This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
0 USMC
LTGEN Walter E. Boomer,
General Boomer had barely assumed command of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) when Iraqi tanks began rolling into Kuwait. Preparing to deploy to Southwest Asia, he convened a series of subordinate commanders’ conferences and dispatched Brigadier General James A. Brabham—who had served earlier in the U.S. Central Command (CentCom)—to Saudi Arabia, where he established liaison with the CentCom staff in Riyadh. The first major unit to deploy was the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, commanded by Major General John I. Hopkins. Eight days after entering the air-deployment flow, the 7th MEB had “married up” with heavy equipment and supplies delivered by Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron-2 (MPS-2) and had taken initial defensive positions in the northeastern Saudi desert, near the port of Al J ubayl.
Proceedings: When did you plan to make your own move into the theater of operations?
Boomer: I wanted to give John Hopkins time to get the 7th MEB in, and get his feet on the ground—then I would come in quickly, right on his heels. Having Jim Brabham there early was very important to us, because Jim knew the lay of the land.
Before leaving for Riyadh, five days after the 7th MEB began deploying, I saw that the buildup on the aviation side was occurring very rapidly—but not for us. John Hopkins and I were concerned, because the ground elements of the brigade were virtually in position but the aviation component was lagging, through no fault of its own. We had to fight for in-flight refueling support, and I eventually had to ask CinCCent to intervene. He did, and we got the Air Force tanker support we needed to get our Marine aviation into the theater. There didn’t seem to be a great deal of discipline in determining where various aviation units would bed down. It seemed to be “first come, first served” in acquiring airfields. So we needed to move very quickly, and Jim Brabham helped us do that. With his experience, he swiftly identified the airfields that would be the most useful to us and the improvements each field would require.
When 1 arrived in Saudi Arabia, it was evident that John Hopkins had things under control along the coast, so I went to Riyadh
In the early days of Desert Shield, the Marines, greatly outnumbered, set up a defensive perimeter some 30 miles out from the key port and industrial complex of Al Jubayl. By the start of Desert Storm—here, the USS Tarawa (LHA-1) leaves the port in February 1991—the bulk of Marine forces had shifted far to the northwest for the liberation of Kuwait, the largest operation in the Leathernecks’ history.
in order to establish myself with the Central Command. The commander-in-chief, General Schwarzkopf, had not arrived, and [Lieutenant General] Chuck Homer, the Air Force component commander, was in charge. I spent about ten days in Riyadh, to get the lay of the land and to see how the CentCom staff would operate. They were very thin at the time, still coming together.
Next, I went to A1 Jubayl to establish the I MEF headquarters. There were no major problems at the outset. John Hopkins had shown a lot of finesse in making arrangements with the Saudis to use port facilities, warehouses, transportation assets, and everything else that was required to unload the MPS squadrons. He had quickly staked things out for us.
Getting unpacked, of course, was just the initial task. Our primary concern was setting up a defense to protect the A1 Jubayl complex—the heart of the Saudi industrial area. Most of the oil fields are in and around Jubayl, along the coast and to the north. And Jubayl houses a huge petrochemical complex, as well as a large, modem port. So establishing that defense was the overriding concern.
Proceedings: At the time, did you sense a strong enemy threat? The 7th MEB had a lot of combat power, but was still relatively small, compared to forces the Iraqis had in the region. Boomer: It was small—compared to what the Iraqis already had in Kuwait and what they continued to bring down from Iraq, as they consolidated their position in Kuwait. From our perspective, it made sense for the enemy to attack—and we planned for that. We took the threat very seriously. I have been asked many times if we could have defended with the forces we had in place initially. My answer—then and now: “Yes, but it would have been one hell of a battle.”
Proceedings: It appears that the MPS system really proved itself, filling the gap between the first airlifted trip-wire force and the arrival of the first heavy armored and mechanized units . . . Boomer: Yes, MPS did fill the gap—without question. The 7th MEB was the first force on the ground that offered a credible defense against mechanized attack. The Army airborne troops who got there first were good, but were too lightly armed and supplied to stop tanks for very long. The quick arrival of the 7th MEB and the MPS squadron must have put Saddam Hussein on notice that our President was serious about defending Saudi Arabia, for openers.
The MPS system worked exactly as planned. John Hopkins would certainly tell you that his earlier MPS deployment exercises paid off in spades. In general, we knew exactly what to do, and things went smoothly. I wouldn’t change any of it—except to have moved the Maritime Prepositioning Force sooner, which I think General [A. M.] Gray [the Commandant of the Marine Corps] had been advocating.
