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—(Baltimore Sun)
Table 1: The Commission on Roles and Missions
Dr. John P. White, Chairman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Les Aspin, former Secretary of Defense The Honorable Antonia Chayes, former Under Secretary of the Air Force Adm. Leon Edney, USN (Ret.)
MajGen. John L. Matthews, ANG (Ret.)
Robert J. Murray, President of the Center for Naval Analyses
Franklin D. Raines, Vice Chairman, Federal National
Mortgage Association
Gen. Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret.)
Jeffrey H. Smith, Partner, Arnold and Porter LtGen. Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
Gen. Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret.)
Dr. John White chairs the Commission on Roles and Missions—whose final report is due the 24th of this month. Air power and presence are big players.
‘U.S. Military Engaged in a Turf War”
‘‘Initiatives May Alter U.S. Military Roles, Structure”
—(Defense News)
"Commission Draft Paper Sets Off Alarm Bells”
—(Defense Week)
It’s roles and missions time—a time when everything is on the table, when even the most sacred assumptions get challenged, a time when the services put aside their petty jealousies and bring out their really major jealousies.
Created by the Congress in the Fiscal Year 1994 Authorization Bill, the Commission arose.
from two congressional impulses. The first was concern over duplication in some areas and neglect of others. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), then-Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Congress’s most respected authority on national security matters, articulated this in a major speech, questioning whether the arrangements made in the 1948 Key West Agreement were still valid today. He called for a major review. And when Nunn talks, people listen.
The second impulse was a general belief that realigning roles and missions would save a lot of money without damaging military capability. The classic issues such as “four air forces” and “two armies” identify apparent redundancies that, if eliminated, could save
money while leaving “essential” capabilities intact. Both elements were important. By the time the Commission was established, the Bottom Up Review (BUR) already had been published and implemented. It cut forces another 20% beyond the “Base Force,” putting them at about 40% below Cold War levels. It was hard to argue that further reductions were warranted, yet the pressures of budget deficits and the desire for increased domestic spending created pressure to do something— a roles and missions realignment offered a way out.
The Commission began life slowly. Authorized in November 1993, it did not hold its first meeting until 24 May 1994. The delay was caused first by the transition from Les Aspin to William Perry as Secretary of Defense, and second by a long discussion about membership. Who would be the commissioners? Clearly the group needed some military experience, both to understand fully a wide variety of complex issues and for credibility of the final product. On the other hand, a commission dominated by retired military officers might deadlock. The
Defense Department finally decided to appoint one retired gen- eral/flag officer from each service along with six civilians (most of whom have military experience and all of whom have significant inter-service experience), including the chairman. This action involved going beyond the statutory number of commissioners, a move subsequently approved in the Fiscal Year 1995 Authorization Bill. Later, an eleventh commissioner having “previous military experience and management experience with the reserve components” was added. (See Table 1.)
The Commission needed a staff and the first appointment was Michael Leonard to be staff director. Leonard had worked many years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) [OSD/PA&E], ending up as the number-two man. His experience covered the broad scope of issues that the Commission would face; the staff he recruited included civilians detailed from OSD, the service staffs,
or defense agencies; military officers nominated by the services; and others hired directly.
Once out of the starting gate, the staff accelerated the pace as it went through a series of steps to identify a broad range of problems and
possible issues. The intention was to develop an innovative group, rather than just “rounding up the usual suspects.” More than 60 issue outlines were developed and presented to the commissioners on 23 September. At this critical meeting, the commissioners selected 26 issues and marked them for further development into full issue papers for later decision. These issues are grouped into three categories: major regional contingencies, joint warfighting, and infrastructure and central support. (See Table 2.)
A Commission staff member, assigned the lead for each of the issues, gathered a team made up of representatives from all interested organizations, the services, the Joint Staff, OSD, defense agencies, even the Commanders-in-Chief, and began the long process of producing an in-depth analysis of the assigned area complete with options and evaluation. No recommendations emerged, however.
The services also organized themselves to participate in this debate. Each created a roles-and-missions cell, whose job was
Joint Warfighting
OSD, Joint Staff, and Service Secretariat Structure
Unified Command Plan Structure
Department of Defense Agencies
Coalition Interoperability
Overseas Presence
Space
Command/Control/Communications/Computers and Information Technologies Intelligence Dissemination and Battle Damage Assessment
Streamlining Acquisition Organization
Procurement Oversight/Auditing
Central Logistics Support
Depot Maintenance Management
Materiel (Supply) Management
Medical Readiness and Health Benefits
Air Power Organization
Aviation Infrastructure
Combat Search and Rescue
Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Theater Air/Missile Defense
Army and Marine Corps Capabilities
Close Air Support/Fire Support
Deep Battle/Precision Conventional Strike
Peace Operations
Constabulary Forces
Reserve/Guard Forces
to participate in issue teams, facilitate data flow and generally keep an eye on the Commission’s work.
