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Arctic Maritime Patrol
By Lieutenant David L. Hall, U.S. Naval Reserve
The central point about the U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy is that it seeks to take the fight to the enemy.1 For the antisubmarine warfare maritime patrol community, the enemy increasingly appears to be located under the arctic ice, where Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) can operate.
The Department of Defense summarized this view in the 1988 edition of its publication Soviet Military Power. “. . . [W]ithin the last several years the Soviet Navy has increased greatly its interest in the arctic as an area of military operations, particularly for its SSBNs. The Soviets think that SSBN operations in the arctic ice zone could increase submarine survivability, based on their belief that operations under and near the Arctic ice pack might provide their deployed SSBNs with greater security and protection than in more exposed waters. 2
Five detachment set out to find the answer at Thule, Greenland in the spring of 1989.
On 6 April 1989, Patrol Wing Five established a detachment at Thule Air Base in northwestern Greenland to conduct Ice Exercise (ICEX)-89. The detachment was supported by P-3 aircraft and personnel from Patrol Squadron (VP)-5, VP-8, VP-10, VP-11, VP-30, VP-44, VP-45, Patrol Wing 11, Air Development Squadron (VX)-l, and reservists from Patrol Wing 0593 and maritime patrol augment units. Canadian Forces maritime patrol squadrons, MP-415, MP-407, and the Maritime Patrol and Evaluation Unit, were integrated fully into the detachment.
At its peak, the detachment consisted of more than 320 people and 11 aircraft flying nine sorties per day around the clock for a total of more than 1000 flight hours.3 In contrast, maritime patrol air- 157 people and four aircraft, which logged 400 flight hours. ICEX-88 was the first comprehensive attempt by the maritime patrol community to test the feasibility of operations under arctic conditions. 1CEX-89 sought to build on the learning of ICEX-88 and to apply it during an arctic ASW exercise with a tempo approaching that of combat. ICEX-89 operations were intensive: 136 missions were flown over the ice, covering thousands of square miles of arctic patrol area. The Thule detachment conducted operations with allied forces, naval reserve forces, and numerous active duty units; during April and May of 1989, Thule looked like a wartime forward ASW base. There were reasons for doubting the ability of maritime patrol aircraft to conduct ASW in the arctic. Springtime temperatures may dip to minus 40° Fahrenheit. Winds can gust
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In keeping with the maritime strategy’s encouragement to look north when considering war with the Soviet Union, the maritime patrol community is focusing on engaging the enemy as far north as one can go—at the polar ice cap.
The implication that maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) should conduct ASW operations in the arctic raises a troubling Question: can they do it? A Patrol Wing craft log about 250 flight hours during a typical fleet exercise. The exercise dramatically affected the normally quiet pace of Thule Air Base, whose 200 personnel service an average of only four regularly scheduled flights per week.
Maritime patrol aircraft had operated from Thule prior to 1989; Patrol Wing Five conducted a smaller-scale version of the exercise in 1988.4 ICEX-88 involved
Patrol Wing Five’s P-3Cs went to Thule Air Base, Greenland, in the spring of 1989 to test their capabilities against submarines operating in the arctic; Canadian units also participated. Operations evaluated acoustic propagation beneath the ice as the squadrons flew nine sorties per day, around the clock.
The aircrews were able to locate open water—polynyas—(above, right) in which to deploy sonobuoys; note splashes (inset). The lessons learned in 1989 were tested in ICEX-90 (below)—P-3C, USS Gurnard (SSN-669), and USS Seahorse (SSN-662).
across the runway at 75 knots. The weather changes so quickly that maintenance crews must use the buddy system when working outdoors. Most important, the polar ice cap, present year-round, makes it difficult to use sonobuoys to detect submarines.
The 1989 detachment went to Thule with two goals. The first was to support research into acoustical propagation beneath the ice. To this end, the detachment participated in three arctic research projects testing various devices potentially useful in arctic ASW; tactics were also evaluated.
The second objective was to determine whether patrol aircraft could conduct ASW operations in the arctic at the pace dictated by combat. This experiment was conducted during a nine-day ASW exercise (ASWEX) involving daily cycles of nine sorties, with seven missions covering the patrol area over each 24-hour period. Crews from seven squadrons, two of which were Canadian, participated in the ASWEX and achieved remarkable results.5
During the ASWEX, aircrews learned to use open water areas in the pack ice— leads or polynyas—to deploy sonobuoys. In spite of the obvious difficulties associated with dropping sonobuoys in such small openings, the results indicated that patrol aircraft can conduct ASW in the arctic.
The success of the Thule detachment in conducting ASW operations in the arctic suggests the need to conduct further operations to test the limits of MPA arctic capabilities. ICEX-90, completed earlier this year, was designed to build on the lessons learned during ICEX-89. The 1990 detachment to Thule conducted another arctic ASWEX, but did so earlier in the year. While the 1989 detachment was established in early April, the 1990 detachment began in March.
The purpose of this scheduling change is to test the effect of more severe weather on ASW operations. ICEX-90 was designed to push against these seasonal constraints and discover how wide the arctic operating window can be opened.
P-3 operations in the arctic during
ICEX-89 yielded important lessons applicable to the design of any new MPA, now that the Navy has cancelled the P-7A. The P-7 was designed for longer ranges and larger weapons loads than the P-3, which would have improved its capabilities in the arctic. The question is whether any additional changes would enhance the new MPA’s suitability for arctic operations.
One of the major lessons learned in Thule was that aircraft maintenance is a major constraint in the arctic. Standing on a ladder and manipulating a tool with frozen fingers is difficult. The optimal design for an aircraft to be flown in the arctic would provide maintenance access low enough on the airframe that maintenance personnel can work flat-footed on the tarmac. Optimal design would also minimize the number of exotic tools required, since the tools most likely to be available in a remote site such as Thule will be generic. All systems, including tactical systems, aboard a new MPA should be cold-soak tested because, like the P-3, it will be expected to fly after sitting for many hours on the flight line in the freezing arctic wind.
