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United States build SSNs? It could buy two to three conventional submarines for the price of a single SSN but they would not have the high speed and unlimited endurance of a nuclear-powered submarine. This combination gives military planners a highly mobile and flexible platform that can operate independently in a hostile environment and survive to complete its mission. No other naval vessel has these qualities. Perhaps the best demonstration of these qualities came during the 1982 Falklands
Conflict. . .
When it became apparent that Argentina was going to
take the Falkland Islands by force, the Royal Navy responded by sending HMS Spartan, a Swiftsure-class SSN, to take station off Port Stanley. The Spartan arrived on station after a 12-day transit, covering approximately 7,100 nautical miles at an average speed of 23 knots.2 By comparison, F1MS Onyx, an Oberon-class diesel electric sub’ marine, took a little more
than one month to arrive in the Falklands after she departed the United Kingdom.1 By mid-April the Spartan was joined by her sister ship, the Splendid, and the Valiant-class SSN, the Conqueror. For the next few weeks these submarines operated effectively in a high air- threat environment that proved deadly to several Royal Navy surface ships. .
, . h the use 0f linear programming analysis, the author This example carries
ical raw materials for a Through the; u m nuciear-powered submarine force level an important message:
healthy and thriving determines t ^ meet jts nati0nal security requirements, cut SSNs are a useful mili-
economy. It is essential, ,‘,r l"e . . t an(j still keep open the submarine portion of tary t00i jf a country has
therefore, that the U.S. df*"se °
Navy has the capability s ,p to ensure that the sea
By LT Christopher P.
Carlson, USNR_________ _____
The dissolution of the Soviet Union eliminated the single, clear threat that the United States used as the basis for force planning assumptions. Instead, it now faces a number of lesser, more ambiguous threats. At the same time, cutbacks in U.S. defense spending are required because of increasing budget deficits and ca s for more resources for domestic programs.
One likely place to start reducing defense expenditures is to reduce or cut weapon systems that were designed to meet the Soviet threat. One such system is the nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN). However, in order to reduce the SSN force responsibly, we need to look at the issues that currently drive force requirements: meeting the greatest threat, executing ihe National Military Strategy, and maintaining a viable industrial base to build SSNs.
Why Does the United States Need SSNs?
The United States, as an island nation, is dependent on overseas trade and sources of crit ical raw materials for a
ensure uiai uiv owe ,. . th
lines of communication remain open. Ina j 10 ’ .
United States has many interests, some vita , in is an parts of the world. To protect these interests, U.S naval assets are often forward deployed. Submarines p ay an
essential role in fulfilling these missions.
If submarines possess one enduring quality, i is stealth. A considerable amount of internal space in to ay s submarines is dedicated to reducing machinery noise to a very low level. This translates into passive sonar detection ranges on the order of a few nautica mi es, making the submarine a proverbial needle in the haystac . Furthermore, despite significant investment into nonacoustic sensors by the United States and the former o viet Union, the world’s oceans have not become transParent and are unlikely to become so in the foreseeable future.1
If all submarines possess stealth, then why should the
global interests. Diesel electric submarines are good for coastal defense but not blue-water sea control. Even with new air-independent propulsion systems, a conventional submarine cannot maintain high speed for more than a few hours. Given our global interests, it would appear that the United States does need SSNs. But how many SSNs—and which class—does the United States need to protect these interests?
