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Contents:
Dancing with an Elephant—16 Damn the Mines—16
Centurion: The Changing Future of the Force—20
Save The Tailhook Association—20
The State of Orderly Liquidation—23
World Navies in 1992—24
The Commanders Respond—24
Offer Service Members a Leave of Absence—25
Resignation in the Canadian Navy—25
Verifying Fleet Survivabilty with Empress II—25
Stalking the Enemy’s Coast—26
Conception Is the Place—28
The Landfall Is Samana Cay—28
Watlings Island Is San Salvador—28
Naval Institute/Kodak 30th Annual Photo Contest Winners—28
Just Say No!!—25
“Dancing with an Elephant”
(See W. J. Holland, pp. 75-77, May 1992
Proceedings)
Commander John B. Moore, U.S. Coast Guard—With respect to Admiral Holland, advocating the first use of nuclear weapons would be more aptly described as “Dancing with the Devil.”
The mere fact that this topic was discussed by credible people in a professional military forum may heighten anti- U.S. sentiment in nations that fear or hate us already. This type of discussion might even distance our allies from us. Our enemies would (correctly) ask: what would have happened if the United States had used its nuclear might in a first strike against Iraq? Besides the enormous casualties inflicted on a largely innocent population, what lingering horror would have faced nations bordering Iraq? What permanent global environmental damage would have been wrought?
At home, demonstrations and riot on a national scale would follow any first use of nuclear weapons. National morality—even in its current state—would demand criminal prosecution of those involved in such a move. The use of nuclear weapons would most certainly dominate national politics and change the configuration of political parties. It is quite likely that it would produce a wave of strong anti-military sentiment that would lead to further evisceration of our defense capability.
Admiral Holland has failed to recognize that the entire nuclear paradigm has been shattered. The most basic tenet of nuclear planning is that, as he wrote, "Nuclear weapons ... establish the upper limits of violence.” This is probably no longer true. Biological, chemical, or other exotic weapons may well figure more prominently in future strategic planning than will nuclear threats.
As Strategic Command wrestles with changes in the world order, I offer this advice to its planners. First, take the moral high ground. Don’t plan anything that the nation and the world will not tolerate. Second, beware of conventional thinking. Using the paradigms of the past will leave you trying to cure head lice with a howitzer. Third, beware of strategic threats from extraordinary axes—such
as a terrorist arriving in this country with genetically enhanced tuberculosis. Armageddon may look more like an AIDS patient than a cruise missile. □
“Damn the Mines!”
(See D. K. Brown, pp. 45-50, March 1992; D. J. Grieve, pp. 17-20, June 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William A. Steadley, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In the 1970s, David Brown and I served as country representatives and alternated as Chairman, NATO Project Group 14, Explosion Resistant Multi-influence Minesweep System (ERM1S). David brought forth several valid points in his article, but one that deserves special attention is the modular concept, i.e., using any platform with modular minesweeping and/or minehunting gear, deck-loaded as the situation dictates. The concept is a great money saver; modular units could either be prepositioned in or airlifted to the area to be cleared, thus reducing startup time for antimine operations. □
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Dr. Tamara Moser Melia, Naval Historical Center and author of ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991(7Vawz/ Historical Center, 1991)—David Brown makes many valid points concerning the Royal Navy mine-countermeasures experience in the Persian Gulf War. Nevertheless, as a participant in Persian Gulf mine warfare during Operation Earnest Will in 1987-88 and the Persian Gulf War—minehunting on board U.S., British Hunt-class, and Tripartite-class MCM ships, flying missions with U.S. airborne mine-countermeasures aircraft, and spending considerable time in rubber boats with U.S. Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) divers—I do not agree with his fairly sweeping conclusions about effective solutions to the mine threat, his historical analogies, or many of his comments about U.S. capabilities. All the lessons are not yet in from Desert Storm, and Mr. Brown’s conclusion that the Royal Navy’s Sundown-class mine- hunter is the panacea for a very complex problem is premature.
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The future of Navy mine countermeasures (MCM) depends on first-rate equipment, well-trained people, (here, a sailor works on a Mk. 105 Mod. 2 magnetic minesweeping system), and the designation of MCM as a full-fledged warfare specialty.
things, and national interests are always best served by that design which takes into account national priorities. U.S. Navy mine-countermeasures (MCM) ships— Particularly the new Avenger (MCM-1) class—designed for a very different scenario, were rushed to the Gulf for Desert Storm with developmental systems and engineering problems common to new ships. However the operational record of the Avenger and the USS Guardian (MCM-5) in the Gulf War is, by any measure, enviable. The clear superiority of U.S. mine-hunting sonars, particularly the new SQQ- 2. and the capabilities of the advanced mine-neutralization vehicles were operationally validated.
Couple these capabilities with pre- Clse integrated navigation systems and EOD units, and you ave a mine-countermeasures combat system second to none.
Cnly time will tell, but the U.S. ships currently in production, the 'V’enger and the Osprey (MHC- 1) classes, will most certainly Prove to be at least as capable as any other platforms. By compar- js°n, the Royal Navy Hunt-class CM ships, which did excellent W°r*c in the Persian Gulf, had c°rrected most of their tech meal bugs during Operation sarnest Will, but still took some even years to reach operational certification.
