamentally reorganized the U.S. defense establishment. The First was the National Security Act of 1947, which, with its 1949 amendment, created a centralized Department of Defense (DoD). DoD evolved over the succeeding years from a military establishment of separate departments (War and Navy) to a centralized department headed by a civilian secretary with full authority and responsibility for its operation. Under this structure, the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) were to be responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their forces. The role of the service secretaries and military chiefs of staff (including the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps)4 in the operational employment of these forces was ended. A 1958 amendment further strengthened the role of the Secretary of Defense, as commanders of the combatant forces were made directly responsible to the secretary and the president.
The second major law was the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, known as the Goldwater- Nichols Act. This law focused on the combatant side of DoD, principally on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the role and responsibilities of its chairman. The military chiefs of staff remained as members of the JCS, but they no longer had a vote. The Chairman was given full authority over the JCS and Joint Staff and was provided with a deputy of the same rank. As compensation for removing the military chiefs of staff from decision-making roles in the JCS, the law provided them the right to report separately to the President if they thought it necessary.
Considering these two significant changes in DoD organization and management, service secretaries and their separate staffs, called secretariats, represent unnecessary layering that is no longer needed within DoD.
Current Responsibilities and Authorities
The principal DoD players are the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, the military chiefs of staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands. The following is a short summary of their current responsibilities and authorities:
- The Secretary of Defense is the unquestioned senior civilian in DoD and is the principal assistant to the president in all matters relating to DoD. Subject to the law and the President, he has authority, direction, and control over DoD.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the unquestioned senior military officer in DoD and the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Chairman—subject to the law, the President, and the Secretary of Defense—convenes and presides over the JCS and manages the Joint Staff. The Chairman may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs or any of the armed forces.
- The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for and have the authority to conduct all affairs of their departments, including recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, and mobilizing. The services are separately organized within the military departments and operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.
- The military chiefs of staff preside over their military staffs under the authority, direction, and control of the service secretaries and are directly responsible to the secretaries. They may provide additional advice or opinion to the Chairman of the JCS. All forces within the military departments are assigned by the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands (geographical and functional commands).
- The combatant commanders are responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to their commands. They have command authority over the forces assigned and the subordinate service component commanders and commands.
The Change in Relationships
Power, it is said, is a zero-sum game: if one gains it, someone else loses it. Up until 1947, our military establishment consisted of a War Department and a Navy Department. These departments operated separately, each headed by a civilian secretary appointed by the President, and with military chiefs of staff promoted from within the services and approved by the Senate. The service secretaries were full members of the President’s cabinet. During this period, the President was the only person who could coordinate the activities of the two departments and was the only forum for settling disputes between them.
With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the new Secretary of Defense became a member of the cabinet, and the Secretaries of War (now Army) and Navy lost their memberships. The Secretary of the Air Force never was a cabinet member.
These changes, followed by those made by Goldwater-Nichols, have resulted in a fundamental reallocation of the roles and authorities associated with the various positions, which in turn have resulted in some significant changes in power relationships:
- The service secretaries lost power vis-a-vis the Secretary of Defense. They are no longer cabinet members, nor do they have any role in the employment of the combatant forces. They are solely responsible for supporting their services’ forces, which are now assigned to the combatant commanders.
- The military chiefs of staff lost power vis-a-vis the Chairman of the JCS. They no longer have voting rights within the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor direction over the Joint Staff. Nor do they have any role in the employment of the combatant forces of their services.
- The combatant commanders gained power vis-a-vis the service secretaries, the military chiefs of staff, and the service component commanders, for they now control both the manpower and forces assigned and the various services subordinate component commands.
In addition, we have seen a gradual reduction in the peacetime size of the armed forces. For comparison, during the peacetime period between World War II and the Korean War, there were about 1.6 million active-duty personnel. Between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the level was about 2.6 million. Between the Vietnam War and about 1990, the level was about 2.1 million. Currently, we have fewer than 1.5 million men and women on active duty, the lowest level since before World War II.
