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ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
The Naval Institute’s Connection to Esther
Ban the SLCM
Do You Have Enough Authority? Punching Out
Essential Parts of the Job Search The Personal Business Plan Editorial Board Chairman’s Address Still Serving
The Admirable Servant, Occasionally Obsequious
We Need Leaders, Not Technocrats Harpoon
Coast Guard and Tiltrotor: A Perfect Match
Contents:
Detecting Stealth Aircraft
Campaign Cabinet Profile
Why Not Continue Building Los Angeles Submarines?
“Detecting Stealth Aircraft”
(See N. Friedman, p. 107, July 1990
Proceedings)
J. J. Welch, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force—Dr. Friedman makes several false assertions and draws conclusions based upon erroneous and already publicly corrected information. He states that a Navy satellite successfully detected and tracked the F-l 17A using its infrared signature. The F-117A has"never been tracked by a spaced-based infrared system. In fact, no such system exists. While spaced-based infrared systems may have some potential as a counterstealth sensor, their biggest limitation is that clouds will obscure low- and medium-altitude targets. Dr. Friedman states that “ . . . weather will sometimes reduce 1R [infrared) effectiveness.” This is quite an understatement when one considers that many parts of the world have cloud cover more than 50% of the time.
Dr. Friedman’s assertion that the A-12 can carry a useful bomb load while the B-2 is very limited is totally false. The B-2 carries several times the payload and can travel two-and-one-half to three times
as far for comparable flight profiles a
difference of more than a factor of ten in payload-range. The Air Force believes that this superior payload and range provide the United States the capability to successfully strike a target thousands of miles away in a timely manner. This is particularly significant if other military capabilities are not immediately available in the area of interest.
Dr. Friedman also claims that, “The original stealth concept was to reduce an airplane’s observable signatures just enough to let it get by amid the confusion of a combat area, at little or no cost in combat capability.” The Air Force’s understanding of low-observable technology and the role that vehicle’s signature plays as part of the overall design is based upon 15 years of stealth technology development and flight testing. In the design of any low-observable system, we incorporate the appropriate signature level as one of many factors necessary to accomplish the combat mission. Other factors considered are range, payload, maneuverability, maintainability, and affordability.
In his closing, it is unfortunate that Dr.
Friedman draws a comparison with Stephen Coonts’s most recent novel, Minotaur, a work of fiction. The significant low-observable development programs under way in both the Navy and the Air Force deserve a far more informed and serious discussion.
“Campaign Cabinet Profile”
Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I appreciated the kind words published about me in the July issue. However, before my good friend Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale or someone else writes you, let me set the record straight on one point. In the first retaliatory strike into North Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Jim Stock- dale led the F-8s; Commander L. T. McAdams led the A-Is; and I led the A-4s.
Editor’s Note; R. G. Smith’s Operation Pierce Arrow is a part of the U.S. Naval Institute’s limited edition. Naval Historical Art Print Collection. This print is signed by both Admiral Stockdale and R. G. Smith.
Why Not Continue Building Los Angeles Submarines?
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth W. Loveland, U.S. Navy (Retired), Engineering Design Manager for the SSN-688 Class at the Naval Ship Engineering Center, 1976-1977, and contractor for Sci-
ence Applications International Corporation, working on the SSN-21 and Improved 688 Classes—This question seems to be the bottom line in the current debate over the Seawolf (SSN-21) class. The loudest critics—as usual—know little or nothing about the subject, but have either a pet technology that wasn’t built into SSN-21 or a political agenda. One SSN-21 will cost more than $1 billion. That prospect alone excites politicians who would prefer to spend that money in ways more likely to win votes and help them get reelected.
The initial justifications for the SSN- 21 were: First and foremost, the SSN-688 is 1960s’ technology with 1970s’ and 1980s’ upgrades. The USS Los Angeles (SSN-688) was a fantastic ship in 1976 when it first went to sea. Nearly 15 years later, it remains more than a match for the newest Soviet Akulas. Although 688s routinely play a successful game of cat- and-mouse with Soviet ASW forces, there is little room left for improving the U.S. SSNs.
