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If 1993 was the year of “operationalizing” . . From the Sea,” as Admiral Leighton (“Snuffy”) Smith declared,' 1994 was the year of learning just what “forward-deployed operations” really meant to a Navy confronting a dwindling fleet and budget, burgeoning commitments, and challenges to roles and missions.2 The new and improved white paper, “Forward . . . From the Sea,” hit the street in November 1994 with the intent of expanding and refining the naval services’ post-Cold War strategic concept first elucidated in 1992. While “. . . From the Sea” announced a reorientation toward regional operations in the littorals, a de-emphasis of global threats, and a continued commitment to the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ contributions to joint and combined warfighting, the expanded vision announced that, “. . . although naval forces are designed to fight and win wars, their most important role in situations short of war is to be engaged forward with a view to preventing conflicts and controlling crises.”3
We ended 1994 with a strong sense of deja vu. The Navy and Marines were indeed engaged in forward regions, in many of the same places as at the end of 1993, and 1992, and. . . . But critical observers began to question whether these investments of national treasure—our people, ships, submarines, and aircraft—had indeed prevented conflicts and controlled crises. Some, like Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak, continued to argue for a force posture that emphasized the rapid- response capabilities of the Air Force to underwrite U.S. “presence” requirements in world regions.4 Others wondered whether our “vital” interests really were at risk and worth the commitment of U.S. forces without a similarly serious commitment by our allies, as well.3
In March 1994 the United States pulled out of Mogadishu to the safety of a Navy amphibious ready group offshore, leaving the remaining United Nations people behind to deal with a resurgence of interclan bloodletting. Fifteen months earlier, U.S. joint forces led by the aircraft carrier Ranger (CV-61) and amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH-10) swooped into Mogadishu intent on Restoring Hope and then Sustaining Hope—“hope” ultimately turning out to be a chimera. A year later, the Navy and Marine Corps again sent forces to troubled Somali waters to provide, in Secretary of Defense William Perry’s words, “overwhelming force” to cover the exodus of the United Nations and to ensure that the United States gets its loaned military equipment back. (See A Special Report: “Out of Somalia: United Shield,” pages 129-130.)
The Navy and Marine Corps remained offshore crisis-plagued Bosnia-Herze- govina during 1994, first enforcing then, in yet another Clinton administration policy-turnabout on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, ignoring U.N. sanctions intended to stem military arms and equipment getting to the Bosnian Muslim government. A few feeble air strikes and a single effective enforcement of the “nofly” zone, in which four Serbian aircraft were shot down by Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons, seemed to have little effect on the ground. One after another of Bosnia’s “safe havens” came under Serb attack, and Bosnian Muslims, as soon as they were able, mounted counter-offensives. But this denouement seemed more a result of internal NATO bickering than the questionable efficacy of naval forces in such un-civil conflicts ... or did it?
In October 1994, however, the rapid movement of initially naval and later land-based ground and air forces into the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia at least on the surface seemed to deter Saddam Hussein from using military maneuvers to threaten another assault into Kuwait. Never certain that this indeed was his intent, the United States nonetheless sent a small armada to bolster our commitment to Kuwait and other friendly regimes in the region. The offending Iraqi forces were soon withdrawn.
A few months earlier, as discussions with the North Korean government regarding its nuclear facilities and suspected weapons program reached nearcrisis levels, the United States alerted its forces in the region. The Navy called on two mine countermeasures ships from the West Coast and sent two carrier battle groups into nearby waters to bolster the U.N.-U.S. position and give former President Jimmy Carter time to reach some common ground.
So it was a mixed bag in 1994: some clear successes, some draws, one or two failures in the use of naval forces to protect vital U.S. citizens, interests, and friends wherever they may be at risk. In July the United States finally had a National Security Strategy for the post-Cold War world. Among other elements, the President’s strategy emphasized the importance of a credible overseas presence that “. . . demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, gains U.S. familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities.”6 Last year was in many respects like every other year in the Navy’s post-World War II history. And so 1995 will be, as well, as U.S. Sailors and Marines remain on station—off North Korea, Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia—ready to do the President’s bidding, however unclear and uncertain it might seem.
