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U.S. MARINE CORPS
Peacemaking is going to be a major military mission for the foreseeable future—here, Lieutenant General Robert Johnston turns over command of Somalia relief efforts to Turkish Army Lieutenant General Cevik Bir and the U.N. forces. Navy and Marine forces have a tremendous capability to conduct peacekeeping and peacemaking opera- dons that should be explored and expanded if the United States elects to play a more active role in such operations.
Peacekeeping is clearly an appropriate land-force mission. During the 26 peacekeeping operations that have been authorized by the United Nations between 1945 and mid-1992, the blue helmets and blue berets of international peacekeeping forces have become well known to television viewers. Today, they monitor uneasy calm from Cambodia, to Somalia, to the former Yugoslavia, to Cyprus. Peacemaking, however—a different mission from peacekeeping—is a mission more suited to maritime forces, particularly if it is done early in a coastal engagement or in a completely maritime context, such as the protection of shipping during the Iran- Iraq War (1980-1988).
On 17 June 1992" U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented an extensive report on peace-
Alter U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali—seen here at the Egyptian Battalion Headquarters in Sarajevo with Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, commander of the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia—presented his agenda for peacekeeping to the United Nations, President George Bush directed that peacekeeping be emphasized as a mission for the U.S. military.
> A cessation of fighting by all parties concerned The consent of all parties concerned to a peacekeeping
mission m their country
►A willingness by other nations to offer their personnel tor peacekeeping in the country in question
In Somalia, the first two conditions were not met; but more important, the use of military force was a clear upfront option, to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid so urgently required. This use of military force marked a major departure from previous U.N. peacekeeping operations. Until Somalia, forces being introduced had gone
keeping, titled “An Agenda for Peace,” to the United Nations. The four aims of this agenda are:
>• To identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results here conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking (active diplomacy) aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict
► To stand ready to assist in peacebuilding in its many contexts—rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures or nations torn by civil war and strife
► To address the deeper causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression
To achieve these aims, the Secretary-General identified tour categories of missions for U.N. forces:
>■ Preventive Diplomacy, action to prevent disputes between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter w en they occur (includes a new concept, preventive peacekeeping or preventive deployment)
► Peacemaking: action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as investigation, recommendation, and negotiation, as prescribed in the U.N. Charter (in the common lexicon, peacemaking is used to mean peace enforcement)
► Peacekeeping: the deployment of a U.N. presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving U.N. military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians—a technique that expands the possibilities for both preventing conflict and making peace through the insertion of neutral forces
► Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace and historical social structures, to avoid a relapse into conflict
Former President George Bush recognized the importance of the U.N. Secretary-
General’s agenda and, during his remarks to the United Nations on 21 September 1992, directed then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to emphasize peacekeeping as a mission tor the U.S. military in the training of combat, engineering, and logistic units. The United States needs’ to develop planning, crisis management, and intelligence capabilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, according to President Bush. For some time, U.S. armed forces have offered lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities in support of peacekeeping. Now they also will offer our allies and friends capabilities for
joint simulations and exercises to prepare for joint and multinational peacekeeping operations.
Secretary Cheney, in carrying out President Bush’s directive, strongly supported and insisted upon a peacekeeping role for U.S. forces. During the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Glen Eagles, Scotland, in October 1992, Secretary Cheney informed the alliance that the United States would emphasize training of combat, engineering, and logistic units for a full range of peacekeeping missions. He further recommended, among other things, that:
► NATO conduct joint training exercises in peacekeeping with NATO Cooperation Partners
► Nations identify potential peacekeeping capabilities to | NATO
>■ The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, establish a statt task force (to plan peacekeeping evolutions) that would formulate doctrine for peacekeeping, develop a training and educational program (including simulations), and make any other recommendations deemed appropriate to the NATO Secretary-General Such high-level policy activity from three of the world’s most influential leaders should give the armed forces of every Western country reason to ponder. Because President Bush’s policy direction was so specific and so firmly acted upon by Secretary of Defense Cheney, farsighted military planners quickly began to take these high- level statements into account.
