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Halfway through the drawdown—here, the carrier Forrestal (CV-59) awaits her decommissioning order—the Navy is working to sustain fleet readiness, ensure future capabilities, and keep faith with its people.
On 9 November 1993, the Navy reached a historic benchmark: For the first time since 1950, the Navy had fewer than a half million people in uniform. It also was the day the Navy reached the halfway point of the congressionally mandated drawdown.
In fiscal year 1989, when analysts at the Bureau of Naval Personnel began drafting the Navy’s Manpower Strategy, the task ahead seemed daunting. The Navy had approximately 594,000 officers and sailors serving in units around the world; by fiscal year 1999, that force would need to be reduced by about 20,000 officers and 170,000 enlisted personnel. More than 200 ships and 1.500 aircraft also would leave service in the process.
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The challenge facing the Bureau of Naval Personnel was to make these human reductions in a humane way, without degrading fleet readiness. The drawdown strategy for personnel had to take into account that the Navy, despite fewer ships and aircraft, still would be called upon to perform its usual missions around the world, as expounded in its new maritime strategic vision, “. . .From the Sea.” It was assumed that the Navy’s traditional operating tempo of approximately 40% of units under way and more than 20% on deployment at any one time would not change appreciably. The personnel-reduction strategy also would have to ensure that the post-drawdown Navy was comprised of personnel with the right skills in the right quantity.
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Despite earlier fears about the Navy's inability to achieve such reductions without a major negative impact on the career force, the personnel drawdown plans are working, four years into the process.
The Strategy
The foundation of the Navy’s manpower strategy was to keep personnel reductions matched with force structure reductions. To avoid a crippling imbalance in required skills, personnel in overmanned areas were targeted for conversion to other specialties or for voluntary early release. Similarly, the strategy called for reduction of all paygrades at the same rate, to ensure that the shrinking paygrade pyramid retained its correct shape. Most important, Navy leadership committed to a course of action
that would keep faith with Navy people, the keel up which Navy combat readiness is built.
The Navy’s manpower strategy, as designed and el cuted today, is based on four key elements:
► Recruiting the best-qualified personnel.
► Achieving the necessary drawdown in personnel usi specially tailored programs, without resorting to in' untary separations of mid-career people prior to their tirement eligibility. This ensures maximum stability opportunity for career personnel, despite the drawdo
► Providing fair and competitive compensation, inch ing the use of incentive and bonus programs to retain " right number of sailors and officers with the skills at qualifications needed by the Navy.
► Enhancing the quality of life for Navy people and tbl^ ^ families, to compensate for some of the spending sh°,Iorc falls of the past.
To execute a strategy in keeping with these four el,aen ments, the Navy requested and then used judiciously ^ combination of congressionally provided programs af^rai Navy personnel-management initiatives. These opti°f^re provided the Navy with a flexible manpower plan $. ^ could adapt to a wide range of force structure and fun1 ing outcomes—a key element in avoiding a repeat of t' ^r°: hollow force of the 1970s.
The options employed by the manpower strategy dude a carefully managed accession policy that brin: in the right number of personnel with the skills nec<n sary to man an increasingly complex and technical Na'I controlling entry into the career force; reduction of the ° ^ reer force without involuntary separations (RIFs, reck1 tions in force) of mid-career, non-retirement-eligit1 retl personnel; strong support of all pay-and-benefit initiative- plus maintenance of targeted incentive and boi"! , programs; and proposed funding increases in quality 1 uc life areas such as housing, child care, and Family S° Pro
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Examining the Options
In the area of accessions, the Navy has reduced to tl* SU sustaining level required for the planned force at the tif ^ of the century. We are reducing officer accessions to all0' the Navy to sustain an officer corps of approximate' 54,500 in 1999. We have reduced enlisted accessions1' ^ a sustaining level of approximately 56,000 new men at* ___ women each year—the minimum number of sailors f quired to ensure fleet personnel readiness and prevent ^ grade petty officer shortfalls in the future. an
To ensure that critical, mid-career skill areas are fill0' properly, a centrally managed program called ENCOP' ‘ objectively controls the number, quality, and skill afe-
IV,
Proceedings / May
ltj (ii? °f first-term sailors who are allowed to enter the career shot f°rce. Sailors who perform well in overmanned areas are offered the option of converting to more critical or un- ur el dermanned ratings.
