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By Commander George V. Galdorisi, U.S. Navy
The Navy’s amphibious forces provide a warfighting capability unique among even the most powerful navies of the world. In the landmark 1986 U.S. Naval Institute publication “The Maritime Strategy,” then-Commandant of the Marine Corps General P.X. Kelley clearly described the Amphibious Warfare Strategy and suggested that we have entered a renaissance period in the evolution of amphibious warfare. General Kelley took great pains to link this strategy directly to the Maritime Strategy, and to the casual reader it would appear that the Amphibious Warfare Strategy enjoys a priority call on personnel and material resources within the Navy system. But this is not the case.
Our ability to execute our ambitious Amphibious Warfare Strategy is questionable. The entire strategy may be built on assumptions and predictions that will never reach fruition. This tenuous basis for success is particularly critical as we operate in the 1990s and begin to fund and build weapons for the 21st century. Most naval strategists agree that, particularly in this era of glasnost and perestroika, more emphasis will be placed on amphibious forces, which are ideally suited to deal with Third World conflicts among littoral nations.
Policymakers must determine whether we are sufficiently poised to execute the Amphibious Warfare Strategy today, as well as in in the near and distant future. Do we have the organization, doctrine, training, and weapons to do it? If we do not, what changes can we make to fund and execute this strategy successfully in an era that will likely see significant decreases in defense budgets?
Amphibious Warfare Plan
The difficulty in assessing our ability to execute the Amphibious Warfare Strategy may derive from the fact that no Amphibious Warfare Master Plan exists to guide our policies, particularly in the area of procurement. This is because, in large part, amphibious warfare cuts across so many Navy and Marine Corps “lobbies.” Different Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations must procure the ships, craft, weapons, and aircraft used in amphibious warfare, while the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC), may often have a different agenda than its Navy counterpart. The half-mile that separates the Pentagon from HQMC may be, figuratively, the most forbidding no-man’s land on earth.
Amphibious doctrine lies in a series of Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs). The unclassified NWP 22 lists the basic organizational structure and warfighting doctrine for amphibious warfare. Amphibious force organization is similar to carrier battle groups (CVBGs), with warfare commanders in various functional areas. One way of determining whether these Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) are capable of getting to and operating in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) is to determine the capability of each warfare commander. Deficiences in a particular warfare area should call for changes either in organization, doctrine, training, or procurement (or some combination of the four).
Assumptions________________________________
One assumption that helps to determine the adequacy of amphibious forces is that ARGs will operate under the protective umbrella of a CVBG. This is a congenial assumption, because a CVBG can provide an enormous share of the offensive and defensive needs of an ARG. But does this assumption reflect the way we deploy, the way we train, and the way we will probably fight?
ARGs follow a completely different deployment pattern from CVBGs. Any encounters that ARGs and CVBGs have during workups and deployments are usually brief and, more often than not, coincidental. The likelihood that a CVBG will be in the area when an ARG answers a call to perform a mission is far less than 100%. In late 1988 the Pacific Fleet’s deployed ARG Alfa graphically illustrated this when it was dispatched to Burma for the potential evacuation of American and allied nationals, as violence engulfed the capital city of Rangoon. Fleet staff planners were chagrined to learn that the closest CVBG could not get to Rangoon until days after the ARG’s arrival, a time when the operation, had it actually been carried out, would already have been completed.
Another assumption underlying our amphibious strategy is that a large-scale conventional war with the Soviet Union is the most likely scenario and that amphibious forces would have sufficient warning time to prepare adequately for a crisis. Adequate warning time would indeed be true for a war with the Soviets, but is not the most likely scenario. Third World crises in locations as diverse as Nicaragua, Lebanon, Panama, Burma, and others would be the most likely places where amphibious forces would be needed immediately. In the most of these cases, the single forward-deployed ARG from each coast would be on the scene in relatively short time, prepared to do the job alone.
Thus, the only rational assumption that naval planners may make is that an ARG will most likely be called upon to act alone.
Doctrine
A CVBG has a battle group commander and warfare commanders in major areas: strike warfare, antiair warfare, electronic warfare, anti-surface warfare and antisubmarine warfare. An ARG is organized along the same lines, and each warfare commander must draw assets from the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) in order to carry out his mission. Each warfare commander’s capabilities in organization, doctrine, training, and weapons determines his ability to ensure that the ARG gets to and survives in the AO A. The sum of those abilities determines our readiness to execute the Amphibious Warfare Strategy.