SSN Force Level Needed to Meet the Greatest Threat
The single greatest threat to the security of the United States are the nuclear-armed republics of the former Soviet Union, with Russia possessing the vast majority of the nuclear weapons. Essentially, Russia is still the only political entity that has the ability to destroy the United States totally. Threat is the combination of intent and capability. One cannot argue that Russia has shown con-
Table 1: Soviet Submarine Shipyards
Shipyard | Submarine Classes |
Admiralty (Shipyard No. 194) | Victor III SSN |
Nizhny Novgorod (Shipyard No.l 12) | Sierra I/II SSN, Kilo SS |
Sudomekh (Shipyard No. 196) | Kilo SS |
Komsomol'sk (Shipyard No. 199) | Akula SSN, Kilo SS |
Severodvinsk (Shipyard No.402) | Akula SSN, Oscar I/II SSGN, Delta IV SSBN, Typhoon SSBN |
Submarine Class
Relative to Los Angeles (FLl)
Table 2: Submarine Capability Comparison
Submarine Class
U.S. SSNs |
| Export Submarines |
Los Angeles (FL 1) | 1.00 | Type 209 |
Los Angeles (FL 2) | 1.10 | IK 800 |
Imp. Los Angeles | 1.48 | IK 800 w/AIP* |
Seawolf | 4.07 |
|
Centurion | 3.18 |
|
Russian SSNs |
| Russian SSBNs |
Victor 111 | 0.76 | Delta IV |
Sierra I/II | 0.94 | Typhoon |
Akula | 1.00 | 2000 SSBN |
2000 SSN | 1.45 | 2010 SSBN |
2010SSN | 1.88 |
|
Russian SSGNs |
| Russian SSs |
Oscar I/II | 1.12 | Kilo |
2000 SSGN | 1.58 | 2000 SS |
2010 SSGN | 1.86 | 2010 SS w/AIP |
0.62
0.78
0.80
0.79
0.87
1.35
1.64
0.53
0.78
1.02
‘Hypothetical modification to show the effects of air independent propulsion (AIP) systems on overall capability.
siderably less malicious intent against the United States than did the former Soviet Union. But it does continue to improve on the latter’s formidable military capabilities, albeit at a significantly lower rate. Military capabilities take years to acquire; intent can change overnight. The breakup of the Soviet Union was not even considered a realistic option a few years ago, and it is equally difficult to predict the intentions of Russia 10 to 20 years from now. Therefore, it is prudent to keep the Russian military capabilities in mind when reviewing U.S. defense policy.
As of 1991, Russia had an estimated 268 submarines, including 60 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), in its navy.4 From 1980 though 1990, the Soviet Union produced an average of nine submarines from five shipyards annually (see Table l).5 However, in 1991 the production rate dropped to six and reports indicate that production rates could further decrease by 50% or more in 1992 and beyond.6
Admiral Vladimir Chernavin recently stated that the Russian Navy hopes to be able to produce two general-purpose (non-SSBN) nuclear-powered submarines each year.7 He conceded, however, that the production rate would more likely be one to one-and-a-half submarines per year.8 In addition, the Russian Navy has terminated SSBN production for the remainder of the decade.9 Admiral Chernavin also indicated that two diesel submarines would be produced each year, one for the Russian Navy and the other for export.1" These and other public statements by Russian officials indicate that only Severodvinsk will continue to produce submarines." The other shipyards have all been designated for conversion to some form of civilian production.
Concurrent with lower production rates, the retirement and scrapping of older submarines continue. From early 1990 to late 1991, the Soviet Navy removed approximately 82 submarines from service.12 The Russian Navy is likely to continue this scrapping program as it tries to cut costs associated with maintaining older submarines. With the reduced production rate and continuous scrapping the Russian submarine force will be significantly smaller by the year 2000.
What SSN force does the United States need to meet the threat posed by a future Russian submarine force? To answer this question each submarine force has to be characterized both in quantity and quality (class capability rating). Assuming that Russia will build submarines at one of the rates Admiral Chernavin specified, and given the estimated capabilities of future submarine classes, then one can calculate a Russian submarine force capability rating. The U.S. SSN force needed to meet this threat must have an equal or greater rating; through linear programing (LP) analysis one can determine an SSN force level and class mix.
The qualitative attributes considered in this capability rating scheme include detectability, sonar search capability, weapons load, maximum speed, and endurance at maximum speed.13 The capability rating for
Relative to Los Angeles (FLl)
each submarine considered was expressed in terms relative to an early Los Angeles (688)-class SSN. The capability ratings for U.S. SSNs, Russian submarines, and representative export diesel submarines are provided in Table 2.