I must take exception to other -p0|nts Mr. Brown makes as well.
(,Wlce in his article, he indicates at minesweeping is of little value; I sub- 1 that it is a very necessary component Th any comprehensive MCM program. ere are many other scenarios besides rePeat °f our Persian Gulf experience, 0r no matter how good the conditions atSonar performance, the prudent oper- r must always assume that some mines
are undetectable. In order to achieve a high level of clearance, hunting and sweeping must nearly always be combined. His assessment of U.S. airborne MCM does not take into account the proven capabilities of the MH-53E helicopter. With the addition of the AQS-14 sonar and Global Positioning System, the aircraft is extremely useful for much more than precursor sweeping.
His historical examples are incorrect
as well: for example, Farragut cried “Damn the Torpedoes!” but he had been minehunting for a month before he stormed Mobile Bay. Mines were used centuries before 1855. There were absolutely no casualties of any kind to MCM helicopters at Haiphong (or anywhere else) from ordnance set off by rotor noise. And lifting eyes are not required for heavy lift of U.S. Navy MCM ships. In addition, remote-control minesweeping also has proven merit and is currently being tested to determine future utility; certainly these systems are nowhere near the size or cost of any MCM ship.
I am, however, fully in agreement with his opinion concerning the Royal Navy’s concept of MCM support with the forward support units—HMS Sir Galahad and other supporting ships—and portable magnetic and acoustic ranges. They were extremely valuable during the Persian Gulf War, particularly in supporting U.S. MCM forces. The need for similar support within the U.S. Navy is one of the key lessons learned in this operation.
Finally, his placing of the success or failure of MCM operations on the shoulders of career MCM specialists is right on the mark. The problem is much more difficult than the U.S. Navy has ever been willing to admit. If the U.S. Navy had a cadre of trained specialists, professionally appreciated and pro- motable, who could devote a great portion of their careers to solving the many complex problems of mine warfare, it would go a long way toward making long-overdue improvements in MCM. Until the Navy actively supports mine countermeasures as a viable warfare specialty, it won’t be able to solve the personnel and leadership problems that have, throughout its history, made MCM difficult.
Our recent operational experience in Desert Storm constituted the first major live minefield clearance by the U.S. Navy since 1952. A lot was learned, and now
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V________________ / the lessons are being evaluated. But one more fact must never be forgotten. If we predicate national needs based on the experience of one war or on another nation’s experience—rather than on our own history-—the Navy will not be prepared for the future. Two major U.S. warships were severely damaged by mines in the Persian Gulf War, and one during Operation Earnest Will—constituting 75% of the major casualties of the U.S. Navy in recent years. Had the more capable influence mines sown by Iraq during the Gulf War been live, or had the Iranians sown influence mines in the late 1980s, the losses would have been far greater, and the lessons learned by all navies would have been radically different. □
“Centurion: The Changing
Future of the Force”
(See P. K. Peppe, pp. 60-64, April 1992
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Bart A. Vinskey, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy—Commander Peppe brings up many valid points, but his belief in the submarine as a “do-all” platform is invalid. That is what killed the Seawolf. The Navy made it a large, do-everything submarine and eventually priced it out of existence. Face it, if the Seawolf and its BSY-2 combat system were not so complicated, they would not be so expensive—and would be under construction and in production.
The Navy needs to return to basics and build capable—and affordable—weapon systems. What the submarine force needs is a boat to go in harm’s way: a small submarine with four torpedo tubes, space for 24 weapons (cruise missiles and torpedoes), a 30-knot top speed, and relatively simple communications, electronic- support-measures, and sonar equipment.
The submarine service doesn’t need to invent new roles or cross over to other communities’ roles. Ten years ago, after the Argentine Navy cruiser General Bel- grano was sunk by a British submarine, the rest of the Argentine Navy stayed in port—while British amphibious forces retook the Falkland Islands. That’s the role for us—sinking enemy submarines and surface ships—and that’s what we should be building submarines to do. □
Harold C. Hemond—Commander Peppe wrote very convincingly of the characteristics that must be incorporated into the next generation of nuclear-powered attack submarine, the Centurion.
However, except by implication, he overlooked probably the most important characteristic. If the Centurion is to avoid the fate of the Seawolf\ it must be drastically less expensive. If the Centurion is half the price of the Seawolf, it may get favorable attention in the Congress. To ensure congressional support, the goal should be more like one-third the cost of the Seawolf.
The Navy and its suppliers are not accustomed to cost as a dominant characteristic in weapons procurement, but this is part of the changing future of the force. The Centurion must be everything Commander Peppe catalogues, but it must be affordable—or it will never exist. □
“Save The Tailhook Association”
(See J. Towers, p. 26, January 1992; S. Hunt, pp. 27-28, March 1992; B. Tillman, pp. 19-20, April 1992; R. J. Kelly, p. 17, June 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Clifford A. Skelton, U.S. Navy—Mr. Tillman is missing the point. First, he should not presume to speak for all members of the Tailhook Association, especially if, as he put it, “The Secretary of the Navy can’t cut my hair and send me to Iraq.” Second— and most important—he skews the issue in the wrong direction, away from the true principles of leadership and accountability and toward a position cloaked in the disguise of camaraderie and esprit de corps.