In nuclear submarine warfare, “better” means less detectable, faster, or more powerful combat systems—in that order. Endurance is a given in nuclear subs; maneuverability is a function of speed; and even tripling their diving depth has only a marginal impact on warfare capability. Survivability is a relatively minor factor in submarine warfare effectiveness; it doesn’t help accomplish a mission, but it may help save some sailors’ lives. A submarine must be able to reach its objective area without being detected, accomplish its mission, and return home. Stealth, speed, and combat systems are the keys to success.
Since 1976, improvements have focused on two areas—stealth and combat systems—but the prospect for more improvements is near zero. The primary selling point for the SSN-21 is the aging of the 688s, which will soon be caught by younger, stealthier, and more agile submarine and ASW forces of potential adversaries.
The second selling point for the Seawolf was that the Soviet submarine capabilities continue to improve, although they still have a way to go. Their supposedly “survivable” submarines, with double hulls and more reserve buoyancy than ours, aren't very safe. Consider the recent loss of the Mike-class SSN. The Akulas are quiet, relatively slow, and have fair combat systems. The Victors (I, II, and III) are less quiet, no faster, and have less capable combat systems. The super-fast and super-deep diving Alfas are as noisy as jackhammers and easy prey for any ASW system. But the Soviets are getting better, and rapidly improving in stealth—thanks to the Walkers, and in a lesser way to Kongsberg and Toshiba. They will continue to get better, and will catch the original 688s soon, if they haven’t already.
The third justification for the SSN-21 involved the advances in the technological knowledge that influences submarine characteristics. This knowledge allowed us to design a submarine with potentially three times the effectiveness of the 688 for only 10% more money over the life cycle of the ship. It seemed silly (and still does) to spend $2 billion (over a lifetime) for a 688 when we could spend $2.2 billion for three times the effectiveness.
What has changed since the decision was made to proceed? The two biggest changes have been the federal deficit and Eastern European politics. Neither should have an impact on whether or not building the SSN-21 is the right thing to do. We didn’t need the Seawolf to counter the Warsaw Pact; we needed it to counter the Soviets. As far as we know, the Soviets’ submarine programs have not changed. They are still building and improving. Can we afford to stop? As far as the deficit is concerned, the difference in cost between Seawolf- and more Los Angeles- class submarines won’t change it much.
If we are going to have a submarine force, we should have the best we can buy. We could justify not buying submarines, airplanes, tanks, missiles, or whatever on the basis of something better coming, just around the comer. But something better is always around the corner. The Seawolf is the best submarine we can buy right now—for any amount of money. Better is possible, but not before the end of the century, and better always costs more.
Buying more 688s is like buying a 1976-model car today, and paying today’s new car prices for it. The older car does the basic job, moves people from point A to point B, but has a gas- guzzling, air-polluting engine, and inefficient shape. We can upgrade the 1976 with new radial tires, but we can’t change its poor aerodynamic shape or lousy engine. A 15-year-old vehicle, be it car or submarine, is not a good buy at new or nearly new vehicle prices.
“Ban the SLCM”
(See C. M. Duquette, pp. 34-38, June 1990;
J. K. PaskVan, pp. 81-82, August 1990
Proceedings)
First Lieutenant Joe G. Hyde, U.S. Air Force, B-52 Pilot—Conventional SLCMs increase our Navy’s effectiveness by reducing the risk of losing air-
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crew members and expensive aircraft in traditional fly-over-the-target iron bomb attacks (like Lebanon, 1982). With the effectiveness of many Third World nations' air-defense networks improving every year, systems such as the conventional SLCM make even more sense. Should we ban the SLCM, we will be selling short a very capable system which certainly gives the U.S. Navy clear advantages in its mission, while receiving nothing in return.
“Do You Have Enough
Authority?”
(See J. Miller, pp. 69-71, February 1990; S. L.
Heaster, C. Blair, pp. 20-22, April 1990
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel James G. Zumwalt, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve—Admiral Miller contrasts the leadership styles of two of his former bosses, Admiral William F. Bringle and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., and how those styles impacted on authority and, subsequently, discipline within the naval service. While I, unfortunately, did not have the honor of knowing Admiral Bringle and do not, therefore, feel qualified to address his leadership style, I am very familiar with the leadership style of my father, Admiral Zumwalt, and feel qualified to respond to Admiral Miller’s comments.
