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!1Dh nrlded against the threat of chemical weapons that ‘° in" (up to 130 ) desert air. It’s time to
train keeping this threat continually in mind.
to Learn ABCs of NBC
One of these days it’s going to happen We’re going to have to fight a chemica vv ■ When that happens, we need to be as teac \ as we can possibly be and we need to be as Well trained. _ . ..
- Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopl
I T
Conflict had broken out in the Middle East. Iraq
using fast-moving mechanized forces had^zed
Kuwait and was poised on the Sauc R
I cations were that the Iraqis might continue Aea^ck^ong the coast to seize the vast Saudi oil fields. During then consolidation of Kuwait, the Iraqis iac ie I located chemical weapons and mtssii launchers, to be in range of major Saud cities. Saudi Arabia had requested suppoit from the United States in an attempt to se- | cure its borders from invasion and prevent ■ Possible chemical attack. U.S. foices vvvr deployed rapidly to this area of vital mter- ( est, to establish a hasty defensive front along the Saudi border. This scenario was the first ) chapter in what was to become one o i most successful coalition wars m modern 1 history. Yet this success could easily have ! become our country's greatest defeat, given our inability to wage war m a nuclear, bic - logical, or chemical environment.
Before its attack on Kuwait, Iraq had become the largest producer of chemical I weapons in the Third World, producing tons of blister and nerve agents annually _Th s stockpile of weapons was a matter of considerable concern to the Coalition forces, because of Iraq's prior willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. During the war with Iran, Saddam Hussein not only used chemical weapons against the Iranians but also his own Kurdish population. To further enhance his position in the region, Saddam conducted aggressive research in the development and fielding of numerous delivery systems for his expanding chemical arsenal.1
Biological and nuclear weapons were also a concern during this period. By 1990. Iraq had become the most advanced and aggressive producer of biological weapons in the Arab world, with the concentrated development of two agents—botulinum toxin and anthrax bacteria.2 At the same time, Baghdad was pursuing nuclear-weapons technology; although it did not possess a weapon, it might have been
u.s. navy tsoorr auhnj
assaults. Each of these evolutions could include NBC training with little (if any) additional time and operation^ expense. The Army continually trains for combat in aJ NBC environment. It is not unusual for an Army unit to go to the field with soldiers wearing or carrying their NB^ protective suits and to spend considerable time using that equipment while carrying out their tactical missions- The Marine Corps continues to fail in its approach to NBC. For example, Twentynine Palms, California, is a ptf' mier location to enhance Marine training through the use of an NBC battle scenario. Units and staffs both could gain a true understanding of how an NBC-type war could fought and how it would impact on their abilities to accomplish assigned missions. The concept of NBC training is currently being lost in the deserts of California because some units fail to deploy with their gas masks—ostensibly because the masks are difficult to repair and maintain.
The Basic School trains the Marine Corps’ newly commissioned officers. It is here that current doctrine and future concepts and ideas are taught to what will be the leadership of the Corps into the next century. Field exercises are conducted for the most part without attention toward NBC play. Gas masks are carried but rarely used: chemical protective suits are never used. With this though' process it is not difficult to understand why NBC train- mg receives little attention in the Fleet Marine Forces.
If earlier exercises had involved realistic NBC training with an eye toward possible problems, critical areas of concern could have been properly addressed prior to combat in Southwest Asia. But several of these areas still need to be addressed, as do additional problems that have een uncovered. To neglect an opportunity to train in 3 realistic environment is to perform a disservice to Marines- rainers throughout the Corps must become multidimensional in their thinking; no longer can NBC be regarded as a once-a-year aggravation.
Current Equipment
able to construct a crude device within six months to a year, using the uranium in the French- and Soviet-supplied reactor fuel.3 U.S. Marine forces had never experienced these additional threats and did not possess in-depth knowledge about them within the ranks, at any level.