As a carrier aviator yet to vacate the cockpit in 14 years of service, I endorse the fact that esprit de corps and camaraderie are essential to our particular specialty. However, as naval aviators, we must put the good of our service and our reputation above all else.
Assuming that the “combat-zone” an-' tics were offensive—ask yourself if you would have been comfortable with your I wife or sister there—we are then faced with two questions: Should the Tailhook Association and senior Navy leadership be held responsible for the offensive acts committed at the 1991 Tailhook symposium? Was the political response by Sec- j retary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett I III and various U.S. senators appropriate? j Responsibility is a partner of authority. Just as commanding officers are accountable for the actions of their commands, so, too, the Tailhook Association is accountable for the actions of its members. Our leaders—including the Tailhook Association’s—must fix the problem' With better supervision and coordination by well-intentioned volunteers from the Tailhook Association and the units that sponsored the suites, the disastrous outcome of Tailhook 1991 could have been avoided. Individually, not a single one of
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US wearing wings of gold could have stopped what we observed—collectively, we should have.
By aggressively condemning the actions and immediately—yet, I hope, temporarily—withdrawing Navy support, Secretary Garrett exhibited the foresight necessary to stave off the permanent destruction of our Tailhook Association. The power of public opinion over the military is tremendous. After Tailhook, the reputation of the Navy in the eyes of the U-S. public was at stake. Along with the grievous acts committed by the very few, the political side effects needed to be addressed as quickly as possible. Therefore, I commend Secretary Garrett and those Present and former naval aviators who enacted new policy immediately. Debriefs nre much more pleasant when we discuss °ur mistakes before our superiors have a chance to discuss them for us. □
Senior Chief Photographer’s Mate Robert L. Lawson, U.S. Navy (Retired), and former editor of The Hook—In recent months, much has been written regard- mg the events of the 1991 Tailhook Symposium. A great deal has been said about Bte suspension of Navy support of the Tailhook Association by Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III; descriptions of it as “political scapegoating” and knee-jerk reaction” are commonly heard, recriminations abound over who is to ulame and many wonder aloud if senior Navy officials are attempting to avoid responsibility for the conduct of naval offers at Tailhook 1991. Finger-pointing ls the name of the game.
As a card-carrying member (Charter .Timber #17, and Life Member #211) of ailhook since 1972—and a worker bee Pr it since 1970—1 must ask one ques- !°n: Why have we heard nothing from e Tailhook Association’s board of di- metors on this matter? With the excep- '°n of a few remarks by Captain Wilbur nutson, U.S. Navy (Retired), the chairman of the board, published in The Hook e nng the membership that all is well and 'Ve are smoothly sailing along, I have not seen or heard of—any action on the part ?. ,^le board to refute, defend, explain
I against the Association. Where is the adership of this organization and what ls it doing?
w,^erbaps an even better question is th 6re WaS Tailhook’s leadership during pe Planning stages of Tailhook 1991? ofN events that led to the withdrawal avy support took place at the parties ated to Tailhook 1991—they were not any way related to the Tailhook Symposium. However, the behavior at the parties was nothing new—this conduct has been going on as long as I have been with the organization. For many years, a large number of Tailhook members expressed their dismay over these antics and voiced their concern that, one day, the party people would get the organization into trouble. These pleas went unheard.
With the exception of a few, halfhearted admonishments to commanding officers of the units sponsoring the “admin suites” to ensure their people behaved themselves, little was done to get the party under control. (I’ll admit that, at one time, I was part of the problem— but we all must grow up sometime.)
In defense of the Tailhook Association, it must be remembered that the “admin suites” are not sponsored by the association—they are rented and operated by individual Navy commands. Furthermore, the vast majority of the people jamming these rooms are not Tailhook members; they neither attend the symposium nor contribute anything positive to the event.
However, these facts do not absolve Tailhook’s board and senior Navy officials of their responsibility for not having worked closely together to get control of the situation years ago. Instead,
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the party mentality prevailed and those in the positions to make changes preferred to wink and look the other way—until it was too late.
Ultimate responsibility lies with those in charge—it’s the Navy way. I do not presume to advise the Navy on what actions to take regarding its leaders. However, it is time for the board of directors of the Tailhook Association to stand up and be counted, to accept responsibility for their inaction and inadequate leadership. In short, they should resign.
Then, how do we fix the problem? Form a committee of senior naval aviators (active duty and retired) and qualified volunteers from the Tailhook Association. This committee could get things back on track. The real Tailhook Association is a professional organization that is important to the Navy. It is time to press on with the program. □
“The State of Orderly Liquidation”
(See J. P. Clancey and J. G. Hayashi, p. 13, April 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Michael J. Eisele, U.S. Naval Reserve—Mr. Clancey and Mr. Hayashi correctly pointed out, that
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the U. S. Merchant Marine is headed rapidly for extinction. For a number of reasons—primarily tied to labor costs and government regulation—U.S, ship operators have higher operating costs than their flag-of-convenience competitors. For decades, these higher costs were largely offset by direct government subsidies, which have since become politically unpopular. Remaining indirect subsidies— primarily cargo-preference requirements and cabotage restrictions—may prove insufficient to maintain a viable fleet. Moreover, indirect subsidies only shift the cost of maintaining a U.S. merchant fleet from the government to shippers and, ultimately, to the public. Because shippers historically form a more vocal constituency than ship operators, the maritime industry cannot rely on indirect subsidies forever.
