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By Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, GCB, ADC
Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, threats to Western security will pop up again. Operation Desert Storm—here, HMS London, on patrol in the Persian Gulf during the recent hostilities, launches her Lynx helicopter—suggests the pattern for future responses to those threats: cooperation and the ability to fight and win.
Dramatic changes are occurring in the international landscape. Far-reaching developments are all about us, and we in NATO face new challenges, opportunities, and risks. But an emerging pattern for the future is to be seen already. Whatever the changing scene in this global picture, the problems of yesterday are still here today in some measure and will be with us tomorrow. We must remain mindful of our continuing role in ensuring our mutual security and, however our security might be defined in the future, we must preserve our ability to defend our interests.
“Security” in the Post-Cold War World
Crises are not new. For the United Kingdom, there have been more than 80 conflicts involving the armed services since World War II. These were not merely colonial actions; in many instances our soldiers, sailors, or airmen stood side by side with Americans. There has been only one year since 1945 in which a British serviceman has not been killed in some form of combat. Indeed, we do not need to look far into the past to see the pattern for future operations; Operation Desert Storm.
If Europe is 3,000 miles east of U.S. Atlantic coast ports, Kuwait is some 10,000 miles to the west. Either way, to respond to such crises, whether they were in Libya, Kuwait, or Bangladesh, U.S. servicemen and women had to cross the major oceans of the world. The United States must therefore be a maritime nation—not only for the obvious geostrategic reasons, but trade and resources so dictate, as well.
The United Kingdom confronts a similar geography. Our servicemen must cross water even to serve in Germany. We also have residual treaties and other commitments around the world. Some stem from colonial days and provide for the security of very small territories which cannot sensibly stand alone: Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands. Others, like the Five Power Defense Agreement (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and United Kingdom), are founded on friendship and mutual interest.
And of course our economic health is dependent on the sea. More than 93% of the United Kingdom’s exports go by sea. Of the critical minerals, we import 90% of our chromium, 100% of our manganese, and 98% of our vanadium—all by the sea. The rest of Europe is dependent on the sea also. Some 30% of Europe’s oil comes from the Middle East—by sea—as does a high proportion of its natural resources.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, there is now a wider meaning to defense for us in NATO. Naturally we remain concerned with the physical defense of our homeland, but there is also a wider meaning to security in the sense that our world is increasingly more interrelated and interdependent, not just in an economic sense but in security terms. This encompasses environmental, humanitarian, trade, safety, international crime, arms sales, investment, and economic concerns. I also include here the “war” on drugs requiring vigilant surveillance and swift interdiction.
We need to remain aware of the specific problem areas of the world. Too often we have said that crises occur in unexpected ways at unexpected times in unexpected places. If crises have been unexpected, it is because our eyes have been centered so much on the Soviet Union during the past half-century. Our intelligence resources and surveillance capabilities, especially those from space, should be adjusted to ensure that potential security problems can be contained, wherever possible, in advance of actual hostilities. Surveillance is vital to enable us to ensure that peace is kept, crises managed, and hostilities deterred.
I suggest therefore that there should be a shift in the direction of our intelligence and surveillance efforts. The picture we need to cover in the future is a wider one with the emphasis on what crisis will happen where and when. Our intelligence effort should be more on prediction than on deep technical analysis. This will increase the importance of human intelligence: knowledge of a potential enemy’s intentions may be more important than a detailed knowledge of his military capability. The day of Mata Hari may well be back!
Area of Worry
To address the areas of worry in the world, I must start with what was the Soviet Union. Of course we welcome the change in political direction. We welcome the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe. We acknowledge that the former Soviet Union as such is no longer an adversary. We are moving away from the period of having to concentrate on measuring the Soviets intent and capability. The aggressiveness of their intent has crumbled already, and their military capability, if it is proportional to their economy, cannot be far behind. Already we hear of severe problems affecting their armed forces: draft dodging, breakdown of discipline, lack of
training, poor morale, and even inadequate food supplies.