Long range will enable the MPA to penetrate into the Barents Sea, a situation the Soviets are not likely to allow to go uncontested in wartime. Therefore, defensive systems for the MPA will be essential. It will require chaff dispensers, radar decoys, and flare dispensers to confuse surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. It will also require air-to-air missiles such as AIM-9 Sidewinders to defend itself against air attack.6
The maritime strategy provides that the U.S. Navy may attack Soviet SSBNs in the event of war against the Soviet Union.7 Increasingly, the Soviets have deployed their Delta- and Typhoon-class SSBNs to the arctic, where they hide under the pack ice in their bastions, protected by Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), which patrol quietly °r lie in wait for an intruding U.S. attack submarine.8 The Soviet SSBNs are armed with ballistic missiles, including the SS-N-18 and the SS-N-20, with ranges of at least 4,300 nautical miles. These facts leave no doubt about the abil- tty of the Soviets to launch a strategic attack against the United States from the arctic ice cap, far from the more convenient maritime patrol zones to the south.
A traditional approach to neutralizing the Soviet strategic threat in the arctic is to depend exclusively on United States Navy SSNs to break into the bastions and destroy the Soviet SSBNs before they launch their missiles.9 The problem with this approach is that it assigns our SSNs a very risky task to be accomplished without support. This jeopardizes not only the submarines and their crews but also the niaritime strategy. To the extent that the deterrent effect of the maritime strategy depends on the probability of its success upon execution, the hazards faced by our SSNs are not only tactically but strategically significant. U.S. Navy SSNs would he forced to transit under the ice in search °f unknown Soviet SSBN bastions protected by Soviet SSNs, which could lie quietly in wait. In contrast, the transiting and searching U.S. attack submarines Would be likely to produce more noise than their Soviet counterparts—making them inviting targets.
Moreover, each U.S. submarine sent under the polar ice cap is a submarine not available to defend carrier battle groups and sea lines of communication (SLOCs) helow the marginal ice zone. Compared to that of the Soviets, our SSN force is quite small. To carry out all its missions, °ur SSN force would have to be in at least two places at once: under the ice and abeam the SLOCs and carrier battle groups. As capable as our SSNs are, they cannot be in two places at once.
The success of Patrol Wing Five’s detachment to Thule demonstrates that maritime patrol aircraft can assist U.S. attack submarines in the arctic and help carry the load. This capability might encourage the Soviets to reconsider their current employment of submarine assets. The greater MPA’s contribution in the arctic, the less hospitable will the arctic be to the Soviets as a location for their SSBN bastions. Increased ASW capability in the arctic would encourage the Soviets to redeploy their SSBNs and accompanying SSNs to safer waters, such as the Barents Sea, closer to the Soviet homeland. This redeployment would reduce the number of Soviet SSNs available to attack NATO’s lower-latitude SLOCs. It would also increase the warning time should the Soviets use their SSBNs to launch a strategic strike. An increase in warning time, of course, would increase the time available to react—thus, to push the Soviet SSBNs into the Barents Sea is to enhance deterrence.
The conclusion that MPA can act as an arctic ASW force raises at least two questions: first, what can MPA do to enhance the detection and tracking capabilities of our own SSNs; and second, what will an MPA do with a Soviet submarine that it detects under the ice?
The answer to the first question is that MPA can map the polar ice, locating the Soviet submarines before the U.S. submarines get there. By communicating the locations of these submarines, the MPA can help our SSNs avoid detection. MPA can also identify and communicate to the SSNs safe routes in and out of the battle area. In addition, MPA can lay sonobuoy fields to identify areas where U.S. SSNs can find safe haven.
As to the second question, once the MPA has contact with a Soviet SSBN, it can employ torpedoes through appropriately located openings in the ice. Leads and polynyas’are found in the arctic year- round, but most commonly in the warmer months. For a patrol aircraft to deploy sonobuoys and torpedoes through these breaks in the ice is a substantial capability since Typhoons and Deltas are likely to surface in such openings to launch their ballistic missiles.111 It is also possible that patrol aircraft in the arctic could use weapons other than torpedoes to attack a surfaced Soviet SSBN prior to a missile launch. The detachment from Patrol Wing Five to Thule, Greenland broke strategic ground during April and May of 1989. The major lesson learned is that maritime patrol aircraft can conduct ASW in the arctic. The strategic implication of this lesson is that MPA forces can help counter a strategic threat in the arctic. The limit of MPA capability in the arctic has yet to be discovered.
'Adm J. D. Watkins, USN, “The Maritime Strategy,” Naval Institute Proceedings Supplement, January 1986, p. 11. See also John F. Lehman, Jr., Command of the Seas (New York: Scribners, 1988). 2U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 1988 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989).
3Petty Officer M. D. Jensen, USN, “ICEX-1-89: Survival in the Arctic,” Naval Aviation News Sep- tember-October 1989, pp. 4-5. See also Commander S. Selby, USNR, “Reserve Aviators Storm Arctic Skies During Exercise,” Naval Reservist News, September 1989, p. 2.
4In 1985 and again in 1986, one P-3 logged 20 flight hours from Thule. In 1987, two aircraft flew a total of 45 hours.
5The specific results of the ASWEX are still classified.
6See Commander John F. Roscoe, USNR, and Lieutenant David L. Hall, USNR, “Sharpening the Sword of Orion,” Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1989, p. 93.
7Watkins, op. cit., p. 11. See also Capt J. L. Byron, USN, “No Quarter For Their Boomers,” Naval Institute Proceedings April 1989, p. 49.
8Maj Gen E. B. Atkeson, USA (Ret.), “Fighting Subs Under the Ice,” Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1987, p. 81.
9Byron, op. cit., p. 49. l0Atkeson, op. cit., p. 81.
Lieutenant Hall is an air intelligence officer with Naval Reserve Patrol Wing 0593 at NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. He served as an antisubmarine warfare watch officer and intelligence officer with Patrol Wing Five at Thule, Greenland during ICEX- 89. He is a previous Proceedings author.
_________________________________________ Sea Mines in Nicaragua
By Captain James M. Martin, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), and Bertrand P. Ramsay
The sea mines planted in the Nicaraguan ports of Corinto, Puerto Sandino, and El Bluff during the three month pe- r|od January-March 1984 were remarkably effective. Had more mines been Planted earlier or the mining period exProceedings / September 1990 tended, for perhaps two months, the San- dinistas might have been forced to negotiate a settlement. Nicaragua’s economy could not have tolerated for long the damage ratio of one ship disabled for every two mines planted. The mere 39 sea mines that were planted affected the country’s economy, particularly its petroleum supplies, to a much greater extent than their number might indicate.