Exercises, Operations, and Tests
The Navy’s routine operating tempo and short-notice responses to crises and contingencies during 1994, if sustained, will burn up its ships, aircraft, and people. In a 12 December 1994 letter to Senator John S. McCain (R-AZ), Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jeremy Bo- orda warned that the Navy’s readiness would suffer if fiscal relief is not forthcoming to a fleet that is already too small.7 At the same time, the CNO strongly opposed any further reductions in the Navy’s forward-deployment commitments: “We now gap major theaters and place forces on ‘tethers,’ committing them to arrive in time of crisis without actually requiring 100 percent [presence] in each important area. ... I firmly believe we have done about as much of this gapping as we can reasonably expect to be acceptable over the long haul.”
In 1994 the Navy’s active and reserve forces participated in more than 350 U.S. and international exercises, showed the flag in the ports of nearly 100 countries, and supported some 13 operations from Haiti and Cuba to the waters off North Korea. Of particular note were the Navy’s at-sea exercises with Russian and Ukrainian naval forces. The U.S. and Russian navies participated in multinational exercises in the Arabian Gulf, Baltic, Black, North, and Norwegian seas; numerous passing-at-sea exercises of opportunity; a June 1994 humanitarian exercise near Vladivostok; and the first NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace Naval Exer-
Provide Comfort
Figure 1: Naval Operations in 1994-1995
Provide Promise Deny Flight Sharp Guard\
Desert Storm Vigilant Warrior>
Sea Signal Able Vigil
Support Democracy Uphold Democracy
Drug Interception Operations
Distant Runner
Eastern Exit Restore Hope Support Hope
Southern Watch
Maritime Interception Operation
TECHMATICS. INC.
cise, which brought together nine NATO and three partner countries. Another two partnership naval exercises were also held. Last year also saw the first-ever U.S. Navy ship visit to Ukraine; the USS Belknap (CGN-25), with the Commander U.S. Sixth Fleet, visited Odessa in the fall. All told, more than 36 Navy ships and some 7,000 sailors and Marines had visited Russia and Central-Eastern European ports by year’s end.
Beyond the Navy’s routine peacetime presence operations and bilateral and multilateral exercises, however, U.S. naval forces in 1994 responded to several chronic and a few emergent crises, many of which required the urgent repositioning of naval forces from one theater to another.
Under the rubric of Operation Southern Watch, the Navy continued maritime operations in the Red Sea, Northern Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf in support of a variety of U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq. From 1990 through 1994, Navy and Coast Guard law enforcement teams conducted more than
21,0 interceptions of commercial ships suspected of carrying banned materials intended for Iraq. These Southern Watch maritime intercept operations in the Red Sea ended in August 1994, when an ashore inspection program was established in Jordan.
In response to Iraq’s positioning of armored forces “on training maneuvers” near the Kuwait border, within six days Navy and Marine Corps forces— including the USS George Washington (CVN-72) carrier battle group, USS Tripoli (LPH-10) amphibious ready group, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the five-ship Middle East Force, five additional surface warships, and a nuclear-powered submarine—were among the first U.S. assets on the scene in Operation Vigilant Warrior. The USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55) was the first strike platform to reach its launch position, leaving her Red Sea op-area and making the 3,200-nautical mile journey in six days, arriving on 8 October. By the time all ships, the carrier strike wing, and hundreds of Tomahawk land attack missiles were in position, only 14 of the 354 land-based aircraft ordered into the theater had actually arrived. Additionally, the five ships of the Guam Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron mobilized and were on-scene to augment the Marines, and another 13 Afloat Prepositioning Force ships arrived to support Army operations. Within 17 days these ships brought two million sqare feet of cargo, including more than 9,000 military vehicles. Ultimately, Saddam blinked and pulled back his forces from their maneuvers. In November, the Navy established a permanent forward-deployed destroyer squadron in the Persian Gulf.
In the Adriatic Sea, Operations Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Sharp Guard continued in what must be seen as a frustrating if ultimately inconsequential attempt at helping bring the conflict in Bosnia to a close. U.S. Navy ships and submarines, Navy aircraft on carriers, and Marine Corps aircraft based ashore provided continuous support to all three operations. Along with Air Force and other NATO aircraft, Marine F/A-18 Hornets attacked armored vehicles on the ground and an airfield in Croatia, without significant military effect. Nuclear-powered attack submarines detected surface ships in support of the U.S. maritime intercept patrols by U.S. surface warships with their embarked Coast Guard law enforcement detachments. Although the United States unilaterally modified the blockade to ignore ships carrying arms to the Bosnian Muslims, the intercept operations continued to target other ships. Aegis cruisers, meanwhile, served as command-and-control nodes for U.S. Air Force humanitarian flights as well as coordinating with AW ACS aircraft the enforcement of no-fly zones above several Bosnian safe havens. In other efforts to bring humanitarian support, however. Navy people helped man a U.S. field hospital in Zagreb, Croatia.
