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To support its strategy of forward deployment and the forces it requires—here, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) steams past the American President Lines container ship President Adams in San Francisco’s Golden Gate—the United States must be assured of adequate logistical capabilities, including adequate sealift.
During the heyday of the clipper ship, when the United States had an abundant supply of wood and mariners, building and manning ships was not a problem. Our ships, captains, and crews were superior and were rewarded accordingly.1 After the Civil War, our forests were depleted and our population looked westward for richer rewards. European powers, particularly Great Britain, turned to new technology, iron and steel, and new machinery for their ships.2 U.S. ship owners lagged behind, continuing their love affair with the wooden sailing ship. The U.S. Merchant Marine has never recovered.
Historical Background
Starting as early as 1789, legislation has both helped and hindered U.S. maritime industries. Recognizing the need for U.S.-flag ships to be available in times of crisis and war and to serve as a training ground for American mariners, Congress has placed restrictions on flag of registry, construction, and ownership. It has subsidized and taxed.
In March 1882, three prophetic articles appeared in Proceedings? They pointed out that, in 1881, only 17% of our foreign commerce was carried under U.S. flag. The difficulty: “Our laws do not permit American ships to run as cheaply as foreign ones are run.” These laws included flag requirements and taxes.4
In November 1991, the Chairman of the Federal Mar' itime Commission called to our attention the fact that only 4% of our total trade moves under U.S. flag. Included in the difficulties recognized by the Commissioner were “U.S- laws, which impose greater cost on our own flag fleets.’ These laws include flag requirements and taxes.5
At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Americans found themselves without ships to handle their foreign commerce. Foreign ships were meeting the needs of their own governments, and the few remaining ships commanded astronomical freight rates.
The Shipping Act of 1916 created a Shipping Board to acquire and operate ships and regulate shipping and ship building. Fifteen hundred ships were built under the aegis of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.6 One thousand of these were not completed until after the war ended, leaving the government with a substantial fleet of costly ships on its hands. These surplus ships were disposed of at bargain prices.7
As World War I led into World War II, a similar scenario unfolded. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe created the familiar shortages of shipping and escalating freight rates. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 had started the wheels turning by stimulating construction of new ships, but, once again, the United States was unpre-
retary of Defense Dick Cheney issued a memorandum to the defense establishment entitled “Strengthening Department of Defense Transportation Functions.” This memo assigns combatant command of the Military Traffic Management Command, Military Sealift Command, and Military Air Mobility Command to Commander-inChief, U.S. Transportation Command (CinCTrans). CinC- Trans, the DoD single manager for transportation, is to:
► Procure commercial transportation assets and services >■ Subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense, activate reserve forces and the Sealift Readiness Program.
CinCTrans’ single-manager responsibilities will continue to be accomplished through the individual service components. The service secretaries will continue to train, organize, and equip their components to perform their common-user transportation mission and will be responsible for their service-unique missions and assets.
MSC and Navy Authority
The MSC is tasked to maintain a nucleus fleet. In peacetime, this fleet is big enough to meet DoD requirements that cannot be met by scheduled commercial carriers. Just prior to Desert Storm, this nucleus force consisted of 11 dry cargo ships, 23 tankers, 11 ships in the Afloat Prepositioning Force, 13 maritime prepositioning ships, and 8 fast sealift ships (FSSs). To meet additional requirements, the MSC can charter U.S.- and, if necessary, foreign-flag ships, subject to the constraints of the 1904 Shipping Act, which requires the use of U.S.-flag shipping for transporting all military cargo. The only exceptions are when U.S.-flag ships are not available or are not available at fair and reasonable rates.
If the MSC nucleus force is not sufficient, and if commercial ships cannot be chartered or contracted, the MSC, with the consent of CinCTrans and the Secretary of De-
Pared to maintain its commerce and support its allies.
Between 1939 and 1946, about 5,600 ships were built in U.S. shipyards.8 At war’s end, many of these ships were sold abroad, used to support U.S. postwar foreign aid programs, sold to U.S. owners, or put into the National Defense Reserve Force (NDRF). Again, the cost to the government was substantial.
