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Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm introduced naval aviation to large-scale joint forces air tasking. Navy and Marine Corps air wings, operating in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, were integrated into the Coalition effort by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)—the Air Tasking Order (ATO) was the vehicle.
While much has been written about the Navy’s ability—or inability—to operate within the JFACC structure, little has surfaced concerning the command- and-control organizations created on board the carriers to deal with the ATO. During the operation, each carrier dealt with the shortcomings of power-projection command-and-con- trol in its own way. Establishing specific strike cell requirements and doctrine without the constant distraction of Pe( forming administrative functions assoc*' ated with tasking and coordination.
The carriers that participated in Of eration Desert Storm were no1 adequately prepared to hand*e the command-and-control tasks associated with extensive jo*nt power-projection operations^ This statement goes far beyo^ any question of the Navy’s in' ability during the war to receiv'e the ATO electronically. [Fora(1 update on ATO electronic transmission, see “Commanding 3 Joint Air Campaign—From 3 Ship?” pages 34-35, this issue ! The problem is a fundame11'
tal one involving both the lack of identified personnel with appropriate training and designated spaces with essentia* equipment. During Operation Desert Storm, strike cell personnel took over the antisubmarine warfare modules (ASWMs) on both the USS Saratoga (CV-60) and the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). If there had been a credible air or submarine threat to carriers operating
would keep us from reinventing the wheel at the start of future littoral conflicts.
The strike cell must act as the battle group’s single node for coordination with the JFACC or other power-projection tasking authority. Its ultimate goal is to make the strike coordination and liaison process as transparent to the strike leaders as possible, allowing them to concentrate on mission planning and tactics
Naval aviation must be prepared to control power-projection forces. Team training and properly equipped spaces on board ship are keys to success— and strike cells must be prepared to deal with allied aircraft such as this Royal Air Force Tornado taking off from Gioia del Colie, Italy, in support of operation Deny Flight over Bosnia.
| Strike Cell Leader |
| ||
|
| Analyst | |
jStrike Ops
. Figure 1: Strike Cell Organization
in the Red Sea, it would have been considerably more difficult to find adequate tttanpower or space for the coordination that became the lifeblood of Navy strike °Perations.
The Red Sea Battle Force relied on the ATO, which spawned, by necessity, a I c°rnmand-and-control structure designed I specifically to disseminate requirements ' ar|d tasking through battle group and bat- | tie force strike warfare commanders. On the Saratoga it became apparent within two days of the commencement of hostilities that a new organization was
required.
The organization centered on a group watch standers who became the single Point of contact for power-projection coordination. Designated the strike cell, it Was developed on a model originated ttt the battle-force level on board the John I T. Kennedy, and was adapted to person- I nel and spaces available on the Saratoga where the group consolidated the work of several carrier and staff operations billots and improved coordination. As an added benefit, it freed the Saratoga’s strike operations officer to concentrate on aircraft scheduling for non-ATO requirements peculiar to Red Sea Battle Force operations.
The strike cell on the John F. Kennedy Was the communication link between the | Saratoga and JFACC representatives in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; all issues con- | cerning Saratoga strikes had to be relayed hy the John F. Kennedy. While cumbersome and frustrating at times, this system reinforced the chain of command in a multi-carrier environment and provided the Red Sea with a single voice on strike issues.
As U.S. Navy doctrine evolves, added emphasis will be placed on joint power- Projection operations in support of littoral warfare. While this environment is not new for deployed carriers, the com- mand-and-control doctrine to support such operations is just reaching fruition. The description that follows is of a generic strike cell model, based on the | organization that operated successfully on board the Saratoga during Operation Desert Storm.
As the battle group strike warfare commander (STWC), the carrier air wing commander (CAG) has responsibility for all battle group assets capable of I power-projection operations. Fie should establish the strike cell as early as possible in the pre-deployment workup to permit adequate time for training. Since the strike cell is a crisis response team that may have to be convened on short notice, it is important that organization members understand and are practiced in their duties and responsibilities.
Once deployed, not every situation will require the full implementation of the strike cell organization. The carrier’s strike operations office, with minimal augmentation, may be able to maintain its traditional role as air scheduling coordination center during small-scale events.
It may not be easy, however, to predict the duration and complexity of conventional strike operations prior to the commencement of hostilities. The strike cell framework outlined here, assumes a long campaign directed by a JFACC. While many conflicts may not meet this criteria, any plan for activating the strike cell can be modified once actual requirements are known. In addition, in the event the embarked flag officer is the senior battle group commander, the strike cell can act as the battle force strike warfare coordination center.
Since carriers have no spaces designated to accommodate a strike cell, spaces must be created out of what is available. Adequate communications is the foremost requirement for selection. Most spaces currently configured with suitable communications belong to the operations department, which performs other vital functions, so the strike cell s location will depend on the battle group commander’s assessment of priorities.
Inability to receive the ATO electronically on board ship hampered Desert Storm operations; since then, much of the problem has been eliminated. The new ATO equipment should be installed in the space identified for strike cell use or in the carrier’s strike operations office. This is especially important if the system is required to transmit as well as receive.
While the carrier air wing commander has overall responsibility for strike cell operations, watch standers and other personnel must come from a variety of sources that include the embarked flag staff, CAG staff, aircraft squadrons, and ship’s company. The CAG operations officer should assist in ensuring proper strike cell manning, both in terms of number of personnel and expertise. Squadrons should not be called upon unless air crews temporarily not on flight status are available. Whenever possible, tactical aircraft aviators familiar with power-projection operations should fill billets. Personnel must have appropriate security
clearances. If reserves are available, reserve augmentees with the appropriate background can fill billets.
Strike cells should be manned as follows:
V Strike cell leaders—two officers (cap- tain/commander), one per 12-hour watch. Responsible for liaison with upper-echelon of flag/air wing/carrier command structure. On call to answer big-picture questions. Likely sources: flag operations, flag air operations, carrier operations, CAG staff.
> Strike operations—two officers (lieutenant commander/lieutenant), liaison between strike cell and strike leaders. Do not stand shifts, but are assigned specific strike events. Carry through from assignment of strike leader until transmission of final mission reports. Strike leader’s point of contact within strike cell for all coordination and requests to higher authority. Likely sources: flag/CAG strike operations.