Assuming that it is necessary, perhaps even vital, to maintain a U.S.-flag merchant fleet for our military and economic security, it is clear that Congress must act to eliminate the disadvantages faced by U.S. ship operators in global competition. Unfortunately, a number of these disadvantages cannot be erased. Certainly, Congress would be reluctant to restore U.S. competitiveness at the expense of safety, or by permitting the economic exploitation of foreign seamen on board U.S. merchant ships. Accordingly, our challenge is to overcome these obstacles by developing the kind of innovative approaches to ocean transportation for which Sea-Land and American President Lines are known. The government’s role in this process must be to foster innovation and competitiveness through supporting research and development, providing economic incentives, and using common sense in regulation.
The restoration of the U.S. merchant fleet will be a long and difficult process. There is, however, one small step Congress might take right now to help restore U.S. competitiveness in ocean shipping— eliminate outdated provisions of U.S. law that permit crewmen to file lawsuits against American ship operators for personal injuries. Based on a historical anomaly, the law permits injured seamen to have claims against their employers resolved by a jury, instead of receiving scheduled benefits under a workman's compensation scheme like almost all other U.S. workers. Replacement of the current system with a no-fault compensation scheme, similar to that administered by the U.S. Labor Department for longshoremen, would have the immediate effect of relieving U.S. ship operators of a substantial—and largely unpredictable liability virtually unique to the
U.S.-flag merchant fleet. Because collective legal fees in a contested case might easily exceed the compensation actually received by the injured seaman, a compensation scheme also would result in substantial savings in litigation costs. Although seamen would give up their right to a lump-sum recovery, they would benefit from the assurance that compensation is not based on fault, and would continue as long as any disability persists.
Of course, implementation of a compensation scheme would be—and has been—vigorously opposed by lawyers who represent injured seamen on a contingency-fee basis. Personal-injury lawyers understand that jury trials can produce spectacular awards, and that the threat of a jury overly sympathetic to a plaintiff can compel companies to settle questionable claims. Unfortunately, the renowned largess of U.S. juries results in substantial cost to U.S. ship operators; thus, reducing the competitiveness of the U.S.-flag fleet in an industry that exists on very thin margins. Given the bleak future described by Mr. Clancey and Mr. Hayashi, it is time for a sweeping reform of this archaic and inefficient system. O “World Navies in 1992”
lSee N. Friedman, pp. 104-133, March 1992 Proceedings)
“The Commanders Respond”
(See J. R. Thompson et. al., pp. 32-39, March
1992 Proceedings)
Colonel R. Menon, Republic of Singapore Army; Director, Public Affairs, Ministry * of Defense, Republic of Singapore—Mr. Friedman is free to express his opinions about the performance of the Victory- class missile corvettes of the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). There is, however, no basis for his claim that the RSN proposes “a new series of 12 [fast-attack boats], officially [italics mine) to counter a Malaysian program of 18 OPVs [offshore patrol vessels].”
In “The Commanders Respond” feature of the same issue, Commodore Teo Chee Hean, commander of the Republic of Singapore Navy, points out that Singapore’s regional policy is “consonant with the view of the Association of South East Asian Nations [which includes j Malaysia], that regional resilience is best ensured by having strong national resilience.” Contrary to Mr. Friedman's claim, Singapore views Malaysia’s plat1 to build 18 OPVs as contributing to national and regional resilience, and, therefore, welcomes the program. □
“Just Say No!!”
(See T. S. Downing, pp. 45-46, February 1992;
T. C. Stewart, p. 12, March 1992; G. P.
Crandall, P. Cornell, pp. 14-19, April 1992; L.
Y. Draude, pp. 19-20, A. G. Van Sant, pp. 1920, May 1992; Editor’s Note, pp. 14-15, June
1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Elizabeth P. Cronk, U.S. Navy—I am assured by wore dispassionate readers, and now in the June Proceedings by the editor, that Commander Crandall’s letter about women in the Navy was literary tongue- in-cheek. The humor is difficult for me to see and impossible for me to appreciate: I regularly hear the outrageous attitudes espoused in Commander Crandall’s letter put forward with straight-faced seriousness.
I chafe at seeing them in print in the Navy’s professional journal just as people of color would chafe at finding a racial slur on its pages. Would Proceed- mgs have published a letter—regardless °f its intent—arguing that racial minorities do not belong in the military and We should return to the not-so-long-ago days of segregation? I think not.
There is nothing even remotely funny about sexual discrimination. Commander Crandall’s letter did nothing to advance the discussion. It made the work of the Professionals at the Naval Academy and ln the fleet who are striving to abolish discriminatory barriers a great deal more difficult.