The Russian force size will be determined from data on decommissioning and production rates. Decommissioning rates will be based on a 25-year life for Victor III SSNs and earlier classes.14 The remaining submarine classes will have 30-year lives. U.S. Navy SSNs are all assumed to have 30-year lives. Russian submarine production rates will be based on the stated building options: one to two
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Russian Submarine Force Capability Rating
poses of analysis. The price of $1.2 billion (1993 dollars) per Improved Los Angeles probably represents the lowest price for a small unit order.18 This price, however, does not include any line restart costs, which raises the price of the first hull of the new order to about $1.4 billion."
Taking the Russian sub
lars However, tor the 0_$3 0 bil. geles class is not a viable alternative because it has such
analysis the per-umt price was varied ^ ^ ^ bm rating for its price. m addition, the Cen-
$75 hdlion^n"!9981dollars ^The Centurion’s price was turion is the first SSN that has affordability as one of its VaOed from $1 0-$2.0 billion per submarine for the pur- primary design requirements. Should the program be sue-
nuclear general-purpose submarines per year and two diesel submarines per year with one going for export. Ballistic missile submarine production is assumed to restart after the year 2000 with a building rate of one pei year. Because of economic and technical difficulties, the fourth generation of Russian submarines is assumed to not Begin construction until the late 1990s.'5 The fifth generation is assumed to Begin production in 2015 Based on a typical 15-year design cycle. Given these assumptions, Figure 1 provides the estimated force level and capability rating of the Russian submarine force out to the year 2020.
The U.S. SSN force can meet the Russian threat from 1993 through 2010 With submarines that are operational or under construction today. However, new construction will be required to match the 2020 Russian threat. To determine the U.S. SSN force in 2020, we must determine the difference in force capabilities between the estimated Russian force and the U.S.
SSNs that already will be in service. The difference must be made up with new U.S. construction.
Through the use of LP,
We can find an optimum solution for force level and class mix from our list of SSN alternatives: the Improved Los Angeles,
Seawolf and the new SSN design—the Centurion.
The LP analysis considered a range of costs for both the Seawolf and the Centurion but used only the lowest cost for the Improved Los Angeles.
Presently, the Seawolf is assessed to cost approximately $2.2 billion per submarine in 1993 dol lars.16 However, for the
marine force capability rating, individual U.S. SSN capability ratings, and estimated costs, the LP analysis will provide an optimum force level that just meets the threat for the lowest cost. The results of this analysis clearly indicate that a significantly smaller U.S. SSN force will be required. Currently, the U.S. SSN force has 87 submarines. The force in 2020 needs to be about 40% to 50% of the current size depending on the Russian construction rate. From daily news reports, it is almost certain that the 1.5 to 2 general-purpose nuclear submarines per year option is unachieve- able given Russia’s stark economic problems. Thus, the construction rate of one general-purpose nuclear submarine per year appears to be the most likely candidate. To meet this threat, the United States would need about 35 SSNs in the year 2020.
As far as which SSN the United States should build, the analysis in Table 3 shows that if the cost of a Seawolf exceeded $2.1 billion in 1998 it would be more cost-effective to buy the Centurion. Should Centurion achieve a per unit cost below $1.6 billion then it is recommended as the most cost- effective alternative even if Seawolf costs could be reduced to $2.0 billion. The analysis also shows that the Improved Los An-
Table 3: Linear Programming Cost Analysis Matrix Centurion Cost (Billion $)
1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
2.0 Centurion 2.1 " | Centurion | Centurion | Centurion | Centurion | Centurion | Seawolf | Seawolf | Seawolf | Seawolf | Seawolf |
2.2 " |
| » | " |
|
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« — ■ ---------------------------------- <8 Linear Programming Equations: (Solve the equations below for an | optimum solution.) |
|
|
|
| |||||
Z=$SeawolfiX 1 )+$Centurion(X2)+1,2(X3) | Minimize the cost of the SSN force. |
|
|
| ||||||
4.07(X1)+3.18(X2)+1,48(X3)>84.4 |
| SSN force capability rating must be at least 84.4. |
|
| ||||||
Xl>2 Number of Seawolf SSNs |
| XI = The number of Seawolf SSNs |
|
|
| |||||
X2>0 Number of Centurion SSNs |
| X2 = The number of Centurion SSNs |
|
|
| |||||
X3>17 Number of Imp. Los Angeles SSNs | X3 = The number of Imp. Los Angeles SSNs |
|
|
cessful, its price could be as low as $1.1-$1.2 billion, depending upon how many are built.