President Bush, however, did more than just make policy: He took peacekeeping action when he directed U.S- forces to deliver humanitarian aid in Somalia. (President Bill Clinton and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin staunchly continued those efforts.) But the strict delivery of humanitarian aid (as in the former Yugoslavia) does not fit the definition of peacekeeping, as laid out by the U.N. Secretary-General- I Peacekeeping requires three fundamental prerequisites to the introduction of U.N- forces:
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great lengths to rid themselves of any significant military capability, to be seen as not having the capacity to intervene on behalf of any warring faction and therefore remaining completely neutral. Common usage within our military calls this kind of operation peacemaking. (Peace- toaking, as defined by the U.N. Secretary-General, involves more diplomatic activity to bring hostile parties to agreement.)
For the purposes of this article, peacemaking will be defined as “the judicious use of military force to gain toe attention of hostile parties.” Peacemaking, then, is a regulatory activity that uses force minimally to induce Wore positive behavior on the part of combatants or po- tontial combatants. Its purpose is not to take and hold territory, but to stabilize a social and political situation where chaos and violence are threatening or occurring. The fore- toost aim of stabilizing is to facilitate humanitarian aid and to provide the time required for diplomacy and other Peacekeeping efforts to succeed. Peacemaking efforts also Provide the normal administrative and security structures °f a country an opportunity to reconstitute themselves, so daily life can begin to return to normal.
Collective security has become a popular phrase since toe fall of the Berlin Wall and the initial withdrawal of torward-based Soviet troops. Seen as a way of doing more to the international security arena with less—specifically, tower troops and smaller force structures—it is an attractive concept for more and more nations as they draw down diplomatic national defense capabilities and as regional security structures get rave reviews from the media. Major Policy changes are now under way to set out the new interaction between U.S. forces and U.N. peacekeeping missions. Our combat and peacemaking forces have been Placed under a Turkish commander in Somalia, breaking a longstanding prohibition against subordinating U.S. forces to a non-U.S. commander. This is a highly signif- •cant step, likely to presage much more active involvement in all types of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions by the U.S. military.
There is an inescapable downside, however. A basic
Maritime forces are well suited for peacekeeping missions of long duration. They can prevent the insertion and supply of troops by sea and prevent maritime conflict along populated shorelines, such as the shelling of Dubrovnik from the coastal waters of the former Yugoslavia.
principle of large regional security structures is that as more and more member nations provide policy guidance from the top, the onscene commander has less and less flexibility in executing that guidance. In other words, the on-scene commander has maximum flexibility when reporting to a single national authority. As more nations join the “coalition of the willing,” their contributions to the cause bring with them more and more constraints, restrictions, and special requirements. This “rule of large organizations” has been blocking almost all progress in the former Yugoslavia because of too many nations’ special and historical concerns.
As previously defined, peacemaking could be accomplished in several ways. Land forces could project sufficient power to establish the conditions necessary for peace (cessation of fighting, as in Somalia). Air forces alone might be able to threaten the warring parties with airborne reconnaissance and air strikes—which, if instituted early in a developing conflict, might be decisive. But maritime forces clearly are best suited to execute a peacemaking mission of long duration.
Maritime peacemaking could prevent maritime conflict along populated shorelines, such as the shelling of Dubrovnik from the coastal waters of the former Yugoslavia, and could prevent the insertion and supply of troops by sea, as well as denying the belligerents the use of a port for repair and resupply of ships. These missions can include operations against terrorism, drug smuggling, and piracy; to facilitate maritime oil production; and to alleviate ecological disasters. They also can deflect attempts at mass immigration across narrow bodies of water, such as the Adriatic, the Strait of Bosphorus, the Florida Straits, the South China Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. Equally important for Navy and Marine forces are noncombatant evacuation operations, the most recent being in Liberia in 1992.
Navy and Marine forces also could function as peacemaking forces to stabilize the social infrastructure, operating up to 200 miles inland (through the use of mar- itime-embarked air capabilities: fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and remotely piloted vehicles). These naval forces would be most effective in an area of complex infrastructure (roads, tunnels, bridges, etc.), where control of the population could be exercised through con-
Admiral Smith, a 1955 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, is the U.S- representative to the NATO Military Committee. His previous NATO assignments include Commander, Submarine Squadron 14, in Holyloch, Scotland; and a tour in Naples, Italy, as Commander, Allied Submarines, Mediterranean. He reported to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, after completing his assignment as Director of Navy Program Planning in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
trol of access to that infrastructure.