Proceedings has allowed Navy women t° be insulted. The Navy Times reports that Vice Admiral Ronald J. Zlatoper (deputy Chief of Naval Operations [ManPower, Personnel & Training]) is willing t° adopt the “Not on my watch, not on Wy ship, not in my Navy” policy against Sexual harassment. Is Proceedings ready t° support such a policy? □
Offer Service Members a Leave °f Absence”
(See N. L. Golightly, p. 97, October 1991; P. E. Wilson, p. 14, December 1991 Proceedings)
Chief Cryptologic Technician Harris M. ustin, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The prob- em of personnel sometimes needing a reak would not exist if the Navy did a orough background check into each re- j^uit’s reason for enlisting. More than ,kely. the Navy would discover that the Prospective sailor wants a break from a uh and monotonous civilian life. Today’s recruiting procedures should art with a psychological profile to dis- °ver a person’s ability to cope with men- and physical stress, to weed out those who seek to use the Navy as a stepping stone to a better position in the civilian world. The G.I. Bill and any of its offspring should be abolished and longterm service schools should be offered only to those who contract for a six-year hitch after graduation from the school. (The Navy has poured billions of dollars down the drain training people who are not committed to the Navy.)
It is unthinkable to have recruits go through all the training necessary to become proficient in their chosen fields only to lose them to some “agreed-upon hiatus” or “temporary deactivation.” Where does the relief crewman come from? In this age of constant changes in armament and equipment, what assurance do we have that those returning to their billets will be able to tackle them without yet another term at school?
The Navy needs people who are continually using their skills and aiming to climb the ladder to top enlisted status— or beyond. The Navy cannot afford to waste money on those who interrupt their service but keep the same privileges as those who stand by their enlistment oath. Why spoon-feed shirkers with on-base privileges, commissary and exchange, as well as medical benefits? The Navy should instead toughen up and take only those who can cut the mustard. In short, recruit warriors—not wimps. □
“Resignation in the Canadian
Navy”
(See N. F. Caldwell, pp. 85-90, March 1992
Proceedings)
Major Thomas E. Charbonneau, Canadian Armed Forces Reserve—While Commander Caldwell’s article is well written and adroitly reflects the present state of Canada’s navy, I must take exception to the caption accompanying the photograph of three members of the Canadian Rangers. The Rangers are not Eskimo home guardsmen armed “with rifles and a toll-free [telephone] number.” While not seen as soldiers per se, they are considered to be scouts much the same as natives were in the 19th-century American West.
The Rangers’ military accoutrements are not identical to the rest of the Canadian Forces and they are drawn from a unique cultural group. Nevertheless, they are readily identifiable as members of the military. The Rangers have two roles. First, there are those missions—such as coast watching—that can be carried out as part of their day-to-day activities. Second, because of their knowledge of the environment, they also are in great demand for supporting military exercises and operations (e.g., the Rangers played an important role in the reporting of radioactive debris from the crashed Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 in 1978). For the latter services, they are paid accordingly. The Rangers also receive basic military training in map reading, first aid, and other related subjects, which enables them to function as part of the Canadian military infrastructure.
Some Ranger patrols are under the aegis of Maritime Command and their principal duty is coast watching; the vast majority of Canadian Rangers, however, are located in the north and are under Northern Command’s control. We should not downplay the role of Rangers in southern latitudes, but it is in the north where the attributes of the Rangers—their deep knowledge of the environment, their preservation of a unique way of life, their ability to work and survive in a harsh climate, their hunting instincts, and their profound respect for nature—are most valued.
Contrary to Commander Caldwell’s implication, the Canadian Rangers are not an instrument of sovereignty. The Department of National Defense’s policy is not to make the Canadian Rangers into a military fighting machine, but rather to keep them as they are: a highly specialized pathfinder force of which the Canadian Armed Forces is justly proud. □
“Verifying Fleet Survivability with Empress II”
(See T. M. Wilbur, pp. 106-108, October 1991 Proceedings)
Richard K. Bott—Commander Wilbur’s narrative on full-scale testing of ships for vulnerability to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) raises several very important and not-so-subtle points about weapon-system acquisition. Every system is designed to meet an operational requirement; however, many of these systems never undergo testing to assess their ability to withstand expected threats—and still live up to those requirements.
The Empress II seagoing EMP-gen- erating system was developed with the specific goal of subjecting a ship operating in its natural environment to EMP. Many weapon systems never receive this type of full-scale testing. Testing a few individual subsystems within the sterile environment of the manufacturer's laboratory provides little data on now highly integrated subsystems may interact after receiving battle damage. Subsystem testing does not account for interaction between systems and the additional hazards such synergistic effects may pose for a ship, aircraft, or land vehicle in combat.
Many weapon systems are far too costly for destructive testing. Commander Wilbur pointed out that EMP testing was conducted at increasingly higher energy levels until system abnormalities occurred, at which point testing was discontinued until the affected systems could be temporarily hardened or disconnected. Unfortunately, this kind of non-destructive testing may not always provide accurate interpretations of interactions that occur when systems are damaged but still operating.
