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Periodically, the question arises: “Do we need four air forces?” The implication is that there now exist a separate Air Force, an air force in the Army, an air force in the Navy, and an air force in the Marines Corps. This is incorrect. There is only one Air Force.
It came into existence in 1947 and is a separate service in a separate Department in the Department of Defense.
The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have aviation components as supporting arms for their primary functions. The
Army requires aerial observation, transportation, and fire support. Most of that is supplied from its own rotary-wing aviation assets. The Navy and Marine Corps require aviation elements to provide both defensive and offensive punches. All their aviators are trained in Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida, and its adjuncts; all are designated naval aviators. And like their flying brethren in the Army, they are a supporting arm. Other combat supporting arms such as tanks and artillery provide fire support to the battlefield, and similarly, different ship types provide support to the battle groups of the fleet.
As soon as the Air Force gained independence in 1947, the Army began replacing the functions of air transport, aerial fire support, and air observation by acquiring its own aviation component. Subsequently, through Department of the Air Force legislative maneuvering, the Army was restricted to the rotary-wing execution of these vital military functions, and the Air Force was detailed to provide the fixed- wing support of these functions. It was obvious that a modern army needed such support. The Navy and Marine Corps retained their aviation, in spite of repeated legislative attempts by the Air Force to absorb everything that flew.
The United States has engaged in four major wars since the Air Force was established. We won two and lost two. We won the Cold War, and the Air Force played a major role in that victory. Along with U.S. land-based and sea- based nuclear missile capability, the Air Force provided part of the three-pronged delivery systems of strategic weapons. In the two wars we lost—the Korean War and the Vietnam War—the air war was not successful. The Air Force’s attempts to bomb the enemy populace into submission were a failure.
In the Gulf War, however, the Air Force illustrated the correct use of air power: specifically, when it was not used as a separate entity but as the ideal supporting arm for the Army.
This is the role for which the Air Force was intended, and it has always been successful when so used.
It is time to rethink the question of a Department of the Air Force. I am not saying that we should eliminate the Air Force as a separate service, but I question its place as a third subordinate department in the Department of Defense. I advocate the return of the Air Force to the Department of the Army.
The Air Force would remain a separate service within the Army, just as the Marine Corps retains its service identity within the Department of the Navy. Many billets, however, would be eliminated. The potential for savings in personnel is significant, where eliminations and consolidations would bring immediate savings. There would still be requirements for the same number of personnel at the field or working level, but duplication at the headquarters level would be eliminated.
Would such a move promote national defense? I believe that it would. First, it would give the Army more say in the amount and type of support they can expect from an air component. Perhaps, for example, the C-117 transport aircraft, might move ahead of stealth bombers and fighters in procurement priority.
An Undersecretary of the Air Force, commenting on the general subject of government organization, put it on the line when she said, “Now one occasionally probes into the past only to find that the emperor indeed is naked; that an office was created to solve a problem that has since disappeared, because of personalities involved, or for some other purposes no longer relevant, but that the bureaucratic structure has continued anyway and can be abolished.” Precisely.
Colonel Hammond recently retired as Editor of Shipmate magazine.
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Proceedings / July 1995