This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired)
In the broadest sense, “joint” operations of land and sea forces have been around at least since 480 B.C., when Athenian Epibatae —perhaps the earliest soldiers of the sea—set out to stop the invading Persians. A new stage in the evolution of jointness arrived with World War I and reached its crossover point in World War II, linking air operations with those of land and sea forces. Today, we stand on the threshold of a third stage—as seen in Operation Provide Comfort (here, Kurdish refugees cross a U.S. check point as they reach safe haven)—in which task-force components shed their service identitities as they become caught up in the drive toward their overarching goal: to accomplish the mission.
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, though traditionally loath to call their blue-green operations “joint” because the two services coexist in the same military department, have worked side-by-side since their inception. Over the years, their relationship has been so tightly intertwined that few outside the Navy department have fully understood it. Nowhere else in the world does “Navy-Marine Team” carry the same depth of meaning.
In March 1776, within months of the Continental Navy and Marines first being authorized, Commodore Ezek Hopkins staged an amphibious raid in the Bahamas, with a landing party of 234 Marines and sailors. From this spotty beginning (Hopkins's men missed major gunpowder stores, but still needed two weeks to load all the captured weapons and equipment on board ship for the return trip). The Navy and Marines survived the transition from sail to steam with their relationship battered but intact, and a new joint mission—seizing and holding advance bases—emerging. Drawing upon lessons learned from the failed Allied landing at Gallipoli, they worked through the 1920s and 1930s to develop amphibious doctrine, tactics, and equipment that would eventually prove its worth in World War II— while the Army worked with its own Air Corps to integrate land and air operations.
A crossover point into “jointer” operations was reached during World War II, and epitomized by the multi-service task forces assembled for the major landings at Normandy in the European Theater and Okinawa in the Pacific. Since then, blue-green naval task forces have continued to respond to many contingencies, but—in practice—very little expansion in scope or duration has sufficed to throw any operation into the joint arena.
Ushering in the third stage of jointness was the Gold- Water-Nichols Act of 1986, which has spurred important changes in doctrine and organization, and even more important ones, over time, in service attitudes toward joint operations. The centerpiece of new joint awareness has been Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, commanded by a unified commander and featuring a high degree of integration among all service components. As the land- warfare phase of Desert Storm came to an end in February 1991, however, a rebellion inside Iraq took center stage and moved the third stage of jointness up another notch.
To whatever extent they are still lingering at the door, even philosophically—the time has come for the Navy and Marines to join the jointness party and open up to the third stage, all the way. The future will call for truly joint task forces in the power-projection role, and most of them will undoubtedly have strong naval components.
On 2 August 1990, the cay Iraq invaded Kuwait, President George Bush heralded that future. At the Aspen Institute in Colorado, he hailed both the end of a divided Europe and of the Cold War, saying that, nonetheless,
. . prudence demands that we maintain an effective [strategic nuclear and defensive] deterrent” and that . . the United States will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies want and need us there.”
The President went on to say that:
“. . . the world remains a dangerous place with serious threats to important U.S. interests . . . Outside of Europe, America must possess forces able to respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur . . . [forces] ... in existence [and] ready to act . . . [with] speed and agility . . . forces that give us global reach . . . [troops that are] well-trained, tried, and tested—ready to perform every mission we ask of them ... a new emphasis on flexibility and versatility . . . readiness must be our highest priority.”
The President left no doubt that each service would bring to these power-projection forces its own mutually reinforcing capabilities. Fiscal realities and a downsized U.S. military surely demand minimal duplication and cooperative effort. While the Navy/Marine Corps is a team, it is not the only team. Navy/Air Force is also a team. For example, some Navy people may want the fleet to own KC-10 refuelers; mutual reinforcement means that the Air Force buys these and flies them for the fleet, under joint command and control. The Army needs fast sealift, so the Navy and the Army also are a team. And so, under common field command, are the Army/Marine Corps and the Marine Corps/Air Force. Desert Shield and Desert Storm decisively proved all that.