Prior to the Korean War, the Federal Maritime Board Was replaced by the Maritime Commission and the Maritime Administration (MarAd). Pressures built as Department of Defense needs in Korea pulled U.S.-flag shipping away from existing assignments, mainly supporting U.S. foreign aid programs. In March 1951, the National Shipping Authority (NSA) was established to allocate shipping to meet the needs of foreign aid, military, and commercial interests.9
The NSA was reactivated to cope with the Vietnam buildup. Ships were withdrawn from the NDRF and assigned to private companies that operated these ships as Agents for the government. The companies organized the transition from mothballs to active, operating status. Unfortunately, these ships were more than 20 years old and Were plagued by delays and breakdowns. Nonetheless, by 1965, no foreign-flag ships were helping supply Vietnam."1
Today the key role of MarAd is to see that all elements °f the nation’s ocean transportation—both commercial and military—are met in time of national emergency. Shipping must be provided for the military, defense industries, foe domestic population, and for friends and allies. But foe problems of the past are still with us. There is still a shortage of militarily and commercially useful U.S.-flag ships available on short notice to meet the immediate surge requirements of crisis and war.
Current Mobilization Plans
With the inception of the National Security Act of 1947 And amendments in 1949, the Navy’s Military Sea Transport Command (now the Military Sealift Command) became the single manager for ocean transportation.
In 1951, DoD and the Department of Commerce spelled out the relationship between MarAd and the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Revised in 1954 and 1973, the Wilson Weeks Agreement recognizes the role of the MSC and the National Shipping Authority in providing for shipping needs in crisis and war. It spells out the role °f the MSC vis-a-vis U.S. commercial shipping in peacetime and requires that the MSC make maximum use ot listing commercial U.S.-flag shipping to meet DoD needs Prior to using government-controlled shipping.
June 1981 saw a further agreement between DoD and foe Department of Transportation—which had assumed responsibility for MarAd—on procedures for shipping support of military operations. This document, currently being uPdated, will specify the authority and actions to be foken by government agencies in peacetime, crisis, and War, to meet military ocean transportation needs.
In 1987 the creation of a new unified command, U.S. transportation Command, streamlined DoD transportation Arrangements under one roof. On 14 February 1992, Sec- fense, can request MarAd to activate the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). This force, currently 97 ships, is held at various ports throughout the country, ready for use on 5-, 10- or 20-day notice.
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Transportation Authority
In the next phase, the MSC, through CinCTrans and the Secretary of Defense and with the concurrence of the Secretary of Transportation, requests activation of the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). Ninety percent of DoD cargo is moved commercially under contract. When a commercial carrier enters into a contract with the MSC or accepts government operating or construction subsidies, it also must agree to enroll in the SRP. The SRP was developed during the 1970s to permit DoD to meet shipping needs under less than full mobilization contingencies."
However, for an operator to provide ships under this agreement is an onerous undertaking. This action seriously disrupts the operator’s normal commercial shipping activities by withdrawing ships from their established trade routes, and cargo is lost to competitors. Reestablishing a position on a trade route after a withdrawal is extremely
difficult and costly.12 For this reason, the concurrence of the Secretary of Transportation is given only under urgent circumstances. For example, the SRP was not activated for Desert Shield or Desert Storm.
The next three steps are even more drastic and, as such, must be ultimately approved by the President.
>• Activation of the National Defense Reserve Force. The NDRF was initiated after World War II, to receive and control the vast number of ships left over after the war. In 1946, there were 1,421 ships in the NDRF. Today, that number has dwindled to 255 (including the 97 Ready Reserve Force ships); 185 are dry cargo ships, 72 of which are almost 50 years old.13 To activate a ship from deep reserve status is a long and costly activity (up to 90 days and as much as $5 million per ship).14
► Employment of Effective U.S.-Controlled Shipping. These are ships under foreign flag but controlled by U.S. owners. This practice was initiated and encouraged after the outbreak of World War II, but before U.S. involvement, to enable U.S. ships to carry goods to Great Britain without violating the Neutrality Acts. Later, these ships became known as flag-of-convenience ships, in that registry under certain foreign flags enables them to escape U.S. taxes and onerous U.S. construction and manning requirements. There are currently 339 ships of this class, of which 46 are militarily useful dry cargo ships.15
► U.S. Flag Requisition. This drastic action would put all U.S.-flag ships under MarAd control, to meet emergency needs.