And yet, the potential is growing for political, economic, ethnic, nationalistic, and military instability to affect us NATO partners. In Turkey, NATO borders the Georgian and Armenian republics, where civil unrest and open conflict have been seen in recent months. The distance from NATO’s eastern German border to Russia is the same as from San Diego to San Francisco. In Norway, with its tiny population, NATO borders Russia, itself. Whatever the future of the disintegrated Union, whether the armed forces remain under central control or not, the Russian military potential will still be the largest in Europe by far. It is only natural—and prudent— that we should be concerned about the former Soviet Union.
Likewise, the Central and Eastern European countries’ transition from communism has not been easy. If prosperity eludes them in the future, there is undoubtedly potential for great instability and conflict. Frustrating their search for economic wealth is a complex web of nationalities and religions that all but ignores the many borders, most obviously in the Balkans. Yugoslavia is but one example where we have seen the consequences of 12 months of turmoil. Another example might be the millions of Hungarians resident in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Ukraine. Parts of the Ukraine have lived under five flags in this century—Czarist Russian, Polish, German, Soviet, and now its own. Its very name means “Frontier.” So Eastern Europe offers us both good and bad news—good news that Soviet domination and the Warsaw Pact threat have evaporated; bad news that this has left increased instability in its place.
Turning to Western Europe, we see a complex picture, a mix of exhilarating success and seemingly intractable problems. Europeans are searching for a “European” identity, but continue to wrestle with the problems of how to accommodate the growing number of nations that want to join the European club. There is the success of NATO, but the problems of how to accommodate with NATO the appeal for a common European security policy. There is the economic success of the European Community; yet, like the United States, we confront problems as we emerge from recession. There is the astounding achievement of
rorists, Irish Republican Army, Red Army Action HezboE lah, and the like. There are very many who profit from drugs and narcotics. Our security concerns thus, are much wider than NATO’s previous focus on military issues.
How should we respond to future crises and conc^s? There are of course useful lessons from the very recent past from which we must learn.
- First, we should have noticed earlier that a clear formula was emerging in Iraq that had al'the a '
a potential crisis: Plenty of manpower. Plen > Y-
Huge purchases of military equipment. Absolute autho -
itarian political power.
- A second lesson is the importance of international pa - nership in crisis control. There will be few occasions w en any nation will undertake crisis prevention or control on its own, perhaps not always for military reasons but certainly for political ones. Coalitions will be necessary— quite possibly under the aegis of the United Nations. We are seeing this point emerge in the Yugoslav crisis.
- Third, cost. Crisis response is expensive. Many Third World countries are themselves armed with very modem technologically advanced equipment. Such weapons require costly, high-tech countermeasures, particularly if casualties are to be kept to a minimum. Casualties are a very important measure of “cost.’ The media will ensure that the world knows about casualties, especially in the aftermath of Desert Storm. Had there been Cable
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German unification, tempered by the problems of meeting understandable expectations at a staggering cost ot nearly $90 billion a year.
Finally, throughout the world we see, sadly, many areas of political, economic, and military instability. There are stiU those who espouse terrorism—ETA or Basque ter-
The good news is that the Cold War is over affbn'40 years; the bad news is that in its place is increased ■nstab.hty here, opposition forces celebrate in front of the burning Parliament building in Tbilisi.
Crisis Response
Network News coverage of the Battle of the Somme in World War I with tens of thousands of lives being lost each day, it is inconceivable that the battle would have been allowed to continue.
► A fourth point is Iraq’s—and other states, as well—ability to obtain sophisticated arms and nuclear materials despite the existing controls and non-proliferation regimes.
These last two points lead me to the subject of non-proliferation and arms control, which might be characterized as preventive medicine, part of our overall approach to security. Tight non-proliferation and arms-control regimes, good surveillance, and verification are the means that should make the military unnecessary. The balance has shifted toward this preventive medicine and, hopefully, away from the need for military surgery, certainly
on a global war scale. .