>• Watch commander—three officers (lieutenant commander/lieutenant), senior watch standers. Responsible for ensuring efficient flow of information in and out of the strike cell. Primary radio telephone talkers. Maintain pass-down log of radio transmissions and all other pertinent information. Responsible for all reporting deadlines. Stands eight-hour shift. Likely sources: flag/CAG assistant air operations, carrier assistant strike operations.
► Watch stander—three (chief or petty officers first class), assist watch commander. Maintain paperwork and files. Responsible for maintaining combat search-and-rescue information. Stand eight-hour shift. Likely source: carrier tactical action officers, operation specialists, intelligence specialists.
► Intelligence officers—two (lieutenants [j.g.]/ ensigns), assigned to specific strike events. Assist strike operations in monitoring strike planning process. Attends
. . Marine Corps officers and noncommissioned officers are logical members of carrier strike cells now that Marine Corps squadrons are regularly deploying with carrier air wings. Here, a VMFA-312 F/A-18C on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71).
save strike leaders time, but requires that strike cell watch standers be family with basic strike information.
Maintaining reporting continuity over a period of several days is difficult but extremely important. Status boards should be kept to display target assignments and ensure that reporting deadlines are met.
The mission report (MISREP! is a pre-formatted message containing detailed post-strike inft>r' mation: assets involved, bon'd damage assessment, and enemyre" action. Most of this comes fro® aircrew debriefs, and the assigned intelligence officer must monit°r post-strike debriefs, not only to ensure that he is familiar with strike results, but also to ensure that debriefers are interrogating aircrews to obtain the proper level of required detail.
Aircrew debrief forms should reflect MISREP requirements s° that the intelligence officers can transcribe them easily and accurately during MISREP preparation- organizations such as the Naval Strike Warfare Center (NSWC) at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, should develop the requirements and doctrines needed
strike briefs and monitors debriefs. Prepares post-mission report messages. Likely sources: squadron air intelligence officers.
► Analyst—one (lieutenant/general service equivalent), observes strike cell process. Collects and coordinates
post-conflict lessons learned and statistics. Likely source: flag staff analyst or equivalent.
► Liaison officer—one (lieutenant com- mander/lieutenant), in the event of operations involving special warfare units, naval gunfire support, close air support, or direct coordination with other services, the strike cell should be augmented as early as possible with liaison officers who possess the required expertise. The Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) com- mand-and-control officer(s) may be an important sub-set of the group, depending on whether tasking and coordination are done at the fleet or battle force level.
The strike cell requires 13 men, excluding liaison officers. This large number is based on watch commanders and watch standers performing other substantial duties within the carrier or air wing organization. Watch stander requirements can be adjusted, based on personnel availability and operational tempo.
The strike cell is designed to support strike leaders. It is the principal conduit between higher authority and strike planners. Most important, it is the single point of contact within the battle group for power-projection coordination. It does not replace the carrier intelligence
center. In fact, the strike cell and the intelligence center must remain as distinct in function as possible; designated strike operations and intelligence officers are the primary links.
Information flow management is the highest priority for strike cell watch
standers. An accurate log of radio-telephone transmissions (including eavesdrop information) and any other information pertinent to assigned targets must be scrupulously kept by the watch commander. Transmissions should be recorded as accurately as possible; verbatim is the goal. To ensure accountability, time-of- receipt or transmission and indications of face-to-face hand off to the appropriate strike leader or assigned strike operations officer should be included.
Individual target files should be kept on each assigned target. Files should include a copy of everything passing through the strike cell regarding a particular strike. The log and target files form the primary data base to reconstruct events. More important, accurate files save time if the target must be hit again; bottom line—save everything!
During operations in which tasking information is disseminated via ATO, the strike cell will be responsible for verifying target, aircraft, and call signs, as well as support from other sources—primarily tankers. The only way to do this is to compare the ATO to mission-request messages and log entries. Discrepancies must be relayed to the JFACC. Accomplishing this within the strike cell will
to establish carrier power-projection cells, and the concepts should be exercised during air wing deployments to Fallon, carrier workups, and fleet exercises. Specific staff and carrier officer billets should receive formal collateral designation to fill strike cell manning re' quirements. Training courses such as the Strike Leader Attack Training Syllabus at NSWC, Tactical Action Office^ School, and Tactical Training Groups staff training courses should all contain introductory lessons on JFACC operations and strike cell principles. Appr°' priate carrier spaces must be designated and fitted out for strike cell use during j exercises and contingency operations.
Once strike cell doctrine is formalized! its principles should be put into practice | at every opportunity, starting with air wing deployments to NAS Fallon. A strike cell should be established coincident with the air wing strike phase. This training should be carried through to the underway phases of workups, strike cells should be evaluated during the battle group phase of fleet exercises. In order to make this training meaningful, however, post-Fallon, embarked, power-projection training must contain realistic littoral campaign planning and execution with JFACC interface.
Although Operation Desert Storm was
by far the largest joint air-tasking experience for East Coast carriers, it was not the first. NATO exercises in the Atlantic and Mediterranean have for years used the JFACC concept for air order tasking, and ATOs and MISREPs are standard formats in all these exercises. The tactical emphasis for naval forces in those exercises, however, was usually on antisurface and antisubmarine warfare. Overland power projection was generally limited because of overflight and target restrictions.
As a result, tasking and reporting requirements were limited in scope and were handled by the carrier s strike operations or a single member of an embarked staff. Without formalized training or doctrine, the lessons of NATO joint operations were quickly forgotten, and Desert Storm’s coordination and reporting requirements caught embarked staffs completely unprepared. Joint operations in the littoral arena are here to stay, and we must employ, rather than forget, the lessons of the Red Sea strike cells.
Commander Spence is a student at the Naval War College. An F/A-18 pilot, he has served with VFA-81, the Naval Strike Warfare Center, ancI VA- 66 During Operation Desert Storm, he was Slnke Operations Officer on the staff of Cruiser-Destroyer Group Eight on board the USS Saratoga (CV-60).
