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By Vice Admiral William A. Dougherty, U.S. Navy
The success of space-generated imagery in Desert Storm—the first space war—has guaranteed its role for the future. Satellites like this Defense Meteorological Satellite Program craft (inset) supplied detailed images of the Arabian peninsula, showing weather, temperature, and environmental conditions that affect combat operations.
On 2 August 1990, when Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers, and soldiers invaded Kuwait, U.S. military space systems, under the command of the U.S. Space Command, were already on the scene, available to begin providing important communication, navigation, surveillance, and weather information to U.S. national command authorities. In the weeks and months that followed, as the United States began Operation Desert Shield and executed Operation Desert Storm, space systems continued to play an important and expanding role in the planning and execution of U.S. and allied efforts in the Persian Gulf theater of operations, becoming an integral part of the force structure of both strategic and tactical operations.
By the end of the war in February 1991, space system support had become widely recognized as a critical, valuable and necessary element of joint operations. Reflecting this recognition, Operation Desert Storm has been called the first space war, because almost every aspect of military operations depended to some degree on space systems support—from commanders of land, sea, and air forces planning their attacks, to drivers of allied supply trains seeking logistics bases. This wider recognition of the broad role and capabilities of space forces to support both strategic and tactical operations proved to be one of the principal lessons learned from the Gulf War.
When the Persian Gulf conflict began, the potential contributions of U.S. military space systems were not widely apparent throughout U.S. military commands. While many U.S. satellite systems had been used before in contingency operations, none had ever been used to this extent and with such widespread integration into the overall force structure. During the successful military strike in Libya in 1986, space systems provided critical support to mission-planning activities and dramatically enhanced air crew performance. When U.S. forces were executing Operation Earnest Will in the Persian Gulf in 1988, U.S. and Allied commanders successfully employed Global Positioning System (GPS) terminals on ships and helicopters during minesweeping operations. During Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, military space systems provided extensive long-haul communications and critical weather support. In each case, these operations were limited in scope or time and required only a portion of our military space capability. Consequently, the greater potential of space system support to operational forces was not readily recognized.
The circumstances of U.S. contingency efforts in the Persian Gulf in 1990, however, were different. The United States entered a theater of operations where it had no established military infrastructure. The logistical buildup of Operation Desert Shield in defense of Saudi Arabia required the rapid introduction of U.S. and Allied troops, which necessitated quick critical support in the areas of communications, navigation, and environmental information. Space systems provided this support at an unprecedented level. They also provided a new dimension—- theater warning of tactical ballistic missile (TBM) attacks. Over the seven-month period from August 1990 to February 1991, as the U.S. forces planned, developed, and executed their war plans, space systems support was refined, improved, and solidly integrated into nearly every aspect of combat operations.
Supporting Space Systems
The most dramatic and time-critical example of space support involved use of the Defense Support Program early-warning satellites to alert U.S. and Coalition forces of Iraqi Scud missile attacks. The program’s warning information provided an edge that allowed U.S. and Allied forces to take defensive action with chemical-protection suits. U.S. Space Command and Air Force Space Command operations crews, located half a world away in Colorado, were uniquely close to the combatants. Daily television news included alert sirens and Patriot missiles streaking into the skies to intercept attacking Scuds. The warning data gleaned from U.S. space systems proved to be a critical factor in protecting U.S. and Allied lives.
Established procedures and formats for giving unambiguous warning of potential Soviet strategic ballistic missiles to U.S. and Canadian national command authorities had been in place and used for years by the U.S. Space Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command. To support U.S. Central Command more effectively, however, Space Command Center crews modified these procedures significantly, in order to warn of Iraqi Scud attacks. In the case of Scuds, which could hit
U.S. and Coalition forces within minutes from launch, the requirement was to observe, evaluate, and make a warning assessment in an extremely short time. This called for unprecedented levels of coordination and cooperation between the U.S. Space Command, its service components, and deployed land, sea, and air forces. New warning alert communication paths had to be established and procedures developed, exercised, and refined.
