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Fighting the Gators
The Harrier and the LCAC symbolize a dramatic improvement in amphibious assault capability, but there’s more to it than hardware. Three Warfighting essayists look at the role of tactics, doctrine, and organization for combat in getting the most from the Gators.
The Tactical- Strategic Link
By Lieutenant Commander Terry C. Pierce U.S. Navy
For amphibious task force commanders (CATF) and their staffs, the recent Marine Corps doctrine shift from attrition warfare to maneuver warfare means that the operational level of war is now a separate level of military activity. This adoption of operational art may be the most significant change in amphibious doctrine since World War II. The extent to which Marines can apply the principles of maneuver warfare may well determine the success of an amphibious operation. And that will ultimately depend upon how the Navy helps to facilitate the change.
Amphibious warfare is floundering—despite tactical innovation in achieving over-the-horizon (OTH) assaults— because the Navy and Marine Corps lack a unified warfighting philosophy. Until April 1989 both services subscribed to attrition warfare, a carry over from the successful amphibious campaigns of World War II. Because the Marine Corps has adopted maneuver, however, we may soon face a situation where the CATF and the landing force commander (CLF) conduct a campaign using opposite styles of warfare. If these two services cannot bridge this doctrinal gap soon, disaster awaits.
In the 1930s, amphibious planners wrote a joint doctrine that set up a unified command structure in which the Navy was responsible for both the tactical sea and shore phases. Because technical and procedural aspects of getting from ship to shore are so significant, the CATF has focused primarily on this aspect of the operation. But now, with the Navy and the Marines embracing their own styles of warfare, the CATF can no longer ignore his command responsibilities with respect to the Marines’ scheme of maneuver ashore. If the Navy does not see that maneuver warfare requires more attention, the United States is in danger of its unified command system becoming like the “loose committee arrangement” implemented by the British at Gallipoli in World War I.
The Navy should begin resolving the issue by recognizing maneuver warfare as a different style of warfare—the common battlefield philosophy for amphibious warfare. For the Navy, this change means the CATFs must be effective at the operational level of war.
First Renaissance of Amphibious Thinking
Brigadier General James C. Breckenridge, father of the first renaissance in amphibious thinking in the 1930s, set forth a highly successful landing doctrine, which traditionally used an attrition style of warfare. The Navy’s approach to attrition warfare is tactical. Success depends primarily upon superior manpower and material numbers and using these assets systemically to destroy enemy assets. Victory does not depend as much on tactical skill as on achieving greater numbers. The Navy and Marine Corps have become masters at the tactical level of landing superior numbers on hostile land. To achieve this end, the Navy has focused primarily on the tactical ship-to-shore movement.
This first renaissance in amphibious thinking resulted from what the British could not achieve at Gallipoli— placing all units under complete tactical control within a unified command. The principal shortcoming of this doctrine was that it failed to define when the assault phase of the landing ended, or at what point the CLF should become tactically independent of the CATF to conduct operations ashore.1
This deficiency remains today, even though joint doctrine has made the CATF responsible for the tactical sea and ashore phases. Because the CATF’s focus is still on the tactical level of war, the Navy still perceives a tactical dividing line between so-called ship-to-shore movement and operations ashore.
Second Renaissance of Amphibious Thinking
The recent publication of the Marine Corps’s philosophy of battle, Fleet Marine Force Manual-1 (FMFM-1) Warfighting, begins the second renaissance in amphibious thinking. Warfighting was not written specifically to change amphibious doctrine but to reflect that the Marine Corps has changed to a maneuver style of warfare, an overall approach. Warfighting will change amphibious warfare, because Marine Corps Commandant Gray has said that he “will create one Marine Corps with uniform warfighting doctrine and common operating procedure.”2 All battles, from low- to high-intensity conflicts, amphibious warfare, and joint combined arms, will use maneuver warfare.
The Marine Corps recognizes that a maneuver style of warfare for amphibious assaults does not guarantee success. No style of warfare does that. It does, however, offer a higher chance of success than the Navy’s attrition method. Attrition amphibious warfare means so-called
Responsible for, among other things, the launch and recovery of troop-carrying helicopters, the Air Boss (here, on board the New Orleans [LPH-11]) works for both the landing force commander and the amphibious task lorce commander (CATF) and reflects the CATF’s overall responsibility—from the outset—for successful maneuver warfare.
er’s intent, focus of effort, and surfaces and gaps. By using a greater tempo, the commander hopes to operate at a faster pace than the enemy in order to keep that enemy off balance. The object of maneuver is not as much to destroy physically as it is to shatter enemy cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance. Success depends upon the ability to identify and exploit enemy weakness. The basic tools of maneuver warfare will be of only marginal utility if they are not applied with a thorough understanding of the operational art.3 The operational level is central to maneuver warfare.