Recent developments in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world suggest
that, in the future, small regional conflicts—such as that in Nicaragua—are likely. Because mines are effective and inexpensive, their use is highly probable in such conflicts. Since World War II, sea mines have been used in at least 12 low- intensity conflicts. The U.S. Navy must be prepared to employ sea mines and to conduct mine countermeasures.
The Somoza family, father and two sons, ran Nicaragua from 1936 until 19 July 1979, when the younger Somoza son was overthrown and the Sandinista National Liberation Front assumed power. Daniel Ortega Saavedra, after receiving military training in Cuba, had played a key role in the overthrow of the regime, and was named to head the revolutionary government. He led the ruling Sandinista
A fishing boat lies mostly submerged (foreground) in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto on 30 March 1984, the victim of a sea mine planted by the contras. The country’s economy was hard-hit by the mining, which turned out to be an effective tactic.
Junta in 1981, and subsequently was elected president on 4 November 1984, a post he held until the Sandinistas were defeated at the polls in early 1990.
The Sandinista government was supported by the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries such as Bulgaria and East Germany; Cuba also gave active support. Within Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were opposed by several rebel organizations; the Nicaraguan Democratic Force operated in the north from Honduras, and the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance operated in the south from Costa Rica.
The United States supported these contra—opposition—forces with economic and sometimes military aid to prevent Nicaragua from actively supporting the armed groups operating against the elected government of the neighboring country of El Salvador.
Nicaragua is the largest country in Central America, slightly larger than the state of Illinois. It has a coastline of 200 miles on the Pacific Ocean and 300 miles on the Caribbean Sea. Important seaports on the Pacific are Corinto, Puerto San- dino, and San Juan del Sur; and on the
Caribbean, Puerto Cabezas, Arlen Sui, and El Bluff, near Bluefields.
Attack craft converted from smuggling boats confiscated by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration may have been included in the early military material provided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the contras for training, patrol of the Gulf of Fonseca, and other guerrilla operations. “Piranha” boats, with 275-300 horsepower motors, were utilized at Roatan Island, Honduras, to train Nicaraguan contras in the use of explosives such as limpet mines to attack underwater targets.
Within Nicaragua, the contras had employed guerrilla warfare since 1981 against the Sandinista regime. Late in 1983, this covert war entered a new phase, one of attrition, as the contras sought to sabotage major economic targets in order to reduce Nicaraguan exports and imports. During 1982, according to Nicaraguan National Statistics and Census data, 2,400,000 short tons of different products entered or left Nicaraguan custom ports; the total increased in 1983 and 83% of this foreign trade passed
r
through the six major ports of the country.
The attrition phase began on 8 September 1983, when the oil pipeline at Puerto Sandino was sabotaged, temporarily suspending the unloading of oil. On 9 September, two planes attacked Puerto Sandino with rockets; on 2 October, two 380,000-gallon fuel tanks were blown up at Puerto Benjamin Zeledon on the east coast. On 21 October 1983, Puerto Cabezas on the east coast was attacked. In January 1984. the covert war strategy Was reinforced by a renewed military offensive, the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors. Mines were laid in the ports of Corinto, Puerto Sandino, and El Bluff from January through March 1984.
Early in 1984, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration began providing the contras with speedboats—called Q-boats—which they used to attack Nicaraguan seaports. Manufactured by Cigarette Racing Team Inc., North Miami Beach, Florida, these Q-Boats are 31-41 feet in length and have Kevlar hulls, twin inboard engines, and room for a three- man crew. The boats can exceed speeds °f 75 miles per hour; carry 25-mm. cannon and grenade launchers; and can lay mines.
The Q-boats were used to lay mines in three important Nicaraguan harbors. Thirty-nine sea mines were planted. They Were generally magnetic influence bottom mines, but some may have also used acoustic influence. The mines were cylinders, about ten feet long and 21 inches m diameter. Each mine contained 300 Pounds of C-4 explosive and perhaps another 300 pounds of inert material to enhance its stability on the seabed. The sea mines used in these ports were reportedly products of the CIA’s Weapons Group in Langley, Virginia, and the Mine Division of the U.S. Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Silver Spring, Maryland. The mines may have been fabricated from sewer pipe by the CIA, with the firing mechanisms provided by NSWC; they may have been assembled and tested in Honduras and supplied to Q-boats for planting by a mother ship operating at least 12 miles offshore, outside Nicaraguan territorial Waters. It would not have been necessary, however, to assemble and test the sea mines at land bases. During World War II, mines were modified, assembled, and tested aboard a transport ship before transfer to aircraft carriers for planting °perations.
The mother ship in Nicaragua was believed to be an oil-rig service vessel with a helicopter landing pad and facilities to service the Q-boats. She was reportedly operating under Panamanian registry. The ship was purchased or leased by the CIA at an estimated cost of 1.2 million dollars. The mines were planted by unilaterally controlled personnel obtained by contract from Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, and other countries.
On 3 January 1984. the Nicaraguan government announced that the ports had been mined.The Sandinistas may have obtained this intelligence by infiltrating the sea mine workshops in Honduras. Five days later, however, on 8 January, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), broadcasting from a clandestine radio station in Tegucigalpa. Honduras, claimed responsibility for the mining.
The contras had expressed interest in using sea mines early in 1983. In February and March of that year, contra representatives asked the CIA for underwater mines to plant in Nicaragua’s harbors. In response, the CIA requested detailed maps of three ports where Soviet ships regularly unloaded military supplies. Subsequently, this request was cancelled because of congressional pressure on the CIA. Nevertheless, sea-mining in Nicaragua was approved in principle by the administration and the three ports were mined early in 1984.
The dates of the mining operations and the ports mined are known for most of the sea mines planted; detailed information on these operations is contained in Table I. The first sea mines laid by Q-boats were planted at an offshore oil terminal in Puerto Sandino on 7 January 1984. During February and March, additional mines were planted at Puerto Sandino, Corinto, and El Bluff. The CIA mother ship supporting these operations departed for the United States on 10 April, and was observed passing through the Panama Canal on 13 April 1984.