Warfare Areas
Strike Warfare (SW): Within the ARG, CATF functions as the Strike Warfare Commander (SWC). The SWC’s main battery consists of the Marines assigned to the em-
Amphibious warfare cuts across a number of blue and green lobbies. The half-mile between the Pentagon and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (background, right), must turn into a conduit for the free flow of information, rather than “the most forbidding no-man’s-land on earth.”
barked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Organizationally and doctrinally the MEU is usually a finely honed and combat-ready force. Once ashore the MEU Commander (CLF) has an array of assets at his disposal to secure the beachhead and fight the battle ashore.
Training is the area that often weakens the ability of the SWC to achieve maximum effectiveness. Blue (Navy) and green (Marine) units operate independently for extended periods and link up for only a few brief exercises prior to the ARG’s deployment. Once deployed, the slow speeds of many ARG ships result in extremely lengthy transits with only brief periods left for practice exercises and assaults. Typically, an assault Marine may actually board a helicopter or assault craft as few as four times during a six-month deployment, which is not an optimal level of training.
The SWC has a dazzling array of modem ships, aircraft, and assault craft available or programmed that some day may enable him to conduct effective landings in the AO A from over the horizon (OTH). New assault ships of the LHD-1 and LSD-41 class, aircraft such as Harriers, CH-53Es, and assault craft such as Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCACs) are all potent weapons for the SWC. It would seem that, with the many billions of dollars being poured into this new equipment, the SWC would be in an enviable position to conduct effective OTH assaults. However, this capability may be in jeopardy.
The plethora of anti-amphibious warfare weapons at the disposal of many littoral nations, such as coastal artillery, anti-ship missiles, attack helicopters, mini-submarines, and other evolving weapons, necessitate rapid OTH assaults. LCACs are ideal for moving heavy equipment and follow-on forces, but without the proposed advanced amphibious assault system (AAA) the overwhelming majority of seaborne forces move at an agonizingly slow six to eight knots on board AAVs, mechanized landing craft (LCMs), and utility landing craft (LCUs). This can be deadly to the ships that must disgorge them and to the
Marines on board the craft themselves.
In a similar manner, the SWC’s ability to conduct OTH air assault is severely constrained by the current air combat element (ACE) configuration built around the venerable CH-46 helicopter. An additional aircraft is critical, and the Navy needs the CH-46s that are to be replaced to fill out its thinning ranks of vertical replenishment aircraft. The V-22 Osprey is the proposed replacement aircraft, but it and its high price tag have taken a beating in recent budget battles. The Secretary of Defense attempted to eliminate the Osprey completely from this year’s budget, and subsistence research and development funding was forced back into the budget only by a few determined Congressmen. With such a bleak outlook for the V-22, now may be the time for planners to opt for a less expensive, readily available airframe to replace the CH-46. A derivative of the UH-60A Blackhawk, used successfully by the Army, could be one candidate.
Thus, in spite of the enormous investment of late, the SWC is still at least an assault craft and an aircraft away from having the ability to conduct a successful OTH assault. These must be priority items if we are to execute the Amphibious Warfare Strategy.
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW): Organizationally, the ARG is well-equipped to conduct AAW. The role of anti-air warfare commander (AAWC) is vested in the Tactical Squad-
ron (TACRON) attached to the CATF staff. TACRON officers have strong backgrounds in carrier operations and conduct AAW much as it is conducted in CVBGs. Doctrine for AAW defense of the ARG is well-delineated in NWPs, and the integration of Navy and Marine forces is usually as complete as training opportunities permit. ARGs usually have ample access to aggressor aircraft while working in the Southern California or the Virginia capes operating areas, but have vastly circumscribed opportunities while deployed. Thus, most AAWCs are never
A derivative of the Army UH-60 Blackhawk has been suggested as a possible substitute for the endangered V-22. Equipped with air-warning radar and data links, it could bring new early-warning and battle-management capabilities to the antiair warfare commander.
as well-trained as they are on the days their scheduled deployments begin.
