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By Rear Admiral Wallace N. Guthrie, Jr., Captain Hugh Baumgardner, and Commander Mel Chaloupka, U.S. Naval Reserve
organization, two types of units have been lormed: commissioned units and augmentation units. Commissioned units have modern, fleet-compatible equipment and are capable of independent deployment. They have outfitting allowances similar to their active-duty counterparts, and through a policy of horizontal integration, they are provided equipment, facilities, and other logistic support comparable to that given the active Navy. Equipment is distributed in a manner that ensures organizational integrity, maintenance compatibility, supply support, and fleet interoperability. Augmenting units, comprised of reinforcing and sustaining units, provide trained personnel to augment active commands both afloat and ashore. They do not normally have organic equipment assigned, but regularly train with the active-duty command that they will augment upon recall or mobilization. Today, the Selected Reserve is a highly capable component of the Navy; it provides approximately 20% of the Navy’s total manpower for less than 3% of the Navy’s total budget.
The Department of the Navy operates under a Total Force policy, in which the capabilities and strengths ot the active and reserve components are integrated to provide the most total military capability and flexibility within budget limitations. Recognizing that certain mission requirements need not be left entirely to an active component, the Navy has placed selected war-fighting capabilities within its reserve force. (See Figure 1.)
As a result of this dependence upon the reserve component as an essential element of the Navy’s Total Force, the Naval Reserve must continue to be well-trained and well- equipped. Access to reserve capabilities under conditions short of national emergency is essential and must be assured.
authority. Known informally as the “200K authority,”8 it was enacted to provide the President with the power to use reserve forces short of full mobilization, for immediate response to an operational need involving national security forces.9 It was also an economic incentive to encourage the services to shift active-force mission responsibilities to the reserves. The significant provisions of Section 673b are:
- An order to active duty is issued at the discretion of the President as Commander-in-Chief. A declaration of war or national emergency is not required.
- The express purpose of this authority is to augment the active force for any operational mission that is beyond its capability. It may not be used for training or to provide assistance during domestic disturbances, or natural or man-made disasters.
- The President may order to involuntary active duty up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve from all components at any one time. Recall of members of the Individual Ready Reserve is not authorized under this legislation.
- Only structured units or Selected Reservists drilling as Individual Mobilization Augmentees may be ordered to active duty under this provision. Individuals assigned to structured units may not be ordered to active duty independent of their units.[1]
- Orders may only be cut for a period of 90 days or less, with the option of a 90-day extension.
- Personnel ordered to active duty under this authority are not counted against active-duty end-strength or grade limitations.
To date, Section 673b authority has never been used. On two occasions, however, the Department of Defense has exercised its involuntary recall procedures to demonstrate the validity of the concept—in training exercises Nifty Nugget (October 1978) and Proud Eagle 90 (October 1989).
Future Prospects
Continued use of the Navy to achieve national objectives is highly probable, given the prospects for regional crises and the inherent capability of mobile naval forces to respond rapidly and effectively to global threats. Between 1976 and 1987, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces alone responded to 53 incidents or crises.[2] In each case, active naval forces were stretched, deployments were altered and/or extended, and exercises and leaves were cancelled or delayed to meet a threat. Resolution of many of these incidents relied on the contributions of naval reservists who willingly volunteered for active duty.
Two key points regarding the future use of reserve forces are relevant:
► Most of the impact of the response is felt within a few months. After that, the crisis is either resolved or the crisis atmosphere evolves into a new situation. Thus, the use of armed forces in a crisis serves mainly to delay unwanted developments while buying time to formulate and implement new policies or actions that may be more sustainable over the longer term. Accordingly, military response to crises should be implemented rapidly to stabilize the situation, act as a deterrent to further escalation, and then disengage in a timely manner. Such a short-range timetable is well-suited for reserve forces.
► Studies have found that the firmer the commitment implied by the military action, the more likely that action will achieve the desired military and political objectives. The outcome is not necessarily dictated by the size of the armed forces involved. Rather, it is determined by the type of response employed—one that sends a political signal of resolve. Historical precedents and the strong American tradition of citizen-soldiers make recall of reserve forces a response that sends an immediate and strong signal of national will and commitment.
History has shown that it is politically difficult for democracies to sustain military operations, particularly those related to distant threats, with ill-defined military objectives. Therefore, political considerations will often constrain national will to use reserve forces. During the Viet- passed the War Powers Resolution in an effort to limit the President’s authority to use armed force short of declared war or national emergency. Conceived during political upheaval, the resolution (now an Act of Congress) mandates that the President not commit United States armed forces to combat situations abroad for longer than 60 days without obtaining approval from Congress. The act does not affect the President’s authority to activate the reserves, but clearly would affect any subsequent debates over involuntary recall.