The sea mines damaged or destroyed nineteen ships, registered in eight different countries, and disrupted shipping during the key November to April harvest season for Nicaragua's principal export crops (see Table 2). The amount of explosive in the sea mines reportedly was tailored to damage ships rather than sink them; the goal was to cause delays and hamper port operations. One Nicaraguan fishing boat, however, was destroyed by two sea mines in El Bluff on 25 February. On I March, a large Dutch dredger was hit in Corinto. On 7 March, the SS Los Caribes, a Panamanian ship carrying medicine, food, and industrial supplies, sustained heavy damage. The SS Lugansk, a Soviet tanker carrying 250,000 barrels of crude oil was damaged by a sea mine in Puerto Sandino on 20 March. The damage to the Liberian- registered SS her Chaser on 28 March was estimated at $1,646,905.24. and a complaint to recover for these damages was filed against the United States two years later in March 1986 by the Chaser Shipping Corporation. This complaint was dismissed by the lower courts for lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for arriving at an award in the case. Further, permitting the action to continue would have required access to classified intelligence documents relating to covert operations. On I I January 1988, a petition for certiorari—court record certification and further hearing— was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Nicaraguan military officials and Eden Pastora Gomez, a contra leader, stated that small unsophisticated sea mines of local design and fabrication had been placed in the harbors and in Lake Nicaragua, perhaps by contras operating independently of the CIA. Reportedly, the actuating devices varied; some of the mines used magnetic influence, some acoustic, some pressure, while some floating mines were actuated by contact with the target. Some of these homemade devices were disguised with a rubberized cap that made them look like rocks; these were actuated by the wake of a passing ship. Local manufacture was claimed from material purchased on the world-wide black market. Although the tactics and the material resemble those used in the 1960s by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, no evidence has been found of any ship damage inflicted by the Lake Nicaragua sea mines planted by contras operating from bases in Costa Rica. Perhaps the announcements and claims of this mining were made for diversionary purposes. The threat of sea mines often causes shipping delays, rerouting, and the application of extensive countermeasures. In any event, no damage to ships by sea mines of local design and fabrication was reported.
The Nicaraguan government detected— and reported—that small boats with outboard motors were operating within the country’s harbors during the latter part of 1983 and early 1984. On 8 September
- the oil pipeline at Puerto Sandino was sabotaged; on 14 October, the pipeline was sabotaged again. On I January
- the dredging project at Corinto was shaken by an explosion that damaged some dredging equipment. On 7 January, contra frogmen emplaced explosives at an oil terminal at Puerto Sandino. On 30 June, a sea mine explosion occurred in Puerto Sandino. Nicaragua reported that limpet mines had been used in the contra harbor mining. Miskito Indians on the Caribbean coast, trained as frogmen and
underwater swimmers, resisted San- dinista attempts to bring them under control and many fled to Honduras for protection. The Miskitos could have used these limpet mines to attack underwater installations.
4 Sea mines planted 29 March
Total 39 (Corinto—20; Puerto Sandino—15; El Bluff—4)
Table 1 Sea Mines Planted In Nicaragua (1984)
Number
Date | Planted | Location | Remarks |
7 January | 3 | Puerto Sandino | Magnetic mines 1 Ship damaged; 2 sea mines Located and marked |
| |||
24, 25 February | 4 | El Bluff | Sea mines planted 24 February |
29 February- | 8 | Corinto | 4 Magnetic mines planted |
4 March |
|
| 29 February |
3 March | 4 | Puerto Sandino | Sea mines placed near offshore oil terminal |
26 March | 6 | Corinto | Sea mines placed in shipping channel |
27 March | 6 | Corinto |
|
28-30 March | 8 | Puerto Sandino | 4 Sea mines planted |
28 March
The limpet mines were equipped with a flotation device for easy handling by frogmen during emplacement adjacent to an oil terminal or a ship’s hull. Limpet mines can be attached by means of a lanyard to underwater control valves and ship’s anchor cable, rudder, or propeller shaft. The mines were equipped with a U.S. M60 fuse igniter, which is waterproof and designed to ignite a time blasting fuse underwater. The fuses have a burning rate of about 40 seconds per foot, which enables the swimmers to select an appropriate firing delay and depart the area. The total explosive charge is perhaps 15 pounds. The source of these limpet mines is unknown, although it has been reported that sea mines of Italian
Table 2 Ship Casualties Caused By Sea Mines in Nicaragua (1984)
Gross
Date | Location | Ship | Tonnage | Flag | Remarks |
13 January | Puerto Sandino | Patrol Boat | — | Nicaragua | Damaged |
—February | Corinto | El Tayacan | 57 | Nicaragua | Damaged; purchased under French contract (Dec. 81) |
25 February | El Bluff | Pescasa No. 13 Pescasa No. 23 Pescasa No. 22 |
| Nicaragua | No. 13 damaged No. 23 damaged; 2 wounded No. 22 sunk by 2 mines; 2 lost, 3 wounded |
1 March | Corinto | SS Geopotes VI | 5,146 | Holland | Damaged, $1.1 million Engine Room Area, 5 Injured |
1 March | Corinto | SS Stephen Express | — | Holland | Damaged |
7 March | Corinto | SS Los Caribes | 5,018 | Panama | Damaged; hole in hull, forward side |
Early March | Corinto | Patrol Boat | — | Nicaragua | Damaged; Soviet |
Early March | Corinto | Freighter | — | Cuba | Damaged |
20 March | Puerto Sandino | SS Lugansk | 22,078 | Russia | Damaged; starboard side forward; 5 injured |
28 March | Corinto | SS Iver Chaser | 15,380 | Liberia | Damaged (British crew) |
28 March | Corinto | — | — | British | Damaged (Possibly SS Iver Chaser) |
28 March | Corinto | Shrimp Boat | — | Nicaragua | Damaged or destroyed |
28 March | Corinto | SS Araceli Perez | — | Nicaragua | Damaged |
29 March | Corinto | SS San Albino | — | Nicaragua | Damaged |
30 March | Corinto | SS Alma Sultana | — | Nicaragua | Damaged; 4 injured |
30 March | Corinto | SS Terushio Maru | 11,103 | Japan | Damaged |
2 May | Corinto | SS Pedro Arauz Paiacious | — | Nicaragua | Sunk, $500,000 loss; 4 injured |
Total 19 (Corinto—14; Puerto Sandino—2; El Bluff—-3)
manufacture were planted by the anti- Sandinista forces. It is well-known, however, that the Italian Navy has long been interested in weapons for use by their frogmen and underwater swimmers.
