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By Robert D. Smith
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The U.S. Marine Corps is currently acquiring a number of air cushion landing craft (LCAC) for use in amphibious assault operations. The chief advantages of the LCAC are its superior speed and its ability to travel over land. The primary disadvantage is its vulnerability. Anyone who has ever seen an LCAC cannot help but notice the two huge push propellers extending high above the rear of the craft. This high profile, along with the lack of heavy armor, makes the LCAC a very likely target.
A vulnerability study of the LCAC was done by the Ballistic Research Laboratory, which concluded that the LCAC was relatively invulnerable to small-arms fire and artillery fragments. The study also stated that only direct hits by large explosive warheads greater than 30 mm would pose a threat to the LCAC components.
A number of potential enemy countries not only have small arms and artillery but also weapons with explosive warheads greater than 30 mm. The Soviet Union has supplied many countries with antitank guided missiles such as the RPG-7, AT-3 SAGGER, AT-4 SPIGOT, and AT-5 Spandrel. These missiles have ranges of 500 to 4,000 meters and the capability of penetrating up to 500 mm of tank armor. It is very likely that these weapons will be used against the LCAC.
The vulnerability of the LCAC and other landing craft to all kinds of enemy fire could be reduced with the use of a piece of equipment on the verge of being retired—the Xenon tank searchlight currently mounted on the M60 series of tanks.
High-intensity Xenon tank searchlights can reduce the vulnerability of an LCAC or any other landing craft because any attempt to look at one of these searchlights for even short periods can result in temporary blindness; there is also a possibility of permanent eye damage. They can be thought of as a “quasi-offensive” weapon.
Since most antitank guided missiles are optically guided, the soldiers firing these weapons are vulnerable to eye damage from high-intensity searchlights— especially because of the optical magnification of the weapon sights and the relatively long times required to guide the missiles to the target. Infantry troops firing small arms and forward artillery observers are also at risk of being blinded by the searchlights.
LCACs and accompanying landing craft could be equipped with a bank ot two or more Xenon tank searchlights positioned on the front of the craft, aimed, at various angles, toward the shore. The broad-beam option on the searchlights could be used to cover a larger area of the landing zone.
During a landing, if there were no resistance there would be no need to turn on the lights. However, if the landing craft came under fire, the element of surprise would be gone and all of the lights would be turned on immediately. This would be done during day or night operations, because the searchlights are equally effective day or night due to their tremendous candlepower. Imagine the effect that hundreds of searchlights would have on
I.S. NAVY (T EDWARDS)
The LCAC is fast and can travel over land—and makes a good target. High-intensity Xenon tank searchlights mounted on the LCAC could reduce its vulnerability.
an enemy, physically and psychologically. The natural motion of the sea and the movement of the craft themselves would create a crisscross pattern of lights Hashing all over the landing zone in an unpredictable pattern.
The U.S. Marine Corps is planning on retiring its current fleet of M60A1 tanks and replacing them with M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks. The searchlights could be removed from any tanks being mothballed, and mounted on LCACs and other landing craft. Effectiveness would be greatly enhanced at very little additional cost.
Mr. Smith is currently working as a mathematician/ analyst for the U.S. Naval Coastal Systems Center in Panama City. Florida. He is involved in the testing of the new Navy mine-hunting sonar AN/SQQ-32. Previously, he worked for the U.S. Army as an operations research analyst, and for the SHAPE Technical Centre in The Hague, the Netherlands, in antitank warfare.
Mobile Care on the Battlefield
Planners on the modern battlefield can no longer think in terms of established front and rear areas. Major offensives will most likely be the exception, not the rule. “Brushfire” wars, with skirmishes instead of battles, hit-and-run attacks against U.S. forces or their allies, insurgencies and revolutions, appear to be
By Lieutenant Michael D. Keaton, U.S. Navy
the present prevailing threat. Training to operate against guerrillas of an unspecified force strength continues to challenge leaders and planners.
Budget constraints, personnel shortfalls and inadequate training areas have mandated rethinking our areas of expertise within the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Medical planners have benefitted from this experience. Often we train and operate without the benefit of established doctrine to guide us; we learn to overcome our own preconceived limitations. When weather refuses to cooperate, vehicles break down or instructors cancel, we improvise. We cannot train effectively if we only train when everything operates on schedule. Combat is not a picture-perfect scenario.
Implementing alternative methods has required reducing personnel and equipment, and decreased lift requirements have allowed for greater mobility and flexibility. Maneuver warfare—the ability of a combat element to adapt to the tactical situation and use it to its own advantage—is the key to success.