In late spring 1994, with the fifth Clinton administration policy about-face for Haiti and a relaxation of Cuban immigrant controls and coastal patrols, a flood of refugees headed toward the United States. Operation Support Democracy had begun in late fall 1993 to enforce U.N. sanctions against the Haitian regime that had overthrown President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The Navy’s Task Force 120, with “joint” support from the Coast Guard and “combined” support from
Highlights—and lowlights—of Navy participation in the Haiti operation included: interdicting fleeing Haitians, here, a motor whaleboat from the LSD-41 operating (right) with the Coast Guard; Army helicopters embarked on Navy carriers—here, the USS America (CV-66); and the new patrol combatants’ first action— here, the USS Monsoon (PC-4), run aground off Haiti.
Canada and France, by March had searched some 70 vessels inbound to Haiti and, as supporting elements, intercepted Haitian migrants’ boats to return their hapless cargoes to Port au Prince.
But this was only the beginning. When conditions deteriorated in Haiti and Cuba, thousands of refugees took to the seas in boats, rafts, inner-tubes, and practically anything that would float. Navy and Coast Guard ships and aircraft supporting the June-October Operation Sea Signal and August-September Operation Able Vigil intercepted Haitian and, after the Clinton administration reversed longstanding U.S. policy regarding U.S. asylum for refugees from Castro’s regime, Cuban migrants seeking better lives. By the end of the summer, more than 30,000 Haitians and Cubans were being detained at the Guantanamo Navy Base in Cuba.
When conditions deteriorated in Haiti and military action appeared imminent, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces joined with elements from the Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard in Operation Support Democracy to return Aristide to power. Under a fig-leaf of U.N. resolutions, the U.S. Joint (expeditionary) Task Force (JTF-190) saw elements of the Army’s Tenth Mountain Division embarked on the nuclear-powered carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69)8—with the Navy’s first women assigned to a combatant—and the Marines conduct a landing at Cap Haitien. The threatened invasion provided the needed impetus for the peripatetic former President Jimmy Carter, this time backed up by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to help bring the crisis to a close without the need for combat.9 At the peak of the operation, the Navy-Marine Corps force totaled 24 ships—including the first real-world deployment of two new Cyclone (PC-l)-class coastal patrol ships (one of which, the USS Monsoon [PC-4], ran aground during the operation)—and more than 11,000 people. By early November, Military Sealift Command ships delivered some 280,000 tons of dry cargo and 1.3 million square feet of equipment. The hospital ship USNS Comfort (TAH-20) was activated twice, first to serve as an afloat processing center for Haitian migrants and later to provide medical support for U.S. forces. As U.S. forces were being withdrawn in early 1995 to be replaced by a U.N. security contingent, the Navy was maintaining an “on-call” contingency presence and com- mand-and-control capability—in Opera-
Lieutenant Kara S. Hultgreen lost her life in the crash of this F-14 in October 1994. The Tomcat was recovered in 4,000 feet of water in December.
tion Uphold Democracy—to help ensure Haiti’s transition from dictatorship.
Navy support to humanitarian operations continued almost without pause during 1994. At home, Navy SeaBees, linguists, and medical people provided assistance to Northridge, California, and nearby communities devastated by the January earthquake. Navy and Marine Corps people supported rescue, medical, and emergency assistance to northwestern communities hurt by wildfires and southeastern communities suffering disastrous floods. In April, the USS Peleliu (LHA-5) amphibious ready group and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit led the Operation Distant Runner noncombatant evacuation of U.S. and U.N. personnel from Rwanda to Burundi. The USS Tripoli amphibious ready group, embarking the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, provided food and medical care for Rwandan refugees in Operation Support Hope.
The drug wars also continued without interruption, with the Navy providing more than 21,000 flight hours and 2,800 ship days in counter-narcotics operations.