Theater ballistic-missile warning information was available to Central Command from early August, but the fine-tuned procedures that alerted U.S. forces and resulted in numerous Scud intercepts took time to mature. U.S. Space Command and Central Command personnel had to learn to operate effectively together under very stressful circumstances. Since simplicity and speed were absolutely essential, in specific voice formats for alert of Scud attacks had to be developed and refined. Several exercises tested communications paths and procedures. In Desert Shield, constant attention to detail and solving problems as they emerged gave U.S. forces an extra edge they ' needed when Desert Storm began.
The Global Positioning System had more tangible connections to a majority of U.S. forces. They system is a constellation of satellites that broadcasts precise naviga- f tion, positioning, and timing signals. As U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, they confirmed that navigating in a featureless desert posed significant challenges; manmade or natural features by which a soldier could determine location did not exist.
At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the sys- , tern had not reached full operational capability, and the U.S. military had not formally planned to have receivers i distributed down to squad or platoon level. As a result only a few hundred Global Positioning System receivers were initially deployed with our forces to the Persian Gulf. It soon became apparent this would be inadequate- and efforts were made to secure many more receivers ^ to support all aspects of combat operations and provide critical location information to troops. To meet the 1 Army’s need, thousands of small, commercial receivers
(called small, lightweight global positioning receivers) were purchased rapidly. Soldiers used them to position their bases, to bring food to the troops, and to orchestrate every aspect of the deployment and maneuver of forces. The Commander of the 101st Air Assault Division, Major General Binford Peay, U.S. Army, stated that the lightweight receiver was “the most popular new piece of equipment in the desert.”
The valued performance of the Global Positioning System in Desert Shield was only an indication of what would happen when the liberation of Kuwait began. Receivers Were on board many strike aircraft as they rolled in on their targets. Pilots knew exactly where they and their targets were, even in heavy cloud cover or smoke. The system helped clear minefields and kept units kept out of each other’s fire zones. It played a role in search-and-res- cue operations and even guided some munitions. After the cease-fire, Apache helicopter pilots voted the system the m°st desired modification for their aircraft. It had a major •mpact on the outcome of Desert Storm, and it is clear that its efficient exploitation will significantly enhance the effectiveness of our land, sea, and air forces in future operations.
The importance of communications satellite support dur- 'ng the Gulf War cannot be overstated. While the Saudis had an extensive communication system, it did not cover ff- S. forces in all locations, ar,d it simply could not pro- v'de the capacity to meet the needs of a half-million U.S. and Coalition personnel.
omrnunications satellites naet this need. The U.S.
Pace Command and other supporting agencies reposi- honed satellites, brought ®nes that were on standby to u" operation, and leased capacity from commercial satellites. More than 90%
. the communications 8.0lng into Saudi Arabia ar- nved via satellite. Command and control of forces within e theater also depended npon space. Satellite circuits Were chopped" from other hiunary users to Central ontrnand; thousands of ter- tl|lna^S Were transported to e area of operations; and a structure was developed to ^andle and control this mas- IVe communications sys- And all this took ninths to accomplish. The 'hovement of satellites and P arming of commercial and led support was a com- ex task. But the results
speak for themselves—Desert Shield and Desert Storm were incredibly complex operations executed with tremendous precision made possible by space-based communications systems. The size, complexity, and operations tempo of Desert Shield and Desert Storm placed heavy demands on U.S. satellite communications, and such dependence on these systems likely will continue to grow.
When U.S. forces deployed to the Persian Gulf region, the maps of Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia were old and out-of-date. To correct this deficiency, multispectral imagery satellite systems were used to prepare up-to-date and precise maps of the areas of operation. Such satellites image specific areas of the earth, then transmit their pictures to ground stations. These images are much more than black-and-white pictures. They show features of the earth beyond human visual detection. By using these images, one can identify shallow water areas near coastlines or earth surfaces that show signs of recent heavy-equipment travel.
Multispectral imagery was used to identify and analyze amphibious and airborne landing zones, examine attack routes, and monitor enemy operations. Air Force and Navy pilots preflew many of their missions on computer systems using multispectral data. Before they ever entered the cockpit, they had seen the terrain they would fly over and what the target looked like at attack altitudes.
Such data were also used to develop engineering drawings so that some of the largest air bases in the world could be planned and built in time to meet stringent buildup schedules. This extraordinary view of the territory and composition of the land and waterways gave U.S. forces an unprecedented insight into the environment around which they would fight.