iUS)y The manpower strategy’s career-force reduction pro- ls afgram uses a variety of personnel tools to reduce end ptj0f strength and shape the force. These include: in tf ^ The Voluntary Separation Incentive (a modified annual ity) and Special Separation Benefit (a lump-sum payment) of tl Programs. These specially targeted bonuses provide incentives for both officer and enlisted personnel serving in „y jf overmanned areas to leave the Navy voluntarily, prior to retirement eligibility. lec£< ^ Selective Early Retirement (SER), which is used to Na'1 s^aPe the retirement-eligible career force, to keep end llc c) strength within congressionally mandated limits.
•edui ^ The Temporary Early Retirement Authority, or 15-year I •(,! retirement, which is offered selectively to personnel in itW overstaffed areas with 15 or more years of service, ion' ^ The high-year tenure program, which also is used to re- j. i duce end strength and manage enlisted communities. This , Program allows all personnel who make E-5 to serve at least 20 years on active duty and then affords them the opportunity to transfer to the Fleet Reserve or retire.
This combination of tools and incentives has been used
' to reduce the career force during the drawdown. The re-
(|) suits thus far have been advancement and promotion op- _ ti|(f portunities for all personnel, reasonable sea/shore rotation ^|0,i schedules, and the ability to avoid involuntary separations ate|, of non-retirement-eligible, career-force personnel.
The Drawdown in Perspective
s 'j Recruiting. During the next four years of the drawdown, 1111 the Navy still will hire more than a 250,000 new officers . • and sailors. Although the quality of new accessions re- ' < mains at historical highs, the recruiting market has be- come much more challenging for recruiters.
The recruiting challenge stems from a number of factors. Today, there are fewer 17-to-21-year-olds in the United States than at any time during the past 20 years. This small pool of available young people will continue until about 1996. The national economy also is improving, and competition from the private sector is increasing. Finally, there is a growing misperception, fueled by continued press reports of military cutbacks, that the military no longer offers a stable career and is no longer hiring.
To meet this challenge, the recruiting program is being carefully reviewed by Navy leadership. Various support programs, such as the Navy College Fund, accession bonuses, the Navy Recruiting Command’s advertising campaign, and recruiter manning are receiving new attention and emphasis. Navy recruiting, an essential element in the plan for maintaining overall personnel readiness, will continue to be a top priority.
Retention and Incentives. During the initial phase of the drawdown, steadily increasing retention rates for first-, second-, and third-term sailors made it difficult to achieve necessary reductions in the career force. Officer corps retention rates also were high.
Voluntary early-out incentive programs enabled reductions throughout the career force, thereby avoiding any RIFs of non-retirement-eligible career-force personnel. But there was a concern that the highest quality people might be leaving the service as the Navy downsized. Accordingly, studies were conducted within the Bureau of Naval Personnel and by the Center for Naval Analyses.
Their findings were encouraging: head-of-the-pack performers in the enlisted ranks applied for the incentive programs at about the same rate as all other enlisted personnel and fast-track officers and enlisted are remaining on active duty in higher percentages than other personnel. Today, the incentive programs are working to reduce the size of the career force while retaining personnel with the right talents to man the Navy of the future.
Promotion and Advancement. The Navy has not missed
65
Proceedings / May 1994
one promotion board or advancement cycle during the drawdown, a claim that cannot be made by any other organization. From fiscal year 1989, the beginning of the drawdown, through today, more than 470,000 sailors have been advanced and 70,400 officers promoted. In 1993, the year with the lowest projected promotion and advancement opportunities of the decade, more than 80,000 Navy people were promoted or advanced. Encouragingly, almost 73,000 promotions and 438,000 more advancements are projected for the remaining years of the drawdown.