Executing the National Military Strategy
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has removed the stability that was once part of the bipolar world. The superpowers and their allies tended to follow a single set of rules when dealing with the other side. In a multipolar world, these rules are no longer in effect. Therefore, a larger number of regional conflicts are likely to occur in the future.
While most, if not all, of these regional problems pose little direct military threat to the United States, they can threaten our access to natural resources and global markets. In addition, regional conflicts could involve allied nations with whom we have established commitments. And there is the constant threat of terrorism and drug trafficking which has directly affected the United States more, perhaps, than the Soviet military ever did during the Cold War.
The 1992 National Military Strategy, designed to cope with this drastically changing global security environment in a time of declining defense resources, is based on four principles: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.20 Officially, the Navy has stated that to execute the National Military Strategy 14 SSNs must be continuously deployed.21 To keep 14 SSNs deployed year-round requires an SSN force of approximately 80 submarines.22 With the current force the Navy will be able to support 14 deployed SSNs until about the year 2000. Beyond this time, however, unless the United States maintains a building rate of about three SSNs per year, the force level will drop below the 80 submarines required. Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the American people are likely to support such a building rate.
If a force goal of 80 SSNs is too expensive, what force level is acceptable? A simple approach to this question is to reduce gradually the required number of deployed SSNs until we reach the maximum acceptable risk.
> Strategic Deterrence and Defense: Russia has about 60 SSBNs of the Yankee, Delta, and Typhoon classes. Given i the current age of the SSBN fleet, the hiatus in SSBN production, and the reduced number of warheads allowed under the 17 June 1992 agreement between President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, it ap' pears that Russia will have about 15-20 SSBNs in the 2010-2020 time frame. During the height of the Cold War. the U.S. Navy stated that it needed about 100 SSNs to light its way into the bastions and destroy a significant number of Soviet SSBNs. But now, in this period of easing tensions and with Russia projected to have a much smaller SSBN fleet, it may be an acceptable risk to just keep an eye on what their SSBNs are doing. To acconr plish this surveillance mission, at least two SSNs (11.4 SSNs to sustain deployments) need to be in Russian SSBN patrol areas year-round.23
► Forward Presence: Under the new 1990 naval policy, three carrier battle groups (CVBGs) are to be forward ds- ployed continuously throughout the year.24 With the number of available surface combatants decreasing rapidly, SSNs are now being assigned as CVBG escorts- This will require a minimum of six SSNs (two per CVBG). ' For crisis monitoring, the Navy will require about one to two SSNs at sea year-round. And finally, predeployment training will account for about one more SSN over the period of a year. Therefore, in order to meet this part of the National Military Strategy, a minimum of eight SSNs (45.6 SSNs to sustain deployments) have to be continuously at sea.
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^ Crisis Response: During Operation Desert Storm, five SSNs participated in the Coalition effort by performing various missions, including precision strikes with Toma' hawk cruise missiles.26 If Desert Storm and the Falklands Conflict are representative examples of regional conflicts, then it is reasonable to suggest that no regional crisis would require more than ten SSNs at any one time. Even if the United States were simultaneously involved in two regional conflicts, requiring five to ten SSNs each, a force level of 30 to 40 SSNs would be sufficient to support deployments to those regions and what regular requirements are left.27 Finally, given the unpredictability of crises, h would be difficult to justify a large SSN force on that basis alone.
^ Reconstitution: Reconstitution is the use of the country’s latent industrial production capability to detei any Potential adversary from threatening the United States and, should deterrence fail, to provide the means to support global war fighting.28 While reconstitution will not directly determine the SSN force level, it does affect the size of the industrial base that produces these submarines. Thus, reconstitution requires the maintenance of a minimum submarine industrial base from which this production capac-
C •
tty will grow.
^ i SSN Force Level Needed for the Strategy_______________
and the associated jobs, is what drove Congress to fund the second Seawolf despite the Bush administration’s decision to cancel the program after the first submarine. This fear is also driving the Navy to complete the Centurion design as quickly as possible so that construction can begin in 1998.