PHMs: Shins Prematurely Put Away
Regrettably, the title may be a postscript to the original Boeing Company sales cliche, “A ship whose time has come.” Some time before the end of fiscal year 1993, all six of the Navy’s guided-missile patrol hydrofoils will be
Eg#
laid up, victims of the decrease in ships and personnel
The decision to decommission Guided- Missile Patrol Hydrofoil Squadron Two is correct given the probability of the budget tradeoffs required to keep them op-
erating. The decision, however, may turn out to be particularly regrettable given the Navy’s changing mission as stated in “ . . . From the Sea,” where littoral warfare has displaced the Maritime Strategy. One would think the hydrofoils particularly useful for the new mission, considering that they are ideally suited for high- risk, coastal patrol, and interdiction
High fuel consumption while foil- borne and dependence on a large, shore-based van complex (here, at their Key West, Florida, home port) have given PHMs a bum rap. They don’t have to operate on their foils all the time—and the vans can be moved.
missions where a ship’s range is less of an issue—and speed, firepower, and operating costs are primary.
Low operating costs? It is widely believed that the PHMs are filled with unique parts and are very expensive to maintain. Such notions are only partially true, and should be examined in comparison with the operating costs of other ships performing comparable missions.
The historical knock on these ships has
Hydrofoils don’t have to fly everywhere they go. Hull-borne operations are appropriate much of the time, particularly for surveillance missions where endurance counts more than speed. PHMRon-2 lets the mission dictate the mode of operation.
always been that they are short range and expensive to operate. In rebuttal, they can be considered very expensive “boats,” or very inexpensive “ships.” Correctly stated, however, and when making any comparison of cost and capability against other combatants, it should always be kept in mind they are now, and always have been commissioned ships, not boats. Pound for pound the PHMs pack more surface-warfare punch than any other surface combatant in existence.
Further, the six-ship squadron’s annual operating costs (including personnel, fuel, and maintenance) are comparable to those required to operate two Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided-missile frigates, according to Navy figures. In the context of flexible littoral presence, this is a very cost-effective use of assets and actually represents a force multiplier when comparing the cost of littoral presence using other less well suited combatants.
If the concept of littoral warfare is not the Navy’s new mission, however, then these ships are in fact too short-legged when compared to a frigate, because their design is not well suited to sustained open-ocean force projection. In such a comparison, it would be unwise to trade PHMs for two highly flexible blue water combatants.
During Operation Ernest Will in 1988 and Operations Desert Shield-Desert Storm in 1990-1991, however, Mk III Patrol Boats (PBs) and Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-missile frigates performed the interdiction and convoy-escort mission in these littoral, restricted waters. While the PBs performed as well as could be expected considering their major limitations, the FFGs represented a politically (if not also economically) high-value asset that need not have been risked. Had the hydrofoils been used instead of—or to supplement—the FFGs, a larger area could have been covered at less cost and risk. Inasmuch as the six PHMs can patrol a littoral area such as the Persian Gulf with much greater speed and essentially the same antisurface warfare weapons suite, they would seem to be a wise choice for retention and use in this kind of operation. Why should they be laid up in light of the Navy’s new mission, which seems ideal for them?
It is arguable that the Iraqi Exocet missile that damaged the USS Stark (FFG-31) and put her out of action for many months, also would have been able to detect and acquire a foil-borne PHM, but it is not germane. Also arguable, but also irrelevant, is that the 1908-vintage contact mine that damaged the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) might have sunk a foil- borne PHM.
What is relevant is that the Stark and the Samuel B. Roberts need not have been where they were—their missions could have been accomplished by a PHM, a ship that is much more cost-effective, and
better suited for the mission.
The question that should have been asked here is why did we use FFGs almost exclusively for a job that could have been done by a ship with a lower radar cross-section and significantly greater speed and maneuverability? The answer, of course, is that the PHMs weren’t there.
Assuming that “ . . . From the Sea” will guide the Navy in the near future, two of the position paper’s themes seem directly applicable to PHM capabilities.
The first theme is flexibility, and the PHM is one of the more flexible ship classes in the Navy today. Aside from the more obvious choke-point control, coastal patrol, and interdiction roles, their speed and relatively small radar cross-section make them prime candidates for special- warfare missions such as landing and providing limited gunfire support for Marine Corps reconnaissance or Navy SEAL units along shallow-water coastlines. Submarines are the only other alternative— and they cannot provide gunfire support. A secondary PHM mission would be to escort minesweepers operating in
littoral areas while remaining invulnerable themselves to magnetic mines.
The second theme is that the Navy must be able to deny access to regional adversaries and interdict their movement of supplies by sea. This reads very much like a counter-narcotics mission statement. The PHM is the one of the best weapons available to combat Caribbean drug runners. The Key West-based hydrofoils currently run barrier patrols and interdiction operations to deny certain Caribbean passages, operating in concert with maritime patrol aircraft and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Although law enforcement is obviously not the Navy’s primary mission, these small ships are able to conduct seven-day if' terdiction operations—unsupported—using their significant sustained-speed
advantage over all other surface ships in virtually all sea-states. PHMs accounted for 28% of the high-seas drug seizures between 1983 and mid-1992, earning them the nickname “El Terror Gris” (The Gray Terror), from drug smugglers- Are these alternate missions sufficient to justify retaining the operation of this squadron in light of a permanently diminished Navy budget? Probably not. Had PHMs been effectively employed in littoral warfare scenarios as originally intended, however, they might not be on the auction block today.
One other myth about the PHMs that should be dispelled is that they are unreliable and require a mother ship—either an FFG or an LST—for refueling and must drag along their large support-van complex. The need for access to a refueler is true, and the PHMs do employ a dedicated mobile logistics support group that consists of 97 mobile vans. All of the vans, however, can be broken down within ten days and transported by sealift or, they can be loaded on board an amphibious ship to accompany the PHMs as they transit. The van complex provides 100% of the squadron’s intermediate maintenance capability and is controlled by the squadron commander.
This unusual concept benefits the ships because the maintenance personnel live and work side by side with the ship’s crews, much like Navy and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons. The pride they take in their ships is the reason behind the
squadron’s recent high reliability rate of
97%.
Forward-deployed reliability was excellent as confirmed by the 100% availability over a 90-day deployment that ended in May 1987. Since then, modest expansion of support capabilities has improved the squadron’s ability to maintain itself independently. Given that the manning for the entire squadron, including the staff and the van complex, is on the °rder of the crew that mans an Aegis cruiser—and the operating costs equate to those of two FFGs—the squadron’s six 96-mm. gun/48-Harpoon-missile capability represents an inexpensive and versatile solution to antisurface warfare tdong the littorals of the world.