Today, amphibious operations are the sole preserve of the Marine Corps. Am phibious assault, the principal type, calls for multipurpose assault ships, air cushion landing craft (LCACs), seabased helicopters, the Harrier (AV- 8B), and in due time the Osprey (MV-22) tilt-rotor aircraft. These items will be scarce; Marine units trained in their use will remain plentiful. Army forces (although they made most of the amphibious assaults in World War II) are no longer needed for that purpose. The Army has probably conducted its last amphibious operation.2
Another fact is that the largest, purely Navy/Marine Corps—purely amphibious—operation of the future will probably be made by a Marine Expeditionary Unit, with a landing force of reinforced-battalion size. The unit also will likely be special-operations capable, and in a forward deployment afloat. Once it has held—or kicked the door open, it would likely be followed ashore by a joint task force. Such a force would likely number about 50,000— instead of the 500,000 of Desert Shield/Storm.
Operation Provide Comfort________________________
As the Gulf War’s fighting was ending on 28 February 1991, a Kurdish rebellion erupted in northern Iraq. By
28 March the Kurds had taken control of a wide area. Saddam Hussein then attacked the Kurds with tanks and attack helicopters, the Kurdish guerrillas were overwhelmed, their people fled from the cities and towns; within a week, effective resistance ceased. Worldwide television showed the Kurds—cold, wet, suffering from hunger and disease, and dying in the mountains of northern Iraq and Turkey.
Joint Task Force Proven Force, an air and special-operations task force under command of Major General James L. Jamerson, U.S. Air Force, had operated out of Incirlik and Batman during Desert Storm. By the end of
USCINCEUR
(Stuttgart)
I”Liaison with commanders of other nations’"^ | forces: UK, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, ( | Belgium, Australia, Germany, Luxembourg, ( ! Canada (all forces tacon, w/o MOUs)
CINCUSNAVEUR
(Naples)
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT (Incirlik Airbase, Turkey) Lt.Gen. Shalikashvili, USA
(spt)
(tacon)
I
Medical Units (coordinated by the JTF Surgeon)
Civil Affairs Command
Sixth Fleet
,TF 60------------
(CVBG) Provide CAP (per JFACC)
.TF61 (PhibGru8)
.TF62 (24 MEU) Provide/spt USN/USMC units tacon to CTF P-C.
r
AFFOR
(Incirlik)
BG Hobson, USAF
Air delivery and airlift for TFs Alpha and Bravo
Combat air patrol AWACS Air refueling JFACC (incl FW and RW air delivery)
T
CSC/ARFOR (Silopi, Turkey) BG Burch, USA
Manage combined logistic support Act as ARFOR
r
TF ALPHA (Silopi, Turkey)
BG Potter, USA
Assist Kurds in
mountains, Iraq and Turkey Assess camps Coordinate drops Search and rescue Support bases, at Silopi and Yukosekova
TF BRAVO (Zakhu. Iraq)
MG Gamer, USA
Establish a security zone/TAOR vie Zakhu and elsewhere in Iraq Construct and operate camps Transfer control to civil relief agencies
IJ.S.Armv
10th Special Forces Group 3/325 Airborne Infantry Battalion 4th (aviation) Brigade, 8th Inf Div (Mech) and assorted Army aviation units from other commands 18th Engineer Brigade 18th Military Police Brigade Various signal units Medical units of all kinds Logistic support units, all kinds, of 21st Theater Army Area Command Psyops units
354th Civil Affairs Brigade
U.S. Navy
Naval Mobile Const Bn 113 SEAL platoon Medical units
Amphibious ready group in support Carrier battle group in support
II S. Marine Corps
24th MEU (SOC)
BLT 2/8 (Reinf)
HMM-264 MSSG-24 ANGLICO teams Logistic support task force
U.S. Air Force
Composite wing consisting of four tac fighter wings, an AWACS contingent, air refuelers, electronic warfare and recce elements Airlift force consisting of several C-130 squadrons and a C-12/C-21 contingent
Hospital and airevac units Civil Engineering units Base support units
UK: Brigade. Royal Marines; RAF C-130 and heli-lift units Spain: Para-expeditionary force France: Battalion, paramarines; air- and heli-lift units Netherlands: Marine battalion, medical units Italy: The Fologre Brigade; special forces; air- and heli-lift units Belgium: Airlift contingent Australia. Luxembourg. Canada: Air- and heli-lift contingents Germany: Heli-lift contingent
March that force had been withdrawn. On 6 April, Jamer- son was redeployed as Commander, Joint Task Force Provide Comfort. His immediate mission was to provide humanitarian relief by airdrop of food and other necessities. His forces were Air Force airlift, Navy CH-53Es, and a special-operations command (the Army’s 10th Special Forces Group and the Air Force’s 39th Special Operations Wing) under Brigadier General Richard W. Potter, Jr., U.S. Army. Jamerson’s force dropped its first bundles on 7 April.