In an attack aircraft flying normally, redundant flight-control computers take electrical signals from a number of sources—pilot, airspeed indicator, angle- of-attack sensors, and accelerometers— and decide what inputs to provide to the control-surface actuators. If the aircraft’s flight control computer is hit, errant signals course through it and out to the actuators. However, backup computers will recognize a problem, outvote the damaged computer, and take it off line—not, however, before a twitch has occurred at the control surfaces. Flying at 20,000 feet, a pilot might be able to recover; flying on the nape-of-the-earth, it would be too late.
Without ballistic testing of the entire aircraft, it would be impossible to determine what would happen if its flight computer were hit in combat. If only the computer were tested, there would be no reaction of the actuator and hydraulic systems—hence, no twitch. If the computer were not supplied with electrical power, there would be no arcing and consequent smoldering or fire. If there were no fuel in the tank adjacent to the avionics bay, the spalling of the computer would not cause a fuel fire. The possibilities are complex, and nearly endless.
Fortunately, many people have seen the value of realistic testing for the systems our troops must have to defend our country. Congress passed legislation in 1986 that required vulnerability and lethality testing of selected major weapon systems prior to full-scale production. The law—referred to as the Live Fire Law— initially addressed only new acquisition of wheeled and tracked land vehicles; however, in 1987 it was expanded to include other major land, sea, and air systems. In 1988, the law was further amended to include upgrades and modifications to existing systems.
The Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army have been performing subsystem ballistic-vulnerability tests on many tactical weapon systems for years under the Defense Department’s Joint Live Fire
(JLF) program. The Navy and Air Force will soon be applying the knowledge and facilities they have developed through the JLF program to perform full-up testing of the F/A-18, AV-8B, and F-15 aircraft. The Army has completed extensive full- up testing of its Bradley armored fighting vehicle and Abrams M-l tank. All of these full-up tests are designed to fill the voids from previous testing, as well as identify the failure modes associated with cascading damage from system interaction. The value of this type of testing is indisputable.
But even destructive testing is not enough to assess a weapon system’s overall survivability, because each test provides only one data point for a specific threat traveling at a specific velocity impacting a specific component at a specific angle. Computer models and analyses must be used to complete the statistical assessment. They must also be relied upon for two other areas. One is the susceptibility of the system to acquisition, tracking, and engagement by enemy weapon systems. The other is the simulation of complete weapon systems that are too expensive to test destructively, e.g., a submarine or an Aegis cruiser. These models and analyses require initial and recurring sanity checks through review, testing, upgrading, and incorporation of data—four areas requiring improvement by all four services and by private industry, as well. □
“Stalking the Enemy’s Coast”
(See S. Edwards, pp. 56-62, February 1992; J
Stockdale, G. Matlock, pp. 20-23, April 1992
Proceedings)
Commander Robert Laske, U S Navy (Retiredj—I would like to substantiate Admiral Stockdale’s version of the events of 4 August 1964. As the communications officer of the Military Assistance Command Special Operations Group (MACSOG) that night, I was in the group’s communications center, monitoring maritime operations and related signal intelligence traffic with the chief of the group, Colonel Clyde Russell, U.S. Army. We wondered what could possibly be going on with the DeSoto (electronic intelligence) patrol when signal intelligence indicated that there were no North Vietnamese boats at sea. Colonel Russell’s assessment was, “The Navy is shooting at whales.”
Time and time again, I have seen references to signals intelligence that supposedly confirms North Vietnamese action on the night of 4 August. From my vantage point, there is no such evidence
If this episode in history is to be clarified—which it should—it will be necessary to have full access to the relevant signals intelligence. Unfortunately, the National Security Agency’s policy of protecting “sources and methods” prevents such an examination. □
John B. Dwyer—In discussing the establishment of the Military Assistance Command Special Operations Group (MACSOG), Mr. Edwards states that MACSOG controlled “maritime operations codenamed 34 Alpha.” This was the designation of the operational plan authorizing a number of covert actions against North Vietnam. On the organizational chart in the MACSOG command history, maritime operations are listed as “07” and later, as the Maritime Studies Group, designated OPS-37.
Over the length of its missions, the Special Operations Group operated a total of 26 fast patrol-torpedo boats (PTFs) of which 16—not 14—were of the Norwegian Nasty-class. PTFs 17-26 were either U.S.-built copies of the Nasty by John Trumpy & Sons, or 95-foot Osprey-class PTFs built by Seaward Seacraft. Contrary to Mr. Edwards’s description of the Nastys as being “made of marine plywood,” they actually had double-planked mahogany hulls.
Mr. Edwards’s description of the Da Nang-based U.S. Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD) is somewhat in error. Actually, the NAD was the cover name for the Special Operations Group’s maritime operations. It was comprised of a 12-man SEAL mobile training team and a Marine Corps force reconnaissance element, as well as boat training and repair and maintenance teams from Mobile Support Team-1, commanded by Lieutenant Burton L. Knight, U.S. Naval Reserve.
As for Mr. Edwards’s statement that General William Westmoreland, U.S. Army, commander of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV), requested DeSoto patrol coverage of SOG sabotage targets in early July 1964, the MACSOG command history states that: “In July, MACV set up July-August DeSoto [electronic intelligence] patrol coordination procedures, indicating OPLAN 34-A MAROPS compatibility, providing MACV always had accurate knowledge of the patrol’s whereabouts.” (Italics mine.)