While it is impractical to increase the i6,000-gallon fuel capacity of the PHMs t° give them more range, it would be feasible to keep them off their foils whenever possible, and this in fact is PHM- ^on-2’s current method of operation. It results in much more on-station time during choke-point operations. Unfortunately, this change comes too late to counter the popular concept that the ships nrust fly everywhere they go—with resulting high fuel consumption.
The other indictment against PHMs has been that the small class of six ships generates inordinate one-of-a-kind spare parts costs. This is not entirely true, because many PHM parts are standard on ships throughout the Navy. Unfortunately, those parts that are unique to the class have been ordered on an as-required basis instead of being integrated into the supply system based on historical demand. Had such a system been implemented after a historical data base had been established, the replacement inventory cost for PHM-unique parts could have been reduced considerably.
Budget woes notwithstanding, the real cause for the demise of the PHMs may be attributed to improper employment when the opportunity was there. Other than their present law-enforcement mission, the ideal place to commit them would have been during Operation Ernest Will, escorting reflagged tankers in the Persian Gulf, and Operations Desert Shield-Desert Storm, where speed, maneuverability, and relative invulnerability to Third World weapons—coupled with their mobile van complex—would have made them independent. For whatever reason, they were never deployed, and the opportunity to demonstrate their
ability was lost. .
The PHMs are scheduled to be laid up. Instead, why not transfer them to the Coast Guard for employment in the counter-narcotics operations that they currently perform so well? The Coast Guard might like to have them, but it has its own budget concerns.
How we dispose of them is not really the issue. That they are being disposed of at all indicates that we are not truly committed to the precepts of • • • From the Sea.” If the new doctrine is in tact a new policy statement, and not just a rebuttal to the media perception of the Navy’s small role in Desert Shield-Desert Storm, we should determine whether the PHM is really a ship whose time has passed—or whether the hydrofoil s mission statement was inadvertently included in “ . . . From the Sea.”
Captain Watkins is a professional in contracts management for Rockwell International and is presently assigned to the staff of Commander, Naval Reserve Readiness Command, Region 19. A Proceedings contributor, he has commanded five surface units, most recently as SelRes Coordinator USS John A. Moore (FFG-19) and the USS Wadsworth (FFG-9).
The Coast Guard Can Fill Strategic Gaps
By Commander Gerald M. Davis, U.S. Coast Guard
Each service, by virtue of its historic missions and military heritage, has a special set of capabilities that set it apart. These are a product of the invisible guidelines created by the customs and traditions that have evolved over the years. Though very specific functions long associated with one service can be accomplished by others, the 200-plus years of tradition have provided each service with a set of deeply ingrained characteristics and mission efficiencies that cannot be easily duplicated.
Still, current shortfalls in capabilities presented by the challenge of war in the Third World include:
^ Military assistance ^ Minesweepers ^ Brown-water forces ► Special forces
>■ Search-and-rescue capabilities V Break-bulk sealift
The U.S. Coast Guard’s heritage may enable it to bridge the gaps outlined above without significantly affecting the Department of Defense’s scarce resources. To do that would require taking advantage of the historic guidelines that have shaped the Coast Guard. Some of the Coast Guard’s special traits are outlined here.
Warrior heritage: Overlooked by many is the Coast Guard’s role—under different names—in every war this nation has fought. The Revenue Cutter Service, with a few revenue cutters, protected shipping immediately after the Revolution, and during the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. The modern Coast Guard steamed on convoy duty during World War II, where it provided the first antisubmarine warfare vessels in the North Atlantic during the early days of the war, and was active throughout the Vietnam War, especially during Operation Market Time.
Flexible diplomatic response: Because of the Coast Guard’s humanitarian mission and constant presence in ports in the Western Hemisphere, it can and has been used to show the flag in areas of potential hostile activity, without bringing on visions of gunboat diplomacy that often accompany a fleet of gray ships on the horizon.
Proficiency in independent operations: In the future, it may be fiscally very difficult to send large battle groups out to sea. Because of the nature of the Coast Guard’s long-standing coastal patrol and law-enforcement missions, its cutters have often operated independently, often with only scant electronic links to any central command. Independent operations all over the world are the standard operating procedure for the Coast Guard, which has always been focused on regional conflict.
Surge capabilities: Because the Coast Guard must always be prepared to integrate into the U.S. Navy during time of national emergency, the service provides the Navy a surge capability, with fully trained personnel and ready ships. This is especially true in the low-technology end of the spectrum of potential conflicts.
Trained personnel: Because many traditional Coast Guard missions garner strength from the individual skills learned at the Navy’s surface warfare schools, all major cutters undergo refresher training every 12 to 18 months—more than twice as often as most Naval Reserve ships. Consequently, the Coast Guard is battle ready, and its personnel are capable of target motion analysis and over-the-horizon targeting using easily fitted Har-
Table 1: | Challer Heritage | ges versu Diplomatic | s Co Indep Ops | ast C Surg Cap | luard ( Trained Pers | lharac Coastal ASW | terist Costal Surv | cs____ Forces |
Flexibility |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rapid Response | X |
| X | X | X |
|
| 1,2,3,4, |
Vert escalation | X |
|
|
| X | X |
| 2,3 |
Brown Water Forces | X |
| X |
| X | X | X | 1 |
Search and Rescue | X |
| X |
| X |
| X | 1,2, 3,4,5, |
Presence |
| X | X |
|
|
|
| 23,4,5, |
Anti Narcotics | X | X | X |
| X | X |
| 1,2, 3,4,5, |
Nation Building | X |
| X |
|
|
|
| 4,5, |
Legend of Forces 1.110 Island class patrol boats with Mk 38 point defense weapons 2. 378' Hamilton-class high endurance cutters (standard weapons suite) including CIWS and Harpoon 3. 378* Hamilton-class high endurance cutters (standard) with CIWS 4. 270' Bear-class medium endurance cutters with Mk 92/Mk 75 5. 210' Reliance-class medium endurance cutters with Mk 38.
poons; electronic surveillance with the WLR-1H; covert intelligence gathering; and surface warfare.
