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Although the only species of his own military to escape Gorbachev’s ax thus far has been the Soviet Navy, Gorbachev has not been shy about subjecting the West to a steady chorus of demands for mutual reductions and restrictions on naval activity. The West cannot reject these calls indefinitely; there is growing pressure for a response.
Some who vigorously oppose structural arms control react to this pressure by advocating a regime of naval confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Soviet authorities, of course, welcome this trend because it represents a softening of previous Western insistence that navies are off limits. Compromises in this area may satisfy both the Soviets and domestic critics without significantly eroding Western material superiority. In addition, since disarmament cannot proceed without mutual confidence, its building is an essential first step. But this is all CSBMs can be. .
Confidence and security can
be improved in numerous ways, and many writers on the subject have sought to categorize the available measures.1 But in essence, there are only two main types: .
- Informative: All measures that involve the exchange of information, whether declaratory or negotiated, public or protected, long-term or perishable. This process starts with broad declaratory statements regarding overall governmental naval policy and programs, budgetary details, building warships and weapon acquisition, and the disclosure of information on day-to-day naval activities and exercises. At the lowest level, the participants establish a framework for on-scene exchange of real-time information by way of agreed communications arrangements.
- Regulatory: Those measures that place limits on the behavior and activities of naval units, again whether widely por- mulgated or highly classified, worldwide in their applicability or restricted by geographic zone.
These measures are often targeted on particular areas and can be interpreted as another manifestation of the phenomenon of coastal jurisdiction slowly extending onto the high seas.[1]
The Soviets vocally promote zoned CSBMs. The connections they wish to see drawn between information exchanges and limitations and prohibitions of activities are well illustrated in a recent submission to the United Nations.[2] In a curious demonstration of Soviet logic, this document claims to promote freedom by proposing restrictions:
“The maintenance of the freedom of navigation and other uses of the sea is an important objective for all States. Measures to guarantee the safety of shipping could include, inter alia, the prohibition of exercises, manoeuvres and the concentration of major formations of naval forces in international straits and zones of intensive shipping and fisheries as well as
dents—a means of measuring fleet potential by weight of broadside, or as a conventional analogue to the throw- weight measurement familiar to nuclear arms controllers. For every missile with an autonomous range greater than 24 nautical miles, warhead weights would be put into the balance.
Whether the balance between the sides should be equal or asymmetrical remains to be determined. So must the question of double-counting for those Soviet naval aircraft counted in the CFE negotiations. Antiship missiles carried by West German naval Tornado attack aircraft must also weigh in the balance.
The restrictions thus applied would solely limit the ability of the superpowers to injure each other. The freedom for either side to use its naval power in limited-conflict situations would be unimpaired. The important, historical freedom of the seas would be preserved, as would the flexibility of the operational planner, since there would be no hint of a regime depending on notional loadings or other unrealistic assumptions about platform capabilities. The objective is to control inventories of weapons.
Conclusions: Far too many nuclear weapons are at sea;
ity to exert influence—or project power—without territorial infringement. They provide governments with immensely flexible and legally unobjectionable means of adding weight to their diplomatic arguments. Freedom of navigation on the high seas lies at the core of this strength, and naval powers have always rejected measures that erode this freedom. They should continue to do so.
in the airspace above them”
The Soviets have proposed many types of restrictions:
SSBN havens, nuclear-free and ASW-free zones, as well as limitations on the location, frequency, size, and duration of major exercises. Soviet maritime doctrine is based on defensive zones, the penetration of which by Western forces triggers specific reactions. The Soviets want the West to recognize these zones.