Nicaragua had no minesweepers and Was not prepared to conduct mine countermeasures when sea mines were discovered in its harbors. The Sandinista government called on other countries, including Brazil, to provide technical and military means to defend itself. France offered to provide minesweepers to Nicaragua in cooperation with another European country, but the offer never materialized. The Nicaraguan Defense Minister also went to the Soviet Union and North Korea to shop for minesweepers with limited success.
Consequently, fishing boats were taken up from the trade and used for mine-sweeping by the Sandinistas. These vessels were used both singly to drag steel chains astern, and in pairs to tow fishing nets suspended between the two vessels. Fishing boats were also used as guinea pig sweeps to escort large oil tankers and merchant ships through the mined areas of the ports. On the Pacific coast, fishing vessels were damaged, and three were sunk during mine countermeasures operations.
Mine hunting was also used as a countermeasure. After a Nicaraguan patrol boat was damaged on 13 January by one °I three sea mines planted near an off-
Pr shore oil terminal at Puerto Sandino, the other two mines were found and marked for avoidance or destruction. According to the Nicaraguan National Port Authority, 27 mines on the west coast had been deactivated by 5 April 1984. This estimate appears high since only 35 bottom mines were planted on the west coast and sixteen of these were exploded by ships.
Because of the stepped-up war of attrition by the contras in 1983 and the publicity in the Congress against military aid, on 9 April 1984 Nicaragua filed a case against the United States with the International Court of Justice at the Hague. The case concerned military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. On 18 January 1985, the United States announced it would not participate in the proceedings of the Court. On 27 June 1986, the World Court issued its verdict— that the United States had acted against the Republic of Nicaragua in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of another state. The Court disapproved the overtlights of Nicaraguan territory, attacks on port facilities, mining of the harbors, production of a “Psychological Warfare Manual,” and the trade embargo. The Court concluded the amount of reparation should be settled by negotiation between Nicaragua and the United States. To date, no action has been taken by the United States.
The Nicaraguan experience highlights several factors related to the discrete use
of sea mines.
First, the threat of sea mines will delay ship movements and cause a corresponding reduction in foreign trade. It does not require a damaged ship to establish the threat, which can be done merely by an announcement that ports have been mined. In 1983, 80% of Nicaragua’s foreign trade was carried in ships, and most of them used Corinto and Puerto Sandino. Oil imports accounted for 40% of the foreign exchange Nicaragua earned through its exports and the country suffered when Exxon stopped sending its tankers from Mexico into Nicaraguan ports after sea mines were planted there. Hull insurance rates increased for ships calling at Nicaraguan ports. For some months, the existence of the sea mines and the uncertainties about their deactivation hampered Nicaraguan trade and jeopardized the delivery of oil supplies to support its economy. At least eight foreign freighters refused to enter Nicaraguan ports during March and April 1984. Daniel Ortega Saavedra announced in 1984 that physical damage resulting from the combination of contra attacks and the mining of the country’s ports amounted to $200 million dollars.
Second, preparation for mine countermeasures is necessary in order to minimize ship casualties and ship delay. Nicaragua had no minesweepers. After the sea mines were planted, it had to take fishing vessels from the trade and equip them with improvised gear for minesweeping, a procedure that resulted in more shipping delays and more ship casualties.
Third, from a societal point of view, the use of sea mines has humane characteristics when compared to other forms of guerrilla warfare. The defender, in this instance the Sandinistas, knew that sea mines had been planted before any ships were damaged. In fact, the Nicaraguan government announced on 3 January 1984 that its ports had been mined, and the contras confirmed this on 8 January. In addition, Lloyds of London may have received timely notification of the mining operations. The first large ship, SS Geopotes VI, was not damaged until I March. The defender, therefore, had the option of ignoring the presence of sea mines and accepting the risk of ship damage. The defender had the further options of closing the ports, delaying ships entering or leaving, and sweeping or deactivating the sea mines. These latter options are a far cry from other forms of guerrilla attack where bombs are placed on school buses and public buildings or where pedestrians are attacked with guns and hand grenades. In fact, one U.S. representative emphasized that the mining was an attempt to convert the CIA program from a brutal war in the countryside to one of attacking government resources. Further, since the mine damage actually inflicted was at sea and away from the more populated land areas, its effect on the people and the country was less marked.
Fourth, political repercussions that are likely to result in United Nations Security Council resolutions. International Court of Justice claims, or other legal complaints can be avoided. The mining of Nicaraguan harbors is the first time since World War II that the United States has supported such actions against a nation with which we maintain diplomatic relations. During the latter part of the Vietnam War, it is true, the United States mined and blockaded North Vietnamese ports for nearly a year. These actions, however, were publicly announced in compliance with the Flague Convention of 1907; and the Nixon Administration could point to the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution as the legal basis for U.S. action against North Vietnam. It should be noted, however, that as in the Vietnam mining, the sea mining in Nicaragua was confined to the countrys’s territorial waters. Ships entering and leaving Nicaraguan ports were subject to control by one government, and damage to shipping using its ports could have been minimized by traffic control. If mines were laid in international waters as was done in the Corfu Channel during the Greek Civil War, and more recently in the Persian Gulf, a single country would find it difficult to control such traffic.
Fifth, from a technical point of view, the use of sea mines in Nicaragua was notably successful. The return for the investment was great. Thirty-nine sea mines planted in three ports resulted in nineteen ship casualties: one ship casualty for each two mines planted. A higher estimate of the number of sea mines planted—75—has been made but has not been corroborated. Nevertheless, even if 75 mines were planted, one ship casualty for each four sea mines planted is still an outstanding ratio.
U.S. forces during World War II— using small, submarine-laid minefields— achieved a ratio of one ship casualty for each twelve sea mines laid. In this endeavor, 658 mines were planted in 36 minefields in the Pacific. Fifty-four known Japanese ship casualties resulted.
Between April and August 1945, 12,053 U.S. Navy sea mines were planted in Japanese home waters by U.S. Army Air Force B-29 aircraft. Six hundred and seventy ship casualties resulted; one for each eighteen sea mines laid.