Proceedings: Jim Brabham said that the original defensive perimeter 30 miles out from A1 Jubayl expanded to roughly 80 miles out, as more Marine units arrived. When, in this process, did you shift gears and begin to think about offensive action? Boomer: As early as October, we really began to think and talk- among ourselves—about going on the offense. I believe that any group of prudent commanders would have done the same thing. We didn’t know for certain that we were going into the attack, but we knew that was a possibility—so we began to do some preliminary planning for that possibility.
Proceedings: Was a rotation plan with 2d Marine Division units pretty well firmed up by then?
Boomer: Early on, we began looking at a key question: If we wound up with a long-term commitment, and had to rotate our troops, how would we do it? General Gray and I firmly agreed on a key point: If we did not assume the offensive and instead began a rotation system, we would rotate by units—not individuals, as we did in Vietnam. Meanwhile, while we were thinking about
this, the 1st Marine Division units continued arriving and we kept pushing out the defensive perimeter. Rotation planning was one of several things going on at the time.
Proceedings: After the President’s decision to present a credible offensive capability to Saddam Hussein, the 2d Marine Division— among others—began arriving, and I MEF started to evolve into a Corps-level command. Was major compositing or headquarters reshuffling required to make the transition?
Boomer: Not really. The I MEF headquarters continued to grow as the MEF got bigger, and the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing headquarters continued to grow as [Major] General [Royal] Moore absorbed the bulk of Marine Corps aviation. Any early concepts of an extremely lean headquarters went out the window; as we kept growing, we needed more staff support. At that point, “compositing” was really a melding of staffs and addition of specialists from all over the Marine Corps. The real compositing took place when the 7th MEB headquarters composited into the I MEF headquarters.
We probably should have renamed ourselves the 1st Marine | Expeditionary Corps. General Gray mentioned that, but other things were happening at the time and I didn’t push for it. He was right, though—“Corps” was more appropriate.
Proceedings: Speaking of “compositing”—it’s been suggested that the term is inaccurate, that what actually occurs is a breaking down of staffs that are later mix-mastered into a larger staff at a higher echelon. This is difficult, even under ideal circumstances— to say nothing of combat. Thinking back over your compositing experience, is there anything you would do differently?
Boomer: Yes. The Marine Corps has tended to treat compositing as something relatively simple to execute. That’s not so. The human dynamics alone can create significant problems in the process. So we need to devote more organized thought and effort to the question of compositing.
For example: A deploying MEB’s officers need to understand early that they will not remain a brigade forever; they will com- ; posite into a MEF staff. They need to look forward to their next ' jobs. Compositing is not a tearing down; in reality, it is a build- j ing process—and that’s the way they should look at it. Instead of grieving over the loss of their old identity, they should be actively seeking their new warfighting identity.
Frankly, the sooner the term “brigade” leaves our vocabulary, the happier I’ll be. I like the concept of the MEF (Forward), instead. It makes people look ahead, not back. If they realize that they are part of the MEF that is coming in behind them, they may start thinking harder about how to help the MEF build toward combat readiness. A shift of identity is required. After Desert Storm, anyone who thinks that a MEF does not have a fighting headquarters hasn’t been paying attention.
Proceedings: Once you started offensive planning in earnest, the breaching operation—later praised as truly classic by General Schwarzkopf—came to the fore. What were your original thoughts along that line, and when did you begin thinking 'n terms of a two-division breach, instead of a single-division breach followed by a passage of lines?
Boomer: We were impressed initially by the speed with which the Iraqis erected their barrier line across Kuwait. We probably drew some erroneous conclusions at the time, assuming the Iraqis to be stronger than they really were. As time passed, out intelligence began to show that—while significant, with a lot of land mines—the barriers were not as refined as we once had thought. They could have been a lot better. Each day, we would find more pieces to the puzzle until we became confident that could get through—although we remained very concerned about the riskiness of the operation.
At the outset, we did not have all the heavy breaching and mine-clearing equipment we needed. I think that will always be
the case for the Marine Corps, because that stuff is hard to haul around on a routine basis. When you are faced with a special breaching problem, you have to send for the right gear. In our case, [Brigadier General] Bob Tiebout and MCRDAC [Marine Corps Research, Development and Acquisition Command] did a great job of gathering heavy equipment from around the world and getting it to us.
You need a lot of equipment for a division-sized breach, because of the requirement for redundancy. You are going to lose some gear when you push through the minefields—and that, of course, is exactly what happened. When the 2d Marine Division arrived in country, we still had only enough breaching equipment for one division. But the gear continued to come in, until it became apparent that we would have enough for two divisions— so we changed plans.
