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Early in May, Vice Admiral William J. Flanagan, Jr., Commander, Joint Task Force 140, wore camouflaged bat- Ue dress as he briefed the media about Ocean Venture 93. They were on board his flagship, the Mount Whitney (LCC-20), at sea north of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Atlantic Command and its Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and special-operations components were showcasing the results of another year of innovative thinking in a joint exercise.1
Jointness was everywhere. Admiral Flanagan wore the same battle dress as his deputy JTF commander. Major General Edison E. Scholes, U.S. Army. He also had his sleeves rolled up Army-Air Force style (the simpler Navy- Marine Corps way of rolling shows the inside fabric s lighter shades). He seemed to be signaling that, while Navy, he sincerely wanted to be and to be seen as a truly joint commander.2
Those at his briefing were witnessing the end of 50- year-old amphibious doctrine, which states that admirals put the forces ashore, where Army or Marine Corps generals later assume command. Strictly speaking, this was not an amphibious assault; it was a forcible-entry operation. At the JTF level there would be no commander amphibious task force (CATF), no commander landing force (CLF), and no phasing of command from afloat to ashore.3 In battle dress, Admiral Flanagan let it be known that he expected to go ashore to exercise command.
JTF 140’s forcible-entry tool kit included special operations; rapid achievement of air and maritime supremacy; simultaneous airborne and amphibious forcible-entry operations, with quick followup by air assault forces; selfdeployment of Army helicopters; carrier battle group operations; swift sealift (including maritime prepositioning) force deployment; minelaying and mine countermeasures; integrated intelligence and surveillance operations; evacuation of civilians from a threatening situation; reinforcement through airfield and port; combat search-and- rescue; psychological operations; and centrally directed all-service air operations from stateside bases and afloat.
Figure 1 shows how JTF 140 used these tools in har-
Figure 2 Ocean Venture ’93 JTF 140 Organization (Phase 1)
mony to accomplish the JTF mission: to restore the overthrown government of a small island democracy friendly to the United States. The terrain is Puerto Rico, redrawn to about half its real size, with the island of Vieques connected to the mainland, and the addition of a nearby island for use as a forward operating base. The U.S. naval base at Roosevelt
Davig-Mountaln AFB
Commander Air Force Forces
MG Record, USAF
Carrier Battle Group America
Roads became the island nation’s key airfield, port and capital city.
Phase I of the maneuver scheme began three hours before dawn on D-day, when a battalion from the Army’s 75 h Ranger Regiment parachuted in to seize the air- „7’ the battalion, reinforced with helicopters from an offshore base, quickly secured the nearby port. Simulta
Commanding A Joint Air Campaign—From A Ship?
Commander JTF 140
VAdm Flanagan* Deputy JTF Cdr MG Scholes, USA*
LTC Kappelman, USA*
Commander Joint PsyOps Task Force
Commander Navy Forces
RAdm Pilling, USN*
r
Amphibious Task Force
Marine Exped Unit opcon for amphlb assault
St. Croix, then Vieques
, . , cured, an ^L-7 fast-
for a hatiTf Unloadln8 helicopters and equipment
m h'°n r°m thC ,01st Airborne Division (Air Assault) whose troops were already arriving by air Mar-
it.me prepositioning force (MPF) ships also began un- oading equipment for a Marine expeditionary brigade (to
mfUAn £vmSl0futhe exercise’the tr°ops were not flown n). An XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post under
Ocean Venture 93 tested a concept that a joint force commander can compress into the limited space on board a ship all the staff he needs to conduct a limited- mission contingency operation.
The test was a success. But the hardest part was ensuring that all the functions in conducting an effective air campaign could be accomplished by fewer than a hundred people, rather than the hundreds normally assigned to a land-based Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and a Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). In Ocean Venture 93, those functions were successfully performed from the command-and-control and intelligence spaces of the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20), operating in waters around Puerto Rico.
Rear Admiral Arthur K. Ce- browski, Commander Carrier Group Six, served as JFACC. His deputy, Colonel Melvin L (Smokey) Greene.