When the 31 July DeSoto patrol entered the Gulf of Tonkin, SOG operations had to be scheduled no sooner than 36 hours after the passage of the DeSoto ship in any specific area. That is hardly what Edwards is saying. □
“Conception Is the Place”
(See S. W. Mitchell, pp. 77-78, February 1992; A. Molander, pp. 23-26, April 1992 Proceedings)
“The Landfall Is Samana Cay”
(See }. Judge, p. 78, February 1992; A. Molander, pp. 23-26, April 1992 Proceedings)
“Watlings Island Is San
Salvador”
(See S. L. Morison, p. 79, February 1992; A.
Molander, pp. 23-26, April 1992 Proceedings)
Keith Pickering—It is amazing that advocates of the many (there are at least nine) landfall theories pay the most attention and give the greatest weight to description of the features of the landfall in Columbus’s log. These features-the lake, the reef, the harbor, and the little peninsula-are so common in the Bahamas that almost any island can be—and has been—seen as a perfect match to the log. At the same time, many of these same advocates have discounted, ignored, or even rewritten those descriptions in the log which are the most specific and quantifiable: the distances and directions from one point to the next.
Dr. Mitchell’s article is a case in point: Columbus has written “leagues” in the log; Dr. Mitchell reads “miles.” It is necessary to realize the Diario speaks in two voices: during the passage through the Bahamas, Las Casas quotes Columbus’s log directly, “in the very words of the Admiral.” The remaining 88% of the Diario was composed by Las Casas himself, using Columbus’s log as a guide; in these abstracted portions, Las Casas speaks of Columbus in the third person. This is an important distinction, because in the directly quoted section not once does Columbus use miles as a measurement for either speed or distance. When directly quoted, he uses leagues exclusively. It is true that out of the 444 measurements of distance or speed in the Diario, there are 12 instances where Las Casas strikes out “leagues” and substitutes “miles.” However, there is not a single instance of the reverse which is precisely the pattern one would expect if Las Casas were translating into miles from an original manuscript that used only leagues. It makes no sense at all if, as Dr. Mitchell supposes, Las Casas were converting from miles into leagues.
In order for Dr. Mitchell’s theory to make sense, one has to accept not only that Columbus wrote miles in the original log, but also that Las Casas misquoted Columbus’s measurements in five specific places, while quoting him accurately in three other specific places. The best that can be said of this scenario is that it is highly unlikely.
Samuel Eliot Morison was apparently well aware of this problem, since he rejects using miles altogether. The track from Conception and the track from Watlings are largely similar, and therefore share the same weakness: Rum Cay is far too small to be Columbus’s Santa Maria Island. Morison solved this problem by inventing the “alongshore league,” which he placed at 1.5 nautical miles— less than half the size of the league he used elsewhere. The alongshore-league theory requires belief that Columbus used the same measurement in two different ways in the same document, and sometimes within the same sentence. Once again, Columbus’s words have been twisted to fit a theory.
Mr. Judge—and Gustavus Fox before him—therefore deserve great credit for showing us a track that fits the log perfectly without such awkward mental gymnastics. By choosing the Crooked-Ack- lins group as Santa Maria, all discrepancies with the distances recorded in the log disappear. The problem with Samana Cay, as Mr. Morison correctly points out, is that Columbus went north- northeast along San Salvador, and Samana has no such coastline.
None of the three authors mentions that there is only one place in the log where Columbus tells us the direction that San Salvador lies from any other point. When Columbus arrives at Santa Maria on the 15 October, he says of the island: “I found that the face which is in the direction of San Salvador runs north- south, and that there are in it five leagues.” In other words, San Salvador lies due east of a north-south coastline five leagues long. This description does not fit Conception, it does not fit Watlings, and it does not fit Samana. The only place in the central Bahamas that fits this description is Plana Cays, lying due east of Acklins at the correct distance described by Columbus.
The idea of Plana Cay as the first landfall was first put forward by Ramon Di- diez-Burgos in 1974, but since he wrote in Spanish, his theory has not gained wide exposure in this country. Of course, Plana Cay has the requisite lake, reef, harbor, and peninsula. The track from Plana] like the track from Samana, fits the log perfectly without assuming any farfetched errors in transcription or interpretation. But unlike Samana, Plana has a coastline bearing north northeast. And unlike any other island, Plana faces a coastline five leagues long running north-south, at a distance of five to seven leagues—just as
Columbus described. Plana Cay is thus the only landfall site that is a perfect match to the log in every respect. □
“Naval Institute/Kodak 30th Annual Photo Contest Winners”
(See J. Debevec et. al., pp. 65-81, April 1992
Proceedings)
Commander Strafford Morss, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired) and Project Manager, Battleship Texas Restoration Project, May 1987-July 1989—While the First Prize photograph-the Texas (BB-35) in dry dock—is grand, I must take some exception, however, to the accompanying caption.