Current Training in the Marine Corps
The ability to fight and win in a nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) environment is a perishable skill AH Marines receive training in NBC fundamentals at different points in their careers. Units undergo yearly training- higher command determines the scope of the training Until recently, however, there has been no standard testing or progression of instruction to ensure mastery of NBC skills beyond the basic level that is required to ensure sur vival in a contaminated environment. The testing that is performed is rudimentary, a means of checking off a requirement that usually falls into the too-difficult-to do category.
Individual NBC training within a unit is, for the most part, unimaginative, and is treated as an afterthought to fill a block on the unit’s monthly report. Such training lacks uniformity and consistency within similar units. NBC play during unit exercises is given cursory treatment, either not integrated at all, or so disjointed that it makes little or no sense. This problem has not just surfaced; it has been the focus of countless after-action reports. There is the feeling that once we have acknowledged the problem it will go away. No apparent solution to this exists, short of the commander’s becoming personally involved. This usually fails to happen, owing to the press of tactical events in a fast-moving battle problem.
Headquarters elements above the battalion level rarely involve themselves in simulated NBC scenarios, beyond passing or receiving radio transmissions that pertain to the tactical problem. This insensitivity toward NBC training could degrade command and control if they themselves were to become exposed, leading to battlefield confusion.
If they neglect unit and individual training, headquarters elements also will fail to develop standard operating procedures; when exposed, units will sustain greater casualties and remain ineffective for longer periods of time.
Current evidence shows a serious problem exists with joint-level battlefield reporting involving NBC warfare. There is no uniform concise report that can be rapidly disseminated. Dissimilar reports make it difficult to consolidate information in a timely manner; they inundate overburdened communication systems. Failure to process time sensitive information can spell disaster.4 As the world experiences the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the Marine Corps expands its involvement in the joint arena, joint NBC warfare reporting demands much closer attention.
To correct these major training and reporting deficiencies would require little additional time. NBC training can be incorporated easily into any other type of training, with significant results. Numerous exercises occur throughout the year, involving everything from amphibious landings, combined-arms and command-post exercises, to helibome
I <
, T ,e current ‘"dividual protective suits (OG-84) used by tne Marine Corps are bulky and extremely heavy. Carrying them in the standard-issue, medium-size pack, with associated rubber boots and gloves, leaves little room in ne pack for other equipment. If carried on the outside of
h-ur ’ 1 Cre 'S 3 ^ear r‘PP‘n8 'he moisture barrier ■ A . 3 P‘otects the suit. On the other hand, when car- ‘)nd’" 3 large Pac* or rucksack, the OG-84, boots, and ® • . , 31?ng. ^lth the other equipment required to be ye infantryman—often pushed the weight of 3 pack to more than 100 pounds. This combat load limits tactical mobility.
Several after-action reports have stated that Marines in Southwest Asia (SWA) chose the OG-84 over the ntish Mark IV NBC suit for its durability. To the con- .r3ry’ '^e Mark IV suits were actually very popular. The Mark IV is extremely light and is vacuum-packed in two bags of tough clear plastic. Because of its small size, it fits into the outside pockets of the Marine pack, along with all of its associated rubber gear. The Mark IV suit significantly reduces the overall weight carried by in-
The OG-84 chemical protective overgarment and M17 gas mask (left) are being replaced by the Saratoga suit and the M40 gas mask, that will eventually be the premier NBC equipment for the Marine Corps. The Saratoga suit is lighter than the OG-84 and doesn’t degrade as easily when wet.
Pantrymen while providing more space in the pack for other equipment.
The after-action reports say that the OG-84 chemical was the garment of choice because of its durability
the desert. If, in fact, it was the “choice, it was beCause of the information provided to the Marines through 'heir chain of command and not because of personal experience. In two different infantry regiments operating in ^A, one continual topic was the availability of the Mark
suits and the problem of units having to wait a long tittle before supply requests could be filled. The suits be- Carne such an issue that our battalion made direct liaison "'ith a local British Army unit to acquire their excess suits Until ours could arrive.