Shallow-water ASW skills: Until quite recently, all the Coast Guard’s Hamilton (WHEC-715)- class cutters have been equipped for ASW. Equipment installed during their recent fleet repair and modernization (FRAM) overhaul includes four- track SQR-17 A(V)1 sono- buoy signal analyzers, provisions for the LAMPS-I, and a crude but effective shallow-water, high-fre-
The USCGC Mellon (WHEC-717)— shown after fleet rehabilitation and modernization—is a capable ship. She can operate LAMPS I helos, fire Harpoons, and defend herself.
quency, hull-mounted SQS-38 sonar dome.
Coastal surveillance: Harbor and coastal patrols are the heart of the Coast Guard’s historic mission. The U.S. Coast Guard, which operates 250 cutters, is the world’s largest coast guard and ranks fifth among the world’s navies. All the cutters have small-arms capabilities and the new Island-class cutters have recently been retrofitted to carry the 25-mm. Mk- 38 chain gun. They can be used for combat search-and-rescue.
Cost-effectiveness: The Coast Guard always has been small, although it expanded to almost one million personnel during World War II. The service’s support and command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure have been designed to permit the force to operate with a minimum number of personnel afloat and ashore. Maintaining a fleet of 250 cutters and 1,000 smaller boats with an average budget of only $1.5 billion marks the Coast Guard as a real bargain for taxpayers.
Stability: While the Navy is being forced to cope with severe budget cuts, the Coast Guard’s budget actually increased 6% in fiscal year 1993. This allows the Coast Guard to retain trained personnel and even to enhance current skills. Without having to build from scratch any aspect of warfare training, the Coast Guard provides the Navy a significant resource pool. During normal peacetime conditions, most Coast Guard cutters spend more than six months under way away from home port. On any given day, more than 100 Coast Guard cutters
are deployed and available for immediate operational tasking.
Exploiting some of the historical characteristics of the Coast Guard results in a suggested force composition (see Table 1). Though the forces listed may seem an obvious solution, significant obstacles must be overcome.
Despite the Coast Guard’s fiscal stability, there are constraints- Increased public awareness regarding ecological and service concerns for quality-0*' life issues are forcing the Commandant of the Coast Guard to search for resources, and peacetime read1" ness is always a tempting target. Congressional pressure for a Coast Guard peace dividend, though less onerous than that facing the other services, is nevertheless there In addition, special interest groups would remove the Coast Guard’s military readiness mandate in an effort to divert funds.
Although they are corn rades in arms, the relationship
between the Coast Guard and the U-S- Navy is often strained. At risk are mi8' sions the two services share, such as antisubmarine warfare and coastal patrol-" the Navy is building 13 Cyclon6 (PC-l)-class 170-foot coastal patrol boats. A conscious effort to maintain and cultivate the Coast Guard-Navy rein- tionship must be continued.
An alternative force: The U.S. Army s horizontal integration of reserves, which places a majority of support forces in the reserves, causes imbalances. Vertical organizations , such as the Marine Corps Reserve, require a complex and often underexercised infrastructure.
On the other hand, Navy planners who wish to call out the reserves can eliminate a lot of problems if they instead call out the Coast Guard—a full-time armed force. Full incorporation of Coast Guard forces in roles previously retained for reserve forces obviates these concerns: Coast Guard units, if properly funded, can be combat-ready and deployable on Day One without adding to general overhead costs associated with maintenance of a large vertically or horizontally structured reserve.
Combat surface forces for the 21st century will not all be gray. Today’s economic and political realities require that tomorrow’s fleet be a composite of traditional U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard combatant forces. The fleet described in this paper is light, responsive, capable of offering commanders-in-chief diverse force-projection options, and tailored to the geopolitical sensitivities of the Third World.
Presence will mean more than a carrier at anchor off the coast. Presence will mean a continuing, cooperative relationship between new economic and political partners. The red-striped white hulls
of the U.S. Coast Guard have always meant safety of life and property at sea. In the next century, that sense of safety will expand into the worlds of deterrence, forward presence, and collective security.
National budgetary realities require that the country obtain the most for its ntoney across the board. The Coast Guard, with very little fiscal investment, Can provide the Department of Defense | the assistance it requires to fill the strate- Sic gaps created by the new world order.
The Coast Guard’s budget is stable and should remain so. The ships and crews that make up this oldest continuous-duty sea service can provide a safe harbor for the skills and expertise we may one day need again. Failure to take advantage of this opportunity because of interservice rivalries would be a travesty.
The future should include the Coast Guard, a small service with a long heritage of service in war and peace. Its surge capability, complete with up-to-date material and personnel trained to use it, is unparalleled—in our own reserve forces or in any foreign navy.
Commander Davis is the Chief of Vessel Support and Repair at the U.S. Coast Guard Maintenance and Logistics Command Pacific, Alameda Cal.forma. He has served as executive officer on the USCGC Munro (WHEC-724) and the USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC-722), and engineering officer on the cutters Polar Sea (WAGB-11), Glacier (WAGB-4), and r„rv,c tWHEC-725).
Airships Are State-of-the-Art
Afresh assessment of a modern airship’s capabilities reveals characteristics that fit favorably into a military strategy based on deterrence, defense, forward presence, and crisis response. When Equipped with a multimission combat system, an airship can provide an effective platform for a wide range of over- the-horizon (OTH) operations within a future Navy-Marine Corps force structure.
Airship design has undergone an evolution, reflecting improvements in aerodynamics, envelope and structural materials, engine design, flight controls, and utodern avionics. Commercial designs such as the Goodyear Z-22, Skyship- 600, US LTA-138S, and airships such as the Westinghouse Airship Inc. Sentinel- '000, with a fly-by-light control system.
represent what is possible today.
These improvements have increased airship survivability by reducing their vulnerability to modem threats. Airship technology has evolved to the point where it is realistic to consider them for numerous applications in support of land, sea, and littoral operations.
Because airships can accommodate a wide variety of sensor avionics, including large-array antennas, they are well- suited for missions requiring detection and tracking of sea-skimming cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles. Airships can be equipped with direct, relay, and beyond-line-of-sight communications gear configured to function as a switchboard converter terminal for real-time cross-band/link operations. Antijam communications, controlled radiated power output, and directional antennas can decrease airship susceptibility and enable operations such as minesweeping and sonobuoy field monitoring in support of Navy-Marine Corps sea, land, and littoral (coastline) mission roles.