On 9 April, Jamerson’s mission expanded; his special operations troops would assist airdrops, organize camps, supervise distribution of food and water, and help with sanitation and medical care. Meanwhile, on 8 April the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group, exercising at Sardinia—including the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’, Colonel James L. Jones commanding—was ordered to sail for Turkey. Upon arrival, the Marine helicopter squadron (4 CH-53s; 12 CH-46s) flew to Silopi, reporting on 15 April to Brigadier General Potter. Clearly, a coalition effort was assembling.
On 16 April, Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. Army, took command of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, with Jamerson serving as his deputy and Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, as his chief of staff. On the 17th, Shalikashvili activated Task Force Bravo under the command ot Major General •lay M. Garner, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding General.
As the facing chart and troop list show, the commanders of Provide Comfort had a wide array of taskings—and of units to carry them out. Here, two F-14s from the Navy’s Task Force 60 get a drink from an Air National Guard KC- 135, while flying combat air patrol to keep the Iraqis from attacking Kurdish refugees.
V Corps, who had accompanied him to Turkey. On the 19th Shalikashvili met with Iraqi Brigadier General Nush- wan Danoun in Iraq to outline the entry of Coalition forces into the country. The next day two rifle companies of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, then part of Task Force Bravo, arrived in Iraq by air. A day later, the unit’s armor (light armored and amphibious assault vehicles— no tanks) arrived overland. A multinational buildup began; by the end of May a 20,000-strong coalition force, containing 11,000 Americans, was in Iraq and Turkey.
Lieutenant General Shalikashvili’s concept of operations was to deliver relief supplies by air and land; to develop small village units near distribution sites so displaced Kurds could help themselves; to stabilize the situation and build an infrastructure; to move displaced civilians to new camps; to convert the effort to multinational organization and control; to return the Kurds to their homes; and ultimately to remove U.S. forces and those of other nations from the area.
His mission also called for using Coalition military
Force. (Air Force Prime Beef civil engineering units worked primarily at base development, under General Burch’s jurisdiction.)
General Gamer’s mission (his “functional responsibility”) was to provide area security in his zone inside Iraq, to build refugee camps, and to move civilians into these camps. His approach was to subdivide his area of responsibility, and to assign responsible commanders area by area.7 He gave the senior French commander the easternmost area, the Italian brigadier the westernmost, the Spanish force commander an area around Zakhu, and the Royal Marine brigadier an area in the center—reinforcing or supporting each with special forces units of various nationalities, engineers, civil affairs detachments, and air/naval gunfire spotting (ANGLICO) teams.
Garner asssigned Colonel Jones’s Marines the critical approach to Dahuk and the city itself, where a confrontation with Iraqi forces was most likely to occur. He gave Jones the Army’s 3/325 Airborne Infantry Battalion, some Italian special forces teams, an Air Force explosive ordnance disposal unit, and a couple of AI4GLICO teams. He told the augmented 18th Engineer Brigade and the combined task force’s civil affairs and medical commands to support Jones.