It should also be noted that the British achieved significant success by mining the Danube River from May to October 1944. Here, 1,382 sea mines inflicted 276 Axis ship casualties; or, one for each five mines planted. Neither Japan, in her home waters, nor Germany, in the Danube, could have tolerated such loss rates much longer.
Observations based on the experience in Nicaragua suggest that sea mine warfare deserves serious study for contemporary application in low-intensity conflicts. Sea mines are inexpensive and effective, a potent combination of particular import in this time of decreasing defense expenditures.
Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End Press, 1988).
David Rogers and David Ignatius, “The Contra Fight," The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 1985.
Central American Historical Institute, “Update 3:13,“ seminar at Georgetown University,5 April 1984.
Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua, The Price of Intervention (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987). " '
Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).
Leslie H. Gelb, “Officials Say C.I.A. Made Mines With Navy Help,” The New York Times, 1 June 1984.
George J. Church, “Mining Nicaragua’s Harbors," Time, 23 April 1984.
Katrina J. Church, “The Briar Patch of Reality; A Legal Analysis of the Mining of Nicaragua’s Harbors," New York University Journal of Internationa! Law and Politics 1985-1986.
R. M. Hicks Jr., American Hull Insurance Syndicate, New York, New York, letter to J. M. Martin dated 16 October 1984.
Democratic Study Group, U.S. House of Representatives, “An Act of War," Special Report No. 9818, 11 April 1984.
Lloyds of London Weekly Casualty Report “Situation in Nicaragua,” 24 January-3 July 1984.
Oliver L. North and Constantine Menges, “Special Activities in Nicaragua," National Security Council Memorandum, NSC/ICS-400215 dated 2 March 1984.
Lenor A. Huper, Charge d’ Affaires, Nicaraguan Embassy, Washington, D.C., response to letter from J. M. Martin, 2 May 1989.
Bernard Noble, Deputy-Registrar, International Court of Justice, The Hague, Netherlands, letter to J. M. Martin, 18 August 1989.
During World War II, Captain Martin was involved with the operational use of sea mines from submarines, carrier aircraft, and B-29s; he helped develop mine countermeasures during the Korean War. Dr. Ramsay worked at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory from 1942 to 1973 where he was engaged in the research, development, test and evaluation of sea mines. Both are contributors to Naval History.
Using the PCO Pipeline
By Captain P.T. Deutermann, U.S. Navy (Retired)
“Hey, John, I hear you've got orders. Where're you hound?"
Big grin. “Command. I’m getting the Ever Ready, out of Charleston "
“Hey, super news. How long is your pipeline?"
Much smaller grin. “Seven months."
Most surface officers view the prospective commanding officer (PCO) pipeline—that accumulation of schools, visits, weeks with the type commander, leave, and travel—as the price one has to pay to go to a ship command.
The purpose of the pipeline is to bring the PCO up to speed in recent tactical developments, materiel readiness and overall systems management, current personnel policies, engineering management, and other developments in fleet issues, often after a two- or three-year tour ashore. Its length, a subject that receives attention at the highest levels of the Navy, has varied over the years. The current length of the surface-commander command pipeline is about five and a hall months.
It is like undergoing a full deployment before ever reaching the ship. Unless the officer happens to be going to command from an assignment in Newport, Rhode Island, the pipeline will involve 6 weeks of PCO school and probably 12 weeks of the senior officer ship material readiness course, both in Newport. Then there will be 3 weeks of tactical training school, 2 weeks with the type commander, and perhaps other schools cn route if there is some unique capability in the ship, such as an Aegis combat system, whose pipeline school is 4 weeks. This is a considerable investment in time, travel money, and per diem for the Navy, and a substantial chunk of family separation for the individual, who may then join a ship that deploys barely a month later.
Nevertheless, the pipeline provides a unique opportunity for the new captain before he arrives at his new command. This is an opportunity to write a command action plan, standing orders, and night orders.
A command action plan is a summation of how the commanding officer "'ants all of the “people” programs in the ship to work together to achieve his command objectives. The standing orders are a collection of the commanding officer’s policies with regard to how things Will be done in his ship, with a separate order addressing each area of policy. The n>ght orders are a subset of the standing orders, with night orders for both in-port and at-sea situations.
An officer en route to surface com- niand usually has at least 15 years experience. If he has followed the notional surface career path, he has had a three-year surface warfare officer (SWO) qualifica- t]on tour, three and a half years as department head, slightly less than two years as executive officer, and perhaps a bonus sea tour on a staff. He has had plenty of hme to watch others command. Whether he knows it or not, he has settled ideas of how he would run a ship. He has decided °n a philosophy of military discipline. He has formulated a standard of professional ethics. He knows how to beat the system, hut also when to conform to it. He remembers how he was treated as an execu- hve officer, a department head, and as a Junior officer. He knows what a clean ship looks like, and what a happy crew sounds like. He may not be able to write °ut a formula for good leadership, but he knows it when he sees it. By the time he §ets to the PCO pipeline, he has come to many conclusions about the standards and methods that, to him, constitute the right way to do business.
The next stop is to write it down. He has five to six months to prepare and he should summarize what he wants the ship to achieve while he is in command. Because most things in a ship are run through one or more of the management programs, and since everything is done by people, he must first match his objectives, the management programs, to the roles of people. This is a command action plan.
The commanding officer’s objectives for the command during his stewardship are necessarily broad in scope, not too many in number, and reasonably specific. Having the best ship in the whole U.S. Navy is neither reasonable nor specific. Having a ship that performs all assigned missions to the best of her crew’s ability is better. Or having a ship that makes it possible for everyone to advance. Or having a ship that has the best safety program, or materiel readiness, or one that never misses a commitment. The key is to settle on a few achievable objectives, that tie together the greatest number of management programs to the abilities, aspirations, and character of those who man ship.
The PCO can learn much about his future command through the pipeline. On the first day at school, the PCO can go to the library and call for the ship’s information folder, which is supposed to contain current copies of the combat systems doctrine, the command action plan, the standing orders, a reasonably current enlisted distribution/venfieation report, a wardroom and chief petty officer mess
What seagoing officer doesn’t dream of sitting in the captain’s chair on the bridge of a U.S. Navy ship? Making wise use of the time in the PCO pipeline can ease the transition from dream to reality.
roster, a layout of the ship’s weapon and engineering systems, plus any other material that would help a new department head, executive officer, or commanding officer learn about his new ship. The ships are responsible for forwarding copies of updated material to the folder at the SWO school. If all the material in the folder is fairly current, it is an indication that the ship is well-run.
