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tions: What is the required numerical strength of the Navy?4
Under severe financial constraints and without a comprehensive policy toward defense issues, large numbers of naval ships are being laid up or scrapped, while new ship construction programs are uncertain. With respect to surface warships, although the Russian Navy is seeking the
“I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there >s a key. That key is Russian national interest.”1 Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s words are as relevant today as they were more than 50 years ago. Allhough Russian president Boris Yeltsin recently withstood another challenge to his authority, there is still confusion and a lack of top-level direction in the development of the Russian armed forces.
In this situation, Admiral F.N. Gromov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Federation Navy, has called “the enhancement of prestige of the naval service and problems of ship repair’ as the Primary problems facing the Navy.- Admiral Gromov’s comment on pres- lige includes concerns about housing there is no housing available for 22,500 officers, warrant officers, and men on extended military service (contract volunteers)—and other personnel issues.
With respect to ship repair, Gromov is attempting to develop a long-range ship maintenance and construction program. He told an interviewer;
Considering all the changes which have taken place and Russia’s economic potential, there has been a detailed elaboration of a new shipbuilding program, which has been submitted to the government for examination. Here it should be borne in mind that the cycle of a ship’s building—from planning to launching—is quite long. The existence of a substantiated and balanced shipbuilding program will make it possible to ensure annual financing at all stages. The previous, Soviet shipbuilding programs ceased to exist in 1990. In 1992, financing of ship programs was provided only for those yards and facilities that Were on Russian territory, although talks are continuing on the completion ot ships at Ukranian yards. No surface combatants or submarines were laid down in Russian or Ukrainian shipyards in 1992, the first time that has occurred since the
Russian revolutions and civil war of 1917-1920. Rear Admiral Leonid Bely- shev, acting Chief of Shipbuilding and Armament of the Navy until November 1992, has explained:
Commissioning of new ships today is accomplished with extreme difficulty. Military shipbuilding programs have been suspended. This is caused, on the one hand, by the lack of financing and, on the other, by the lack of an answer to one of the main ques-
development of a major carrier force, there are no plans in the near future to begin the construction of large warships.5
A major consideration would be where to construct carrier-size ships, with the Black Sea shipyard (No. 444) in Ukraine—the Nikolayev south yard—having built all previous Soviet aviation ships. Soviet officials have told the author that the massive Severodvinsk submarine yard (No. 402) will be modified to build aircraft carriers.6 Ironically, that yard was es-
tablished in the early 1930s to build and maintain Soviet battleships, but Sverdlov- class light cruisers were the largest ships built there. There have also been unconfirmed reports that the Baltic shipyard (No. 189) in St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) will be modified to construct carriers. The largest warships built to date in that yard have been the four Kirov-class
Table 1: Russian Attack Submarines, | ||
| Year 2000 |
|
Type | Operational | Potential Force |
1993 | 2000 | |
SSGN Oscar | 9 | 15 |
I SSGN Yankee Notch 3 | few | |
SSN new design | - | 1+ |
SSN Akula | 7 | 19 |
SSN Sierra | 3 | few |
SSN Victor III | 26 | 26 |
SSN Victor II |
|
|
Even using foreign as well as domestic breakers, scores of abandoned ships dot the Russian coastline. Here, an abandoned submarine rests in Vladivostok.
battle cruisers. At some 28,000 tons they are the largest surface combatants built by any nation since World War II, and the world’s largest nuclear surface ships except aircraft carriers.
Until the carrier issue is resolved, the Russian Navy will give preference to the construction of relatively small surface warships, up to 4,000 tons, for operations primarily in coastal and maritime defense zones. Construction of 8,100-ton, antisubmarine destroyers of the Udaloy class has halted with 12 ships. A few additional antiship missile destroyers of the Sovremennyy class (7,850 tons) are being completed, probably for a total of 16 ships.
The principal ships expected to be built in the near future are frigates of the new Neustrashimyy class, completed since 1990, and a variant of the older Krivak class, which was first completed in 1970. However, at least a second gun-missile corvette of the Dergach class has been completed, the world’s first surface effects ship with a full combat suite. Construction of that advanced ship of some 760 tons may be continuing.
There are currently some 20 warships in various stages of construction in Russian and Ukrainian shipyards. The largest is the full-deck carrier Varyag, which is some 70% complete. Ownership of the unfinished ships in Ukrainian yards is still at issue.
The submarine situation is also far from clear. Admiral Gromov has stated that, in accord with the START II agreement, the Russian Navy will have 24 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) by the year 2000. The composition of that force is not clear, as Russian officials had previously told the author that the Delta III, Delta IV, and Typhoon classes would be retained through 2000—a total of 27 submarines. These submarines will carry more than half of the strategic missiles now planned for the Russian arsenal. The first unit of a new class of SSBNs is expected to be completed in 2000.
Attack submarine construction is continuing in Russia with five launchings expected in 1993: one Oscar guided missile submarine (SSGN), two nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), and two Kilo diesel- electric submarines, one of which is for foreign transfer. At a building rate of four units per year—three “nucs” and one diesel boat—the Soviet attack submarine force in the year 2000 could consist of about 100 units. (See Table 1.) The diesel and even nuclear numbers could be much larger, especially if the Admiralty-Su- domekh yard (No. 194) in St. Petersburg continues in operation. A new nuclear attack submarine design should be introduced by 2000, as well as improvements in designs now being built.
In November 1992, President Yeltsin announced that submarine construction would end at the Komsomol’sk shipyard in the Far East in the mid-1990s. The yard currently builds the Akula nuclear- propelled attack submarine (SSN) and Kilo diesel-electric attack boat. The Kras- noye Sormovo yard (No. 112) at Nizhny Novgorod (formerly Gor’kiy) already is phasing out submarine construction; that yard built titanium-hull Sierra SSNs as well as the Kilo. There are also reports that the Admi- ralty-Sudomekh complex will be phased out of submarine work.