Although Section 673b was available to the President for the involuntary recall of Selected Reserve crews of the reserve minesweepers that were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1987, this authority was not used. Why? The principal reason was to avert an unwanted debate over applicability of the War Powers Act. If invoked, it would have forced the President to terminate U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf within 60 days, unless Congress approved. A secondary reason for not using this authority was to pre-
nam War, for example, President Lyndon B. Johnson neither declared a national emergency nor asked Congress to declare war. Nor did he mobilize the reserve forces, as President Harry S Truman had in the Korean Conflict. President Johnson chose “to avoid declaring a national emergency concerning the nation’s Vietnam commitment because of potential international and domestic political consequences.”13
In 1973, reacting to the Vietnam experience, Congress
During GWG 89, one of the annual Global War Game series conducted at Newport, Rhode Island, recall of reserve forces became a major issue. After a number of misconceptions and mistakes, a new appreciation emerged for the value of reserve activation in stabilizing crises.
elude sending the strong domestic political signal that involuntary recall would have sent. Consequently, the minesweepers were deployed with makeshift crews composed of active-duty personnel and volunteer reservists. They were forced to operate in a hostile environment without benefit of seasoned crews that had been trained as integrated units. This action lowered morale in those reserve crews who earlier had been assigned to the ships and trained to perform the mission.
Largely as a result of these precedents, Congress has taken two actions likely to affect the use of reserve forces in the future:
- The FY 1990 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill directs the Navy and Naval Reserve to plan to make well-trained Naval Reservists available when their units are deployed in peacetime. This legislation also directs the Navy to analyze the accessibility of Reservists, before additional missions are transferred to the Naval Reserve.
- The FY 1990 Department of Defense Authorization Bill directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study of current Total Force policy, the distribution of missions among the active and reserve components, and the force structure of both active and reserve components.
Practical Lessons
The Global War Game (GWG) series conducted annually at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, is the largest and perhaps most prestigious exercise of its kind conducted in the United States. It has had a significant impact on the nation’s approach to global conflict and national strategy. In July 1989, GWG 89 became the first major war game to include enhanced reserve play. It provided dozens of flag officers and senior government officials with an unsettling picture of multiple crises and regional conflicts in a 1995 scenario. In the GWG-89 scenario, active forces deployed around the world became overextended and recall of reserve forces became a major issue. Military commanders and political decision makers wished to signal decisive action, and recall of reserve personnel provided the National Command Authority with a vital force-expansion option.
As the political and military players grappled with the numerous crises of GWG 89, it became obvious that existing plans and prescribed force lists were not flexible enough. Players found that they could not rely on earlier global war scenarios or their experience in prior recalls. Faced with mounting uncertainties, they were forced to think of new ways to solve problems.
During the game, it was soon evident that even the terminology used to describe force-expansion options had
become an important issue. For example, misuse of the term “mobilization” rather than “Selected Reserve recall” created the misconception that Section 673b was the first step in the mobilization process under conditions of national emergency. When the game’s U.S. President wanted to demonstrate resolve and decisiveness in reaction to North Korean aggression, he quickly directed a limited reserve recall under his Title 10 authority. Unfortunately, many players regarded that “200K” recall provision as justifying an inflexible, automatic force expansion to the full 200,000 reservists permitted, rather than a selective means of tailoring the forces to the specific requirements of a particular mission. Flexibility suffered from undue reliance on “scripted” forces outlined in the joint planning guidance.
There was also a tendency for the services to recall immediately all their allocated reserve forces allowed by joint planning guidance, in order to protect their “shares” and to prepare for worst-case options, rather than recalling only those forces specifically required. This approach had two adverse effects. First, it reduced the freedom of the joint staff to adjust the apportionment between the theater commanders-in-chief and the services. Second, it undermined internal and worldwide political stability by sending unintended signals.
On balance, GWG 89 brought a better understanding of how reserve activation could enhance the ability of military and political decision makers to deal with crisis situations. By selectively recalling reserve units and individuals with specific mission capabilities, a tailored force can be activated to meet specific national military and political objectives. Future exercises will undoubtedly reinforce understanding of the flexibility available under Section 673b. One of the major questions now facing the U.S. Navy is how to structure the Total Force, given an evolving national security strategy characterized by new eco-
- Fully consider use of Presidential recall authority in the military planning process, as one means of deterring escalation of regional crises that do not require a declaration of national emergency.
- Use Presidential recall authority on a selective basis, to promote public awareness and eventual acceptance of involuntary recall. Neglect of the reserve recall only reinforces the perception that reserve components are to be held back for a general war or full-blown national emergency.