Critical to the success of Task Force Bravo was the mission-oriented spirit and cooperative chemistry between Garner and the commanders of the service and national contingents. This started from above; Lieutenant General Shalikashvili and General Galvin had from the beginning sought to forge a coalition even more tightly knit, if possible, than the one built by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in Desert Shield/Storm. Each national contingent came with its own commander; for the larger ones this was a major general. Each national commander established liaison with Lieutenant General Shalikashvili at his command post in Incirlik, and in turn with Shalikashvili’s subordinates of concern to them. There were no “memoranda of understanding.” Shalikashvili simply told each national commander that he expected to exercise tactical control, a well-understood NATO term. Each commander immediately accepted that, asking only, “What can I do to help?”—and the troops went about their business.8
The climate of teamwork that prevailed between the Marines of the 24th Expeditionary Unit and Major General Gamer, commander of Task Force Bravo, was probably unprecedented in Army-Marine operations.9 The Marines and the 10th Special Forces Group, with its air and base support, were the first U.S. troops in western Turkey. Gamer arrived with only a four-man command group and little in the way of communications. From the Expeditionary Unit’s command post, he organized and directed the air-supported airmobile and ground entry of coalition forces into Iraq.
Guarding the integrity of their incomparable air-ground team, the Marines fought successfully to have the following words engraved in joint doctrine:
“The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic
forces for guaranteeing camp security, establishing a protected security zone in Iraq, operating a combat air patrol over Iraq, and engaging in combat with Iraqi forces, if necessary.
Operation Provide Comfort was distinctive, incorporating an unforeseen situation and mission, a heavily multinational force composition and effort, and a deep involvement of civilian and international agencies critical to mission accomplishment. It also involved sensitive negotiations with Iraqi authorities and a variety of Kurdish leaders, daily media coverage with corresponding high visibility and political impact, and nearly hour-byhour reporting by the task force commander directly to—and receipt of direction and guidance from the Commander-in-Chief, Europe, General John Galvin, U.S. Army—who was in turn the single channel to and from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Command Authority.
While Provide Comfort saw a few exchanges of fire with the Iraqis, there was no fighting, no coordinated employment of combined arms and tactical air (although plans were made and wargamed daily), and no one killed or wounded in a fire fight.4
How, then, did Provide Comfort point the way into stage
three__ the “jointest”—where teamwork comes first and
service identity second? First, Lieutenant General Sha- likashvili named the Commander of the Air Force forces, Brigadier General James L. Hobson, Jr., to be the joint force air component commander,5 responsible for coordinating all air delivery, with jurisdiction over Army cargo helicopters (the “Army,” whoever that was, did not object to this unheard-of arrangement). General Hobson also controlled the cargo helicopters of other nations (but not of those from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit).
Next, look at the mission of Brigadier General Harold E. Burch, U.S. Army. Not only was he the Army Forces Commander; Lieutenant General Shalikashvili also named him the commander of a Combined Support Command and told him to manage a mix of U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps logistic units to support the operations of the full multinational task force.6
General Shalikashvili’s organizing principle was simple; give key subordinates the disparate service and national elements for a given function, then hold them responsible for pulling that function together. He said, in effect: “Burch, here are your all-service means; you support this operation; Hobson, you take charge of things that haul by air; Gamer, use your forces to establish a secure zone and get the refugees into camps,” and so on. Service and national contingents then fell to with a will.
This approach permeated the combined task force. Major General Gamer’s Task Force Bravo was to build camps for the refugees; this called for a coordinated effort. Garner simply made the commander of the Army’s 18th Engineer Brigade responsible and placed under him the mixed bag of service and Coalition engineers, including the Navy’s 133rd Seabee battalion from Rota, Spain, a project planning team and field squadron provided by the British, a Dutch engineer relief battalion, and units for explosive ordnance disposal from the U.S. Army and Air
air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of MAGTF ground element.
During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission ...”