The most significant flaw of both informative and regulatory CSBMs as a means of promoting stability is that they cannot effectively be applied to the submarine—the most destabilizing maritime weapon of all. Many experts who otherwise advocate CSBMs recognize this limitation and are unable to advance practical ways to overcome it. For example, the official Norwegian study explains that “in principle submarines might be included. But submarine-free zones have to our knowledge never been
promoted as a possible measure. This probably due to the fact that no naval power has seen this as advantageous, and to the problems of verification.”[3] 2 3 [4]
More honestly, Admiral J. R. Hill says: “If there is one word that summarises the obstacle to confidence-building measures at sea, it is, quite simply, submarines.”[5]
Finally, if the superpowers endorsed zoned maritime limitations, the restrictions would spread rapidly to lesser powers that have maritime pretensions and seek to exclude foreign navies from their sensitive areas. The navies of the free democracies currently provide a powerful deterrent to “authoritarian states which decide to flout international law for their own purposes.”[6]
CSBMs that limit the movements of naval forces inhibit the options of the maritime powers. They are impotent as regulators of the activities of nuclear- powered submarines. The advan- I tage of naval forces is their abil
many with experience of war-gaming and tactical exercises remain puzzled about their military usefulness. Drastic reductions—but not total elimination of nuclear weapons at sea is recommended.
That proposals for Western reductions have been concentrated on the U S. Navy is not accidental, little consideration has been given to whether bloc-to-bloc or bilateral negotiations are the better course. Although the burdensharing polemics have eased since the 1988 U.S. presidential election, there are still valid arguments that the load might be more equitably shared. One way might be for the United States to spend less.
Continued refusal by the West to enter into naval arms negotiations is myopic and will prove counterproductive. A much wiser course is to recognize that negotiated, balanced reductions must be preferable to unstructured cuts forced by budgetary and demographic imperatives. NATO’s maritime security thus need not be weakened.
For the Soviet Union to join the democratic world is an end devoutly to be wished. The West must encourage perestroika. A step along this road might be to offer the prospect of naval arms negotiations if CFE ground and air force reductions remain on schedule.
'Adm. C. A. H. Trost, USN (Ret.), in evidence to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, quoted in Defense News, 20 March 1989.
'‘■The Military Balance 1989190, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, p. 233; See, for instance, Adm. L. Baggett, Jr, USN (Ret.), “Eight to ten per year.” Royal United Services Institute Journal (UK) Autumn 1988; Adm. of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse, RN, opening Underwater Technology Conference , 26th October 1988: “A new Submarine every seven or eight weeks”; Soviet Military Power 1989, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989, pp.
130-131 et al. , . . .
3From a letter from Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucct to the Chairman ot the Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Senate Anncd Services Committee, 23 March 1988, quoted in Published Hearings for FY ’89, Part 3, pp.
10-11. . J “See for instance comments by Yuri Nazarkin, Head of Soviet delegation to U.S.- Soviet Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, quoted in Pravda, 17 August 1989, (Novosti Press Release VOVP2-890817DR37).
5Adm. W. J. Crowe Jr., USN (Ret.) “Crowe Urges Talks on Reducing Naval Weapons,” International Herald Tribune, 9 January 1990, p. 1.
Commander McCoy joined the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 1987 as the Naval Information Officer. His primary responsibility is to compile the naval sections of The Military Balance. He also monitors and analyzes all areas of naval and maritime activity, particularly arms control and Far East and Indian Ocean affairs. He served 30 years in the Royal Navy, where, as a navigation specialist, he served in all classes of surface ships and commanded two frigates. He was assigned on exchange duty with the Canadian and Australian navies and spent five years in the Ministry of Defence.
[1]Hill, p. 71.
[2]Working paper submitted to United Nations Disarmament Commission by Bulgaria, East Germany and the Soviet Union. Naval Armaments and Disarmament, A/CN. 10/119, 10 May 1989.
'See for example RAdm. J. R. Hill, RN (Ret.), Arms Control at Sea, London: Rout- ledge & Keegan Paul, 1989 (Chapter 13), Sir J. Cable, Navies in Violent Peace, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 198 (Chapter 10), and of particular interest, R. H. Solstrand et al., Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Rapport—88/5002, Confidence Building Measures at Sea, 10 November 1988.
“Solstrand, p. 33.
"Hill, p. 198.
[6]Capt. Richard Sharpe, RN (Ret.) in foreword to Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1989-90, p. 81. Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1989.