The AAWC has an impressive array of weapon systems at hand. Huey Cobras with air-to-air missiles, basic point missile defense systems, guns, close-in weapon systems, chaff, and Stinger missiles can present an impressive gauntlet to incoming aircraft or missiles. What is severely lacking is the ability to achieve early warning and battle management of all systems. As the Royal Navy learned painfully in the Falklands Conflict, early warning is indis- pensible in defending ships at sea. Derivative models of the UH-60A Blackhawk have been equipped with various types of air warning radars and data links. Such a relatively inexpensive addition to the ACE could give it the essential warning and battle management that the AAWC so sorely needs.
Electronic Warfare (EW): The Navy and Marine Corps platforms attached to the ARG have an impressive array of electronic warfare systems. But no doctrine or plan has been devised to integrate them. The EWC function is usually assigned to the TACRON, but this staff usually has little knowledge of ARG EW systems other than those found on the flagship. Most EW training is done either by individual ships in order to “check the fleet exercise publication (FXP) block” or by the ARG in transit. The most beneficial training would be that conducted in the busy EW environment of the AO A, where EW operators would be challenged the most and where the EWC would be forced to integrate his assets. Unfortunately, in the majority of exercises, the time spent in the AO A is insufficient for anything except the actual landing. Therefore, EW skills are rarely tested.
In the same fashion as the AAWC, the EWC is limited by the lack of airborne assets in his ability to move the battle space outward. An aircraft with an EW suite and a digital datalink compatible with the SLQ-32 V3 found on ARG flagships (something akin to the LAMPS Mk III), would fit the bill nicely and would provide the EWC with a most important asset.
Antisurface Warfare (ASUW): ASUW for the ARG has not been addressed thoroughly. Who is in charge and where he is located are both unanswered questions in every ARG. While most amphibious vessels practice frequently with their guns, they do it most often in transit (typically a line of ships steaming at ten knots shooting at a large cardboard target). This is hardly the type of training that will prepare a defense against determined attackers in an AO A. The ASUWC must have a plan and the time to train for ASUW in the AO A. As in the case of the other warfare areas however, practice assaults begin upon arrival in the AO A, and no other training occurs.
The weapons available to the ASUWC really amount to only a point defense for ARG ships. Maximum range of any gun system on board amphibious ships is approximately six to seven miles. They desperately need a standoff weapon. Harpoon is a tried-and-true ASUW standoff weapon, but the ability to fit these large weapons on board already crowded amphibious ships is questionable. However, it is a problem that must be tackled if the ASUWC is to have an effective capability.
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW): This warfare area is easily the most ignored within an ARG. When amphibious planners face the challenge of ASW, they most often retreat to the assumption that the ARG will operate with a CVBG. The problem is so difficult that there is not even an ASWC designated, nor is there any ASW doctrine. ARGs never practice ASW, and the only ASW system on board some ARG ships is the passive/defensive NIXIE system. An ARG is so vulnerable that a Third World submarine could operate at periscope depth within 100 yards of any ARG ship with virtual impunity, a fact that should not have been lost to Navy planners as ARG Alfa loitered off Rangoon in late 1988, totally vulnerable to the submarines of a number of nearby littoral nations.
Amphibious Warfare Strategy Deficiencies____________
Grouped into the areas of organization, doctrine, training, and weapons, the following are areas in which we fall short in our ability to execute the Amphibious Warfare
Strategy. . .
Organizational: The organization of the amphibious forces requires little change to accomplish most missions. The relationship between CATF and CLF is well-defined and functions well in the fleet. One possible change would be to upgrade the CATF and make this officer better prepared to command an ARG (at least as qualified as his Marine counterpart, CLF, who often has substantial amphibious assault experience). Often the amphibious squad-
ron commander has little more experience in amphibious operations than an 18-month command of an amphibious assault helicopter or an amphibious transport dock. A more well-rounded amphibious background and a well- defined training pipeline (such as that provided to a Battle Group Commander or a “Senior CAG”) could better prepare the CATF.
Doctrine: Amphibious warfare doctrine is essentially well-defined in an entire series of NWPs as well as in recent tactical notes and memoranda. CATF must execute the doctrine to suit the way he intends to fight and assign warfare commanders commensurate with their experience, their location, and consider sometimes-overlooked factors such as available communication nets. If ARGs organized and executed existing doctrine to the extent that CVBGs do, our ability to execute the Amphibious Warfare Strategy would be enhanced tremendously.