Finally, the Commission directed the creation of a group to look at the Defense Department’s management processes. Based °n his business experience, Dr. White strongly believed that changing organizational structures alone was not enough. Organizations needed to change the way they did business if they were truly to adapt to future conditions. This process group
is looking at the five main managerial processes in the Department and their organizational implications.
Casting the intellectual net widely, the Commission recognized that many players in the national security community had important ideas to present, the services themselves being the most obvious. Each service chief made a presentation before the commissioners laying out his service’s vision for the future. All were polished and thoughtful products. The Air Force’s General Merrill McPeak captured the headlines, however, with a set of sweeping revisionary proposals, at the core of which was a concept of dividing the theater battle space into four areas—the close battle, the rear battle, the high battle, and the deep battle.
The F/A-18 (top left) has become a lightning rod for those who would like to see a smaller Marine fixed-wing aviation component. The F-16 is carrying a Joint Direct Attack Munition—basically an iron bomb updated with a guidance and control kit. Designed to be compatible with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft, the new munition represents the wave of the future.
He also made very specific recommendations about changes—eliminating the Army’s Advanced Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the Marine Corps’ F/A-18s, substituting amphibious carriers for attack carriers in some deployments, and making U.S. Special Operations Command a component command, to name a few. It was a bold and innovative effort; it was also harshly criticized for being parochially Air Force and for breaking an informal agreement not to turn the roles and missions debate into an interservice food fight.
In addition, various commissioners met with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and all the CinCs, soliciting each for his ideas about the important issues.
Finally, the Commission received presentations from a wide variety of interested organizations, from defense industry groups to reserve associations.
To date, several products have emerged. The Commission staff has produced a world view called the “futures briefing,” which attempts to identify the future operating environment of the armed forces. The result is not radically different from the general consensus: we are approaching a world of very uncertain threats, rapidly emerging technologies, constrained resources, and economic interdependence.
The second product—called the “attributes briefing” and produced by the chairman—is a general description of the characteristics needed in armed forces of the future. In it, Chairman White made the point that “DoD must change. It must respond to a new, highly uncertain environment.” He offered six attributes for successful military forces in the future: responsiveness, robustness, cooperation, innovation, competition, and efficiency. To illustrate how these attributes might be applied, he described three areas the Commission was looking at closely:
► Enhancing joint warfighting
► Privatizing routine support functions >■ Redesigning the role of the reserve components
He emphasized that the Commission’s recommendations would not be simply a collection of 26 decisions on individual issues but would reflect a set of broader themes.
So what’s the answer? The Commission has been meeting since late February to review the 26 issues, develop consensus, and discuss themes for its final report. No doubt some information on the discussions will leak out and be reported, perhaps accurately, perhaps not. The only product that counts, however, is the final report due 24 May.
Colonel Cancian is the Director of the Infrastructure and Central Support Group, Commission on Roles and Missions; his reserve billet is Operations Officer, 4th Civil Affairs Group. He wrote “Are You Telling the Truth?” in Proceedings, December 1994, pages 37-41. The views expressed represent his personal opinions.
A Critical Look at Who Does What
. By Rear Admiral Thomas C. Lynch, U.S. Navy
As the roles and missions debate enters the home stretch, it may be productive to review the history, progress, and potential outcomes of this debate and its relevance to the future of the Navy and Marine Corps.
The first roles and missions debate in 1947-48 culminated with the Key West Agreement, which saw the creation of the Defense Department and an independent Air Force—and the Revolt of the Admirals.
The 1994 version, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, is an outgrowth of the 1986 Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense legislation.
In addition to reorganizing the department, it directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a triennial review of service roles, missions and functions. Admiral William Crowe, U.S. Navy, and General Colin Powell, U.S. Army, both submitted reports, but recommended no significant change. Congress, however, in
the 1994 Defense Appropriation Bill, created an independent commission to examine what they perceived to be excessive duplication among the services and to determine if there are more cost-effective, innovative ways to size and employ our armed forces in the post-Cold War environment.
The Commission’s report may advocate changes to Title X, U.S. Code or DoD Instruction 5100.1, each of which specifies the roles, missions, and functions of the individual military services. This is important because assignment of a primary function permits a service to program funding for that specific
task. Although the general purpose of each service is the same, i.e., to fight and win wars, the debate centers on which service is best suited to perform specific functions most cost-efficiently.
Although focused on vital national security issues, the roles and missions debate has generated surprisingly little interest beyond the Washington beltway. The 11-member panel and associated 35-member staff have pored over reams of data provided by federally funded research and development centers, private consultants, and the service staffs in reviewing issues under the general headings of operations, infrastructure, and process. The Commission staff has developed a range of options that will be assessed in terms of robustness, responsiveness, cooperation (jointness), effectiveness, competition, and innovation that will provide the foundation of the final report due to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS for comment on 24 May.
From the beginning, the Navy and Marine Corps together have stayed on course, to emphasize those things we do well. We have been successful because our existence as independent services is not threatened by the current debate. The Constitution directs Congress to maintain a Navy; our citizenry and political leadership understand and appreciate the continuing Navy contribution to the nation’s defense.