The services need elevated eyes and ears. On-station endurance, economy of operation, and payload capability make airships serious contenders for such missions. A properly sized modem-technology airship could remain on station at sea for 20-30 days, refueling and resupplying at two-to-three-day intervals, or operate from fixed or mobile land bases. It could function as part of U.S. sea or land forces or in conjunction with a coalition of multi-national force.
An Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)-sponsored program recently conducted a demonstration that linked shore terminals with a surface ship operating OTH using a Sentinel- 1000 airship as a communications relay platform. The airship has a 4,000-pound payload capability. (See Figure 1.)
The demonstration was conducted 2728 October 1992 with the airship at an altitude of 3,000 feet at varying distance between the ship and three shore locations. The USS Anzio (CG-68), at sea, linked with the USS Conolly (DD-979), pierside in Norfolk, Virginia; a base station at Elizabeth City, North Carolina; and a mobile radio van positioned south of the base station. Clear and secure voice communications and Link-11 data circuit configurations were conducted simulta-
The Sentinel-1000 airship that participated in the ultra-high- frequency (UHF) radio-relay demonstration between ships in port and at sea flies over its base near Weeksville, North Carolina.
neously using Navy-developed I four-channel equipment.
Also on board the airship was a Navy-developed Laptop Imaging Transmission Equipment (LITE) system that had been installed as a piggy-back sensor demonstration. Images were transmitted to the Conolly and the Elizabeth City base station. Additional demonstrations planned for later this year and in 1994 will include other sensor equipment.
The Navy is involved in other airship programs. On 5 June 1992, the Naval Research Laboratory used the US-LTA Corporation’s (Eugene, Oregon) 138S airship as a host platform for meteorological sensors to develop data for subsequent calibration of satellite- borne microwave scatterome- ters that measure wind direction and speed at sea by bouncing microwaves off the wind-disturbed sea surface.
The US-LTA 138S is a single-engine airship with a 3,000-pound payload. The airship made a series of flights off the Oregon coast, some lasting four hours, at altitudes as low as 35 feet. Additional experiments were conducted in August 1992 and more are planned.
Grumman Aerospace used a Skyship 600 airship operated by Airship Management Services to conduct remote-sensing-measurement experiments using breadboard instrumentation systems along with laboratory equipment. Central to the various Grumman sensor suites flown was a large Michelson Fourier Transform Spectrometer. The sensor heads were fastened to a stabilized mount and suspended from the gondola. The airship’s low vibration and smooth flight characteristics and loiter capability allowed for high-fidelity data collection.
As Proceedings author Chris Lyford pointed out in his October 1992 article, “Rigid Airships: U.N. Peacekeepers” (pages 110-111), airships may prove increasingly useful to far-flung U.N. operations. They also lend themselves to easing the defense conversion problem because of their potential use for customs and police work.
Humanitarian and disaster relief, arms- control verification, and peacekeeping operations are all activities that require multinational participation. Whether the U.N. develops its own organic force or the force remains a multinational coalition, global interaction will be part of 21st-century political and military reality. Surveillance and communications capabilities will be essential elements of these operations; as Lyford pointed out in his article, these capabilities plus the psychological benefit derived from the presence of a nonthreatening U.N. airship could in time become a symbol for peace just as today’s blimps are symbols for corporations.
The military’s detection-and-moni- toring role in the drug war requires elevated surveillance and reporting capabilities. Mobile, long-endurance airships with the proper sensors obviously have a role here. The airships could be supported at a number of U.S. or foreign sites. Extended at-sea operations are possible using the techniques already mentioned. The airship permits establishment of a mobile electro-optical surveillance fence where and when needed.
Presently it is very difficult to assess the effectiveness of detection-and-mon- itoring platforms without applying some degree of weighting factors to certain conditions. If the mere presence of an airship over a given area causes a smuggler to turn back or replan a route, this will never be known. If a smuggler’s surface vessel decides to loiter for a number of hours and then give up its intentions because of the airship’s staying power, this will not be recorded. Consider the case where a load is dumped for later pick-up but the airship’s staying power denies the opportunity for the turnover to be completed. These situations, as well as others, are difficult to inject into an overall effectiveness equation. Airships can detect and monitor— they also can deter.
Airships offer police departments significant potential Sensor information (derived from still and motion video, infrared and visual gyrostabi- lized binoculars with night vision) can be linked directly to central or local, fixed and mobile, command headquarter stations for monitoring and evaluation. The distant unit commander would have realtime, on-scene, command-and- control capability from a remote headquarters station. An expanded communications system could include a satellite radio system for imag6 and voice transmission to distant cities for immediate suspect or vehicle identification and verification.
An airship helped the Los Angeles "Police Department provide security for the 1981* Olympic Games. Airships provided surveillance for the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. South Korea. In the summer of 1988 the French government used an airship 10 monitor the French Bicentennial Celebration. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department currently uses surveillance airships for events of national interest as well as for work all over Japan. Airship8 do indeed offer an ideal platform for these operations.
Additionally, on-the-spot presence for long periods of time could provide valuable information during natural occurrences—earthquakes, hurricanes, or other environmental disasters. Damage assessment, after-shock occurrence and travel and weather advisories could be made available in order to keep authorities and the public informed. As an example, after Hurricane Andrew, a Goodyear blimp provided instructions to the populace using its lighted message board. The potential for other uses is obvious.
Depending on the load, altitude, and endurance characteristics, one airship may be better suited than the other but the fact remains that these platforms offer an ideal setting for experimentation and test. To associate airships with a state-of-the-Ark mind-set rather than state-of-the-art is to deny the evolutionary design and technology changes that have occurred. Airships are the right tool for many jobs.
Mr. DeSipio is the Technical Agent at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania, for ARPA’s airship program.
The Care and Feeding of Ship’s Pilots
By Captain John G . Denham, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The author (gesturing) discusses getting under way with the commanding officer of the USS Flint (AE-35) at Mare Island, California. The skipper appears to be comfortable with what he is hearing from his pilot.
Front-page maritime casualties cause the public to wonder: “Who is driving ‘he boat? What does this pilot guy do? ^ho are they, and why are they only on some ships? Why don’t they prevent accidents?”
Answering these questions is not easy. Like so many things in the maritime industry, traditions, legal jurisdiction, rules and regulations, bureaucracy, and human factors all contribute to the difficulty.