Once the PCO sets out three or four major objectives, he analyzes all of the standard Navy management programs to see how each, if properly run, can contribute to attaining his objectives. If one of the objectives is to have a command climate of fairness and equal treatment for every individual, the command action plan might first cover the military discipline program, which would include the CO’s standards of conduct, appearance, obedience, and integrity. Second might be the advancement program, with a stipulation that everyone has to participate in the advancement program as a matter of policy. Third might be the human relations program, where the role of the chain of command would be described, and individual responsibilities defined with respect to superiors, subordinates, and contemporaries. Fifth would be the training program as it relates to all of the items listed. And sixth would be the captain’s views on accountability of individuals for their own actions and attitudes.
The command action plan does not have to be a large document; indeed, it is more effective when it is about a ten- pager. Ideally, in the example outlined, the captain could express views on all of the program topics in two pages. Of course, he cannot express these views until he has decided what he thinks about personal accountability, discipline, the chain of command, and the role of training in human relations. Coming up with a command action plan in the pipeline forces the PCO to do this.
Another objective might be to have an exceptionally clean and good-looking ship. Standard programs in the ship that support this goal could include the ship’s daily routine—morning clampdown, the executive officer’s daily inspection of all messing and berthing, the senior medical representative’s sanitation inspections, the execution of sweepers during the day, the proper securing of materials at the end of the working day, the cleanup that precedes eight o’clock reports, and the way in which the duty section handles cleanliness and security after hours.
The good-looking part involves the preservation programs—painting, corrosion control, lighting, stowage, closure systems, smoking policies, distribution of the preservation workload, technical training, and the paint budget. The captain does not have to address every single aspect of how the ship will attain the objective, but he does have to set the goal and then make a simple statement demanding strict adherence to the prescribed (and standard Navy) daily routine.
He may find when he comes on board that a fairly simple goal and prescription about the daily routine is going to cause a significant shakeup in how the ship is run. He may find that the executive officer has fallen into the habit of doing the mess decks and one or two berthing compartments each day, instead of the entire ship, as regulations require. But the captain sets high standards for cleanliness by requiring adherence to the Navy standard ship’s organization and regulation manual. And those high standards will permeate all of the streams of activity involved in the goal of a clean and good-looking ship. The command action plan can cover this in two paragraphs.
There should be some salesmanship exercised in the command action plan, in order to show how achievement of the big goals will help everyone on board enjoy a better professional and personal tour of duty in the ship. The two goals described—a command climate of equal opportunity and a clean and good-looking ship—are easy to relate to everyone’s benefit, and ought to be standard in any command action plan. Others should be related to the ship’s mission or missions, and should also be things the PCO is personally interested in. The crew expects each CO to be a fanatic on something or other, while hoping that he's not a nut in general. The command action plan fulfills this expectation, and makes it clear from the outset where the captain wants to go. The crew is conditioned and normally willing to do what the captain wants.
Standing orders are, in essence, the rules of the game: how the CO wants watches to be stood in the ship; how the crew is to respond to emergencies; how boats are to be managed and controlled; how dangerous evolutions, such as fuel and ammunition handling in port, are to be conducted. There can be as many as the CO wants, but they must be confined to one topic at a time and they should be consistent with the ship’s bills and standard Navy and type commander regulations. The commanding officer has the right and the duty to impose his own standards, as long as they are at least as rigorous as the regulations.
The concept of a collection of standing orders is not new. The PCO school has collections on file as examples, and the PCO should review them before writing his own. If his ship already has a collection, he should study them and decide what revisions to impose, especially now that he has a command action plan on which to base his requirements. If his ship does not have a collection of standing orders, he is free to build his own. The writing of standing orders takes time and more effort than the command action plan, but it reinforces the command action plan by translating goals into required actions. This process will help to clarify the feasibility of the command action plan in the PCO’s mind, especially if he has set some unreasonable goals. If a standing order gets ridiculously hard, then he has to go back and reexamine the goal.
Night orders are a special case of standing orders. Everyone is familiar with the captain’s at-sea night order book. The first section covers the way in which the captain wants underway operations to be run, that is, when to call him, how to maneuver around contacts, what to do when visibility is impaired. The first section could be considered one standing order about how the bridge, combat information center, and main control will run their watches. The second section contains the daily pages. There is usually one page, in a traditional format, that outlines the ship’s status and leaves space for the CO to write down supplementary instructions for the night. A new page is prepared for each night.
Sometimes, in reviewing his ship’s folder at the PCO school, the PCO will find that there is a ship’s instruction that constitutes the night order book, and a separate engineering department instruction that governs the engineering plant operation and night orders. This should be clarified. The clearest way to work the administrative problem of night orders is to have only one set—the captain’s. The engineer can then have the first line of his night orders to the engineering department state that the engineering officer of the watch should carry out the captain's night orders.
What ships call the captain’s night order book is actually two things in one - a regulatory section at the front, which is more properly a standing order, and die night order sheet at the back, which is a daily supplement aimed at the night’s activities. The best way out of this muddle is to have one (of the several) standing orders address operation of the bridge, combat information center, and main control while under way. This standing order can be numbered and then bound separately into the captain’s night order book, and reviewed periodically by the watchstanders. The second section, the night orders for that specific night, can be enclosed in the binder. This clarifies the regulatory nature of the specific instructions (such as when to call the captain) and eliminates the possibility of conflicting procedural instructions. If the engineer is going to issue night orders, he should get the captain to countersign them.
Night orders also should be used in port. There should be a standing order for the in-port condition similar to the collection of rules and procedures written for the at-sea condition. There should be a second section where the CO jots down his instructions for the night, just as he does at sea. And while the navigator or executive officer prepares the captain’s at-sea night orders every day, usually at the eight o’clock reports, the day’s command duty officer should prepare the captain’s orders for the in-port night. He can make the book available to the other department heads, and they can write in such things as major maintenance projects, the expected arrival of a tug and harbor crane at 0630 the next morning, and special weather notices.