Enlisted advancement opportunities already are beginning to rebound. For the officer corps, the Navy’s promotion rates are the equal of any service—and better than most—based on a combination of flow points and opportunities. Captain and commander promotion opportunities and timing remain at or near predrawdown levels, and separation incentives are now beginning to reduce numbers in large year groups to improve future promotion opportunities for junior officers.
Quality of Life. The drawdown imposed extremely tight funding constraints on the Navy. From the programmed appropriation in 1988 to the actual authorization across the Future Years Defense Plan, funding for the Military Personnel, Navy, account experienced a 28% reduction. Despite these budgetary pressures, additional funding has been provided for key quality-of- life areas such as housing, child care. Family Service Centers, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs and facilities.
The net result has been an average increase in funding for these key programs that directly benefit sailors and their families of more than $700 million per year over the Future Years Defense Plan. For example, the bachelor quarters and family housing accounts received total funding increases of 130% and 30%, respectively. The Morale, Welfare, and Recreation program also was authorized an additional $65 million in fiscal year 1994 and the out years.
Release of Officers. During the drawdown, reserve officers who do not rank at or near the top of their competitive categories have been released from active duty. Any officer who attrites from initial warfare training or who does not obtain designated warfare qualifications also has been separated. Furthermore, because vacancies in the regular Navy have become scarce, some reserve officers who in the past would have been selected for augmentation cannot be continued on active duty.
This is not a desirable steady-state policy, but it has been necessary during the drawdown to avoid RIFs of the career force. While analysis of augmentation trends shows
that top-performing reserve officers are being augme^ ‘ and retained, involuntary release of reserve officers ,ec!|u' be discontinued as soon as possible.
Selective Early Retirement. Because voluntary ret5ers ments have not been received in sufficient numbef^ss reach mandated end-strength levels, all services have uMan selective early retirement prdons dures to avoid RIFs of mid-cair‘Jus non-retirement-eligible person^1 ^
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all eligible senior personnel follow equitable procedures P[oc mirror those used by officer f e
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motion and enlisted advanced, boards.
Although it is a neces*n force-shaping tool, selective
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retirement is the least desirably all the drawdown programs. 1 Navy was the last service to !o^ selective early retirement and I used it the least of any service^ ^ a percentage of total force.
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units and billets, the Navy will1^ commission or disestablish • ra(,: ships, aircraft squadrons, and *c ^ marines, affecting almost 36,0 ^ officers and enlisted personnel. To accommodate this Id ^ number of personnel transfers while protecting persod ^ readiness and supporting the career goals of our peof t the duty preferences and professional qualifications of j • personnel on decommissioning units have been matef ^ against projected manpower requirements for the eid ^a year. This ensures a much wider range of options for tlw ^ leaving decommissioning units.
Expanding Opportunities
While the manpower strategy addressed force redD tions and the overall quality of life in the Navy, other p* sonnel policies also have been reviewed and modified d» ing the drawdown. Two major areas of emphasis h*' been increasing opportunities for women and enhanc>( equal opportunity for all Navy personnel.
Women On Board Combatants. With the repeal of combat exclusion law in the fiscal year 1994 National P fense Authorization Bill, the Navy moved forward W'1 its plan to assign women to combatant vessels. The cd of ship modifications and the evolving personnel invd tory necessitates an incremental, methodical, and clos^1 monitored approach. This plan is now being execute Eight ships will receive women during calendar year 19?
66
IV,
Proceedings / May 1
^mei111^ additional combatants will receive women during sub-
icers r^111 years-
The selection of the ships embarking women crew mem-
ry rer)ers 's based on ships’ schedules and the cost-effective- mker;iess of modifying berthing compartments for women, lave uWany ships will retain single-sex crews for practical reant pro*ons—such as when separate berthing is not feasible be- id-cafause of size and configuration. In addition, the number ersow women qualified for sea duty, in different rates and it BoJan^s’ is not yet sufficient to permit assignment of women “cordf0 a" combat ships.