The use of Navy and Marine forces for peacemaking has some obvious advantages. Probably the most important advantage is the ability to use the adjacent water space for ship deployment in preparation for the landing of troops or entry of aircraft without lengthy negotiations with the nation of interest or third parties. The maritime forces engaged in peacemaking can be dispatched quickly after a political decision or can be just over the horizon during the closing stages of a political agreement—to begin peacemaking operations immediately. Also important is the sustainability of maritime forces. Resupply and support of peacemaking personnel can be done largely from the sea, obviating the requirement to support additional or significant infrastructure and manpower ashore and the attendant difficulties of drawing down in the future.
A key advantage for maritime forces in peacemaking is that ships can serve as “cities of stability.” This includes berthing and messing facilities for peacemakers; a hospital; a helicopter capability, to dispatch troops to trouble spots within the objective area; command, control, and communications (C3), for conducting the entire operation; and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), for collecting essential intelligence. Search and rescue is critical, either when supporting air operations in coastal areas or when controlling migration of refugees by sea. Minesweeping is a critical mission that can prevent belligerents from blocking strategic waterways.
C3 is crucial to modern combined-arms operations. It also is important for the kind of discriminating use of minimal military force that is required for peacemaking. Locating the command headquarters as far forward—and therefore as close to the action—as possible would make it easier for the peacemaking forces to adapt as the situation unfolds, applying force minimally yet taking initiatives. As indicated, RPVs could be used to keep the command headquarters informed about unfolding events.
Rules of engagement (ROEs), whether in conflict or in peacemaking, have four fundamental functions:
► ROEs serve as a guideline to help keep the peace during a transition to war, i.e., as a guard against accidental escalation and a safety measure for personnel and ships.
► To control combat operations during wartime, ROEs serve a political purpose by ensuring that the military force follows the directing body (i.e., NATO or the United Nations).
► ROEs serve a military purpose by ensuring the safety of military personnel by minimizing escalation and increasing the effectiveness of the operation.
► ROEs serve a legal purpose by ensuring that international law is followed in the execution of a peacemaking mission.
There is a developing body of opinion that supports the concept that ROEs can increase their deterrent effect in any peacemaking operation if they are known to all parties in a conflict. Obviously, the mechanics of how those ROEs are escalated need to be kept from the belligerents; but the bottomline effect of well-publicized ROEs is an increased deterrent effect.
Ships of all varieties also can carry nonlethal weaponry
and technology that can be applied to achieve the peacemaking objective. The use of nonlethal technologies ha* been gaining support worldwide since their introduction in large numbers during the Gulf War. Information is now in the public domain that describes the ability of policing forces to interrupt the electrical power distribution to cities; to interrupt communications, particularly by satellite and microwave; to disable vehicles remotely; and to gather critical intelligence over reasonably large areas.
A significant advantage in the use of nonlethal technologies is the optimum employment of peacemakers in their enforcement role. Fewer troops would be required; and, in the early stages of such a deployment, perhaps none would need to be berthed in the country being policed. The demonstrated use of these advanced technologies may be an initial step toward convincing the local warring factions that such capabilities can readily and practically be applied to their disadvantage.
Because these technologies are inherently nonlethal, it would be easier to gain political consensus for their use than for the use of force, which could involve extensive injuries or loss of life. Increased deployment and rapid development of these nonlethal technologies are logical steps for improving maritime capabilities. They also are logical steps in filling the gap between disarmed peacekeepers and military forces capable of working their will through violence and the threat of violence. Because of this wide applicability, development of nonlethal technologies and capabilities to enhance maritime peacekeeping operations should remain a high priority.
Peacemaking, as well as peacekeeping, clearly is going to be a major military mission for the foreseeable future. This is particularly true for the U.S. Navy, which currently enjoys considerable supremacy in blue-water ocean capability. Basing the peacemaking force principally at sea helps to minimize the quagmire problem: Such forces would not have to depend on the cooperation of locals for protection or for executing a withdrawal if the prescribed mission changed too radically. At the same time, should a peacemaking operation require expansion, the use of maritime forces to commence the expanded peacemaking process and to enable the introduction of subsequent forces would be a logical progression.
Navy and Marine forces currently have a tremendous capability to conduct peacekeeping as well as peacemaking operations, if the events in Somalia are any benchmark. Existing capabilities can be greatly expanded through the application of advanced technology, saving manpower and lives in the process. The ability to put specialized maritime capabilities into a troubled area rapidly needs further study, extensive debate, reasoned decision, and judicious implementation.