Jr., was from the
Joint Force Air Component Commander
RAdm Cebrowski, USN*
’on USS Mt. Whitney
Twelfth Air Force. Together they managed the planning, targeting, air traffic control, and communication activities of the 78 JFACC personnel—principally from the Air Force and the Navy, but with significant Army and Marine Corps representation as well. Two fundamental measures of effectiveness dominated their work: development and on-time distribution of each day’s air tasking order
(ATO), and successful execution of those orders.
For the JFACC to do his job he needed a constant stream of information from the JIC. Captain Charles Mauro, from the Second Fleet Staff, served as the joint task force J-2—i.e., intelligence He had distilled the JIC’s billets down to a manageable (given shipboard space limitations) 66, approximately half of whom were watch- standers. The Army and Navy supplied most of the watchstanders,
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with significant contributions from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and national intelligence agencies. With connectivity to the Atlantic Fleet JIC in Norfolk assured through several intelligence-communications enhancements installed in Mount Whitney prior to the exercise, the J-2 could command both his own and others’ analytical assets in support of the JFACC and the joint task force as a whole.
The true measure of success for an afloat JFACC is his ability to prepare the battlefield and then protect the joint task forces as they execute their mission. Targeting is the process by which this measure is achieved, and the ATO is the vehicle for initiating and sustaining operations. For Ocean Venture 93, Atlantic Command headquarters had generated a fictitious master target list for the target country of St. Alexander.” Joint task force JIC and JFACC personnel
scrubbed the list, identifying what they
neously, an 82nd Airborne Division battalion parachuted in on the south coast to come to the aid of U.S. civilians gathered there; and a Marine expeditionary unit, reinforced with British, French, and Dutch Marines, launched an amphibious assault on Vieques against significant enemy forces.
As the port was secured, an SL-7 fast-
!*„ -r | . —- ***> ' |B V |
i#1 |
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| Sieved to be the highest priority targets, given their commander’s I guidance: to take out armed opposi- | '10n while leaving the civilian in- rastructure intact. To this list they added targets identified by the c°mponent commanders as being I Pessary for them to execute their missions. Approximately 70 targets emerged, and they constituted the | lfst draft joint target list.
I Once the joint target list existed, ®*e next stop in the targeting Pfocess was the guidance, appor- tlQnment and targeting (GAT) cell of the JFACC. Comprised of repreSentatives of each component commander, as well as joint task force staff representatives, the GAT pri- °ritized the targets on the list and Created the joint integrated priority j^rget list (JIPTL—pronounced ji- ■ ^T-el). This prioritization was es- I Pecially crucial, because in the ®arly days of any air campaign, the I ■’PACC is unlikely to have enough assets to strike every desired target, targets above the cut line were assigned as primary targets, those I °elow the cut line were assigned as ' secondary or divert targets.
With the GAT recommendations Completed, the next step in the tar- I Seting process was the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), chaired by the Deputy Joint Task Force Commander, Major General Edison E. Scholes, U.S. Army.
Here the component commanders themselves considered the implications of the target prioritizations and allocations of forces contained in the draft ATO. After it passed their review, the JIPTL and apportionment recommendation went up to the joint task force commander, Vice Admiral William J. Flanagan, Jr., for his approval. The JFACC then distributed the ATO to all participating air units a minimum of 12 hours in advance of its date of implementation.
In Desert Storm, ATO distribution was a problem. In Ocean Venture 93, there was no such problem. The computerized Contingency Theater Air Planning System (CTAPS) allowed electronic distribution of the ATO within minutes to all the diverse air units taking part in the exercise. CTAPS maintained continuous connectivity to stateside air bases and the carrier USS America (CV-66) equally well.
In Ocean Venture 93, the afloat JFACC controlled more than 100 sorties a day. Total combat sorties reached 621 for the entire exercise.
TIMES PHOTO (S. ELFERS)
From the cramped intelligence and command spaces of the Mount Whitney, the JFACC and his Gang of 78 transmitted the daily air tasking order to land- and sea-based aviation units in a matter of minutes.