Failure to use presidential recall authority places our policies of Total Force and horizontal integration at risk. In a time of competing demands for diminishing defense resources, reserve components must remain adequately funded if they are to maintain present high levels of mobilization readiness and fleet interoperability. The active force has a right to expect its reserve partner to share the burden of meeting operational requirements; both the Congress and the taxpayers have the right to expect effective use of today’s well-trained and well-equipped reserve force to implement national security policy.
nomic, political, and military power arrangements—and diminishing resources allocated for defense. Before force structure issues can be addressed reasonably, or military roles and missions debated properly, however, willingness to use Naval Reserve forces under a full range of conditions—from regional conflicts to global crises must be affirmed.
Since World War II, the United States has turned most often to the Navy as the service of choice when employing armed force in support of political objectives.[3] As regional threats and crises involving U.S. interests continue, so will reliance on the Navy for their resolution. The potential contribution of Naval Reserve forces may be overlooked if military and political decision makers consider using then only in the context of a general war. That could be a costly mistake.
Current legislation permits the involuntary activation of reserve forces to support any operational mission, even when there is no national emergency. But Section 673b has not been invoked since becoming law in 1976, despite numerous crises and the Total Force policy. During this period, reserve components have enjoyed significantly increased manpower and budgetary support, and enhanced personnel and equipment readiness for mobilization. It a well-trained and -equipped Naval Reserve was a wise investment throughout the Cold War, it should be an even better investment when the probability of global war is minimal.
Relying on individual volunteer reservists to be activated for regional conflicts—such as Operation Just Cause recently conducted in Panama—has several shortcomings. Volunteer reservists are often subject to employer and family pressures. In a crisis, reaction time would be lengthened considerably while personnel in appropriate specialties are solicited and provided necessary orientation, once they decide to serve. In addition, ordering volunteers to active duty for irregular intervals elevates the potential for problems in the continuity of operations.
In sum, the employment of Naval Reserve forces to meet crises can be a valuable military means of deterring escalation of hostilities without overcommitting active naval forces. In addition, the appropriate use of reservists is a fundamental tenet of defense policy and an effective use of Total Force resources.
Six recommendations are in order:
- Fully explore reserve recall as an option for balancing the active and reserve components within the maritime element of our National Military Strategy.
- Review Total Force policy regularly to provide a valid basis upon which to make force-structure and force-mix decisions with regard to active and reserve components.
- Consider assigning all or a substantial part of any mission to the reserve component only when the Navy is prepared to recommend involuntary call-up of reserve personnel, and when that mission exceeds the capability of the active force.
- Exercise our reserve call-up laws and policies periodically, to ensure that recall procedures are better understood and that they will meet the challenge of rapidly moving real-world events.
‘Honorable Stephen Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), in an interview published in Naval Reserve Association News, October 1988, page 18. 2Report to the Congress on the Navy’s Total Force Fiscal Year 1987, page 11.
3Report to the Congress on the Navy’s Total Force, February 1984, page II-7. 4Naval Reserve Association News, February 1990, Vol. 37, No. 2, page 13.
5The Secretary of Defense may also invoke “stop-loss” authority under Title 10 USC 506, 511a and 671(a), which applies to promotion, separation and retirement of active and retired personnel, and extends active duty for no more than six
months. ... ,
President Truman issued Proclamation 2914 (December 19, 1950) authorizing the Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries to call up personnel for 24 months under the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950. This action was a precursor to enactment of the Armed Forces Reserve Act in 1952, which consolidated presidential and service recall policies and authorities into one statute.
7A narrowly defined authority that involved a small number of reservists recalled as
members of state militias. .
8Many interpret this authority to mean recall of the entire 200,000 reservists. In actuality, the authority could be used to recall just one unit or one Individual Mobilization Augmentee.
^The President must notify Congress of such actions within 24 hours.
10This prevents the selective voluntary recall of individuals from different units to make up an “elite unit” and unfair discrimination among individual reservists within units.
"Statistically, 73% of the responses occurred in the Caribbean, Middle East, Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf areas. The average length of response in those areas was 104 days while the average for other areas was 20 days. It is worth noting that the average did not exceed the 180 day reserve recall period authorized under Title 10 USC 673b.
12The President did, however, selectively recall two Naval Reserve Construction Battalions and six Naval Reserve air squadrons in 1968 for limited periods of time, the latter in response to the USS Pueblo incident. These Reservists were activated under authority provided in the “Russell Amendment,’ P.L. 89-687, which allowed the President to activate Reservists and Reserve units for a period ot 24 months during 1968 and 1969 without a declaration of national emergency. This legislation was a precursor at the Carter administration's request for similar authority and enactment of Section 673b of Title 10, United States Code in 1976. “Legislative History, P.L. 94-286, page 1036.