This action presumes an emergency involving NATO countries that would find these countries willing to submit their shipping to NATO control. Given the diverse interests of NATO members, however, it is likely that situations would arise in which the need exists, but not all NATO members would cooperate.
The maritime response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was real and substantial. The Sealift Enhancement Plans and Programs initiated during the 1980s proved practical. The Navy and its supporting maritime industries performed better than expected.
Like a volunteer fire department, the ships and men responded admirably to the call, but also like a volunteer fire department, the program finds funding and volunteers hard to come by. For the nation’s fourth arm of defense, funding comes slowly. Cargo ships and crews are not always readily available. The public must continually be made to recognize the value and the urgency of maintaining ships and crews for fast response to emergency.
The prepositioning programs, established by the Navy under the Sealift Enhancement Program, were an outstanding success. The first prepositioning ships arrived in the Arabian Gulf within eight days of C Day (date of mobilization), nine days earlier than planned.16
The FSSs, large roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships that function at high speed, arrived on the scene within 20 days of C Day, after mobilizing, loading, and steaming 8,700 miles from the United States to the Arabian Gulf. Heavy equipment was delivered seven days earlier than planned-1
In spite of some problems getting started, the Ready Reserve Force responded well. Private operators charged with its mobilization met expectations, cooperating with MarAd in breaking out ships and finding crews. The MSC mobilized 78 of 96 RRF ships.18 The NDRF was not used because of ship design, speed, and the significant
The U.S. maritime industry is involved in all types of Mobilization in support of U.S. foreign policy. For the military, ships must transport combat, combat support, and combat services support equipment, as well as sustainment cargo; as much as 95% of these types of cargo move W sea. Commercially, ships are needed to import raw materials, goods, and equipment to support our economy, in
time and cost needed for mobilization. This points up the need to evaluate these ships to determine whether many should be scrapped.
Once requested by the MSC, the commercial container fleet responded nobly, transporting one million tons of sustainment cargo—29% of total dry cargo moved.1’ However, there is a real question whether these ships could not have been more fully used—and used earlier. Could the use of special fittings, flat racks, and sea sheds have ntade these ships more readily available and prepared to carry combat cargoes?
Work needs to be done between Mar Ad, the military, and the containership operators to implement a system including special fittings—for maximum, early use of con- tainerships in crisis and war. Additionally, the Unique system devised hy container-ship oper- ntors to move cargo Horn point to point without rehandling greatly enhances the efficiency of container dipping. This system cannot be duplicated by DoD without a substantial expenditure of time, effort, and money.
Containerships make UP the bulk (77%) of H.S. dry cargo shipping.20 For these ships to help meet the needs °f an early surge volume of military cargo, careful cooperation and Planning is required.21 With the necessary facilities, more unit cargo could be moved in containers. The Special iHidEast Sealift Agreement, negotiated with seven com- tuercial operators early in the crisis, served as a model tor fast movement of troop-sustainment cargoes. ~
U-S.-flag car carriers were of limited value because of their cargo height and weight restrictions. However, with careful planning, military loads can be matched to the capabilities of these unusual ships.
The foreign sector responded well, providing, in particular, many of the large RO/RO ships. The Desert Storm coalition, however, was worldwide, with full support for the U.S. initiative. We cannot always count on such SuPport.23
Conclusion dustry, and war effort. Ships must be available to carry export goods to support the economies, industries, and war efforts of friendly nations. Civil defense and emergency management activities involve the merchant marine in evacuation requirements.