With limited motor transport assets in SWA to support the battalions, the NBC of- ticer was often restricted to opiating two five-ton trucks and trailers. When these vehicles "'ore loaded with decontamination equipment and chemical decontaminate, there was 0nly limited additional space, itough to carry approximately 250 spare OG-84s and associated rubber gear. The battalion "'as to use these additional Suits as replacements for those c°ntaminated as a result of a chemical attack. This limited number of replacements would have allowed only one quarter °f the battalion to decontaminate themselves in a timely ntanner. The rest would have to wait for additional suits to he brought forward on the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) logistic trains.
When this same limited space "'as repacked with British Mark I Vs the battalion could carry more than 1,000 complete suits, enough for almost
'he entire unit. .
The Ml7 protective mask, which most Marines use, Was found to have a failure rate of more than 37% when the Marine Corps Test facility at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, tested masks that belonged to units piepaiing to deploy to SWA between 7 August and 31 December 1990. Damaged masks that were repaired and retested still had a failure rate of more than 36%. Masks that could not be repaired were replaced from current stocks. Failure rates on Ml7 masks that were randomly selected from depot storage were less than 1%.5 Units that deployed to the Gulf prior to the testing of M17 gas masks were not provided the results of the tests. No effort was made to replace or test those masks already deployed. If the Iraqis had used chemical or biological weapons, units with untested masks could have sustained up to 30-40% needless casualties.
U.S. Marine forces arriving in Saudi Arabia discovered that there was insufficient NBC equipment on board the maritime prepositioning ships (MPS), and that much of the equipment was unserviceable. OG-84s, which are charcoal lined and have a limited life span once they are removed from their packages, are vacuum-packed to prevent exposure to the elements. Seals were ruptured on some of this equipment, exposing it to petroleum-based vapors that rendered it useless for combat. In addition, numerous other chemical protective overgarments were found to have expired shelf-lives.6 This degradation of equipment could well have limited the offensive capabilities of U.S. forces, given the chemical weapon systems available to the enemy and his propensity to use them.
NBC officers that were in SWA are still confused as to the capabilities of the chemical protective overgarments provided. Because of a shortage of OG-84s and the failure of the U.S. industrial base to fill the gap on short notice, the Marine Corps was forced to procure and field both the British Mark IV suit and the U.S. Saratoga suits that were under development at the time. Each protective overgarment possesses its own technical data for use in an NBC environment. Additionally, some data were modified on specific suits as a result of further testing. When this information failed to reach units in the field, NBC officers had to rely on the earlier data, some of which were incorrect. To alleviate this problem, the Marine Corps needs to ensure that it has enough overgarments in war stocks both forward deployed and in the United States.
Another area of grave concern was the M258A1 Skin Decontamination Kit. These kits consist of small packages of towelettes soaked in chemicals used to remove blister agents. Many of these packages swelled from exposure to heat, which rendered them useless. This decontamination kit is the only piece of gear a Marine has to remove chemical agents from his body and equipment in the field. Though it is common knowledge in the NBC community that exposure to high temperatures could render these kits unserviceable, no precautions were taken to protect them from damaging heat.7
Medical-supplies blocks (AMALs) embarked on board MPS were deficient in many areas. The AMALs offloaded from MPS were not fully stocked and combat ready. In addition, medication needed for the treatment of NBC casualties was not even included in the AMALs. Attempts to secure the medicines through Marine Corps Medical Logistics Companies were frequently futile.8
The U.S. Naval Institute ami Kodak Present MjAf A the32ndAnnual Naval & Maritime w IW
The U.S. Naval Institute and Eastman Kodak printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper I
Cnmp.un are proud to cosponsor llu- 52nd and attached to the back of each print or A.III1I ■ Bi E
Annual Naval & Maritime Photo Contest. printed on the transparency mount (Do not !■ I I
I he contest is open to both amateur and write directly on the back of a nrim
printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print or printed on the transparency mount. (Do not write directly on the back of a print. No staples, please.)
7. Entries may not have been previously published, and winners may not be published prior to publication in Proceedings. Prior publication could result in the relinquishment of the prize awarded.