In his final analysis, Admiral Miller suggests that the problems of the early 1970s that the Navy experienced, such as the “race riots” which occurred on board two carriers during Admiral Zumwalt’s watch, “were probably not racial, but rather a breakdown of respect for the authority of officers and leading petty officers.” In effect, Admiral Miller’s contention is that a perceived lack of authority by the enlisted ranks led to a lack of discipline which led to the personnel problems of that era. With all due respect to Admiral Miller, I believe he has put the cart before the horse.
As an infantry platoon and company commander serving with the 3d Marine Division during that same time period, I had a firsthand appreciation for the nature of the personnel problems we were experiencing. As a Marine officer, I do not think I, or any of my fellow Marine officers, perceived any similar lack of authority within our service as that which Admiral Miller alleges existed in the Navy. Yet, we had the same personnel problems. I take no pride in the fact that the Marines, too, experienced such “race riots” as those that plagued the Navy. Perhaps because our riots occurred outside the view of the media it was perceived that the Marine Corps had no similar problem. But the truth of the matter was that we did. What Admiral Miller has failed to grasp is that these problems of the early 1970s were not the result of a breakdown of authority and discipline within the naval or any other military service—it was the result of a failure of society as a whole.
There was definite social unrest in America in the late 1960s and into the early 1970s. We were in an unpopular war that was fought, statistically, by a larger segment of the black than of the white population. Those who entered the military services represented a microcosm of the American society from which they had come. In effect, the racial tensions our society already had generated became, as young blacks and other minorities joined the various services, a time bomb, with the only unknown being the length of the fuse. As the minorities joined the military, they felt further pressured by serving in a profession which, due to an unpopular war, had fallen into disfavor with that same society. For Admiral Miller to suggest then that Admiral Zumwalt’s policies, which sought to defuse such tensions, were the cause of the problems the Navy experienced during the early 1970s, is to blame the bomb squad for the explosion which results from their efforts to render the bomb harmless.
Even if one were to accept Admiral Miller’s contention that some of the policies implemented by Admiral Zumwalt may have been perceived as taking authority away from those who should have been exercising it, Admiral Miller fails to ask a critical question: Why were the policies necessary? The obvious answer is that those same commanders were not taking the measures to do what Admiral Miller himself says such commanders should be doing—undertaking “all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being , and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.” With tensions mounting and with reenlistment rates at an all time low of 9% when Admiral Zumwalt began his tour as Chief of Naval Operations, he realized the Navy could not continue to stand back and simply toe the line—a more aggressive policy was required.
What Admiral Miller fails to give Admiral Zumwalt credit for, however, is that by the time Admiral Zumwalt retired in 1974, reenlistment rates had more than quadrupled! The actions Admiral Zumwalt felt compelled to take in order to preserve the Navy's manning levels and
“The Personal Business Plan”
(See A. R. Buist, pp. 44-45, June 1990 Proceedings)
Gerard R. Baumann, Senior Vice President, Right Management Consultants Inc.—Proceedings should be applauded for its special retirement package. Career transition is a phrase that naval personnel will become more familiar with as the so- called “peace dividend” begins to reach the fleet. This professional and timely section will be a valuable resource for the future.
Captain Jacobsen’s delineation of the “Essentials of the Job Search” is right on target, with one exception—networking! Although retiring and transitioning military people might have a limited primary network in the professional target zone they have selected, they still have an extensive network base.
Networking is the process of educating the people you know—and the people you get to know through people you know—to listen intelligently on your
“The Admirable Servant, Occasionally Obsequious”
(See G. V. Stewart, pp. 46-50. June 1990;
W. H. Parks, pp. 64-65. July 1990; B. Linder, pp. 16-18, August 1990 Proceedings)
Raymond J. Barrett—I endorse Colonel Parks’s letter about deficiencies in the clearance process for non-official writing by officers. It does not appear that things have changed since I retired in 1974!
fighting capability at that difficult time in our history had worked with great success. Perhaps Admiral Miller should read the thousands of letters to Admiral Zum- walt that I have read—hundreds of which are from officers and enlisted men and women now serving in the Navy— thanking him for making the Navy a better place in which to work. Such a review would provide Admiral Miller with a better appreciation for what those policies actually accomplished.