Training: Amphibious forces would realize immediate, substantial benefits if we trained the way we would most likely fight. In particular, deployments should be restructured to allow more time in AOAs for practice in all warfare areas, not just assaults. Too often a “port-to-port” mentality prevails, which sacrifices training opportunities for the sake of completing more port calls. A recent six- month ARG deployment (which included more than a month in upkeep) covered more than 32,000 nautical miles at an average speed of about 12 knots. It was little wonder, then, that most exercises had to be squeezed into three or four days.
Weapons: Perhaps the toughest deficiency amphibious forces face involves the weapons available to defend the ARG as it proceeds to the AOA to conduct over-the-horizon assaults against well-defended beachheads. ARGs need:
- OTH air assault vehicle
- OTH armored assault craft
- Early warning and battle management aircraft
- Electronic warfare aircraft with data link
- Standoff anti-surface weapons
- Rudimentary ASW weapons
Such a shopping list is initially daunting and could consume tens of billions of dollars. And the likelihood of the amphibious forces receiving that level of funding in the face of declining defense budgets is indeed remote. Is there a way to execute the Amphibious Warfare Strategy without “breaking the bank?”
Prescriptions for the Amphibious Warfare Strategy
Fortunately for the amphibious forces, a number of initiatives can enhance their capabilities without consuming a disproportinate share of the budget.
- The Department of the Navy must accelerate its decision on the CH-46 replacement aircraft. If this aircraft is not to be the V-22, then we must move out smartly toward another aircraft such as the UH-60A.
- We must procure a follow-on assault amphibian soon. Current LCMs, LCUs, and airborne assault vehicles
(AAVs) have no OTH capability and almost totally negate the enormous investment in new assault ships and assault craft such as the LCAC.
- An early warning and electronic warning aircraft is critical. Sophisticated platforms, such as AWACS or E-2 aircraft, represent overkill for an ARG. We need an off-the- shelf helicopter, or perhaps even an remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), to expand the battle space and give warning time to each warfare commander. Other navies, such as those of Great Britain and Israel, are substantially ahead of us in capitalizing on this capability.
- Providing the AV-8B Harrier with significant air-to-air and air-to-surface ship capability would allow warfare commanders to capitalize on expanded battle space and optimize their resources. The Harrier will never see service in its optimal close air support role if it does not assist the ARG in getting to and surviving in the AOA.
- Provide the ARG with at least a rudimentary ASUW and ASW capability. This cannot be done by adding more weapons to already overstuffed amphibious ships. Just as CVBGs do not consist of carriers alone, an ARG should not contain only amphibious ships. The addition of perhaps one guided-missile frigate (with Standard Missile, towed array sonar, and LAMPS Mk III helicopters) and one FF (with Harpoon, bow-mounted sonar, ASROC and LAMPS Mk I helicopter) could tremendously enhance an ARGs capabilities in AAW, EW, ASUW, and ASW. Dozens of these ships are in the Naval Reserve, not dedicated to CVBGs, and their deployment schedules could be dovetailed with ARG deployments. If the amphibious forces train with these ships, they can effectively include them in the Amphibious Warfare Strategy.
Conclusion
The importance of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy as a component of Maritime Strategy is well recognized and the percentage of the Navy Department’s budget dedicated to amphibious warfare confirms this assertion. What has, unfortunately, fallen into the “too hard” category in the past has been a warfighting strategy and an effective means of equipping these amphibious forces with the ^ means to defend themselves enroute to and within an AOA and to conduct a viable OTH assault. “Budget busting” solutions are available but are unlikely to be funded in the foreseeable future. It may be time for Navy planners to make the difficult decisions to opt for lower-cost solutions and to use existing, off-the-shelf technology to execute this strategy. To do anything less would seriously degrade our ability to “fight the gators.”
Commander Galdorisi is Commanding Officer of Helicopter AntiSubmarine Squadron Light 41 (HSL-41). He has served in LAMPS squadrons on both coasts and most recently served as executive officer aboard the USS New Orleans (LPH-11). He holds a Masters Degree in Oceanography from the Naval Postgraduate School, a Masters Degree in International Relations from the University of San Diego, and graduated from the Naval War College with Highest Distinction.