Getting the equipment was just the first step. Our Marines had to train with it, and learn to use it well. The 1st Marine Division had been training for several months, working against obstacles We constructed that were noticeably tougher than the Iraqi barriers. The 2d Marine Division had the benefit of watching over the 1st Division’s shoulder and telescoping their own breaching training, but they still didn’t have much time to become truly Proficient.
About two weeks before the ground attack began, however, [Major General] Bill Keys [commanding the 2d Marine Division] came to me and said, “I can do this breach with my division.” Up to that point, we had planned to have the 1st Division do the breach, then pass the 2d Division through to continue the attack into Kuwait. I was not comfortable with that original plan. Yny passage of lines under combat conditions is a horribly complicated evolution, and the thought of a division-sized passage— With troops and vehicles strung out for miles, vulnerable to artillery fire—really made me uneasy. But until the equipment and Gaining shortfalls were fixed, we had no other choice.
When Bill Keys said he could do his own breaching operation, I believed him. Almost 20 years earlier, Bill and I had fought side-by-side as co-vans [advisors to the South Vietnamese Marines] and I knew from that vivid experience that when he makes a commitment, he keeps it. So I asked Bill a few questions about his plan, then told him that I would go back to my headquarters and think about it overnight. In reality, I think I had already Ulade up my mind by the time I got back to my command post.
would do the two-division breach. It would mean asking General Schwarzkopf for some extra time to move the 2d Division and our logistic support area farther to the west, but I felt the change in plan was a good one—and that’s the way it turned out.
! attribute that successful change in plan to Bill’s positive think- ln8> his strong belief in his Marines, and his stepping forward to Put everything on the line when it was most needed. roceedings: You’ve touched on something central here. In addition to you and Bill Keys, there were a number of former c°-vans on the scene in key positions. Two characteristics of that c°ttibat advisory experience were the need to act independently— Miting your own rulebook as you kept moving through new territory—and the need for shared trust and heavy reliance on the c°-vans around you. It sounds as though history may have been Jupeating itself.
uorrier: The situation wasn’t any different in the desert. The ^Pe of battle we were fighting was unique in the history of the j arine Corps, so we were continually breaking new ground. But ^d commanders who were independent thinkers, people I j-°uld rely on. Whenever they told me they could do something, I • evv them well enough to know that they could do it, even if it Involved some risk. There were times when I would look at a attle plan and think. “I would do that a little differently.” Then e second thought would roll in: “But the commander wants to
do it this way.” If you have faith in him, you leave his plan alone.
Proceedings: To ensure continuous support in the attack, you placed your logistical support areas far forward, at times miles ahead of the nearest friendly ground combat units. Did you ever have second thoughts about that, or was it just something that had to be done?
Boomer: I felt that it had to be done. I didn’t have any second thoughts, but I didn’t sleep well until we had consolidated our forces enough to remove some of the danger. And those logisticians were at risk—way forward of where they’d normally be.
By the time the two-division breaching operation commenced—here, an M-60 tank races through a cut in the Iraqi berm line—the Marines had accumulated enough information to conclude that the Iraqi barriers were less formidable than they had first seemed.
But to sustain the attack with the speed and power it required, we needed to take some risks. I had a great deal of faith in the logisticians. I had been watching them for six or seven months by that time and had seen their self-confidence grow steadily, to the point where I could ask them to do things way beyond what doctrine said they were capable of doing. This may be cheerleading, but I firmly believe that Marines can do anything. If you give them at least some of the equipment they need and turn them loose, you’ll always be amazed at what they can accomplish.
When I told Jim Brabham and Chuck [Brigadier General C. C.] Krulak [Commanding General, 2d Force Service Support Group] what I wanted to do, their only request was to get started on it as quickly as possible. What they created out there in the desert at the A1 Khanjar support base was absolutely mind- boggling. Even seeing it from the air, you could hardly believe they had done it—and in just two weeks! Earlier in the campaign, while we were still learning what we were capable of doing, I might have hesitated to ask for so much. But at that point I knew that I could ask for the near-impossible, and they would deliver.
Proceedings: The possibility existed for a real slugging match, if the Iraqis resisted strongly or used chemical or biological weapons reportedly at their disposal. When did you first begin to think that they might not use their mass-casualty producing weapons? Boomer: We went into the attack wearing chemical suits, and the four-day operation was about three-fourths over before I
Tired but happy, these 1st Marine Division Leathernecks take a break after the recapture of Kuwait International Airport on 28 February. Battle plans are no more than pipe dreams—unless carried out by warriers who know what to do and who unfailingly do what has to be done.
began to think that the Iraqis had probably missed their chance to cause heavy casualties to our side, and started to relax a little. Proceedings: In light of the controversy over “managed news,” you scored a coup by taking some journalists into the attack with your mobile command post. Overall, how did you think the war was covered?