To employ maneuver warfare successfully during amphibious operations, we need a commander who can visualize the entire campaign at the operational level, who can combine the results of individual tactical actions to fulfill the needs of strategy. Joint doctrine has dictated that this person be the CATF. As a result, the Marine Corps depends upon the CATF to command and to delineate a commander’s clear intent at the operational level of war, which should convey the CATF’s overall scheme for accomplishing the strategic aim.
The larger perspectives at the operational level require more complex and challenging decision-making processes than normally occur at the tactical level. The tactical level of war is the world of combat. Winning the current battle and engagement is the limit of the tactical commander s view. However, at the operational level the CATF will have to deal with a series of tactical actions, many simultaneous as well as sequential, over expanded parameters of time and space.
division in the ship-to-shore movement, slow tempo, entry at a few selected sites followed by a lengthy logistical buildup, and reliance on massive firepower to batter the enemy into submission.
For almost a decade, the Marine Corps has raised serious questions about the tactical cost of using attrition warfare. Marine hero Chesty Puller was usually successful, even though he turned in the highest casualty rates of World War II. Today, we no longer have a large numerical and technological superiority and cannot afford to sustain such casualty rates and lost equipment. A forthright reassessment of how the Marine Corps fights resulted in the adoption of maneuver warfare as its warfighting philosophy a year ago.
Concepts of Maneuver Warfare_____________________
Based on a unique philosophy of command, maneuver warfare combines four tools: mission tactics, command-
The CATF should understand that the ability to collect a few quick tactical successes—which includes getting Marines ashore—at the beginning of an operation does not guarantee victory. Tactical success in winning battles and engagements is not enough. Defeating the enemy in combat cannot be an end in itself. Rather, the CATF must view tactical success as a means to a larger end. The aim throughout all phases of the operation is for the CATF to give a strategic meaning to each of CLF’s tactical successes.
CATF’s Operational Level Concepts________________
To function at the operational level in maneuver warfare, the CATF must be able to perform several skills either simultaneously or sequentially. He must be able to link the strategic design to tactical execution, to understand how the strategist and the tactician do their jobs. Located between the strategic design and tactical execution, the CATF is the link that combines and integrates
Able to cross the high-water mark and land troops and fighting vehicles “feet dry,” the LCAC should help the CATF to see the landing as an entity, no longer divided between the ship-to-shore movement and subsequent operations ashore. Maneuver elements now include amphibious ships and landing craft, as well as Marine Corps units.
both skills. The CATF could perceive many of the traditional concepts of attrition amphibious operations differently.
- Frontal Attack—The CATF should avoid frontal attacks and assault landings if possible. Deliberately attacking strong points when the enemy’s flank or rear are exposed is the antithesis of maneuver warfare. Flowever, if an enemy is expecting you to attack his flank or rear, then you should attack his front.
- Ship-to-Shore Movement—The CATF must be able to see the landing as a single entity without the so-called division between the ship-to-shore movement and operations ashore. At the operational level, the maneuver process begins well before any landing craft leave the ships. The CATF should consider the maneuver elements to include the ships themselves, the landing craft, and marines once they are ashore. The CATF already should have the ATF maneuvering against its foe well before it enters the amphibious objective area. To maneuver into position, launch a successful OTH assault, and then pause to set up a force beachhead so that the CLF can wait for superior troop buildup and for the CATF to say, “It’s your show,” negates the CATF’s maneuver advantage. It also seriously degrades the landing force’s ability to react rapidly to changing situations. CATF probably faces the most impor- ’ tant decisions as commander after the initial ship-to-shore I movement begins.
► Force Beachhead Line (FBHL)—A tracing of the final terrain objectives of the landing force delineates the FBHL. In attrition warfare the FBHL means more than it does in maneuver warfare, because the line provides a measure of control over the landing forces. However, at the operational level in maneuver warfare, the CATF should perceive it quite differently, using his commander’s intent as a controlling measure. Since the scheme of maneuver ashore always drives the ship-to-shore movement, this could mean that many landings may well be beyond the traditional lines of the FBHL. At the operational level, FBHL is wider than it is deep, because instead of the traditional broad landing beaches, the CATF
may use many maneuver landing points. These points are sometimes no more than ten yards wide, spread out over a much greater distance that the CATF will use to seek gaps in the enemy line.4
- Recon-Pullvs. Command Push Theme—The traditional theme of trying to push as many men and logistics ashore as soon as possible should not be the intent of the CATF. The CATF should realize that keeping much of the landing force afloat during the initial ship-to-shore phase is operationally wise, because he will have a strong, mobile ready reserve.