Admiralty law created admiralty lawyers—specialists in marine law. Their role as it relates to pilots is to defend or Prosecute them, and to explain to oth- ers—or confuse them—about a Pilot’s abilities, limitations, accomplishments, failures, good character, and accountability "'hen engaged on board. Over the years, the laws relating to pilotage have become a labyrinth °f precedent that can, in most oases, be argued for or against any defendant.
The U.S. Coast Guard recently undertook a comprehensive review of pilotage and issued a Report of the Pilotage Study Group on 15 September 1989. In some cases, my views may differ with some of the group’s conclusions.
First, pilots perform a necessary role in the safety and operation of ships by providing two essential services: local knowledge and special ability and familiarity with tug use in ship handling. Almost every sea port in the world has some form of Pilotage, i.e., a man-equipment system to assist vessels into and out of port. In most cases, pilot associations provide these services, for a fee, through their pilot members. Some ports employ pilots as members of their Work force, e.g., Los Angeles, California. The U.S. Navy has a contingent of federal employees and military personnel who are pilots. Most local pilots—harbor, bar, and river—are licensed by the states in which they pilot as well as by the U.S. Coast Guard, and this dual licensing has been the cause of jurisdictional conflicts for some time—the Exxon Valdez versus the State of Alaska and the Summit Venture versus the State of Florida are but two examples.
To guarantee in nearly all weather conditions a reliable pilot service, most states and some nations provide legal protection for a pilot group to function by granting an exclusive franchise and limiting the business to the one group—which means there is no competition. In most pilotage areas, locally appointed pilot commissions or boards are responsible for the quality of service. Some maintain that competition does not improve the quality of pilotage service, but this policy has its critics.
The cost of operating and maintaining a pilot service is significant: salaries, sup-
port personnel, administration, taxes, insurance, equipment and its upkeep, and the inevitable accident insurance all must be funded. In a typical major sea port, a minimum of 50 to 75 pilots must be available for service to cover operations. Humorists have determined that pilots propagate at a rate equal to a number that can maintain a better-than-average in
come. The number of local pilots available usually equates to the number that can derive a comfortable income without arduous manual labor, from the income produced from locally developed tariffs multiplied by the number of vessels calling and departing the port. There are no homeless or poverty-stricken pilots.
Qualifying as a pilot usually takes years of preparation; waiting for a slot adds more time. Those with no technical training start as apprentices, while those who are already licensed can start as trainees. Nepotism may play a role. Regardless of the path followed, nothing today fully prepares one for the first time a ship master says “Pilot, you have the conn.
Pilots do not steer, although it sometimes is necessary to take the wheel and straighten out a helmsman who cannot distinguish left from right. Pilots direct the movements of the vessel using verbal commands when they have the conn. When they do not have the conn, they often can be used as backseat drivers. They are not specifically accountable for the quality of the service they provide—in their own words, “We advise.” Except when actually directing the movements of the vessel and proved incompetent, inept, etc., they are seldom held responsible.
Most are eager to be recognized as good pilots and appreciate thanks for a job well done. In any accident investigation involving a pilot, counsel will quickly point out that the pilot does not replace the master, but is there to assist. According to one admiralty judgment, Cooley versus Board of Wardens for the Port of Philadelphia, a pilot sometimes is “acting master.” Other decisions have held the pilot almost solely responsible for the navigation. During Panama Canal transits, the pilot “shall have control of the navigation and movement of the vessel,” according to 35 CFR Part 105.6. Regardless, the master is the one person totally responsible.
A pilot’s participation as a member of a bridge team is sometimes questionable. The pilot’s contribution is essential be-
cause of the service provided—local knowledge—and good seamanship requires the use of all information from all available sources.
There is some humor in the business. Prior to undertaking employment as a river pilot I was informed of two essential requirements for piloting: Never take your eye off the rudder and don’t lose your sense of humor. After several years as a pilot, some additional research, and a number of interviews with senior pilots, I developed some guidelines. In matters of navigation: skillful because the U.S. Coast Guard license stipulates competency. It is up to the master, however, to determine whether this is true before he hands over the conn of his vessel. Unless one is familiar with the pilot, the only means of doing so is to talk with the pilot and discuss his or her plan and experience. Skill, unfortunately, can only be observed. Familiarity is not necessarily the key element; some well- known pilots nicknamed “Crash” or “Crunch” are not easy to accept.
The master’s primary concern should be whether the pilot is familiar with the
to do? The master has several options:
► Accept the pilot and hope for the best
► Reject the pilot and wait for the consequences
These lead to several possibilities- stay at reduced speed with the watch officer at the conn and let the pilot advise on the navigation until the master’s comfort zone is adjusted or satisfied; inform the pilot you do not consider him or her qualified to handle the ship in certain circumstances and ask for a more experienced pilot at the first available opportunity. Of course, you can always take the
► Follow the current—it usually leads to the sea.
► Do not worry about the tide—use more tugs.
► Keep plenty of distance between everything.
► Do not go faster than you can think; this could mean not getting under way.
► Check the draft—carefully. It pays.
In general:
► Do not point—you may be wrong.
► If confused, mumble and stand to leeward so you can’t be heard.
► In fog, de-tune the radar—this eliminates many problems.
Pilots coming on board are usually assumed to be experienced, qualified, and
vessel and the route. Questions therefore should be framed to elicit informative answers: “Have you piloted this ship before? When? Do you have experience in any sister-ships?” If the answers are negative (don’t expect direct answers), then it is appropriate to review all the pertinent ship data and maneuvering characteristics in accordance with company policy and good ship management. Time or circumstances may preclude a lengthy interchange between a pilot and the master, of course, but like so many other things in our business, the courts and those lovable admiralty lawyers would probably not find that pertinent.
Given these ambiguities, what is one
Pilots know tugs—and how to use them to help big ships like the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). Even with a pilot on board, though' the bridge team's performance is crucial; the pilot is there to assist the ship's company.
pilot on board and do the work yourself- The master should not commence any delicate maneuvers until he resolves any questions that leave him uncomfortable- A master may consider that a pilot with recent experience in SEALAND ships might easily be able to relate to the differences in horsepower and size with most of the ships in American President lines. The same master would probably have some concern, however, about a pilot’s familiarity with a containership if the pilot were predominantly experienced in handling tankers. In addition, in most ports tanker berths and container- ship berths are in different areas and thus routes and tugs normally used are frequently different. A knowledgeable master will also determine the last time the Pilot transited the route and question his familiarity with the assisting tugs.