Fighter/attack, reconnaissance, heavy bomber, special operations, and transport aviation all participated and were commanded through the JFACC. The shipboard Joint Force Air Component Commander and his supporting Joint Intelligence Center were tested as a concept, and emerged as a reality. The process worked, and the experience is now in hand for the real thing.
—Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr.
brigadier General John M. Keane parachuted in 30 minutes after the Rangers. Commanding the 82nd, 101st, and Ranger contingents under the designation of Commander, Army Forces (ComArFor), General Keane took charge of evacuating U.S. and other noncombatants from the capital city, using elements of the 82nd Airborne.
With the capital secure and the government restored, the 82nd Airborne, 75th Rangers, and XVIII Airborne i Corps tactical command post redeployed to the United States, and Phase II began. The 101st Airborne Division contingent air-assaulted south to join the 28th Marine Ex- I Peditionary Unit, and the two maneuver battalions attacked eastward to destroy the remaining enemy. Phase II cul- i minated in an all-service live-fire exercise in the Vieques training area. ;
In preparing the way for Phase I, on D-2 JTF 140 s land- and carrier-based air, directed by Rear Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, the Joint Force Air Component I Commander, began to take out the enemy’s radars, surface-to-air missiles, intelligence collectors, command-and- control facilities, and other key targets—while attempting to minimize civilian casualties and damage to the civil infrastructure.
Simultaneously, Army Special Forces units and Navy SEALs entered the objective area from the air and across the beach to conduct reconnaissance and mark targets for missiles and strikes. They were supported by specially equipped C-130 transports, gunships, and helicopters from the Air Force Special Operations Command, and by selfdeployed and airlifted specially equipped OH-6, AH-64, and CH-47 helicopters from the 160th Aviation Regiment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
Figure 2 shows the organization of JTF 140 for Phase I. Each of the three maneuver commanders—Army, Marine Corps, and special operations—was at the scene of operations. The commander of Air Force forces. Major General James F. Record, directed Air Force operations from Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona. Rear Admiral Leonard F. Picotte was at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, ready to fly in. Other key commanders were on board the flagship Mount Whitney. I heard of no problems with communications. The combination of ample equipment, multiple links, good training, and detailed planning seems to have done the trick. In previous exercises, communications equipment had been positioned ashore ahead of time; in Ocean Venture 93,
CinCLant would have none of this.
In Ocean Venture 92, Rear Admiral Robert J. Spane, Commander Naval Forces, had commanded his mostly notional fleet from a van-mounted command-and-com- munications facility alongside the Army JTF commander at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and then served under a Marine joint force commander at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
In Ocean Venture 93, Rear Admiral Donald L. Pilling commanded his fleet of ships—this time real, and including Coast Guard cutters—not from a flagship south of Puerto Rico with major portions of his fleet, but from spaces on Admiral Flanagan’s flagship far to the north. Coordinating with the JFACC and with liaison officers of all JTF 140 commands, Admiral Pilling directed the full range of naval warfare specialties, including air and cruise-missile strike warfare, amphibious assault, minelaying, mineclearing, naval gunfire, interception of shipping, and the delivery by the USS Groton (SSN-694) and the USS Woodrow Wilson (SSBN-624) of SEALs for reconnaissance and other operations ashore.
The Army used Ocean Venture 93 to demonstrate the strategic and tactical mobility of Army forces. The 82nd Airborne and XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post came in from Pope AFB, North Carolina—1,500 miles away—and the 75th Rangers came from Fort Stewart, Georgia; both had done the same in seven-hour flights for Operation Just Cause in Panama, in 1989. The 101st contingent self-deployed about half its helicopters in a series of hops from Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the others were shrink-wrapped and hoisted on board an SL-7 fast- sealift ship that departed Jacksonville, Florida, carrying the division’s remaining equipment. The helicopters and other equipment were unloaded and in the hands of troops within 24 hours.