- Operational Mobility—At the operational level, the
CATF can gain a decisive advantage if he can shift a seaborne force from its initial point of main efiort to another point faster than an entrenched enemy can. Uncommitted units could immediately reinforce successful probes, and committed units withdrawn quickly from unsuccessful probes could be shifted as reinforcements, as well.5 .
Operational mobility may be difficult to achieve throughout the landing phase, because the tendency at the tactical level is to exploit initial successes ashore. The CLF will be eager to get all landing forces involved as rapidly as possible. As long as the CATF remembers that the operational level is more important than the tactical level, he can determine which tactical situations call for committing the remainder of the force.
CATF and the Art of the Operational Level___________
The CATF and CLF are responsible for deciding at the operational level of war. The following scenarios focus on the mental process and considerations involved in operating at this level.
Campaign: End Run: Civil policy has directed that the military’s strategic aim is to capture objective Zulu. The Army is conducting Campaign Bold Thrust to achieve this end. Because Bold Thrust has met with stiff resistance, the Joint Task Force Commander has requested an amphibious operation “end run” behind enemy lines. From the initiating directive, CATF and CLF learn the purpose of End Run is to set up a beachhead behind enemy lines to provide for the landing of follow-on forces.
Designing the Campaign: The CATF focuses on the strategic aim of capturing objective Zulu. CATF knows that the most effective way to defeat the enemy is to destroy that which is most important to his success. CATF will depend upon CLF to identify critical enemy factors. These turn out to be his reserve near objective ZULU. Also, his substandard road system is a critical factor, because once he commits his reserve, amphibious task force air assets could attack the roads and make it very difficult for him to turn quickly and go in the other direction.
At this point, the CATF should be able to describe an overall scheme, which will guide the CLF to devise a plan for execution and encompass the CATF's broad vision of what he plans to do and how he plans to do it. The CLF must clearly understand the CATF’s intent. Also, the
CATF should provide an operational direction that will focus his subordinates and serve to unify the various actions within the campaign.
CATF’s Intent: “My intent is to conduct an amphibious landing 11 September 1991 in the enemy’s rear near Port Red. I want to cause the enemy to shift some his forces from the Bold Thrust campaign. If needed, I want to set up a beachhead for follow-on forces. Our efforts should create the opportunity for the Army to achieve a breakout. 1 do not want us to lose sight that the overall strategic aim is objective Zulu, therefore, our operational direction will be toward Zulu. During End Run the landing force should control terrain objectives only if they continue to serve our need to achieve our strategic end.”
There might be a tendency for CATF to slip back to the traditional attritional approach and try to have the landing force win strategically by collecting tactical victories. However, for the CATF, “the operational level involves deciding when, where, for what purpose, and under what conditions to give battle and to refuse battle.”6 The CATF’s task is to determine and pursue the sequence of actions that will most directly serve the strategic aim.
Linking Tactics and Strategy________________
FMFM-1 Warfighting, describes a philosophy opposite to attrition warfare. This new doctrine of maneuver warfare states how the Marine Corps intends to fight future conflicts, including amphibious operations. The Navy should heed this fact, because blending maneuver warfare concepts with amphibious operations causes a basic shift in intellectual attitudes and preparation.
Among the challenges facing the Navy is understanding the operational level of war that is central to maneuver warfare. The Navy has tended to focus on the tactical aspects of war and to neglect the operational aspects. Successful maneuver warfare depends upon a CATF who understands that tactical success in itself does not bring strategic success. With a concept of the operational art, the CATF can link tactics and strategy, which, it is hoped, will lead in the end to successful maneuver warfare amphibious landings.
'Lt.Col. Merrill Bartlett, USMC (Ret.), Assault From the Sea, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1985), pp. 179.
2Gen. A. M. Gray, "Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1988, pp. 26.
3Capt. Richard S. Moore, USMC, "Blitzkrieg From the Sea,” Naval War College Review, November-December 1983, p. 40.
“Col Bruce Brown, "A Road Map Toward Maneuver Warfare,” Advance Sheet for Command and Staff College, AS-C-63.
’William S. Lind, "The Operational Art," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1988, pp.
46. .
6“Campaigning,” FMFM 1-1 Advance Copy, p. 6 (See manual for discussion of the operational level of war for MAGTF commanders).
Lieutenant Commander Pierce is Tactical Action Officer at the Joint Electronic Warfare Center, San Antonio, Texas. He was previously assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps Command Staff College before completing Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California.