Considering both the downsizing of the armed forces and the loss of responsibility and authority of the service secretaries and military chiefs of staff, do we need both levels and their large staffs to guide our forces into the next century?
Civilian Control of the Military
Whenever the suggestion to eliminate the positions of civilian service secretaries arises, a great bellowing is heard about dilution of civilian control of the military. This is hogwash.
Originally, civilian control was seen by colonial Americans to mean legislative control. This concept was expanded early on to include executive department control by the appointment of civilian political executives over the War and Navy departments. Since those early days, actual civilian control has expanded significantly.
Since 1947, we have added not only the civilian Secretary of Defense but also a host of other civilian appointed officials within the office of the Secretary of Defense. The national press, think tanks, consulting organizations, special interest associations, and others also contribute to civilian control. More fundamental, civilian control resides in the “civilianist” attitudes of the American public and the reflection of these attitudes in the presidency and Congress.5 The loss of the three service secretaries can hardly put civilian control of the military at risk.
Streamlining the Management Structure
It is time to streamline the management structure of the military departments by eliminating duplication, layering, and redundant operations and personnel. This would simplify the decision-making process, providing clearer accountability for performance, and improve the efficiency of the policymaking machinery of defense management. Large numbers of quality personnel (civilian and uniformed) could be reassigned to more productive duties.
One alternative is to eliminate the position of service secretary and its complete secretariat. The military chiefs of staff then would assume complete control of their services. Sufficient civilian appointees exist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to assure continued civilian control. The major advantage would be the complete elimination of a bureaucratic layer, with its attendant improvements in efficiency and effectiveness. However, because the service secretaries occupy historical positions in our country, this alternative probably is not politically feasible. Even today, after the other organizational changes in DoD. this alternative may be too far-reaching to be acceptable.
Another, more feasible alternative is the full integration of the service secretaries and their secretariats with the military chiefs of staff and their staffs.6 This alternative also would eliminate an entire bureaucratic layer, with its attendant advantages. By providing opportunities for actual department management, it would strengthen the service secretaries and offer the possibility of improved performance. The image of civilian control would be retained, and the service secretary would have access to information in the service staffs that currently is not available without clearance through the military chief of staff layer.
Under this alternative, the military chiefs of staff would remain the senior military officers of their services and would perform within the literal meaning of their title, chiefs of staff. Each official—secretaries and chiefs—would maintain a small, personal staff but rely jointly on one large, functional, integrated staff, headed by appointed assistant secretaries and/or military deputies, depending on the function. The overall savings in manpower could be significant, perhaps as high as the current manning of the three secretariats: 1,000 billets and an annual payroll of $125 million or more.
Conclusion
Significant changes in the roles and authority of DoD leadership have been made over the past 50 years, but the service secretaries, the military chiefs of staff, and their respective staffs have not changed or been reduced. It is past time to make the management structure of the military departments and services more effective and efficient. The savings in manpower and funding would be significant, and the improvement in effectiveness and efficiency could be startling.
1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Section 954(b).
2 "Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces—Directions for Defense,” 24 May 1995, pp. 4-23 and 4-24.
3 The Departments of the Army and Air Force have two staffs—a secretariat and service staff reporting to service secretaries. In the Department of the Navy, there are three staffs—the secretariat, the Navy staff, and the Marine Corps staff. Ibid, p. 4-24.
4 The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps occupy equivalent positions to those of the military Chiefs of Staff in the Army and Air Force. For simplicity, the Navy and Marine Corps chiefs will be included in the term military chiefs of staff.
5 See Allan R. Millett, "The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective,” Mershon Center Position Paper, no. 4, April 1979, The Mershon Center, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
6 This alternative is also discussed in Archie D. Barrett, “Reappraising Defense Organization," National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1983.
Colonel Smith is an independent consultant working on manpower, personnel, and training issues of interest to various departments of the government. He served as a senior DoD representative on President Jimmy Carter’s Reorganization Project, 1977-79, and in a number of career policy positions within DoD, as well as in the private sector.