Combat service support (CSS) providers must ensure that they can sustain the combat element of the MAGTF; the most effective way to achieve this is to make the CSS element an integral member of the combat element.
Preserving the combat strength of the MAGTF through health service support has been and continues to be the mission of the medical battalion. Medical is not always first on the minds of planners when developing a concept of operations or a scheme of maneuver. Without adequate medical support before, during, and after the battle, well-planned operations may prove too costly in personnel losses.
At 3d Medical Battalion, 3d Force Service Support Group, we are meeting this challenge. Our objective is to provide immediate lifesaving care and patient stabilization at any location within the tactical area of responsibility (TAR). We have developed plans for emergency-room type support facilities that are rapidly deployable, highly maneuverable, and allow rapid employment upon arrival in the TAR.
Providing immediate lifesaving care and stabilization to the sick and wounded maximizes the retum-to-duty status of the fighting force. Because of their mission and their place in the casualty evacuation chain, battalion aid stations (BASs) are limited in their ability to provide surgical intervention. BASs are constrained also by their equipment and supplies, in their capability to provide emergency-room type medical support. Their mission requires them to rely on battle dressings and intravenous solutions as a primary means of stabilization. Physicians and corpsmen at all levels provide nothing short of heroic efforts in these endeavors. Medical support beyond the BASs is a key factor in keeping our wounded in action from dying.
The mission of the medical detachment within the CSS element is stabilization for further evacuation or surgical intervention, as necessary. The objective of the medical detachment is to maintain combat effectiveness by sustaining and preserving the fighting force. Medical planners must assume a more aggressive role in maneuver warfare planning.
CSS medical support has been rou-
Regardless of the vehicle used as the delivery platform, the Mobile SST provides immediate on-site lifesaving care.
tinely provided by the beach evacuation station (BES) for the first few days of amphibious exercises/operations. The collecting and clearing company provides the support as the combat service support area is established. Occasionally, the BES is required to displace in support of the combat element. In even fewer instances, the collecting and clearing company displaces in support of the combat element. One reason for this rare occurrence is that while the maneuver elements have been scaling down their lift requirements, the medical personnel and equipment have remained the same. It is a huge logistic nightmare.
Until recently there was no platform organic to the medical battalion that could provide rapidly deployable, technologically advanced support at the earliest phases of an operation. Imagine the paradox: at the time the landing force most needs CSS medical support, the medical detachment is still waiting to land. They are scheduled for an on-call serial in the embarkation plan. The medical detachment used to rely on others to transport its mobile-loaded medical equipment (authorized medical allowance lists, or AMALs). Full-scale health service support operations could not commence until this equipment arrived. Mobile-loading medical equipment, on board any rolling stock that was available, has been and continues to be standard operating procedure since corpsmen have supported Marines. The size of the vehicle has determined how much additional medical gear Doc can bring with him, and the rest of the gear arrives as lifts become available.
In the early 1980s, an idea was conceived to mobile-load standard AMAL equipment, tents, and camouflage screens on board a five-ton truck (M- 923). In addition, two ambulances and a task-organized evacuation section comprised the mobile BES. They could provide mobile medical/surgical support to the maneuvering combat element. Experimentation with different configuration methods allowed for a highly mobile BES.
The main drawback to this idea was dedicating one M-923 as a medical- equipment mover. It was often difficult to convince embarkation officers to set embark priorities for both an ambulance and a truck (M-923) in an early landing serial. This is especially true when the M-923 is dedicated to hauling only mobile-loaded medical equipment.
More often than not, the decision was made to prioritize the most critical medical items from the BES and land them early with the ambulances. When the remainder of the equipment arrived, the BES was then officially established. This required medical personnel to become smarter in planning health service support to landing force personnel.
The M-923 mobile-loaded BES (or mobile shock surgical triage [SST]) was limited in how it could be deployed. Due to its size, weight and lifting restrictions, the M-923 could only be introduced to the battlefield using fixed-wing cargo planes or landing craft. Another factor working against the M-923 was the limited motor transport assets available within the landing force. The M-923, when used as the mobile SST platform, could not be used as a personnel carrier or cargo vehicle. It became nothing more than a large ambulance support vehicle. The personnel of the mobile BES/SST still required transport to their new combat service support/landing zone support area. These limiting factors made it necessary to go back to the drawing board.