While terminating submarine production with the expectation of restarting it sometime in the near future may appear to be the most cost-effective alternative, little information is available on the total restart costs from which to make an informed decision. The monetary cost to restart submarine production undoubtedly will be high—easily in the billions of dollars. But whether or not this cost will be more than producing a minimum number of submarines for the next five to eight years is unknown at this time, and it may prove to be too difficult to provide an accurate estimate. The cost in worker skills, however, is of greater concern as it is seen as the perishable element.
Many critics of continued submarine production claim that submarine construction skills are directly transferable to the civilian sector and can be reclaimed later if needed. Unfortunately, this argument does not apply to the criti- production later.
cal areas of nuclear propulsion and submarine hull welding. At present, not one civilian nuclear reactor power plant is under construction. With no viable civilian market the nuclear technology skills will erode, probably beyond the point of recovery. The same is true of the advanced welding techniques used to join fabricated hull sections. These skills are hard won through experience, as the problems encountered with the Seawolf s HY100 hull will testify. No one in the private construction sector will use expensive (and difficult to weld) high yield strength steels when lower strength steels adequately meet their needs. And without these skills, it is virtually impossible to build a modern SSN.
Yet another problem with the submarine industrial base is how to keep component subcontractors from going bankrupt or getting out of the volatile defense market. The larger defense contractors, such as General Dynamics and
Table 4: U.S. Navy SSN Force Results | ||
Issue | SSN Force | SSN Class |
| Level | to Build |
Greatest Threat | 35 | Centurion |
National Military | 50-60 | Centurion or |
Strategy |
| Improved |
|
| Los Angeles |
Tenneco, are diverse companies and probably could survive a short-term termination in submarine production. Many of the component manufacturers, however, probably could not survive because they have developed expertise in a very specific area and usually lack the resources and a civilian market to diversify.30
The best option appears to be to continue submarine production. The other alternatives are to put subcontractors on retainer to keep their manufacturing process open, or to just stop building submarines. The retainer alternative is not very attractive because the U.S. taxpayer is essentially paying the subcontractor to not produce anything. To stop building is equally unacceptable because of the high probability that production could not be restarted. Therefore, the remaining alternative is to build the minimum number of submarines for the next five to eight years to maintain the industrial base.
From a production viewpoint, good reasons exist to choose the Seawolf over the Improved Los Angeles—cost and technology base. Restarting costs for the Improved Los Angeles drives the price of the first unit to about $ 1.4 billion (1993 dollars). The cost to complete SSN-23 is estimated to be slightly higher.31 Thus, for approximately the same amount of money the Navy gets a considerably better submarine. In addition, many of the technologies used to construct Seawolf SSNs probably will be used in the production of Centurion SSNs. This will help in keeping the Centurion’s price as low as possible. Finally, General Dynamics has stated that the Electric Boat Division could survive with SSN-22 and -23 until the Centurion starts production in 1998.32 Given this, it appears that a minimum industrial base could be maintained by funding the construction of three Seawolf SSNs, provided Centurion construction begins on schedule.
Conclusions
to maintain a minimum industrial base to build the Centurion in 1998, however, the United States needs to build three Seawolf SSNs in the interim. Based on these conclusions, the proposed U.S. SSN force would be around 50 to 60 submarines with the Centurion making up the bulk of the force. With this SSN force, the United States can meet its national security requirements and still safely reduce submarine construction funding.
'Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 5th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti- j tute Press, 1991), p. 28.
’Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: WW. Norton & Company, 1983), p. 61.
’Ibid., p. 176.
4U.S. Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 6th ed- (Washington, DC: 1991), p. 123.
5Norman Polmar and Jurrien Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies ' (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 216; and U.S. Department of Defense, Military Forces in Transition 1991 (Washington, DC, 1991), p. 23.
6RAdm. Edward D. Sheafer, Jr, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, testimony before the Sea Power, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House ■ Armed Services Committee, 5 February 1992, p. 16.
7Ibid., p. 17.
8Ibid.
■'B. Starr, “Soviet Navy may avoid break-up,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 January 1992, p. 11.
l0Sheafer, p. 17. -
"Ibid., p. 16-17.
