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By Commander Robert C. Schaeffer, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The beginning of the reckoning . . .
“All is over.
Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken,
Czechoslovakia recedes into darkness.
She has suffered in every respect
By her association with the Western democracies.”
Winston Churchill delivered this eulogy to the House of Commons on the afternoon of 3 October 1938. More than half a century later, the Western democracies vacillate as they confront with great discomfort a decision identical to the one they bungled so tragically, so long ago.
Two distinct paths lie before this nation in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; the course to be chosen will define the fortunes of the United States for decades to come. On one, we encounter an unparalleled opportunity to advance the cause of stability and international cooperation, but this path requires vision and imagination. Down the other, more twisted course swirl echoes of the dismal past. Grainy newsreel pictures of black homburgs and rolled umbrellas, mass graveyards, and swastikas blend with surreal scenes of endless gasoline lines and the distorted faces of poisoned children, scattered through Kurdish villages. Guttural Warnings to the West assault the airwaves, incomprehensible in a cacophony of simultaneous threats and denials. Past and present collide—merged in time and tangled in the same inability to decide, to take a stand, to do what must be done.
Two dynamic forces are at work in the Middle East: Islam, which demands attention only when it manifests itself •n militant, fundamentalist form, and Arab nationalism, equally important but often fatally forgotten. Arab nationalism has a long 20th-century history, focused around the secular triangle of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. In form and structure, it remains in a time warp. Saddam Hussein has mobilized his society much as Hitler did in the 1930s, hy blaming the West, by blaming nonassimilating groups—the Kurds in Iraq serve as Jew-like scapegoats—and by blaming non-Arab neighbors such as
Iran. Moreover, he has made a Hitler- esque calculation that the West will stand by and wring its hands while he gobbles up everything he desires. Kuwait is Hussein’s Rhineland, Sudeten- land, and Czechoslovakia, all rolled into one. Saudi Arabia stands as Hussein’s Poland—where the German Fiih- rer’s calculation of Allied unwillingness to resist at last proved wrong.
It is imperative that the United States intervene with overwhelming strength—preferably as part of a multinational effort. This crisis is an opportunity that can be turned to strong Western advantage if we have the will. We must begin by recognizing that by
themselves sanctions, embargoes, negotiations, and the entire range of efforts designed to create “behavior modification” represent no more than the upraised arms of our own surrender, simply applied in stages—first from the elbows, then fully extended overhead. Everything the world knows about Saddam Hussein tells us that this bloody man will not be moved by sanctions alone. Force is required.
Dialogue revolving around saving Saudi Arabia is shortsighted. What of tiny Kuwait, as legitimate a nation-state as Saudi Arabia, and a longstanding friend of the West? Can we accept the collapse of a decades-old energy-security policy and merely go on the defensive after a significant oil-producing nation has been annexed by force? To do so gives credence to Hussein’s calculations of Western response.
The military maxim is engraved in stone: As Lord Nelson and the Duke of
Wellington both recognized, timeliness is everything—the difference between victory and defeat. And certainly, we need not accept the bitter loss of Kuwait as a lasting defeat.
The President’s initial response has so far been characterized as militarily and diplomatically defensive, but he still has the time, the opportunity, and the means to redirect history. Unfortunately, however, he is preparing U.S. citizens the wrong way if they are to support the right course of action.
Daily commentary from Pentagon officials, congressional sources, and network analysts stresses “long-term staying power,” and the theme of “holding together” this quickly assembled international alliance—as well as the “will” of the American public to support a lengthy military presence in the region. “Long-term” should not be in our military lexicon unless we wish to revisit the errors of the past. Demonstrably, the West can project power into the region. Therefore, the President can resolve this crisis quickly, and also reduce the potential for future aggression in the area.
Consider the following action: The President urges the Soviet leadership to undertake a joint military operation, under the auspices of the United Nations, using the 12 Soviet divisions already in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Baghdad is easily within range of Soviet air power and almost every type of Soviet missile; Iraq lies about 125 miles from the Soviet border, separated by Turkey—a NATO ally that has already joined the U.N.-sponsored embargo by cutting the flow of oil through the Iraqi pipeline. The United States has already positioned tactical air and ground units in Saudi Arabia and is assembling strike-capable forces in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. NATO allies can now join in a multinational endeavor, emboldened by U.S.-Soviet cooperation. In turn, the United Nations, possessing the power of enforcement for once, can issue an ultimatum: Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait and restore the legitimate government.
Is this realistic? Should we be considering all-out war? Well—if not now,
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when? Economic considerations aside, far more U.S. fighting men will be lost in a prolonged, timidly escalated Vietnam-style affair than in a decisive multilateral strike at the Iraqi homeland.
As for the Soviets, again consider their response to date. They have sent positive signals of their readiness to participate in such an effort. Mikhail Gorbachev now looks at an opportunity to demonstrate to the West that the Soviet Union is truly a part of the civilized Western World at last; to obligate the West to the Soviets and thereby obtain substantial assistance for his failing economy; to pacify his own military establishment by giving it a new motive and reason for existence; to move substantial force into a region of the Soviet Union tom by ethnic strife; and to divert his people for a time from the massive societal problems they face, instilling renewed pride by playing on the theme of the Soviet Union’s commitment to world order and peace and its ability to rescue the West. The Soviets have a number of assets and motivations to bring to this venture. As the major contributor to the Iraqi military build-up, they have valuable intelligence concerning Iraqi capabilities. Moreover, the Soviets had a non-profitable pre-crisis involvement with Iraq. In contrast, the Soviets had a favorable financial arrangement in which Kuwait was underwriting Soviet overseas investments in addition to economic development programs within the Soviet Union. The Soviets cannot afford to see Kuwait disappear.
For the United States, the long-term gains will far outstrip any short-term losses. Better to owe the Soviets a favor than to lose the oil resources of the Persian Gulf; certainly Hussein will dictate world oil prices if he stays in Kuwait, controlling its oil fields and intimidating the Saudis into decreasing their output. It is true that the West has long opposed Soviet entry into the Middle East, but the geostrategic posture of the world has changed considerably. The Soviets have discovered the economic consequences of maintaining an empire. More important, U.S.- Soviet relations will reach their 20th- century high-water mark as the mechanics of this cooperative endeavor unfold, a status that can provide an equilibrium and equality between us that is important to the Soviet psyche and crucial for the incorporation of this huge nation into the Western community. Energy supplies will be stabilized for the West and Japan, and all future Third World dictators will realize that the days of capitalizing on past superpower rivalries are gone forever.
Is this too bold, too daring, for U.S. leadership to pursue? Probably. It is one more measure of our proclivity for national knee-knocking that most will either snicker at such a proposal or dismiss it as unrealistic. Yet the words of that indomitable leader who stood before Commons in 1938 are truly for all generations. Like Czechoslovakia then, Kuwait today stands as a test, a measure of the will of the American people. “Do not suppose that this is the end,” Churchill concluded:
“This is only the beginning of the reckoning.
This is only the first sip—
The first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year—
“Unless—by a supreme recovery of our moral health and martial vigour, We arise again and take our stand for freedom,
As in the olden time.”