The solution came with the delivery of the M-997 High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle ambulance. This hard- backed ambulance can transport four litter patients and eight walking wounded, or combinations thereof. We can mobile- load the M-997 with appropriate AMALs and organic supplies necessary to establish a mobile SST. This is a vehicle that is deployable on board a ship or fixed-wing aircraft, or externally lifted by rotary wing aircraft. By spread-loading the equipment between two M-997s, we can load all the medical supplies and equipment necessary to set up and operate a mobile SST in a tactical environment.
The load plan leaves two litter positions available on each M-997 that can be used for patients whenever required. This ensures that we do not lose our medical capabilities during transit phases. In addition, the M-997 can be used for limited periods in a nuclear, biological, or chemical contaminated environment. It has a built-in filtration system that can support four patients, the driver, A-driver and corpsman. We can transit contaminated battlefields. This mobile SST can go to the contaminated casualty instead of bringing the casualty to the mobile SST, BES or collecting and clearing company.
We now have a field emergency room readily available to provide support anywhere in the theater of operations. The mobile SST can provide stabilization and minor surgical support.
A task-organized mobile SST is readily available to the elements of the MAGTF. The AMALs and M-997 ambulances are organic to all letter companies within the medical battalion. An established mobile SST provides the nucleus from which a collecting and clearing or surgical support company can be built.
In maneuver warfare, the mobile SST provides lifesaving support that is readily available to the combat element. As an adjunct to regimental aid stations or operating within other support areas, we can maximize the return-to-duty status and minimize casualty losses. Medical can thus also serve the landing force/MAGTF commander as a force multiplier.
Lieutenant Keaton is the Head, Operating Management Department, Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington. Previous tours include Company Commander, 3d Medical Battalion, 3d Force Service Support Group.
Tomahawk Equals True Value
By the Staff of Carrier Group Seven, U.S. Pacific Fleet
The time has come to reevaluate fleet weapon systems to determine where the Navy can generate tactical leverage. The Tomahawk missile, with its current capability and ever-increasing deployable numbers, can make the difference in a wide range of tactical situations. Both the Tomahawk antiship missile (TASM) and the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) provide the battle group with the necessary flexibility to keep a potential adversary at a tactical disadvantage.
While initial and superficial analysis of the TASM/TLAM capability may indicate that only the antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC) and the strike warfare commander (STWC) may reap benefits from the Tomahawk, full integration of this capability by all commanders will serve as a significant force multiplier for the battle group.
A TLAM mission package can be designed to deliver a tailored result. A combination of various target types yields results that will serve the respective commanders and increase the overall effectiveness of each TLAM/TASM mission.
Before examining the advantages Tomahawk brings to the battle group, two important adjuncts must be discussed: First, the role of the battle group’s force over-the-horizon track coordinator (FOTC) and second, the role of the cruise missile support activity (CMSA). Only with these two supporting functions working efficiently can the battle group realize the true value of the Tomahawk.
Force OTH Track Coordinator
The FOTC performs three vital functions for the battle group. First, he maintains a surface and subsurface database that includes both potential threats and friendly surface traffic, to ensure accurate targeting. Second, the FOTC is a vital link in monitoring the flow of nonorganic intelligence information to the battle group for generation of new tracks and for updating and correlating new data. Finally, he provides targeting data for all battle group war-at-sea strikes.
The theater-wide database maintained by FOTC is critical for Tomahawk planning. Over-the-horizon tracks are impor-
Since the United States adopted the Tomahawk concept in 1972, it has evolved into one of the most effective force multipliers in the Navy.
tant not only to ensure that they can be targeted as required but also that friendly casualties can be avoided during a TLAM strike. The ability of FOTC to work with the ASUWC to generate an adequate surface surveillance picture is central to the success of Tomahawk. Equally important is the interaction between FOTC and the STWC for surface track coordination.
Timely integration of nonorganic intelligence information to the FOTC database is essential in providing warfare commanders with the latest tactical picture. An accurate update in order-of- battle asset location can have a strong impact on planned war-at-sea or deep interdiction strikes. The full value of nonorganic theater and national sensors cannot be realized without centralized, evaluation of FOTC information.
Finally, as a warfare coordinator, the FOTC must provide the battle group in general, and Tomahawk-capable units in particular, with a targeting quality tactical database. The information should be used by all warfare commanders in making tactical decisions. War at sea, overland strikes, underway replenishment, carrier/battleship operations, antisubmarine warfare exercises, and every other major battle group evolution should be undertaken only after the plot from the FOTC database has been factored in.
Cruise Missile Support Activity
The CMSA role in employing the Tomahawk weapon system is vital. It is the TLAM mission repository. Without discussing the cruise missile C3I architecture and associated hardware, suffice it to say that these missions are time-consum-