The Navy modified three ocean surveillance ships with upgraded communications equipment and radar to detect aircraft suspected of drug trafficking. Two of these ships were—and remain—continuously on station, which has released other active fleet and reserve force surface assets for other missions. Similarly, P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft have been modified with modular radar, electro-optical systems, and communication systems to provide high- endurance surveillance and tracking capabilities. These and other Navy, Army, Air Force, Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency operations were supported by the Navy relocatable over-the-horizon radar system in Virginia, which provides wide-area surveillance of the Caribbean basin. This support has proved so valuable that additional systems will be installed in Texas and Puerto Rico to expand coverage.
One consequence of these operations during 1994 was that the established guidelines for operational and personnel tempo were strained and in some cases, especially in the Atlantic-Mediterranean areas of responsibility, violated. Funding for steaming and flying hours was also overshot. On any given day during 1994, about half of the fleet was at sea, either forward deployed or supporting inter-dePloyment cycle commitments, and half of the Fleet Marine Force was operationally committed.
Such high tempos of operations must be expected as long as the President and his commanders-in-chief demand more from less. The post-Cold War 350-ship fleet cannot reasonably meet the same, if not greater, peacetime presence and contingency-response commitments as the Cold War 600-ship fleet. For example, as a consequence of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and fiscal year 1993-94 program planning, the Navy established a surface force plan of 110-116 modern ships, a significant reduction of the mid-1980s’ plan for 224 surface warships. During the
March-October 1994 period, however, the total warship operating tempo averaged 131 ships; in August, moreover, the Navy operated as if it had 149 surface warships, taking into account deployment and interdeployment cycle guidelines. By all accounts, the surface fleet was literally being “ridden hard and put away wet.” Should this be allowed to continue, the result will be inevitable: hollow ships, underfunded and worn out, and skilled people voting with their feet to stay on shore. As the 1995 edition of Force 2001 explained: “Projected naval force structure is inadequate for today’s level of operations, and contingency operations cannot be funded by greater reductions in that force structure.”10
The year saw several other notable firsts and lasts. A U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser, the USS Gettysburg (CG-64), and the frigate Halyburton (FFG-40), were the first Navy ships to visit South Africa in more than 25 years. In the event they learned that shallow-water, littoral antisubmarine operations are tough, indeed. Navy Theater Air Defense programs saw the new Block IV Standard Missile achieve two successful at-sea intercepts from the USS Lake Erie (CG-70) during the summer. An even more advanced version of this missile, the Block IV(A), will be the Navy’s future common anti-air/theater ballistic missile defense weapon. And the USS Saratoga (CV-60)—just one of 76 ships decommisioned in 1994— completed her final deployment in June and was decommissioned in August.
In June, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Battle Group conducted the first live-fire tests with the cooperative engagement capability system, demonstrating actual engagements using real-time exchange of fire control-quality data. The test was so successful that Defense Secretary Perry ordered the program’s schedule to be accelerated. And in August, the USS Anzio (CG-68), Cape St. George (CG-71), Kidd (DDG-993), and Wasp (LHD-1) used the system to track a tactical ballistic-missile target. The Anzio's Aegis weapon system tracked the Sergeant target missile and relayed her track data through a P-3C Orion aircraft to the Kidd and the Cape St. George and an Army Patriot missile battery on shore. These and similar tests have provided the baseline for further developments, including a demonstration of the lightweight exo-atmospheric projectile kinetic kill vehicle launched recently from the USS Richmond K. Turner (CG-20) intended to field a robust, if nascent, sea-based theater ballistic missile defense system by 1997.
There were tragedies, as well, in 1994. One of the Navy’s “revolutions-in-the- making” suffered a grievous set-back on 25 October. Lieutenant Kara S. Hult- green, who was among the first women carrier-qualified in the F-14 fighter, lost control of her F-14A after the aircraft’s engine failed during a landing approach to the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and was killed. Her radar intercept officer, Lieutenant Matt Klemish, survived. On 21 December a Navy salvage team recovered Hultgreen’s Tomcat in 4,000 feet of water off the coast of Mexico.