But when Colonel Jones reported on 14 April to Major General Jamerson—then the Provide Comfort commander—and heard him say that the Marine helicopters, at that time afloat, were to move to Silopi and report for duty to Brigadier General Potter’s Special Operations Command, without a second thought, Colonel Jones started them on their way.10
In 1989, almost three years after Goldwater- Nichols spelled out strong new authority for the combatant (unified and specified) commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and field commanders agreed on, and the Chairman published, a new set of definitions for command relationships.11
Although new, the combatant commanders’ authority (CoCom)—replacing “operational command"—simply laid out and expanded on the law: saying, for example, that each commander-in-chief had “full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CinC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.”
►Operational control (OpCon), which had been the equivalent of the CinCs’ former operational command, was newly defined as the “transferable command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command." The definition, now longer and stronger, included “authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned. . . .” (It did not, “in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.”)
►Tactical control (TaCon), a new term, was simply the “detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.”
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff and field commanders
evidently have uniformly assumed that joint force commanders would have operational control over forces assigned, Lieutenant General Shalikashvili in Provide Comfort never had more than tactical control. Consequently, his abilities for “authoritative direction” might have suffered. But by all accounts that was not so. Indeed, when queried Major General Gamer, Colonel Jones, and others in the chain of command did not know whether they had been OpCon or TaCon to the commander of Task Force Provide Comfort. And it never occurred to them to ask. All they knew was that Shalikashvili had the mission and was in charge, and they were going to do what he told them to do.12
This can mean only that jointness has come of age, that the mixed national and service forces of Provide Comfort were operating much like the U.S. Army-only formations in which I served (and indeed like Navy, Marine, and Navy/Marine formations in which most of this magazine’s readers have served). Legalistic prescriptions and interpretations of command relationships simply did not matter; mission accomplishment was the overriding concern. Teamwork made for mission accomplishment—so teamwork it was. Familiar service and national command chains were not neglected; they were used both for matters of administration and support as well as as the channel through which operational instructions were passed. Operational orders, however, would go something like this: “Take your unit, and report to so-and-so (the Brit, or the Marine, or the special forces commander). He'll tell you what to do, and I’ll stay in touch.” Although less formal, the process was in essence the same as assembling air squadrons and ship contingents for action in a World War II naval task force.
Lessons learned in Provide Comfort were many. For one thing, it was evident that the U.S. military could be much better prepared for what the President called for at Aspen in August 1990: “well-trained, tried, and tested— ready to perform every mission we ask of them. . The troops got the job done handsomely under the circumstances, but, as Major General Garner said in his afteraction briefing charts: “Contingency operations require a homogeneous staff, deployed early and well-versed in joint and combined operations. . .” and this, among many other necessary components of joint force readiness, was lacking.13
Little things—most of them easily corrected with regular practice in joint operations—went wrong. Rather than dealing with the Sixth Fleet, it would have been helpful for Lieutenant General Shalikashvili to have had a U.S. Navy component, through which he could more directly reach his ANGLICO, SeaBees, SEALs, and Marines. Amphibious Squadron Eight (also known as Task Force 61), redesignated as a task group, with a one-star commander, would have been a natural; it owned the Seal teams and the maintenance facilities for the Marine Expeditionary Unit’s aircraft and other materiel.
The process of preparing the Air Force air tasking order, which called for requests 48 hours in advance— including those for cargo helicopter support—was shaky at the outset. U.S. Army aviation complied with the order, but because of their inability to forecast two days ahead (and because higher-ups were allocating shortages), the troops did not always get what they felt they needed, when they needed it. The Marine helicopter squadron, responsive to the expeditionary unit commander and thus to the commander of Task Force Bravo, stayed outside this tasking, and Bravo received, in general, better helicopter support.14
Provide Comfort’s remarkable combination of mission orientation, teamwork, responsiveness, and morale stemmed from the commitment by all parties to a worthy cause. But while there was stress in preparing for serious combat, combat itself was light. What if there had been fighting, and a requirement for precise coordination of combined arms and tactical air, and casualties, and stress, and setbacks? Would the team have held together, or Would legalistic prescriptions and interpretations of command relationships have then become a factor?
