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By Norman Polmar, Author, Guide to Soviet Navy
Not What It Used To Be
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to massive disarray in most Soviet institutions, including the Soviet Navy. A fleet, that a few years ago was impressive for its size and war-fighting potential, is today mostly tied up or riding at anchor in Russian and Ukrainian ports. Shipyards that a few years ago were producing a veritable stream of surface warships and submarines, as well as high-tech naval ships and “vehicles,” today appear to be grinding to a halt. Indeed, for the first time since the late 1950s there are no cruiser-type ships Under construction in Russian shipyards. In fact, the future of the Soviet Navy's new aircraft carrier program is in doubt.
As this page is written, Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin remains in command of the Soviet Navy. As noted last month in Proceedings, he was associated with the pro-government faction in the abortive August 1991 coup attempt. According to some reports, Admiral Chernavin immediately aligned himself with the head of the Soviet Air Forces, Mar-
Admiral of the Fleet V. N. Chernavin, ®re meeting with Vice Admiral R. Y. ^°gi”) Kaufman during the U.S. ^•hmariner' s recent visit to the Soviet nion, sided with the government r,ng the coup, and thus retained c°mmand of the Soviet Navy.
shal of Aviation Yevgeny Shaposhnikov.1
The Marshal strongly opposed the coup. He later said that if he was ordered to attack the Russian Parliament, center of the anti-coup forces, “I would immediately go to the Kremlin and issue an ultimatum to [the coup leaders] to repeal the order. If within 10 minutes [of the ultimatum] I did not return to my headquarters, bombers would be sent in and would leave nothing intact.”2
Marshal Shaposhnikov was made Soviet Minister of Defense after the coup attempt, the first aviation officer to hold that position. Opposing the coup led to Admiral Chemavin’s retention as head of the Soviet Navy despite questions about the loyalty of some of his fleet commanders (who have since been replaced). When Admiral S.G. Gorshkov stepped down as head of the Soviet Navy in December 1985 after almost 30 years in office there were doubts that his successor could maintain the momentum of the Soviet naval buildup.
Admiral Chernavin proved himself to be an able successor to Admiral Gorshkov with respect to the political-military management of the navy. Major construction programs were continued, with the first Soviet nuclear-propelled carrier, the Ulyanovsk, laid down in November 1988. Under his direction the Soviet Navy initiated a series of historic exchanges with the U.S. Navy, beginning with the visit of a Soviet task force to Norfolk,
Virginia, in July 1989.
Simultaneously, Admiral Chernavin was managing the cutbacks in the Soviet Navy, primarily through the decommissioning and scrapping or sale of scores of outdated warships. And, he was attempting to preserve the morale of his officers and enlisted men in the face of massive cutbacks and economic problems. The Soviet Navy’s leadership is heavily engaged in the conversion of a naval force that relies almost exclusively for its enlisted personnel on three-year draftees to a “professional force.” During his prior visit to the United States in November 1991, Chernavin told the author that visiting a U.S. naval officer selection board and discussing personnel matters with American officers was a key motivation for his visit.
But Admiral Chernavin and the Soviet Navy are increasingly besieged by problems as the situation deteriorates. The political breakup of the Soviet republics has left the important naval bases, airfields, and other facilities in the Arctic and Far East in Russia. On the Baltic Sea, Russia controls the St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) area and the important port cities of Kaliningrad and Baltiysk. The latter are located in what formerly was East Prussia and were incorporated into the Soviet Union after World War II. Baltiysk is headquarters for the Baltic Fleet and home port for many of the fleet’s major warships. There is also a fishing port. And, being near the Polish border, it also hosts a flotilla of KGB maritime border troops. Kaliningrad, connected to Baltiysk by canal, is a major commercial port and contains the large Yantar Shipyard No. 820. The recent independence of the three Baltic Republics makes these Russian ports all the more important.
On the Black Sea the naval bases on the Crimean Peninsula will apparently remain under Russian control. But the 1 December 1991 vote for independence in the Ukrainian referendum means that the massive shipyards at Nikolayev will not be under Russian control. (The Northern Shipyard No. 445 was a leading
**r°Cee,*ings/,January 1992
cruiser-destroyer yard, while the Black Sea Shipyard No. 444 builds carriers.) Several major commercial ports are also on the Ukrainian’s Black Sea coast.
Obviously there will be some degree of accommodation among the new Baltic nations, Russia, the Ukraine, and other new political entities being carved out of the Soviet Union. Resources, food, port access, and other factors will lead to arrangements for ports and shipyard access, albeit at a cost. But will the Russian “state” want to maintain the world’s largest submarine fleet? Or aircraft carriers? Or naval infantry?