Our merchant marine will combine with the ships of allied nations, as they did in World Wars I and II, to support both the military and the industrial needs of allied countries. When applicable, this effort will be coordinated through a variety of allied shipping councils.
Is a U.S.-flag merchant marine needed? Yes—its necessity has been proved in every war and crisis we have ever faced. To be dependent on the ships of other nations for the support of U.S. foreign policy is folly. There
is no guarantee whatever that foreign merchant ship owners will be willing or able to steam their ships into a combat zone.”24 Desert Shield and Desert Storm were unique in the extent of their worldwide support. U.S. foreign policy, however, is not always compatible with the interests held by our world neighbors. On the other hand, maintaining a large force of ships that are neither economically nor militarily useful is equally unsatisfactory.
MarAd must evaluate the overall need for ships to meet the industrial and military needs of our country. The MSC with TransCom must work with DoD shippers to assess military shipping requirements and to recommend types of ships to meet these requirements to MarAd. Requirements and recommendations must then be supported before Congress. The U.S. maritime industry (ship owners, shipyards, maritime unions, labor, and supporting industries) must put aside individual interests and agree on a program that profits the nation as a whole.
Basic plans currently in place make sense and, if properly implemented, can help solve our problems.
Prepositioning, both in-country and afloat at strategic locations, proved effective and delivered cargo for Desert Shield in 8-14 days. Using privately owned merchant ships, this program, while expensive, provides employment for a core of merchant ships that become available for service once prepositioned cargo has been delivered.
Funding has been provided to the Navy by Congress to procure strategic sealift to meet surge needs. In Fiscal Years 1991-1992, $1,875 billion was appropriated and, in Fiscal Year 1993, $614 million. An optimistic estimate is that this money will result in 15-20 ships. Nine ships are planned for prepositioning and 11 as fast sealift ships,
ready for use on short notice.2
The Ready Reserve Force, part of the National Defense Reserve Force, must be reassessed.26 During Desert Shield, not all RRF and no NDRF ships were used. The RRF should consist of the following ship types:
► Large, fast RO/ROs. These should be acquired through purchase of existing ships, U.S. or foreign, for reflagging, and through new construction in U.S. shipyards.
► Break Bulk Ships. These ships are militarily useful for some types of ammunition and unusual-sized cargoes that do not lend themselves to containerization.
Plans call for the RRF to increase to 140 ships by 1997. Funding of $440 million is expected to permit procurement of 10-11 ships in 1993, most of which are expected to be RO/ROs.27
Ships in the RRF must be exercised and maintained on a regular basis, to ensure they are in proper working condition at all times. Funding must be provided to MarAd specifically for this purpose. Regular rotational breakout and exercising of these ships also will provide employment for a cadre of active merchant mariners who then would be available for early call-up.28
The National Defense Reserve Force, exclusive of the RRF, includes many ships that should be scrapped. High breakout and maintenance costs suggest that consideration be given to eliminating the force all together. Any remaining useful ships could be incorporated into the RRF long-lead breakout force.
The Sealift Readiness Program was a useful idea when the majority of U.S.-flag merchant ships were militarily useful break bulk ships and easily operated by MarAd and its contractors. Today, however, most participants in this program are container operators. The government is not prepared, staffed, or equipped to enter into container shipping. This program must be modified to enable the government to take advantage of container operators’ valuable infrastructure, including terminals, equipment, and tracking systems.29
Action to provide support for a privately owned met-
A Realistic Alternative
By Captain Andrew P. Diamond, former Master, USNS Harkness
Rarely does a month go by without an article in some professional journal or industry newspaper proposing a new plan to save the U.S. Merchant Marine. The authors are always earnest, the plans usually intelligent and well thought-out, but when you look in the envelope for the blank check to pay for it all, it’s never there.