We must recognize that there is still a wide-reaching requirement to tighten international non-proliferation regimes. A sensible balance must be sought between export of technologies and high-tech weaponry, and the retention of our own industrial base; between control of exports to undesirable customers, and driving those customers to develop their own indigenous industries. These thoughts prompted our Prime Minister, John Major, to take the initiative shortly after the Iraqi conflict to propose the new “United Nations Register of Conventional Arms” to include both arms holdings and transfers. Approved by the U.N. General Assembly, I most sincerely believe that this initiative merits the support of us all.
Arms control has a place here too. It has been the instrument used in redressing the nuclear imbalance, in blunting the Soviet military machine, and improving the East-West conventional balance. Arms control can codify the dramatic changes and reductions that are taking place, principally in Europe, through the ratification and implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Arms control may also be an appropriate vehicle to give us reassurance about the nuclear weapons held by the new countries of what was the Soviet Union. But arms control is bureaucratic, and verification is expensive. We may ultimately be better served and security enhanced in some regions of the world such as Europe by moving away from negotiated binding reductions to voluntary structural ones.
That being said, I question whether maritime arms control as such is sensible. Yes, we have already some useful measures, such as the Incidents at Sea Agreements, that increase confidence among nations. Furthermore, the reduction of some weapons may be of value, as we have seen in the strategic arms arena (START). But before considering any arms control measures that might impinge on the actual structures of our own naval forces, we must appreciate that there is a continuing need, especially for the United States, to maintain a substantial global naval capability for use in contingencies around the world. Sup pose several years ago that we had negotiated a maritime arms control regime for Europe in which Soviets ha achieved reductions in U.S. carrier battle groups, to as tew as nine or even six. This would have had a devastating impact on available naval forces elsewhere in the worl •
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and would have hamstrung the U.S. response to Saddam Hussein’s aggression. Thus, from my perspective, global control measures, if any, must be viewed against an overall, global security picture. I personally find it hard to visualize how they could contribute at all to world security and stability.
The Future
European security will gradually develop a cohesiveness. The formation of the new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) is a major step forward in providing dialogue and cooperation with the Central and Eastern European states. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has provided a useful forum for dialogue across a wide front, touching many issues that contribute to the broader concept of security. The European Community (EC) is developing an interest in the political aspects of European security. In addition there is the Western European Union (WEU) which can act as a useful bridge between the European Community and NATO.
But the traditional security arrangements will continue to have their vital place. Our Atlantic Alliance is undergoing a profound change, but it will remain as the prime rock of stability. We Europeans need American armed forces in Europe. Let us remember that NATO has not just been the guarantor of security for the last 42 years, it was and will remain the only organization able to provide insurance policy, preventive medicine, and, if all fails, the surgeon’s cure.
Europe is still both interdependent and interrelated with the United States. This was evident in the Kuwait campaign, where the linkage between the U.S. and the European participants proved so important, as did the relationship with the Soviet Union and Mr. Gorbachev. Both in Europe and world wide, European security interest remains indivisible from that of the United States. We are firm believers in the need to maintain the transatlantic link that has served us so well.
In the wider world, the United Nations is now assuming a higher profile. The change in superpower relations and the responsible position now taken by the
There are many lessons to be learned from the recent past. Among them, manpower, money, modern military equipment, and absolute authorian political power add up to a potential crisis—here, Baghdad, February 1990.
Russians have allowed us to see the United Nations as an instrument of global foreign and security policy. It is an instrument to be used in dialogue. It can provide the overall umbrella for security, and it can provide the international mandate for operations such as Desert Storm. But peacemaking is a very different task from peacekeeping. The United Nations does not in itself have any special powers to force a peace, for example between internal warring factions in Yugoslavia. Consensus is still the key, and the United Nations is better fitted as a keeper of the peace once this has been established. And it is worth noting in this regard that three (United Kingdom, France, and Russia) of the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council are European, and three (United Kingdom, France, and United States) of the permanent five are members of NATO. If Russia’s Boris Yeltsin is eventually successful in achieving membership in NATO, as he has already requested, the circle will have been joined.