Responsible commanders and staff officers who were fhere say “No.” They say that attitudes of teamwork were firmly fixed in the leaders and in their troops. And besides, one commander said, “We planned for, and "'argamed daily, the possibility of fighting. We were ready.” This is what they had been taught in service- conducted training.
Provide Comfort showed that the third stage of jointness—’’jointest”—is opening up before our eyes. Downsizing the U.S. military, while preparing at the same time for a global range of force-projection contingencies, calls for rapid further movement in this third stage. This will affect the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in many ways. Some can be foreseen (increased joint professional training is one; greater commonality in methods is another). Others will be revealed as time passes. You have much to contribute, sea services!
And you have everything to gain.
'Marines in the Revolution, History and Museums Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1975, pp. 41-60
Overstated perhaps. But the last amphibious assault made by U.S. Army forces was in 1945 (at Inchon, 1950, the 7th Infantry Division was administratively loaded in the Second Echelon Movement Group). Today the Army’s contribution to forcible entry in force projection should be to exploit the potential of airbome/airlanded/air assault operations reinforced by forward prepositioning, airlift, and fast sealift. The Army should neither organize, train, nor equip for amphibious assault, but only watch what the Marines do so that it can, as in World War H, produce, if required, amphibious assault forces in due time.
’The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit was a special operations capable (SOC) unit. ’The combined task force had three killed in action and nine wounded in action as a result of mines in northern Iraq. There were 13 incidents of firing at allied aircraft (one C-130 was hit),but no casualties. One firefight with Iraqi soldiers resulted in two Iraqis killed and one wounded, with no allied casualties.
'A joint force commander can designate a single air authority, known as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), for the "planning, coordination, allocation and tasking” of all tactical air in the force. (Joint Pub. 1-02, p. 197). General Schwarzkopf used this mechanism very effectively in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
'General Schwarzkopf had done much the same in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. He made his Army Forces Central Command commander responsible for the Central Command rear area logistics effort; his logistics operator thus became Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, U.S. Army.
’Following doctrine, one might say that these five subordinate commands of Major General Gamer were his “maneuver units.”
■Only the Germans objected to tactical control, for policy reasons deriving from the German constitution’s prohibition of operations outside NATO territory. But they accepted “coordination,” which amounted to the same thing.
’Some, citing Vietnam, Korea, and the Gulf War, might take exception to this. But from my conversations with the principals, Army-Marine cooperation and mutual respect at every echelon in Provide Comfort, while building on former experiences, were of a distinctly new order.
‘“Credit for the exemplary team approach of the Marines goes not only to Colonel Jones, but also to Brigadier General Zinni, the Provide Comfort chief of staff. For a full account of the 24th Marine Expedtionary Unit’s efforts in the operation, see The Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991, pp. 99-107.
"Change 1, 21 April 1989, to Joint Pub. 0-2, UNAAF.
1 “Contingency plans normally provide for the force commander to have OpCon. Brigadier General Zinni’s explanation of why Lieutenant General Shalikashvili did not have OpCon of his U.S. commanders is that the operation was put together from scratch so rapidly that no one took the time to consider OpCon and its implications. TaCon, which would apply to other nations' contingents in any event, seemed sufficient and was the quick solution for all.
1 Commander-in-Chief, Europe, has directed each of his service component commanders to organize a core group, around which a joint task force could be built tor future operations, and has begun an exercise program to train the forces and staffs so formed.
As helicopters became more plentiful, the Air Force was able to send them out to task force control, yet keep a few for tasking in general support. The problem is not the Air Tasking Order, but how it is written. Mission-by-mission tasking planned 48 hours in advance simply will not work for everything. But an order that allocates air even cargo helicopter air, in multimission “bunches" by a day or by a multihour time frame permits responsive flexibility. Desert Storm had the same problem (see “A Look at the Air Tasking Order." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1991, pp. 114-115).
Lieutenant General Cushman is a frequent contributor to Proceedings. He has commanded the 101st Airborne Division and the combined field army that defends along the DMZ in Korea.