I have heard Admiral Zumwalt say on many occasions that the policies he implemented as Chief of Naval Operations won him a long list of friends and a long list of enemies—and that he is proud ol both. It reflects an attitude that many of us should strive to adopt as leaders—one of always doing what one feels is in the best interests of his service and his people, regardless of the personal consequences or criticism that may result. The ultimate mark of success is never to compromise that principle while rising to the top of your profession. By that measure, Admiral Zumwalt has been a very successful leader.
“Punching Out”
(See F. A. Mastin. Jr., pp. 39-45, June 1990 Proceedings)
“Essential Parts of the Job Search”
(See K. C. Jacobsen, pp. 40-41, June 1990 Proceedings)
behalf. Most jobs are obtained through secondary and tertiary contacts.
Successful networking does not put people on the spot through a direct request for a job. The code of the job search uses the approach that seeks advice and counsel in the transition process. The only request we make is for the names of others our contact can give us who might work us closer to the career target we have chosen. “Advice, counsel and further names” are the watchwords ot successful “informational interviews.’
Using this approach we are able to avoid the “hat in hand” feeling when we begin to approach our primary contacts. Friends and family are ideal starting points after we leave the phrase need a job” out of our conversation. Other primary contacts that military retirees have in common with their civilian counterparts will come from church groups, social organizations, parent-teacher associations, school contacts, former military, local government officials, bankers, doctors, dentists, and in one infamous case from my own experience, a barber in Madison, New Jersey.
Using those close to us as a starting point of a network to penetrate the hidden job market is analogous to laying a sono- buoy pattern. We develop our first pattern at a known point and spread the patterns out from there. With an ever-increasing and widening network of buoys working for us, we increase our probability of “hearing” the passage of our hidden target—ultimately, the right job.
Thanks for a wonderfully timely edition. We all need help in the difficult challenge of change, coping with the loss of control and fear of the unknown.
“Editorial Board Chairman’s Address”
(See H. B. Thorsen, p. 12. June 1990; W. H.
Parks, pp. 64-65, July 1990; B. Linder, pp.
16-18, August 1990 Proceedings)
“Still Serving”
(See R. F. Dunn, p. 46. June 1990; W. H. Parks, pp. 64-65, July 1990; B. Linder, pp. 16-18, August 1990 Proceedings)
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As a U.S. Foreign Service Officer, I had to “wrestle” with the Department of State’s clearance system. And on the exchange program as Deputy Chief of Air Force Plans and Policy for two years, I also ran into that service’s clearance review. Then, during my two years as Department of State Adviser to the John F. Kennedy Center at Fort Bragg, I experienced the Army’s procedures.
I found the same frustrating problems in all these clearance systems. There were three principal difficulties:
- The lack of clear guidelines requiring a reviewer to state precisely any objections and his reason(s) for them
- A lack of an enforceable requirement that reviewers reply within a time limit realistic for timely publication
- Perhaps the most serious deficiency, the absence of any knowledgeable officer to supervise and enforce the process, with authority to settle differences between a writer and reviewers
The lack of clear guidelines, as Colonel Parks describes, all too often led to a reviewer trying to impose his personal predilections. Since a reviewer was the officer in charge of some aspect of the subject matter, he often felt better informed than the writer. In some cases, it was obvious the reviewer felt threatened by the author’s writing.
In other cases, such a reviewer tried to cite “U.S. policy” or “Air Force policy” as prohibiting something written by the author. An Air Force reviewer, for instance, refused to clear an article I wrote while on the Air Staff that factually reviewed the difficulties in separating “air space” from “aerospace.” He insisted that since the Air Force had not decided which definition it endorsed, it prohibited any effort to make such a definition. I strongly protested that I had only described the various possible definitions and, specifically, had not endorsed any of them. It did no good, and I had no avenue to decide the issue. I was not able to get the article published until after I left the Air Staff and no longer needed that Air Force reviewer’s okay.
I had similar experiences in other instances. I eventually had to drop an article on U.S.-Canadian relations because a successor of mine on the Department of State’s Canadian desk objected to it. He felt it was impolitic, even though it contained nothing classified or any comment on official policies. For another article, I had to delete a considerable section mentioning the overwhelming use of force as one option in Vietnam because it was not yet U.S. policy.
The need in this area of clearance procedures is twofold. First, there should be a clear statement of freedom of speech with the burden of impinging thereon to be established clearly by the reviewer. Second, a reviewer must be required to state precisely his objections and the reasons) for them. These provisions put the burden on the reviewer, which is where it should be in a free society; and they eliminate vagueness and personal predilection and give the author something concrete to rebut. With these requirements there will be clear material for an overall authority to review to settle any differences.