What the U.S. Merchant Marine needs is money and a political constituency. It has neither. A freighter has to pay her own way. She does not fly, submerge, or shoot anything. She will not be appearing in the next Tom Cruise blockbuster. Who would want to spend money on anything so unglamorous? The active merchant marine numbers 11,000 strong. That’s not an air wing, a brigade, a battle group, or even a small town—not much of a political constituency. If all U.S.-flag ships were replaced tomorrow with foreign-flag ships, the American public would roll over and go back to sleep.
So let’s assume the worst: past
trends will continue and by the end of the decade we will be left with a merchant marine consisting of Jones Act shipping, Ready Reserve Force ships, assorted tugs, barges, and supply boats, and the ships controlled and manned by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). How can we stretch this resource to meet wartime contingencies with little money and less political interest?
The MSC will continue to grow as it takes over more Mobile Logistic Force ships. It will continue to be the preeminent player and controlling force in the U.S. Merchant Marine. When it comes to creating a manpower pool for the next crisis, however, the MSC can be its own worst enemy. I sailed for the MSC on board underway replenishment ships in the 1980s, and they were some of the most enjoyable years I have spent at sea. The deck seamanship and shiphandling challenges were without peer in the industry. I was moving up quickly. Yet, after three years, I quit.
Like most former MSC civil service mariners I have talked to, I left because the MSC demanded too much time at sea. The minimum tour on board an MSC ship is six months, and, because MSC ships do not conform to Navy deployment cycles, very quickly you can find yourself working 10-11 months at sea.
People go to sea to make a living and for the lifestyle, which includes time off to be with family and friends and to pursue other interests. Mariners are willing to spend 24 hours a day, 7 days a week away because they know they are going to get close to the same amount of time at home. I have sailed the last five years on board MSC contractor-operated ships where the minimum tour is 2-4 months. Generally, I work 6-7 months a year. That gives me time at home, a decent wage, and I return to my ship fresh and ready to work. Most important, it gives another mariner a job opening to do the same.
The MSC probably could increase its employee base 30%-40% if it gave its people the time off they want.
chant marine is under way but has not yet been implemented. Proposals put forward on 17 June 1992 by the Policy Coordinating Group chaired by Secretary of Transportation Andrew H. Card, Jr., are substantial and substantive. They include measures to put U.S. owners on a more level playing field in international trade. For these Proposals to succeed, they must be presented to Congress with the full, united support of DoD and the Department °f Transportation.
Logistics, as part of national defense, only becomes crucial in times of crisis. To support our policy of forward deployment and the forces it requires, we must have the ships, and these ships must be under U.S. control.
'W.G. David, “Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means t0 be Taken for its Revival,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 9 March 1882, P- 160.
David, pp. 166, 167.
David, p. 147; J.D.J. Kelley, “Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline a,)d the Means to be Taken for its Revival,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 9 March 1882, p. 1; and F.E. Chadwick, “Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of Its Decline and the Means to be Taken for its Revival,” U.S. Naval Institute Probings, 9 March 1882, p. 71.
‘David, p. 167. , , KI
’Christopher L. Koch, Address before The Western Cargo Conference, 1 November 1991 p 1
‘Maritime Administration, Draft. MARAD, OPLAN 001 A, Washington, 1 June 1990, PP- 2-4.
’Andrew E. Gibson, “A Strategy for Rebuilding the American Merchant Marine, V-S- Naval War College, Draft undated, p. 8.
'Heine, p. 9.
Maritime Administration, Draft MARAD, OPLAN 001 A, p. 22.
'"Lester Velie, “Our Leaky Pipe Line to Vietnam,” Readers Digest, December
"National Research Council, Panel on Sealift Readiness, The Sealift Readiness Program (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, June 1975), pp. L m "Leo L. Collar, “Desert Storm and Its Effect on U.S. Maritime Policy, Defense Transportation Journal, June 1991, p. 68.
"Military Sealift Command, Ship Register, MSC P504, March 1992.
"Charles R. Daggs, Interview, 16 October 1991.
"Maritime Administration, Foreign Flag Merchant Ships Owned y • • Companies, 1 July 1990. _ . ,QOn
"Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 199 ),
p. 220.