K. Entries must be postmarked by 51 December 1993.
Only photographs accompanied by self- addressed, stamped envelopes will be returned. Photographs not awarded prizes may possibly be purchased by the Naval Institute.
DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 1993
Write for details or mail entries to:
NAVAL & MARITIME PHOTO CONTEST t'.S. Naval Institute, I IS Maryland Ave. Annapolis, Ml) 21402-30.53 (410) 268-6110
nnTuRl ey 18 cu,Tently the Marine Officer Instructor at the NROTC „ Hampton Roads. Prior to his present assignment, he was a student tinna?, me C°rpS Command and Staff College at Quantico. Add>' onal assignments include operations officer for an infantry battalion at asmden“’ recruiting duty, XO of a Security Forces company, and t the U.S. Army infantry officers school at Fort Benning-
The ability to detect chemical agents is critical to a unit. A requirement to remain at a heightened level of NBC protection can rapidly degrade the capabilities of a force, especially when operating in temperature extremes. Currently, few detection devices are available. MPS in SWA provided limited M8 chemical alarms, which were of little value, being developed to detect one agent only. It fails to cover the full range of hazardous chemical agents. Also, an inordinate amount of time is required to maintain the system in operating order. This excessive maintenance prevents the M8 from monitoring continuously on the battlefield. Even when fully functional, the M8 produced a high false alarm rate if the filters were not cleaned every 30 minutes. In light of the fact that the M8 battery pack also is cumbersome and replacements are unavailable, this early warning system currently does not meet the needs of the Marine Corps.9
The Marine Corps is testing the Individual Chemical Agent Alarm (ICAD), and it should be ready for fielding in the near future. If enough units are procured to meet the realistic needs of the Marine Corps, then every field Marine will be assured of early warning in a chemical attack. In the case of a biological attack, there are still no alarm systems available to provide any form of early warning. 7
With the continued proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in Third World countries that are prepared to use them, theater commanders need to ensure deployed combat units are adequately protected. This requires that a commonsense approach be used to determine what
The U.S. Naval Institute and Eastman Kodak Company are proud to cosponsor the 52nd Annual Naval & Maritime Photo Contest.
The contest is open to both amateur and professional photographers. The winning photographs will be published in a 1994 issue of Proceedings, the monthly magazine of the Naval Institute. Cash prizes will be awarded as follows: 1st Prize $500
2nd Prize $350
3rd Prize $250
Honorable Mention (13) $ 100 each
ENTRY RULES:
1. Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject. (The photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest.)
2. Limit: 5 entries per person.
3- Entries must be either black-and-white prints, color prints, or color transparencies.
4. Minimum print size is 5" x 7".
5. Minimum transparency size is 33 mm.(No glass- mounted transparencies, please.)
6. Full captions and the photographer’s name, address, and social security number must be
should be loaded aboard MPS and how it should be main' tained for 100% combat readiness.
In addition, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps needs to ensure that Marines are trained efficiently and concurrently for NBC, and that the development and procurement of NBC defense equipment receives adequate budgetary support. Then, and only then, will any Marine expeditionary force be prepared adequately for comba1 m an NBC environment.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unpublished Report on the War in Southwest Asia, dated January 1992, p. 02
!Ibid., p. Q3. ’ .W
'Ibid., p. ] 8.
LeSS°nS Learned- Number 99999-00093(02183). Submitted W ^Unpublished Report, p.3.
by'FM^LANTCXl7/90°nS Leamed' NUmber 01732'61689(02484), Submitted
by FMFLan^'i^j7/90 °ns Leamed' Number °1732-24681 (02483), Submitted
hv Pl tTc6 C0IpS Lessons Leamed. Number: 91146-70468(02654), Submitted »U ^1A'2.SurSeon- Lt- mice, Date Unknown
bv Lessons Leamed. Number: 21049-52357(02210), Submitted
y mlkdac, Colonel Hendrickson, 11/01/90.
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