nnel > ^ very detailed fleet introduction and orientation ures |Process—f°r lhe women going to combat ships and for icerj/he crews and families of the combatants receiving nceni'Vomen—'s a*ready under way at the fleet level. This is not a social program, and combat readiness is a driving ^cesjfonsideration. The Navy is determined to put the right jve ejPerson in the right billet, regardless of gender. Opening irabieComhatant ships to women also provides a more equitable ms iTotation between sea and shore duty for all sailors and en- ' ,sures career paths for women that are consistent with those
and 1°^ t*le'r ma*e counterParts-
rvjc£ Another consideration in making the decision to embark women on board combatants is the changed nature q tf.°f warfare at sea. As articulated in “. . . From the Sea,” jfNa'fhe sea services increasingly will be involved in littoral . ,actions. The nature of littoral warfare and the way naval aok‘^°rCeS are emPloyed 'n regi°nal warfare blurs the dis- t Tinction between what is a frontline area and what is not, tabli'ant^ Prev*ous designation of ships as combatants or iidiitf noncombatants has become irrelevant.
^ j gf Emphasizing Equal Opportunity. The roots of the Navy's don* eclua* opportunity program can be traced back to the first .j|[jequal opportunity manual in 1964. Over the years, addi- . ^ | tional programs and initiatives were added to ensure that s|| racism and prejudice had no place in the Navy.
' 0 This effort continues. In February 1994, Secretary of
. ^ the Navy John Dalton announced an extensive review of ls ^ the Navy and Marine Corps’ entire equal opportunity pro- rs j gram. The review—the most comprehensive in the his- P tory of the Navy—is under way and covers accession pol- |S - icy, career management (assignments and promotions), 13 • the performance evaluation system, retention, and the ^ Navy's Command Managed Equal Opportunity program. >r The intent of the review is to ensure that the Department
of the Navy’s policies and programs reflect an aggressive, effective, and efficient action plan that recognizes and supports the organization’s commitment to equal opportunity for every member of the service.
An executive policy group was formed to oversee the effort, and several actions already have been taken or directed. The Navy’s equal opportunity manual is being revised to clarify key points and provide concise program direction for commanding officers and equal opportunity specialists. Aggressive senior officer and enlisted personnel training has been instituted to increase leadership’s emphasis on and awareness of equal opportunity issues. This included the first-ever Navy-specific equal opportunity training for recently selected Navy flag officers by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute.
The Navy’s comprehensive review of equal opportunity programs continues, and additional initiatives will be included in the effort over time.
Making the Navy a Career
The Navy’s fiscal year 1995 budget requests 441,641 active-duty men and women. This includes 381,151 enlisted personnel (counting midshipmen and aviation cadets) and 60,490 officers. With the planned reductions in end strength during this fiscal year, about 75% of the drawdown will be complete. The remaining 25% will be completed between fiscal years 1996 and 1999. The Navy's Manpower Strategy is working to preserve near-term readiness, and its continuing success ensures that the Navy will build the quality and capabilities it will need in the future. Most important, throughout the process, the Navy has worked to keep faith with its people. This will continue throughout the remainder of the drawdown.
The Navy of the future, although smaller, will be as capable of meeting its missions as ever. The Navy’s recapitalization will ensure that the ships of tomorrow’s Navy will be the most technologically advanced of any in the world, and the aircraft will be superbly outfitted to ensure air supremacy over any hostile region. The Navy’s Manpower Strategy gives us confidence that the sailors who man, maintain, and operate that Navy will be of the same high caliber.
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A seaman had the task of shining the desktop of a pompous lieutenant who took pleasure in seeing that the job was done with meticulous care. As he sweated over the desktop, the seaman was chided by the officer: “Cheer up, son, let’s see you smile.”
The lieutenant even required a shine for his desk on the day the young seaman was to be transferred to another base. However, there was a surprise for that officer when he entered his office the next morning. He found the beloved desktop marred beyond repair, covered with dents, scars, and scratches. On top of the desk was a single envelope. It contained a Polaroid shot, taken the night before. The seaman, wearing Navy dress shoes, was dancing gleefully on top of the desk.
Hernt Albright
Proceedings / May 1994
ay
The Old Soft Shoe—Notl
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Admiral Zlatoper is the Chief of Naval Personnel.