Notwithstanding the increasingly multipolar nature of the world, superpowers are still enormously important, not only for their restraining strength, but for much more. The demise of the Soviet Union puts huge pressures on the United States as the dominant and arguably only genuine superpower. On frequent occasions, the world looks to the U.S. President for leadership and bold initiatives for peace and stability. There is risk therefore that the United States will become a lonely superpower and the U.S. President a lonely man. We appreciate the fact that the United States needs political as well as military support from its friends. And I am proud that the United Kingdom has been to the fore in providing that support. We gave it in the U.N. Security Council when Washington needed political support against Iraq.
In moving to this era of continuing crisis-response, we must ask the question whether the United States can do it alone. Clearly Europe cannot. Besides any political aspects, we have only a limited military capability when compared to that of the United States. In particular, we lack strategic lift; space-based surveillance; and many command, control, and communications and intelligence capabilities (C3I). So we hope to continue to cooperate with the United States.
But how? Where do our defense arrangements stand? Several of these arrangements are limited by treaty. NATO is an example. Yet NATO acknowledges the wider meaning of security and the impact on NATO security of events outside the NATO area. Given the reality of global interdependence, it is questionable whether there can now be such clear-cut and separate security zones in our world today. However, for historic, cultural, linguistic, and other reasons, certain countries may be more willing and able than others to make a specific contribution in future crises. I am thinking here of past examples of the Belgians
- Third, interoperability. Successful coalition efforts require in-depth understanding of allies’ capabilities and limitations at all levels. Political issues inevitably affect tactical deployment. Rules of engagement need to be harmonized. It is one thing to have 20 navies operating together as in recent Gulf operations, but there is a need for common political guidance, be it for boarding a merchant ship when enforcing an embargo or deciding how close each nation would allow its ships to go to the front line.
- Fourth, achieving interoperability. We were fortunate in the Gulf that 19 of the 20 navies involved were used (to a greater or lesser extent) to exercising NATO procedures. The odd one out was Poland, but even then there is a lesson there because we are now receiving warm indications from the former Warsaw Pact nations of their desire to cooperate and participate in international security tasks.
- Interoperability applies to materials, as well as operations and tactics. Considerable progress has been made duce force levels, surveillance must be enhanced. And this does not just mean intelligence systems. It means people who understand the country and the language of the potential aggressor and the way he thinks. It is no good being able to count the grains of sand in the desert from space if we do not know when offensive action is planned. In short, we need more human intelligence.
Conclusion
We must acknowledge change and the new—and old— challenges we face together. But while doing so, I believe we can draw some clear messages from our recent operations.
The first message is that crises do happen. Do not let our politicians think that their security worries are over with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The second message is that multinational cooperation must be the backbone to crisis response.
Third, NATO has a continuing and vital role in our mu-
in this, but much more remains to be done. I cannot but remember that in the Gulf we could refuel from U.S. Navy East Coast tankers, but most Europeans lacked commonality of equipment to take fuel from the U.S. Navy’s West Coast ones.
► Fifth, command, control, and communications and intelligence. Clearly C3I came of age in Desert Storm. It was conclusively proved that C3I is essential for successful operations. To employ our fewer assets most effectively, we will need even better capabilities in the future. But we must recognize that this is expensive, particularly if satellite-based.
^ Finally, crises and their management. Crises come at short notice, and their “management” will be difficult. Given that the former Soviet Union is subsiding, how far can we reduce not just force levels but force readiness? Obviously we cannot afford to cut either too far. If we re- tual security. Related to that is my fourth message, that Britain will remain the United States’ staunchest ally and that the Royal Navy will remain, for the U.S. Navy, a loyal and reliable partner.
My final and principal message is that we in the military must warmly embrace wider concepts: not just defense, narrowly defined, but security, widely interpreted. But in so doing we must never lose the ability to fight, and win, at the highest level of hostilities if we are forced to do so.
Admiral Sir Julian Oswald is Chief of Naval Staff and the First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy. The Naval Institute published his article, "NATO's Naval Forces Must Endure," in the November 1990 Proceedings. The current article was adapted from the Admiral's 6 January 1992 keynote address at the Naval Institute-AFCEA Seminar in San Diego, California.