Ascertaining what ships the pilot is familiar with and then discussing similarities and differences with your ship is a quick way to bring a pilot up to speed.
He should be given the ship’s data sheet regardless of his level of knowledge; it then is the pilot’s responsibility to review lire material provided. As the indoctrina- lion progresses, the bridge team should continue to function and provide information and assistance to whoever has the conn. If the pilot has the conn and indicates that he or she does not require assistance, the bridge team should continue 1° function and provide information 1° the master—although at this point the master should reconsider the pilot’s experience.
When passing the required information to either the pilot or the master (person directing the movements of the vessel), it should be done in a clear and audible voice. The legal requirements for communications between “the person directing the movements of the vessel,” and the sources of radio, radar, and navigation information still exists—this information is the ship’s responsibility; pilots provide current local knowledge that Would not otherwise be available.
Rejecting a pilot may ruin your entire day, and should not be done except for an obvious incapacity: inebriation, physical disability, disorientation, or displayed ineptitude. Although it is embarrassing and sometimes difficult to resolve immediately, the pilot organization will provide a replacement as soon as possible. If you must reject a pilot, consideration and normal courtesy should be extended to the maximum extent possible.
After a pilot boards and is accepted, he or she becomes an additional resource to the bridge team. The pilot is required by law to be familiar with the pilotage tools (radar, fathometers, compasses, etc.), and to possess expert knowledge in piloting and local conditions. Obviously, it is impossible for a pilot to know every ship and her equipment, and in some newer diesel ships with bridge-controlled engines, specific instrumentation is difficult to identify. It is appropriate to ask the pilot if any equipment needs an explanation. Some pilots desire that certain equipment be operated in specific modes; this should be done quickly, if possible, and the master and all the bridge team informed of the changes from standard operating procedures.
Ship handling has been described as an art, a science, and a skill. When the
pilot has the conn, the master is probably the best person competent to judge his ability, or lack thereof. Anyone considering becoming a master or pilot, however, should be mentally second-guessing the pilot’s every move.
As a bridge team member, a pilot should brief his planned route and pass on what local knowledge is appropriate. The ship’s team should verify the data as a matter of course. A pilot might plan a route that is incompatible with the vessel’s fresh- or brackish-water draft, present air draft, or cuts a safety margin too close; he may not understand the ship’s engine operations. When passing information to the pilot—speed, for example—it should be clarified: is it through the water, over the bottom, from Doppler log, by pit log, or by automatic radar plotting assistance. Revolutions per minute should be clearly identified: are they engine, shaft, or propeller? And, with variable-pitch propellers, the pilot should be informed of the way the ship reacts to zero-pitch and when backing. Good seamanship dictates that all other anomalies, such as gyro error, be reported to the pilot.
With the pilot at the conn, the master should place himself where he can observe the bridge team and the pilot. If the bridge team should falter, the master should immediately provide guidance. Masters frequently cause bridge-team failures when they engage in extended conversations with the pilot and unconsciously signal to the team that its product is no longer needed. Wrong! Many accidents occur with pilots on board.
A by-product of the bridge-team function is that no one person can place the vessel in danger without others becoming aware of it. Sometimes a pilot errs and the bridge team catches it before the pilot recognizes the error. What to do? If the error endangers the vessel, the pilot should be informed as soon as possible. This should be done by means of a clear, audible, and correctly phrased announcement: “Pilot! My last position shows us on the right-hand side of the channel heading for shoal water ahead. Recommend we come left to course 040. Do not wait for an answer, but notify the master and then verify your data. If the master is on the bridge he should initiate some action when you announce your findings. If he is not on the bridge, whoever is in charge must take charge and make a decision. The ship retains primary responsibility for the navigation; the pilot is there to assist. If per chance you are wrong, take the heat and be more careful in the future. Before the pilot departs or you leave the bridge, tell him you
made the mistake and will be more careful in the future.
If a master decides he must take over from the pilot, he should do it in a manner that clearly indicates he has relieved him, has the conn, and is responsible. It can be done effectively in several ways: “Pilot' I want you to come right to course 040 now,” or, “This is the Captain, I have the conn,” or,’’Pilot, I will take the conn now. Captain has the conn.
There is no problem in turning the conn back to the pilot when things are settled down, if you believe the pilot is capable of continuing. Remember, the pilot is there to assist the master and serve the ship. When the master is satisfied the pilot is ready, simply state: “Pilot has the conn.”
Communication while the pilot is on board is frequently confused. First, the pilot usually brings his own equipment and feels free to talk to whomever and whenever he wants. Second, pilots usually have their own communication agenda: what to say, who to talk to, etc. Regardless, Channel 13 is the bridge-to- bridge frequency and the sole purpose is to assist in the navigation. One way you may monitor the pilot’s communications is ask what other frequency he or she will use and put it on a speaker, or put it on a hand-held unit and monitor it.
Finally, do not call the pilot “Captain. The only ships that have more than one captain are aircraft carriers; they just seem to need more. All other ships have only one captain. In the Merchant Marine the master is the captain and the pilot is the pilot. It is easy to understand the confusion when the bridge team starts calling out “Captain, ...” to the pilot and the master answers. The pilot is the pilot; that is the job, title, and profession. It is a proper, respected, and proud title.
Where do pilots go when they reach the final berth? Some may go to purgatory. The great senior pilot declared that there are three classes of pilots: Great, good—and those who think they are great. These last shall be sentenced to spend eternity walking the bottom of the channel doing the devil’s work—pushing ships, holding anchors, fouling propellers, and creating unexpected excitement for those who are unprepared and lack local knowledge as they ply the route.
Captain Denham is a Senior Fellow and Program Director at the Center for Nautical Studies, Seattle, Washington. While on active duty he commanded the USS Estero (AKL-5), the USS Ozbourn (DD-846), and the USS Sacramento (AOE-1). He is a Licensed Master Mariner, Unlimited; and a Licensed First Class Pilot for waters of the San Francisco Bay region and Puget Sound; he served as a pilot for seven years.