The executive officer initials this at the end of the day, and the command duty officer then takes it to the CO before he leaves each night. This gives the captain a good rundown of what might be going on that evening in his ship, and also gives him the chance to add his requirements for supervision, tagouts, and special precautions.
After all of this preliminary work, the new captain can walk on board the ship with his mind made up about what he is going to try to achieve in his command tour. There is a powerful leadership message sent when the new captain can hand over his command action plan, standing orders, and night orders to the executive officer on the first day.
I'm ready to go, XO. Are you? Is the wardroom? Any questions?
And this, of course, is really what the PCO pipeline is all about.
Captain Deutcrmann, a frequent contributor to Proceedings, recently retired from active duty after 26 years’ service in cruisers and destroyers, including command of a gunboat in Vietnam, a guided-missile acstroycr for three years, and a squadron of destroyers in Pearl Harbor.
An Electric Combat Submarine for the 21st Century
By Commodore Hans M. Ort, Royal Netherlands Navy (Retired)
In April 1945 the most advanced combat submarine of its time went to sea: The German Type-XXI “Electric Submarine.” She was streamlined and had large batteries that allowed her to remain completely submerged for three to four days while operating at a speed of four knots. The Type-XXI had a maximum underwater speed of 16 knots, which it could sustain for more than one hour. In comparison, the latest U.S. submarines of the Balao (SS-285) and Tench (SS-417) classes could travel underwater at ten
RDM, the Dutch Submarine Design and Construction Company, began the project as a private initiative in 1984, and has a considerable investment in the design. The concept covers a range of boats from 1,100 to 1,800-tons submerged displacement that will be built using modular techniques. Although the project was primarily aimed at a budget-conscious design for export, the top-end of the range might well be compatible with the Royal Netherlands Navy’s requirements for a successor to its Zwaardvis-class
While the project definition study relates to the 1,800-ton Moray, the modular approach will permit the results to be extrapolated to smaller submarines.
This implies a multiple spin-off, from smaller boats suitable for navies with less costly requirements, to a larger boat design with a configuration close to the operational profile of the Walrus class. These are long range, ocean-going, deep diving submarines with a small crew. They have a high battery capacity, six torpedo tubes (with 14 reloads), and a
L.
’Closed-cycle diesel Liquid oxygen Compensating water
knots for abut 30 minutes before depleting their batteries. The Type-XXI U-boat Was also deeper diving, had a faster battery charging rate, a synthetic rubber coating to defeat hostile radars, and other advanced features.
Now, 45 years later, an equally revolutionary submarine is being developed— the Dutch Moray SSK design. As the name implies, the new submarine is an electric eel that can move silently through the water on a variety of missions; it will have better underwater performance and he more difficult to detect than traditional hiesel-electric submarines.
It is the first submarine to be conceived from the outset as a platform for an air- mdependent propulsion (AIP) system, although the Moray will still rely on a standard diesel-electric propulsion system for normal transit and patrol duties— 'ncluding fast battery charging and high sustained speeds, both on the surface and submerged.
boats. The design, designated by RDM the “Moray-1800 pfH”, is an 1,800-ton boat with provisions for hybrid propulsion-AlP to be retrofitted when available.
The Dutch government has allocated funds for RDM to begin the project definition phase. The end result may well be a decision by the Royal Netherlands Navy to replace its Zwaardvis-chss boats at the end of their lives with the Moray 1800, fitted with air-independent propulsion. At the same time, foreign navies may find that other members of the Moray family, with different displacement and performance, could meet their requirements.
The Moray project is interlocked with the company’s submarine activities as a whole. Expertise gained in building the Walrus-class submarines is fully applicable; although the Moray is a new design, full use has been made of proven components and concepts.
sophisticated combat system plus Mk-48 torpedoes and encapsulated Harpoons.
From the outset, the Moray 1800 pfH aims at the incorporation of AIP. Al- thought he boat as designed is a conventional SSK, its weight compensation, rudder dimensioning and hydrodynamics, engine room layout, etc., are such that an AIP plug can be incorporated without any need for redesign at a later stage.
RDM has been involved in AIP research for several years and has aimed at a high power unit from the start. This certainly does not make the project easier, but a high-power philosophy is in line with the type of submarine RDM specializes in: the ocean-going vessel. To be commensurate with the operational profile of an ocean-going submarine, AIP must be able to deliver power of 500 kilowatts or more, depending on the size of the submarine.
The submarine will be required to make full use of its towed array and to
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trail a contact for long periods at an average speed of 10 knots, quite different from the low speed demands for coastal submarines. RDM chose a closed cycle combustion engine whose exhaust gases are processed using a water management system (Cosworth Systems) and topped up with liquid oxygen before they are recycled.
Although the type of combustion engine is not decisive, a conventional marine diesel has been selected in the first instance as it is a reliable, safe, well- understood power source. RDM baptised its AIP system SPECTRE—submarine power for extended contact trailing and range enhancement.
The first phase in this project was the design and construction of a land-based 150 kilowatt closed cycle diesel to prove the feasibility of keeping the noise level within the limits that are set for underwater running of an electric submarine. This has now been completed successfully. Two subsequent stages in the SPECTRE program are scheduled:
- The first is to test a land based unit of 400 kilowatts built by Cosworth in England. This will be an excellent opportunity to verify RDM’s findings in relation to performance and noise reduction at higher power levels.
- The second will be the proof of the pudding: development of an air-independent propulsion system intended for submarine operation. After testing on shore, this unit must be tested at sea.
The Royal Netherlands Navy is phasing out its remaining three triple-hull submarines as they are replaced by the Walrus class, and will give one triple-hull submarine to RDM for use of a sea-going test platform for a SPECTRE system of about 600 kilowatts. Sea trials, including running on the sound range, are scheduled to take place in 1992 or 1993.
During 1990 and 1991, RDM will be actively engaged in the development of their SPECTRE system and Moray-class submarine design. Trade-off studies and selection of the most suitable options, in close consultation with the RNLN, will come first, followed by drawings, specifications and documentation. The end result should be a new cost-effective approach to the demands of submarine services for the end of this century and beyond—a new “Electric Submarine” with performance far superior to the Type-XXI U-boat that set the standard 45 years ago.
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Commodore Ort is a veteran submarine officer. He has commanded two submarines, an ASW frigate, and a fleet resupply ship; ashore, he has been involved in submarine design and ASW tactics.