Changes may already be taking place. U.S. satellite photography taken during 1991 is said to have indicated continued work on the vertical short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft carrier Varyag (formerly Riga), launched in 1988, and the larger Ul’yanovsk. However, a Soviet journal has recently reported that as the Ukraine moves toward independence, Yu. Makarov, the director of the Black Sea shipyard, “abruptly changed his attitude toward the Navy. It is [now] planned to stop construction of aircraft-carrying ships, and to fulfill orders of foreign firms.”’
This position was apparently confirmed by the navy’s Main Directorate of Shipbuilding, with the statement that “The hulls of these ships must be preserved and mothballed. It seems that a decision on such a question is within the jurisdiction of the higher organs of state authority.”4
Meanwhile, at the Nikolayev Northern Shipyard, the completion of the Slava- class missile cruiser Admiral Lobov marks the end of warship construction at that facility. Earlier, the delivery of the Kirov-class nuclear battle cruiser Yuri Andropov by the Baltic Shipyard No. 189 in St. Petersburg marked the end of naval construction there as well.
Other than aircraft carriers, the largest surface warships being built in Russian yards will be destroyers. The antiship missile destroyers of the Sovremennyy class are believed to continue in series production; the 12th and last Udaloy-class antisubmarine destroyer is being followed on the building ways by an improved design.
In the last few years Soviet yards and other industrial facilities have sent to sea a new frigate class, a surface effects ship- configured corvette, new small combatants, and several new types of naval aircraft. Reports persist of new submarine designs in development, with an improved Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) already going to sea. The reduced noise level of the first
Akula, which went to sea in 1986, was a shock to Western intelligence. While the characteristics of the new variant have not been publicized, there is concern about further advances.
The Soviet submarine force continues to shrink, and it is not clear if a high rate of new construction will continue. Ten submarines—six of them nuclear- propelled—were launched in 1990; the numbers for 1991 are not yet available. However, even a 50% reduction in the building rate will be impressive in comparison with the probable rate for U.S. submarine construction in the next few years—one SSN per year.
The new Soviet “openness” (glasnost) policy has led to more information about Soviet submarines (as well as surface ships). Three U.S. submarine admirals have toured Soviet undersea craft—Admirals Carlisle A.H. Trost and William J. Crowe, Jr., were given tours of a Victor III SSN; retired Vice Admiral R.Y. Kaufman was given a deck tour of a Typhoon strategic missile submarine.5
Although they found these undersea craft impressive, the openness of the Soviet Union has also revealed a litany of problems. Beyond the loss of four nuclear submarines at sea—a November, Yankee, Mike, and Charlie type—on 10 August 1985 the reactor of an early Victor-class submarine exploded while undergoing a refueling at Chazma Bay near the large port city of Vladivostok in the Far East. According to Soviet officers:
“The explosion resulted after the control elements of a new reactor core were inadvertently removed as the reactor lid was being re-lifted, after being improperly placed the first time.” “The explosion ejected highly radioactive materials into the surrounding land and onto the water. According to the Navy officers, several 100,000 curies of radioactivity were released ... Ten men in the reactor compartment were killed instantly.”6
Like many surface combatants in the Soviet Navy, Soviet submarines, here a Foxtrot and a Kilo in Liepaja, Latvia, are spending lots of time in port.
The Soviet officers contend that the fallout did not reach nearby Vladivostok, although high radioactivity levels were detected in nearby areas. Recently taken films show the submarine still moored to the pier at Chazma, with other submarines tied up at nearby piers and men and women working in the area. The hull of the SSN aft of the sail is torn open— almost symbolic of the problems and tearing asunder of the Soviet Union itself and, in some respects, the tearing apart of the Soviet Navy.
'Capt. William H. J. Manthorpe, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View,” Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1991, pp. 102-104.
'Michael Evans, "Marshal Was Ready to Bomb the Kremlin," The Times [London], 13 September 1991.
p-n. |
'Capt. 1st Rank (Res.) V. Zaborskiy and Maj. Gen. (Res.) A. Kubarev, “Aircraft Carriers: To Build Them or Not?” Sovetskaya Rossiya, 12 November 1991, p. 3.
'Ibid.
'See VAdm. R. Y. Kaufman, USN (Ret.). “Typhoon,” Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991, pp. 89-95.
"Joshua Handler, “Preliminary Report on Greenpeace Visit to Vladivostok ....” (Washington, D.C.: 6 November 1991), p. 4.
Editor’s Note: The Soviet Navy at this j crucial juncture in its history is described in detail in the 5th Edition of the Guide to the Soviet Navy by Norman Polmar, just published by the Naval Institute Press. As in the past, the reference book describes the ships, aircraft, people, organizational structure, weapons, sensors, bases, shipyards, and other facets of the Soviet Navy. The latest edition of this reference work, published at three-year intervals, is in a new, 9xl2-inch format’
477 pages; list price $49.95; member S price $39.96.