Ocean Venture 93 was a valuable workout for some of the nation’s first-line contingency forces and their commanders. It also highlighted the U.S. Atlantic Command’s new experimentation and concept-development mission. As the joint and service doctrinal communities continue drafting new doctrine, Admiral Paul D. Miller, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic, and his component commanders, whom Admiral Miller calls his “board of directors,” are converting imaginative ideas into reality.
Some observations:
► Ocean Venture 93 confirmed that command of an allservice forcible entry force can be exercised from a flagship at sea, and that the JTF commander can be an admiral. (He also can be an Army or Marine Corps general.4) It also showed that a forcible-entry JTF commander can command two or three separate maneuver formations, just as Admiral Flanagan did in Phase I.
► A separate “land component commander”—with his own fully staffed command center, afloat or ashore, through which orders and reports would have to flow—is unnecessary. Admiral Flanagan needed no such subordinate headquarters; General Scholes, his Army deputy JTF commander, was available to him as needed for advice on land force decision making and fine-tuning orders.
► The shipboard JTF joint operations center on Ocean
Venture 93 left something to be desired in that it lacke suitable maps for tracking land operations; even the best of today’s computer-generated screen displays are inad£' quate for that purpose. One large-scale 1:50,000 map was used by the Joint Target Coordination Board meeting 'n General Scholes’ cabin, but it was not available full ti®e in the joint operations center. .
>■ Some serious simulation-supported experimentation U* joint task force command-and-control is required. A sug' gestion for CinCLant: lay out somewhere ashore the Mou>l1 Whitney's, spaces (do this because limiting the space avail' able promotes downsizing and streamlining procedures)' and designate a full-time surrogate JTF commander ot two-star rank. Give him an all-service staff of broad ex* pertise and joint orientation. Support him with current, or off-the-shelf, aids to decision and battle direction. Direct him to use the experience gained in Ocean Venture and other operations/exercises, such as Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, and Restore Hope. His mission, starting with a clean slate and an open mind: To produce a standard cofl" figuration and standardized procedures for the direction-' including JFACC—of a multidivision forcible-entry force- in time for his product, as approved by CinCLant, to be used in Ocean Venture 94. This can be either afloat of ashore—and by whatever commander/deputy commander combination CinCLant wants.
Finally, Ocean Venture 93, while very useful in many ways, was conducted on much too small a scale to shed light on the full range of forcible entry issues. Logistics- tor example, were exercised hardly at all, and there was no deep battle, nor serious air or maritime threat, nor a significant problem of air defense and airspace control-
The next Ocean Venture should be a multidivision, evefl two-corps size, simulation-supported, air-land-sea ex£f' cise along the line of the full-theater workouts that the Combined Forces Command in Korea has been conduct' ing annually in its Ulchi/Focus Lens series. Ocean Veit' ture should be modeled on the proved Army Battle Com' mand Training Program, which starts with a seminar (with senior commanders present) and progresses to the full' scale computer-supported warfighter exercise itself.
'The components of U.S. Atlantic Command are: Forces Command (Army), Fort McPherson, Georgia; the Atlantic Fleet and the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, at Norfolk, Virginia; Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, Virginia; and Specif Operations Command Atlantic, also at Norfolk, supported by the U.S. Special Op” erations Command at MacDill AFB, Florida.
3My illusion was shattered upon learning that Vice Admiral Flanagan was simply complying with NAVPERS 15665H; only the Marines roll their sleeves inside out- See Section 9, Employing the Fleet in Littoral Operations,” in Handbook f°r Joint Commanders, John H. Cushman (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), for a discussion of forcible entry.
This is true notwithstanding the remark by General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Com' mandant of the Marine Corps, in an address at the U.S. Naval Institute Annual Meeting, May 1993, that operations at sea should be commanded by an admiral, on land by an Army general, air mostly by an Air Force general, but that “littoral operations should be commanded by a Marine.”
General Cushman has commanded the 101st Airborne Division and the combined field army that defends South Korea along the Demilitarized Zone. He was Commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College. General Cushman examined Ocean Venture 92 in his September 1992 Proceedings article, “Ocean Ventured, Something Gained.”