"U.S. Department of the Navy, Antisubmarine Warfare—Meeting the Challenge (Washington, DC: 1990), p. 27.
This is a static comparison of submarine characteristics only and not a mission- based analysis that the U.S. Navy has done. The results of the Navy analysis would give the following ratings: Los Angeles=\, Improved Los Angeles—2, and Sect- wolf=6. These numbers can be found in the 29 June 1992 issue of Navy News & Undersea Technology (Vol. 9, Number 26), p. 8.
"Sheafer, p. 20. l5Sheafer, p. 22.
Ronald O Rourke, Navy Seawolf and Centurion Attack Submarine Programs: Is- sues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, CRS Issue Brief IB91098, updated 4 June 1992), p. CRS-3.
"Discussion with Op-22 staff.
'"O’Rourke, p. CRS-2. l9Ibid.
“Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The national Military Strategy 1992 (Washington, DC: 1992), p. 6.
2tO’Rourke, p. CRS-13 !!Ibid.
To determine the SSN force level needed to maintain a specific number at sea continuously, multiply the number of deployed SSNs by 5.7. The number is found in the CRS attack submarine study (CRS Issue Brief IB91098) by Ronald O'Rourke on page CRS-14.
Ronald O Rourke, Aircraft Carrier Force Levels and Continuous Deployments (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, CRS point paper, dated 14 May 1990), p. CRS-3.
U.S. Department of the Navy, Meeting the Challenges of a Dynamic World— Naval Policy for 90s and Beyond, National Security Decision Making Course Selected Readings Volume X, slide number 29.
-60 Rourke, CRS Attack Submarine Study, p. CRS-13.
27Ibid.
“Powell, p. 7.
- Naval Submarine League, The Submarine Review, July 1991, p. 34.
'"U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future U.S. Defense Industrial Base (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), p. 43.
"O’Rourke, CRS Attack Submarine Study, p. CRS-11&12. nThe New York Times, 10 April 1992.
Lieutenant Carlson is a Naval Reserve intelligence officer assigned to the Naval Maritime Intelligence Center 0566 reserve unit. During active duty, he went through the nuclear submarine training pipeline and was assigned to the USS Lafayette (SSBN-616). But because of a medical problem he was disqualified from submarine duty and assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Lieutenant Carlson has since resigned his active commission and now works for DIA as a civilian undersea warfare analyst.
„ In summing up the minimum requirements from the 1 four principles of the National Military Strategy, on y
111 strategic deterrence and defense and forward presence di' rectly affect the SSN force level. Together, these two pnn- ' ciples require 10 to 11 submarines to be continuously deployed. ,
With this decreased deployment requirement, the toice ' needed is reduced to about 57 SSNs. To maintain a ' SSN force will require a building rate half that needed toi
’ the stated force level of 80 SSNs. By reducing the build-
| ing rate to 1.5 SSNs per year, approximately hah'the
annual total submarine construction (SSNs and S s)
' funding allocated during the 1980s could be cut. on
1 gress and the public may find this rough 50% reduction
, in annual submarine construction funding accepta e.
Determining which SSN to build is fairly straig * 1 or Ward. From a capability standpoint, all three SSN a ter- natives are considerably superior to any potential Thu World submarine (see Table 2). However, Irom a cost per spective the Seawolf is just too expensive to produce in the numbers needed to sustain an SSN force near 50- submarines. The Improved Los Angeles and Centurion can Probably both be made affordable with large enough Production runs; thus, either one is acceptable.
SSN Construction Industrial Base______________________
A pressing concern for many decision makeis is that ■ once nuclear submarine production is shut down it may he impossible to preserve the critical skills and technology needed to restart production later on. This fear of an unrecoverable loss of the submarine industrial base,
A proposed SSN force level can now be defined that will meet national security requirements while minimizing costs. The results, summarized in Table 4, show that the requirements imposed by the National Military Strategy will determine the force level and not the traditional Soviet, now Russian, threat. The Russian submarine threat, however, represents the pacing technological threat that requires an SSN with the capabilities of a Seawolf or Centurion. Because of its stated goal of affordability, the Centurion is the SSN the United States should build. In order