Boomer: Taking the media with me was a spur-of-the-moment thought. I knew where my command post was going, and I thought to myself, “What a hell of a view someone is going to get of this war! ’ ’ The less-experienced reporters want to cover a war from the rifle-company level—and there’s a need for some of that. But the best way to get a picture of what’s happening is to go with a senior command element that is operating far forward. Then you can get the sights and sounds along with a clearer idea of what is happening throughout the battlefield. I had no qualms about letting the media come along, and they could report on anything they saw.
Overall, I think we got a good shake with the media. We tried to treat them as fairly as we could and, generally speaking, they covered the Marines quite fairly. We had no problem with allowing reporters to talk to individual Marines. We thought that would result in good stories, because we have bright young people who express themselves well. There’s always a chance that someone will get on camera and say something silly, but that’s not confined to junior Marines and we regarded that as an acceptable risk. I think subsequent events proved us right on that. Proceedings: You touched briefly on establishing Marine aviation in the region. In light of the joint air-tasking setup and the use of the Air Tasking Order [ATO], do you feel that Marine air got to support you in the way you’d hoped?
Boomer: Yes—there is no question about the quality or quantity of Marine air support. It worked exactly as we had planned, over the years. General Homer adhered to the Omnibus Agreement, with respect to allocation of sorties, and the ATO served a useful purpose and generally worked—although it’s still a bit too large, too complicated, and too slow. We provided excess sorties to the Air Force, as promised, and the Air Force made no attempt to assume operational control of Marine aviation. The air support picture was not entirely problem-free, but all in all it worked pretty damned well.
Proceedings: In your new role at Quantico [Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command], you will be in a position to orchestrate the lessons-leamed analysis effort and possibly correct some shortcomings. Two deficiencies that seem to come up during every war are tactical communications and intelligence . . .
Boomer: In the area of communications, we still are not equipped to conduct a joint campaign of that size. We have been giving some thought to the equipment we need to ensure interoperability, so we know what we need; it’s just a matter of getting it. Frankly, it took some outside assistance to keep us plugged into the joint setup in the desert, so we need to fix that shortfall. That doesn’t mean buying a billion dollars worth of gear, but selective buying of equipment, including the new SINCGARS [Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System] family of radios now coming on line.
The 1st Marine Division was particularly resourceful in using PLARS [Position Locating and Reporting System], which came into its own during this operation. We’re just beginning to see its potential and must be innovative in its use. Of course, the GPS [Global Positioning System] is an absolute must, and we need to acquire more of that capability. If we get some money, we can make some rather dramatic improvements.
In terms of intelligence, we probably have put too many eggs in the satellite basket. In a campaign the size of Desert Storm, the satellites get overworked, and fail to meet the expectations of the commanders, especially at lower levels. We’ve led them to believe that they’re going to get some marvelous stuff—and what they do get is pretty good—but it never quite measures up to their expectations, and they want to know why. We need to do some fine-tuning.
We desperately missed the tactical reconnaissance capability that the RF-4C, which left the inventory just as this campaign started, would have provided. It’s got to be one of our top priorities to get that capability back into the Corps. We simply can't place total reliance on satellites for real-time surveillance, battle- damage assessment, and the like.
Proceedings: In closing, I’d like to give you a chance to answer any question I haven’t asked.
Boomer: The campaign was successful, and I wouldn’t do things much differently. The experience reinforced something that I have always believed in: Training must remain our first priority-' not only for Fleet Marine Force units, but at Marine Corps bases, as well. Quantico must take the lead in this.
The thing that made the big difference on the battlefield is that we had thousands and thousands of individual Marines constantly taking the initiative. The young lance corporal would take a look, see something 75 or 100 meters out in front that needed to be done, and go out and do it without being told. As I read through award citations from Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this theme reappears, time and time again. That aggressive spin1 comes from being well-trained, and confident in your professional knowledge. It is young Marines with that aggressive spin1 who take their divisions ahead. When you say that the division Is moving forward, you are really saying that thousands of Marines are forging ahead as individuals and in small units. They are the real heroes of any battle. You can have the best battle plan in the world, but without the right people to execute that plan it is no more than a pipe dream. It’s the well-trained Marine who turns that plan into reality.
Proceedings: Once again, it comes right back down to that young rifleman . . .
Boomer: Yes—and the young truck driver, and the young communicator, and the young engineer. Everyone has a piece of the action, and every piece is important.
■ut