Infrastructure and Industrial Base
The Navy in 1994 continued its plan to reduce infrastructure but preserve key industrial and technological bases. As the 1994 edition of Force 2001 stated: “We are committed to reducing infrastructure in greater proportion than force structure, while maintaining readiness.”" The 27 bases and facilities approved for closure during the 1993 Commission of Base Realignment and Closure deliberations will be closed by 1999. In all, 94 Navy and five Marine Corps bases have been designated for closure and 37 Navy bases for realignment; 16 closures and realignments were completed through 1994. Further closures and realignments are expected to come as a result of the 1995 round, which was also expected (groundlessly) to be more painful than the 1989, 1991, and 1993 rounds combined. Funding to implement the previous rounds remains
A graphic illustration of the ongoing plan to close military bases to reduce infrastructure—a total of 94 Navy and 5 Marine Corps bases so designated— was the final fly-over of F/A-18 Hornets at Naval Air Station Cecil Field. Secretary of Defense William Perry briefed the latest iteration of the plan in February 1995.
inadequate, however, and it looks as though the expected savings, which were to be applied toward the fleet’s “recapitalization” for the future, will not be as great as anticipated.
The Navy in 1994 began to look hard at consolidation of major maintenance and supply facilities, ranges and test facilities, and schools. A 1992-94 review of Navy shore-based education, training, and training support documented the opportunity for substantial savings by consolidating school training, reducing staffs, and eliminating redundant courses.12
From the Navy’s perspective in 1994, the defense technology and industrial base remained one of the vital supporting elements of U.S. preparedness.
That base exhibited continuing trends of down-sizing—with some firms leaving the defense
market altogether—of diversification into non-defense markets—with other firms attempting to emphasize “dual-use” technologies and systems—and of consolidation. During 1994, Northrop acquired Grumman Aerospace, and Martin Marietta Corporation continued to build on its earlier acquisitions of LTV Missiles Division and General Electric Aerospace to ensure its position as primus inter pares by merging with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Lockheed-Martin will thus rival
General Dynamics as perhaps one of two single firms that span military-defense- aerospace research and development, acquisition, and support. And other firms—such as Hughes and Raytheon for surface-to-air missiles—looked to establish special ventures to ensure their niche capabilities.
The Navy’s program for preserving essential elements of the industrial base had four principal components in 1994. First, the Navy decided to ensure the capabil
ity to design and produce sophisticated weapons by procuring selected weapons —such as the Tomahawk cruise missile, the Rolling Airframe Missile, the Standard Missile, and the Advanced Medium-Range Air- to-Air Missile—at minimum sustaining rates from single producers. Second, the Navy will ensure the ability to produce complex surface warships by acquiring Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class Aegis destroyers from both Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding. Although the Navy had intended to fund three DDG-51 s per year during the fiscal year 1996 Future Years Defense Plan, the Department of Defense has modified that plan to include three ships each in four of the fiscal years and two ships each in the other two years. Similarly, the LPD-17 amphibious ship program is planned for Fiscal Year 1998 to ensure the continued health of the U.S. shipbuilding base, particularly as DDG-51 procurement has been reduced. Third, the Navy’s aircraft plan will ensure a viable, if minimal, aircraft industrial base by focusing on limited new acquisition but expanding service life extensions and upgrades to existing aircraft types. A special focus for naval aviation is the Air Force-Navy-Marine Corps Joint Advanced Strike Technology program that will provide the
foundation for future development of a family of next-generation strike and tactical aircraft.15
Finally, the Navy has continued to support the Bottom-Up Review’s decision to split, Solomon-like, nuclear-powered ship construction between Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (nu- clear-propelled aircraft carriers) and the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics (nuclear-powered attack submarines). Last year was the “year of CVN-76,” with a full-court press mounted to ensure the safe passage of the ninth nuclear-powered carrier through congressional shoals, and 1995 is expected to be the “year of the submarine.” The Navy last year decided to recommend the procurement of the third Sea- >vo//(SSN-21)-class attack submarine in fiscal year 1996 and to request the lead unit of the New Attack Submarine (NSSN) in fiscal year 1998. In many regards, the issue of the nuclear-powered submarine technology and industrial base in 1994 encapsulated all elements of the immediate problems challenging the U.S. defense industry.