Weather satellites also played a key role during the war. U.S. and Coalition forces used data from Defense Meteorological Satellite Program spacecraft and civil weather satellites to predict rapidly changing weather patterns and monitor burning oil wells. Meteorological satellites were the most reliable sources on weather in Iraq. The information they provided was used extensively to plan and execute attack missions, determine wind direction and potential spread of chemical agents, and to alert U.S. forces of sandstorms or
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oceedings / August 1992
other weather phenomena. This access to current weather data also allowed U.S. forces to capitalize on night vision and infrared targeting capabilities.
Future Space Requirements
While the performance of space systems operations and support to Desert Shield and Desert Storm was one of the real success stories of the war, the U.S. Space Command has recognized and identified areas where improvements can and must be made. In the Gulf War theater, the United States had time to deploy terminals and develop procedures that made space systems work more effectively for troops in the field. The next crisis may not allow four- to-six months to build up and prepare for it. Since many military operations depend on space systems and will become more dependent in the future, the Space Command and its service components must ensure that support from space systems is immediately available to troops and assembled forces whenever and wherever they go into combat.
Theater missile defense needs improvement because of the expected ability of many countries to develop and market tactical ballistic missiles in the near future. A follow- on enhanced early-warning system to upgrade the defense satellite system is needed to give the United States capability to monitor all areas of the world for missile launches and to meet shortened reporting times to guard against the short flight profiles of tactical ballistic missiles. The United States cannot afford to face a Saddam Hussein of the future without an improved warning satellite.
A responsive space-launch capability is needed to react to the loss of key satellites and to replace them. This capability does not exist today. As an interim measure, the U.S. Space Command will have to rebuild the expendable-launch-vehicle facilities that were neglected when the space shuttle was the only access to space. In addition, the United States must develop new spacecraft boosters and upper stages that do not require weeks and months to build and check before launch.
The United States must also be able to monitor enemy air movements and cruise missile attacks. The Iraqi planes
that fled to Iran were a constant source of danger to U.S. forces. In Desert Storm, airborne early-warning resources were available to meet this threat. With new and more capable systems being introduced and reaction times reduced, U.S. naval forces and other users need the extra edge provided by a space-based wide area surveillance system. The system will open a window into an adversary’s air and naval operations that will eliminate the element of surprise, a key to U.S. Central Command’s success in the Gulf War.
Finally, the United States must be able to protect its space systems and selectively deny the use of space to an adversary. Perhaps the biggest difference between the Gulf War and one of the future will be facing an enemy that has its own space capability or access to it from a third party. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s end run around Iraqi forces would not have been a surprise if Saddam Hussein had access to space-based intelligence or surveillance systems. Others will also learn the lessons of Desert Storm regarding space support to military operations; thus, an antisatellite system is needed if the United States is to hold and exploit the “high ground’’ in future military operations. Ultimately, to control the sky above the battlefield, one must also control the space above the battlefield. As with the former, the latter will save lives, | as well.
Much is yet to be written about the successes of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Important lessons will be learned from studies of the close cooperation between joint and Allied forces, the vital role logistics played in equipping and sustaining forces, the tempo of operations, and the cooperation of air, land and naval forces that resulted in a decisive victory with minimal casualties. One additional lesson, however, has come through loud and clear: this was the first war where the complete range of space sys- terns was integral to operations at the theater level. U.S. space systems and the military forces that control them came ot age and are now recognized as a key element in all military operations.
Vice Admiral Dougherty is Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.
Another Hitch
Shortly after the advent of the Variable Reenlistment Bonus (VRB) program, a third-class petty officer on board our cruiser decided to ship over for six years. As a technician, he qualified for what was then a substantial sum of money. The captain decided to use this opportunity to promote the VRB and to publicly recognize the young man’s commitment to the Navy. Therefore, the reenlistment ceremony was conducted as an “all hands” evolution. After reading the oath of office and making a few remarks the captain gave the sailor an opportunity to comment on how he intended to use his bonus money, with the intent to demonstrate his maturity as a good example to his contemporaries.
“Well, Captain,” he replied, “I guess I’ll either get married or buy a motorcycle.”
Captain C. C. Lumpkin, USNR
( The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in Proceedings.!