"Woodward, p. 221. _
"Francis R. Donovan, “Test of Sealift Planning for MSC,” Defense Transportation Journal, June 1991, p. 60.
"Military Sealift Command, Desert Shield Brief, 12 August 1991, p. 3.
“Koch p 1
"'George Hayashi, “Intermodalism Pays Off in the Gulf War, Defense Transportation Journal, June 1991, p. 65.
“Hayashi, p. 65. , „ . _ ....„
“Andrew E. Gibson and Jacob L. Shuford, “Desert Shield and Strategic Sealift,
Naval War College Review, Spring 1991, p. 17.
“Norman Friedman, Desert Victory (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1991),
p. 248. . . . ..
“Warren G. Leback, “Needed: a Consensus on Maritime Policy,” Sea Power, Apnl 1992, p. 65.
“Military Sealift Command, Desert Shield Brief, 12 August 1991, p. 14. “Andrew H. Card, Jr., Interview, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1992, p. 49.
“Collar, p. 68.
“Hayashi, p. 66.
Mr. Goodhue currently is a marine consultant in Hancock, New Hampshire. Prior to his retirement in 1991, he worked at the Navy’s Military Sealift Command as director of its Dry Cargo Ship Division, and with the States Marine Group of Companies from 1947 to 1985.
Those extra people then would be bailable for wartime contingencies— Wore available than some pie-in-the- % Merchant Marine Reserve for which no one is willing to foot the bill.
Obviously there would be increased c°sts for such a program, but not as Hiuch as one might think. Mariners c°uld be given a choice between shipping full-time or part-time with the MSC. Full-timers would retain vacation, medical, and retirement benefits year-round. Part-timers would go on ieave without pay once their vacation time ran out, could pay their own premiums when government-paid medical coverage lapsed, and could accrue retirement benefits more slowly or pay into the system at a higher rate.
Morale within the MSC would increase dramatically, as mariners could stiip as little or as much as they "'anted. The MSC personnel office Probably would be swamped with ap- Piications from people with critical job skills who originally would not have considered the MSC. This would not solve all our manpower problems, but K’s a start that doesn’t cost much.
What about the Merchant Marine Reserve? Most merchant mariners don't want to be tied to some future
commitment, yet we have answered our nation’s call every time—from world wars to Desert Storm. A formal reserve program with strict drilling requirements and a yearly points system is unpalatable to most mariners and probably unaffordable. A better solution would be to create a manpower database and pay mariners a nominal yearly sum to remain active on it. Inclusion in this database would not entail a legal requirement for mariners to ship out during wartime—that’s why the registration payment would be low—but, if past experience is any guide, and shoreside reemployment rights are guaranteed by law, close to 90% of these mariners would respond to a call to duty. As an additional incentive, it could be made easier for these mariners to keep their U.S. Coast Guard licenses current, and they could be given some other Naval Reserve benefits.
One of the big problems of Desert Storm was breaking out poorly maintained Ready Reserve Force ships. Why not berth these ships on a rotating basis at government facilities near major metropolitan centers across the country? Mariners who are not actively shipping, but who are active on the database, could do a weekend, one week, or two weeks supervised active duty on board these ships, running, checking, and repairing vital systems. Once checked out, the ship would be towed back to the mothball fleet and another one would be rotated out for maintenance. If properly supervised, this would keep the Ready Reserve Force ships under constant maintenance and would provide hands-on training for mariners. When the call comes again, you would have a group of people familiar with these ships.
The only way to revitalize the U.S. Merchant Marine is for Congress to pass a cargo preference act, reserving a percentage of all imports and exports for U.S.-flag ships. Cargo creates ships, not the other way around. Unfortunately, such a bill will never pass, considering the economic and political forces lined up against it. We must, therefore, fall back on low cost, politically palatable solutions to our sealift problem. The Military Sealift Command is the dominant employer in the industry; sooner than we think, it may be the only game in town. It must lead the way in expanding the merchant marine manpower base and creating a reserve program before it is too late.