Newport News Shipbuilding had apparently decided to pull out of the submarine business altogether once its final Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class attack submarine is delivered in 1996. With about 35% of its work in early 1994 related to submarines and another 55% to nuclear- Propelled aircraft carriers, the firm has chosen to expand its market niche to nonnuclear surface warships and the “Double Eagle” product tanker that it has developed for both U.S. and foreign buyers. Through mid-1994 Newport News had laid off more than 10,000 skilled workers and closed engineering offices Ihroughout the United States; another
5,0 people are expected to lose their jobs through 1996.
Electric Boat, which builds only nuclear-powered ballistic-missile and attack submarines, has no similar advantage of looking to commercial markets. There simply are none for nuclear submarines, and the firm is unlikely to be allowed to sell its wares to foreign navies. Even with the third Seawolf (SSN-23) and the New Attack Submarine, however, the company will see its total work force reduced by 70%, from more than 16,500 people in 1993 to about 5,500 in 1998.
This has led to some innovative, if dubious, proposals for shutting down the submarine industrial base for reconstitution at some future date. An independent Rand Corporation study undertaken for the Secretary of Defense and released in August 1994, The U.S. Submarine Production Base: An Analysis of Cost, Schedule, and Risk for Selected Force Structures, estimated that it would take about $300 million to shut down and mothball Electric Boat, about $50 million per year to preserve the facilities and a core cadre of people in all skill areas and trades pending a future decision to reconstitute the industrial capability, and about $3 billion to reconstitute the work force, if indeed the qualified people could be found. Meanwhile, a total vendor base of some 600 major equipment providers and some
3,0 other companies throughout the United States would also be in jeopardy. The report noted that it would take more than ten years to ramp up to even a low build-rate of two submarines per year if the yard were mothballed for about five years. From this perspective, then, building SSN-23 in 1996 and committing the nation to the NSSN in 1998 made good sense.
Observations
The question regarding ends and means—the reasons for the service’s regional posture and the resources for the Navy to carry out current operations— will continue to dog the Navy, at least for the next few years. Congress last year created an independent Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Services, with the objective of defining the future direction of the U.S. military services. Principal roles, missions, functions, tasks, and—perhaps most critical from the Washington, D.C., perspective—budgets hang in the balance.
Much more than any other service, however, the Navy and Marine Corps in 1994 underscored the daunting requirements placed on them in this era of sort- of-peace. They operated in practically every world region at a tempo that at times approached that of several “lesser regional contingencies” combined. They showed that the traditional core “values” of a naval service—strategic mobility, relative freedom from host-nation base structures and political constraints, selfsufficiency, and multimission flexibility—are in great demand, today and in the future. It will be, as Yogi Berra noted, “deja vu all over again.” 'Scott C. Truver, “The Navy in 1993,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1994, p. 114.
The “roles, missions, and functions” issues and the deliberations of the Congressional Commission on Roles and Missions will be discussed in “Tomorrow’s Fleet,” in the June 1995 Proceedings.
3 “Forward . . . From the Sea” (Department of the Navy, 1994), p. 1 (also December 1994 Proceedings, pp. 46-49).
Theresa Hitchens and Robert Holzer, “Air Force, Navy Dispute Role Amid DoD Study,” Defense News, 7-13 March 1994, p. 4.
5See, for example, David Gompert and Richard Ku- gler, “Free-Rider Redux,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 1995, pp. 7-12.
hA National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: July 1994), p. 7. 7“Boorda Implores Congress to Pass Supplemental as Soon as Possible,” Inside the Navy, 23 January 1995.
"Col. Lawrence E. Caspar, USA, “Flexibility, Reach, and Muscle,” Armed Forces Journal International, January 1995, pp. 40-41.
’“Haitian Military Rulers Agree to Leave; Clinton Calls Off Plans for U.S. Invasion,” New York Times, 19 September 1994, pp. Al, A8ff.
10Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, N8/80, March 1995), p. 17.
"Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, N8/80, February 1994), p. 50.
'-’The 9 January 1995 CinCs’ Conference reviewed the Navy’s new Tactical Training Strategy. For one facet of the new plan, see “Boorda Plans Shakeup of Destroyer Units,” Defense News, 23-29 January 1995.
'■David Fulgham, “Stealth, Armament Are Key JAST Decisions,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 23 January 1995, pp. 38-39.
Dr. Truver is Director of the Center for Security Strategies and Operations at TECHMATICS, Inc., Fairfax, Virginia. Ms. Maren Smith, of the Center’s Naval Programs staff, assisted in the research for this article.