This leaves only the Severodvinsk yard in the Arctic to build submarines. Today Severodvinsk builds the only nuclear submarines, having produced most of the Delta SSBN and Akula SSN classes and all of the Typhoon SSBN and Oscar SSGN classes.
But much of the naval- industrial base already is being taken apart, in part for conversion to nonmilitary industry. Russians, however, are finding that conversion is slow, difficult, and very expensive. To again quote Admiral Belyshev,
. . . just the shipyards building submarines, in order to switch to civilian production, must tear down the existing industrial equipment for making cylindrical hulls and installing systems and mechanisms in them and in their place create new equipment for planar structures. This will take not only years, but also huge amounts of money. However, conversion is particularly hard on enterprises that make naval weapons.7 Admiral Belyshev cites Russian and Western estimates of an 8% to 10% conversion of military per year as the maximum amount that can be undertaken without noticeable detriment to an enterprise’s economic indicators, i.e., that can ensure the supply of components, train personnel, and adjust technical services. At the same time he contends that the maximum reduction of financing for an in-
dustry such as shipbuilding is about 15%
Per year. The reductions in the military shipbuilding in Russia in 1992 exceeded these “permissible limits” several fold.
Also at issue is the Russian Navy’s ability to maintain existing ships. The shipyard and related industry conversion efforts coupled with the loss of yards to Ukraine and the now-independent Baltic states is delaying repairs for operational ships. In 1992, the Russian Navy was forced to shift about 60 ships from repair to inactive status and turn over another ten ships for scrapping that Were not previously scheduled for disposal. The repair situation in the Pacific Fleet is especially critical, and Yeltsin s v'sit to South Korea in November 1992 hiay have opened discussions on using Korean yards to support the Russian fleet.
The naval ship and shipyard issues are only part of the problems confronting the \ Russian Navy. Admiral Belyshev has reVealed, there are:
. . . attempts (still continuing in Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltic and Azerbaijan) to privatize naval materiel those same ships, weapons, equipment, property, and training institutions and centers; disruption of call-ups to active military duty and refusal to fulfill obligations to support the Navy’s large strategic formations with provisions, fuel and other necessary supplies; absence of a contribution to the budget for defense on the part of all independent states of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] (except for Russia, which declared itself the successor to the USSR) 8
Meanwhile, large numbers of Russian warships are being laid up and scrapped. Indeed, even using foreign as Well as domestic breakers, scores of abandoned ships dot the Russian coastlines, to addition to two V/STOL carriers that are no longer operational, the Russians are discarding the Moskva-class helicopter cruisers; the cruisers of the Kresta U, Kresta I, and Kynda classes; the Kashins and older destroyers; the older frigates, antisubmarine and missile craft, and numerous mine and patrol craft.
The Delta II and older SSBN classes, as well as older attack and cruise missile submarines also are being scrapped. The Russian surface fleet may have fewer oceangoing ships than the U.S. Navy by toe late 1990s, but the Russian submarine force can be expected to be at least twice the size of the U.S. undersea force.
Other Developments________________________
Personnel. Personnel callups of the
Russian armed forces has dropped precipitously and few naval ships or units are up to full strength. In two submarine formations of the Northern Fleet and two of the Pacific Fleet an experiment is being conducted with all-volunteer/contract crews, mostly officers and warrant (,mich- man) personnel. It is planned to transition to an all-volunteer Navy, with at least submarines to be manned entirely by officers and warrants. The latter correspond to senior petty officers in Western fleets.
In a recent military survey of the potential for volunteer service among 1,200 conscripts and men subject to military service who expressed a desire to serve on a “contract” basis, Airborne Troops accounted for 30%, followed by the Air Force at 23%, with the Navy in third place at 18%. This indicates that the Navy could encounter major recruiting problems in an all-volunteer force.
Black Sea Fleet. Details of the agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the future of the Black Sea Fleet have been revealed. A joint command element has been established to develop autonomous command and control structures for Russian and Ukraine naval forces in the Black Sea, divide the existing naval forces, and prepare personnel and forces for “achieving the highest level of combat readiness and executing missions at sea, independently and jointly. • • •
Ukrainian Navy. The recently established Ukrainian Navy has accepted the Slavutich, which had been under construction as the intelligence-collection ship Pridneprovye for the Russian Navy.
Under current schedules, the formation of the Ukrainian Navy will not be completed until the end of 1995, with discussions ongoing of how to divided the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
/inston S. Churchill, radio broadcast, 1 October
>39
'ladimir Aleksandrov, "Melancholy People Unstable for Navy,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 March 1993, noted in Capt. 1st Rank B. Tyurin, “Ships Are randoning Formation,” Morskoy Shorn,k. No. 7, (02
ee "The Soviet Navy: Carrier Conundrum Contin- :s,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. November
•92, pp- 119-121. ,
ee “The Soviet Navy: The World’s Largest Sub- arine Yard,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Ocher 1991, pp. 121-123.
iAdm. Leonid Belyshev, "Will Russia Remain a ^ Mnrxkov ShoFttik, No. 7,
■Capt 1st Rank B. Tyurin, “Shipbuilding and Repair: Weight of Problems on Budget Scales,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 8-9, 1992, p. 6.
■'“Carrier Conundrum Continues,” op. cit.
'“Capt. 1st Rank Nikolay Kostrov, “The Black Sea Fleet in the Sights of Glasnost,” Narodna Armiya, 1 September 1992. Kostrov is the first deputy commander of the Ukrainian Navy.
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