The Texas started her career as a museum ship—and a memorial—in Houston, Texas, on 21 April 1948. The ship was operated by a state commission until 1 September 1983 when the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department assumed custody. By the early 1980s, leaks from above and major flooding from below— I always mixed with oil—made it apparent that the ship had materially deteriorated beyond the capabilities of the commission to deal with her problems.
In 1987, a bill—sponsored by the Texas congressional delegation and providing nearly $5.1 million from Navy operating funds to dry dock the ship—was passed.
To move the Texas to a shipyard, she j had to be floated, her navigational draft minimized, her stern area strengthened, t and her watertight integrity improved.
A consortium of Houston Ship Channel companies, under the leadership of the Shell Oil Company, volunteered to assist Texas Parks and Wildlife in trying to float the ship by providing the equipment to remove, transport, and dispose of the water-oil mix that was flooding the Texas. Eventually, more than 2.6 million gallons of the mix would be handled.
The Texas began to float on 2 October 1987. The tone for the next 15 months was set that day, when the barge | to which the water-oil mix was being j transferred folded in the middle.
The Texas herself often seemed recalcitrant, unwilling to be saved. On 13 December 1988, she resisted the efforts of seven tugs to pull her from her berth, finally coming free after eight hours. Mov- ! ing her to the dry dock in Galveston, Texas, took more than ten hours and was , a race against rapid flooding. But the ! Texas finally was settled on the blocks of the “Big T” dry dock at Todd Shipyard in Galveston. In spite of the flooding, block clearance was achieved—thanks to an increase in water salinity from her San
Jacinto Battleground berth to Galveston.
The photograph shows the ship at the completion of the initial hull survey. The white markings of the hull are plate thickness readings and some plate removal has started. The prominent foremast house has been removed for major work and set on the dry dock tanktop, forward of the ship (including the rigging, moving the foremast house was a 42.5-ton tandem-crane lift).
The superstructure, mast houses, and mast platforms required more extensive work than expected, and the underwater hull was in far worse shape than had been believed.
The Texas has 92 fuel tanks; many had leaked and there was fuel oil everywhere—
258 tanks, voids, and compartments required gas freeing (30 tanks had been cleaned before she arrived in Galveston). In the gasoline flasks located in the bow, 5,000 gallons of 100-octane aviation gasoline were discovered. The tank compartment had been flooded since 1948.
The gasoline had been there since 1945 and should have been removed prior to the Texas' s 1946-48 lay-up.
Out of 68,000 square feet of shell and blister plating, 14,100 square feet had to be replaced. More than 43,000 leaking or sUspicious rivets were ring-welded in the ship’s bottom.
The old wood deck had been removed Prior to installing a concrete deck on the rnain and 01 levels in 1968. The wood deck had been bolted through the steel deck. When the concrete was installed, the bolts were not removed nor were the air holes plugged. It was obvious that water coming through these holes ac- eounted for much of the main-deck leakage. A new wood deck was installed after the Texas left the shipyard.
More than 3,000 square feet of main deck plating was replaced as was 1,100 square feet of inner-bottom plating in the engine room bilges.
Re-creations of the antiaircraft gun and director sponsons and shields, removed bV the Navy in 1948 to minimize maintenance, were installed. Ten 40-mm quadruple mounts—most of them removed from the USS Missouri (BB-63) during her reactivation—were mounted in their appropriate 1945 locations (four 1.1-in. gun quadruple mounts were removed). A reproduction of the ship’s SK- radar antenna was built by the Parks and Wildlife Department and set on the mainmast. The weight of the reproduction antenna was within 100 pounds of the original antenna, blown away in a 1960s hurricane.
The entire exterior of the ship was cleaned to bare metal and painted. Above the waterline, the Texas was repainted in Pacific Blue, as she was in 1945.
The prize winning photograph was taken in late August 1989, with the Texas ready to undock. She went alongside until February 1990, when she docked again for repair of some relatively minor leakage and bottom touch-up. More work was done at a temporary berth in the Houston Ship Channel at a pier at Green’s Bayou. Finally, in September 1990, the Texas moved into her newly refurbished, fully floating berth at the San Jacinto Monument, and was reopened after a two-year hiatus.
It is apparent that the money from the Navy did not come close to covering the entire cost of restoring the Texas. It is estimated that the total price tag for the job was more than $18 million. Many might question the wisdom of expending so much money on a museum ship.
The Texas is important for many reasons. Commissioned on 12 March 1914, she is the sole survivor of approximately
A diamond in the rough—the Texas (BB-35 ) awaits her multi-million dollar, 26-month restoration in Galveston, Texas.
135 dreadnoughts built between 1906 and 1922. As the only surviving early dreadnought. she exemplifies the international competition in battleship construction— a factor in the arms race that has been deemed a major cause of World War I. The Texas's construction was the result of the cooperation between the U.S. Navy and U.S. steel companies in the development of the specialty-steel industry in this country. Her two steam-powered, four-cylinder, triple-expansion main engines, a National Engineering Landmark, make her an important relic of not only world naval history, but of world industrial history as well.
The Texas is a National Historic Landmark and is properly considered an international treasure of which people of the United States—particularly, the state of Texas—-are the trustees. □