“Blechman and Kaplan, op. cit., page 4; also, Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War, 1975-82,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1984, page 34; and, Adam B. Siegel, U.S. Navy Crisis Response Activity. 1946-1989: Preliminary Report,” (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1989), page 1.
• - to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires.”
U.S. Code, Section 262 Title 10
With this broad definition, the mission of the Naval Reserve may seem abundantly clear. But most people—civilian and military alike—take a narrower view. They rarely consider “other times.” They think of the Naval Reserve only in terms of general mobilization for all-out war. They can recall reservists’ significant contributions in both world wars and in Korea, but few remember or understand the reserve’s role in the Berlin Crisis of 1961, or in the Vietnam War, or during the Pueblo (AGER-2) affair in 1968.
This lack of understanding is not merely a failure of memory. Although their recall was useful in signaling national will, reservists ordered to man antisubmarine warfare ships and aircraft during the Berlin crisis never saw active duty. Reserve mobile construction battalions called up for Vietnam had little equipment, waited four months before being deployed, and were deactivated within one year. Six aircraft squadrons called up when the Pueblo was captured never left the continental United States and were returned home within six months. In those days, unless the nation was engaged in a major war, the Naval Reserve was not adequately funded, equipped, or trained for integration into the active-duty Navy.
Times have changed. Within the last 15 years new legislation and policies have brought about a dramatic improvement in the capabilities of all reserve components. The readiness for mobilization of the Naval Reserve is currently at an all-time high. We have come a long way from the days when reserve personnel were not adequately trained to operate and maintain front-line equipment, when the reserve force had ships, aircraft, and other equipment significantly less capable than its fleet counterpart. Today, Naval Reserve personnel and equipment stand ready and fully capable of deployment during small or large-scale combat operations.
Since 1980, the Naval Selected Reserve has grown more rapidly than any of the other reserve components, increasing by some 54% to a total of more than 150,000.' In the 1990s, according to current plans, the Naval Reserve will become the tenth largest naval force in the world, as measured in manpower, ships, and aircraft.2 As part of this transformation to a larger and more capable
Congress has directed that the ratio or mix between the active and reserve components of the Navy be based upon the premise that “military capability should reside with the reserve components unless there is a compelling reason to maintain it in the active forces.”3 The Department of Defense’s Total Force policy, first established in 1973, states that the reserve constitutes the primary augmentation for the active component in a military emergency. Reservists are expected to be the initial source of additional manpower and equipment when U.S. armed forces must deploy and fight. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney recently noted the increasing reliance on reserve forces when he stated: “As we enter the decade of the 1990s, rapidly changing political developments around the world and budgetary constraints make it imperative that we continue the successful integration of reserve and active forces to carry out our national security objectives.”4
Recall authority for the Naval Reserve is found in Title
[1] U.S. Code Section 673, which contains the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. That act was intended to standardize reserve recall policies. It also provided the framework for maintaining active military skills in all reserve components after the Korean Conflict.
Although only Congress may declare war, a national emergency may be declared by the President, the Congress, or both. During a national emergency, the President has the authority under Section 673 to mobilize up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve from all components for not more than 24 months. Congress must review the declaration of emergency every six months and decide whether to continue or terminate it.5 To date, declarations of a national emergency by the President have been issued only four times: during the Depression (President Roosevelt, 1933); for the Korean Conflict when personnel were mobilized for combat (President Truman, 1950);6 during the Post Office Strike (President Nixon, 1970);7 and, for the international economic and balance of payments crisis (President Nixon, 1971).
Upon determination of need in the national interest, the Secretary of the Navy has recall authority in three limited cases:
- Under Title 10 USC 672b, he may order to active duty, any unit or member of the Ready or Standby Reserve (active status) who drills as an Individual Mobilization Aug- mentee—without the consent of the individuals affected— for not more than 15 days per year.
- Under Title 10 USC 673a, he may recall involuntarily any member of the Ready Reserve who has not fulfilled statutory active-duty reserve obligation, until total active service equals 24 months.
- Under Title 10 USC 688a, he has authority to recall retired members of the regular Navy, members of the Fleet Reserve, or members of the Retired Reserve who have completed at least 20 years of active service.
In 1976 Congress created a new reserve call-up option in Section 673b of Title 10 USC: the Presidential call-up
Admiral Guthrie is Deputy Director of the Naval Reserve. Captain Baumgardner is Deputy Director of the Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Administration Department at Naval Intelligence Command Headquarters. Commander Chaloupka is the Reserve Adviser to the Director of Advanced Concepts Department at the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies.