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By Captain James F. McNeive, U.S. Marine Corps
On 15 March 1944, deep in *he heart of the Burmese jungle, a platoon of British soldiers laid 350 pounds of high explosives °n a key railroad bridge belong- lng to the Japanese Army. The subsequent explosion completely destroyed the bridge and severed a critical link in the Japanese supply line. The platoon placed nooby traps around the wreckage to discourage repair work and went on to destroy a nearby rail- r°ad station. The platoon then Proceeded to lay mines on all hails and roads leading to the area and disappeared into the jungle.1 The actions at the ^awhun Bridge were part of a uuique Allied campaign, called Operation Thursday, that had ^gun 10 days before. The platoon was part of a force 12,000 strong, known as Chindits, and hey had just completed a critical mission in a coordinated guerrilla war 150 miles behind Japanese lines.
Realizing that attacks against he rear can be fatal in both conventional and guerrilla wars, he Marine Corps has empha- Slzed rear-area security over the last few years. Little attention bas been given, however, to the guts of the enemy,” as the creator of the Chindits would have phrased it. Today’s tactics concentrate on maneuvering conventional forces into positions •hat will shatter an enemy’s cohesion, which usually means getting behind the enemy and attacking his lines of communication. This tactic is sound in the conventional sense but does not allow for deep penetration of enemy territory. Marine forces nianeuvering to attack a conventional enemy’s rear are tied to their own heavy logistical chain, which must be protected. At the same time. Marines still must deal in some manner with bypassed enemy units. In addition, this use of conventional forces is almost useless against a guerrilla force that can simply melt away when threatened. The Marine Corps must have a single strategy that will allow it to attack the “guts” of either a conventional or guerrilla enemy with infantry forces—trained in guerrilla warfare and supplied from
the sea—deep into an enemy’s territory for an extended period of time.
The Chindits were created by an eccentric and unorthodox English major general named O.C. Wingate, an experienced guerrilla fighter who had reduced guerrilla tactics to a series of standard operating procedures that could be used by conventional forces. The key to Wingate’s tactics was the highly mobile column of Chindits, which could be resupplied by air. His Chindits were to be evasive, able to withdraw in such a manner that the enemy would be either unable or afraid to follow.2 In 1944 Wingate called for a large body of conventional troops to be trained in guerrilla warfare and infiltrated deep behind Japanese lines, via air and land routes, in order to interdict Japanese supply routes. By attacking in this fashion, Wingate hoped to neutralize the Japanese supply system and weaken their forces facing the main Allied armies in the China-Burma-India theater. A Marine-style Chindit force could be based on Wingate’s model. Such a force would give the Marine Corps the means to deal with either a conventional or guerrilla enemy.
Operation Thursday lasted more than six months and involved 20 battalions, 2,000 mules, and masses of equipment and weapons (to include antiaircraft guns and artillery) deep behind Japanese lines. The nature of the operation was extremely risky. According to some historians, the operation did not completely achieve its goals. Whether this was the result of Wingate’s death early in the operation, or the use of the Chindits as a conventional force, is subject to debate. The questionable execution of a unique form of warfare does not disqualify it from future use. If that were the case, the last amphibious landing would have been at Gallipoli.
Guerrilla forces often control sections of a country in which they can move about freely, with little interference from government forces. These “liberated” areas provide the guerrilla force with a supply base and an area where it can rest, train, and
Eccentric Englishman O. C. Wingate, right, created the guerrilla Chindits and commanded them in Operation Thursday, a brilliant maneuver to break Japanese supply lines.
rearm. In these same areas, a guerrilla-trained Marine force could be effective. The ultimate objective in this scenario would be to destroy the guerrilla supply base and break its military strength.
As with actions against conventional forces, attacks against hard targets would be avoided. Patrolling and ambushing have proved to be a potent combination that has been successful in the past. British Security Forces in Northern Borneo used this combination with deadly results against Indonesian raiders in the early 1960s during what was known as “the Confrontation.” In the space of three years the Security Forces, using guerrilla tactics, became masters of the jungle.3 A similar example occurred in Vietnam with the employment of what David Hack- worth termed the “Hardcore Battalion,” an American infantry battalion that “fought and thought like their guerrilla foes.”4 Following Mao’s handbook on guerrilla war, Hack- worth reported that this battalion shattered and rendered ineffective Vietcong forces in the western portion of Dinh Tuong Province. Marines learning from these, and other similar examples, would fight like their guerrilla enemies, using their own style of warfare to beat them.
Operating in a light mode, a guerrilla-trained battalion could use the fire power of its rifle companies as its center of gravity. The key to this force would be its ability to break down into squad, platoon, or company-size elements, operating close enough that they could mass, using secrecy and surprise, on an appropriate target. Of course, not all Marine infantry battalions would be required to train in this form
of warfare, just those necessary to accomplish the given mission. Wingate believed that training to convert a conventional force into a guerrilla force would take 20 weeks, but whether or not this is true for a Marine unit remains to be seen.
The training of Marines as guerrillas could build on small unit training already being conducted by the Marine Corps. Though training would involve many small-unit and individual skills, its cornerstone would be night training. Marines must win control of the night, and they can only accomplish it through solid leadership and accurate firepower. Forces that own the night can intimidate the enemy, a valuable asset deep in his territory.
If Marine amphibious capabilities include deep penetration, then support for a Marine guerrilla force must come from the sea. To establish a supply base ashore would offer the enemy a target and would shift the initiative away from the Marine force. The difficulty of resupply will depend on whether the Marines enjoy air and sea superiority. In either case, resupply must occur covertly over air and sea
IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM
routes. Infiltration over such routes is a common guerrilla operation and one that will need to be perfected by Marine and naval units.
One of the differences between a Marine guerrilla unit and a conventional rear area attack would be the time span covered by operation. The intention would be to deploy this type of unit for an extended period of time, set at some point before fatigue degrades the combat efficiency of the unit. Wingate believed that 90 days was as long as a unit could retain its efficiency when fighting, without rest or relief, behind the enemy lines.5 Similar restrictions were placed on British units operating in the jungles of Northern Borneo during the Confrontation. These units, conducting mostly reconnaissance missions, were restricted to four-month deployments. Any request for extension was refused, because the British believed that after four months in the jungle, the unit’s physical and mental edges were dulled.6 Marines would need to be removed or replaced before fatigue makes the force susceptible to enemy counterinsurgency efforts. When that happens, the Marines will become the hunted instead °f the hunter.
T.E. Lawrence once wrote that a “guerrilla war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.” This proved to be true for Wingate’s Chindits and Would be the case with Marines deployed along the Chindit oiodel. The detailed planning ar>d the maximum effort required would force the Marine Corps to become innovators of a unique form of warfare. Using one strategy against both a conven- honal and unconventional foe
would be marked with many advantages and disadvantages. Against a conventional enemy, actions by Marine “Chindits” could weaken an enemy, creating a situation in which friendly conventional forces could achieve a decisive victory. They could break a guerrilla force militarily, though it would not solve political and economical problems that created the guerrilla problem in the first place. This single strategy would not only allow a Marine force to seize the initiative and force the enemy to react to the Marines’ tempo, but would allow the
Marine Corps once again to become a premier light infantry force.
'Shelford Bidwcll, The Chiruiit War (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1979), pp. 124-125.
2lbid., p. 51.
3Harold James and Denis Shcil-Small, The Undeclared War (Totowa: Rowan and Littlefield, 1971), p. 150.
4David H. Hackworth, “Guerrilla Battalion, U.S. Style,” Infantrv, January-Fcbruary 1988, pp. 27-32.
5Bidwcll, p. 68.
6Jamcs, Shcil-Small, p. 200.
Captain McNeive is an infantry officer with the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, 2nd Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
______________________________ Improper Attire------------------------------------
Though he was not in the regular Navy, one World War II merchant ship skipper was determined to run a taut ship. He requested the ship’s officers to wear ties to all meals. Everyone complied, except one crusty old chief engineer. Threats and blandishments had no effect. But one morning the skipper was overjoyed when he arrived at breakfast to find the chief wearing a tie. His joy was short-lived, however. After finishing his meal, the chief left the table—wearing no pants.
Thomas LaMance
_____________________________ True Sportsmanship_________________
My mind is still pretty clear, even though I turned 80 this year. But sometimes I wonder if today is really today—or maybe tomorrow. Either way, I’m always aware that today is not yesterday. Often, my sharpest recollections are about things that happened a long time ago . . .
Back in 1936,1 was assigned to the coal-burning tug Ontario, homeported in Pago Pago, Samoa. Once a month, we made a run to a neighboring island, where other U.S. sailors manned a radio station. We carried mail, supplies, and occasional native passengers. Everything was strictly routine, until the month our skipper decided to take his lovely wife along. Now, wait—I know what you’re thinking. But by then—well into the fourth decade of the 20th century—we had gone far past the old superstition that a woman at sea was an invitation to disaster. You see, we were a right sophisticated crew, with several high-school graduates among us. Even our Samoan shipmates had some schooling, and no longer got themselves tattooed from head to foot. So nobody on board expected trouble, as we sailed off at sunset and spent a quiet first night at sea.
A half hour before sunrise, the skipper, in his usual calm, self-assured manner, went to the bridge to check his charts. Without warning, a blood-chilling scream split the air. Since the beginning of time, such a cry has brought men running to the aid of their wives, and this was no exception. Our skipper was not a big man, but he had the fighting spirit of a wolverine and within seconds he had crashed through the hatch that led to his sleeping quarters. He’d drawn his huge .45-caliber pistol, ready to blast the sailor who had dared molest his wife. She was scrunched up in a corner, pointing frantically toward a big flying fish flopping around on the deck. Evidently attracted by the light inside, it had skimmed right through the porthole and—judging from the wife’s hysteria—must have landed right in her lap or close to it.
The skipper, still calm, aimed in and was about to let the fish have it when the boatswain’s mate of the watch, coming up behind him, reminded him that shooting fish this way was as bad as taking a sitting duck—and the only sportsmanlike thing to do was to let the creature take wing again before getting in a shot.
At this point, my memory clouds up again—maybe addled by all the screaming at the time. But if I know the skipper, he waited for a proper shot. You see, he was always a good sport about things, even when his wife wasn’t. Ralph A. Chapman