Setting realistic deadlines for reviews makes it possible to come to grips with any differences and to resolve them in a timely fashion for publication. These deadlines need to be in the governing guidance, not set on some ad hoc basis. They need to be clear and known to all concerned, all the time. I would also go further than Colonel Parks who suggests lack of comment by a deadline “assumes” no objection. I would insist lack of comment within the time allowed means no objection.
Understandably, reviewers are busy with their official duties. I know I went flat out all day during my several Washington assignments, and I saw my colleagues equally busy. Getting an article to review adds to that workload, so it’s an item that is easy to put off. Without a deadline that must be met, or any objection forfeited, it is easy for the article to get put off continually by the crush of regular duties. Yes, the reviewer may have to read the article over lunch, as I did several times when 1 received material to review.
There needs to be in the clearance system a strong incentive to see that material gets reviewed promptly. Official duties are obviously important, but professional thinking and discussion are also too vital to get overlooked.
An officer clearly designated to supervise the clearance process is needed, with equally clear authority to resolve differences between an author and a reviewer. I found the so-called clearance offices were little more than a rnailroom operation. They received the article from the author and sent it out to a list of reviewers. Any replies received from the latter were transmitted back to the author. In none of the services I dealt with did I find any tickler or other follow up system to ensure prompt replies from all reviewers. Most important, none of these offices had the authority to settle differences between an author and a reviewer.
Obviously, there can be ticklish questions involving an officer on active duty writing privately about official matters. But in my day, and apparently still, the
“We Need Leaders, Not Technocrats”
(See J.E. McFadden, pp. 84-86, January 1990;
K. Montor, p. 72, February 1990; T. L.
Johnson, A. F. Campbell, and L. R. Wass, pp. 24-26, April 1990; C. G. Graves and A. C. Bernard, pp. 16-21, May 1990; B. Howe, pp. 23-24, June 1990; M. J. Fitzgerald and N. Dujmovic, pp. 19-24, July 1990; J. M. Hasik,
K. Oliver, B. L. Denny, August 1990 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Mark L. Gorenflo, U.S. Navy—I am a member of a small but proud contingent of Naval Academy humanities majors who volunteered for nuclear power training. I still recall with pleasure my discussions with a Naval Reactors engineer concerning the finer points of the Arthurian legend course I was taking at the time of the interview. Despite my putative educational handicap, I was selected for nuclear power training and have completed my first tour aboard a fast-attack submarine. I am looking forward to my prospective tour as engineer officer aboard a new-construc- tion submarine. Based on this experience, I have some insights to offer on the “Leader vs. Technocrat” issue commented on by the Naval Academy’s current crop of midshipmen.
If I may respond to Midshipman Graves first, let me state briefly and categorically that he is absolutely wrong. Had
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system to deal with such questions was incomplete, haphazard, and unfairly loaded against the writer.
Why not have some folks from the Naval Institute sit down with appropriate Navy officers and work out a better system?
R.P. Hansen—Proceedings serves a critical role in providing a forum for those interested in naval affairs to express their uncensored views freely. In this regard, I am dismayed by any move to require naval officers to pass an essay up their chains of command for approval prior to submitting it to Proceedings. Such an action would severely damage Proceedings as a forum and place it into a category similar to the Soviet Navy s Morskoy Sbornik. The fact that a policy is misunderstood and reported wrong can tell an important story. If an officer states a policy “incorrectly,” naval officials can “correctly” state it in the Comment and Discussion section for the benefit of all. Proceedings has had some gutsy articles written by some brave officers who have challenged conventional wisdom in the past year. I hope this trend is not quashed.
he asked me, an officer who has served in both the engineering spaces and the combat information spaces, I would have extolled the virtues of many of the technical courses I was required to take, even as an English major. It is unacceptable to fob off your dedicated and knowledgeable sonar chief when he asks for your technical insight in troubleshooting the ship’s crucially important sonar system with the response that the chief’s “applied schooling and hands on experience” should be able to handle the problem. A similar response to a technical issue regarding a
reactor control system or a primary piping system is equally unacceptable. A grasp of the fundamentals of electrical engineering or mechanical engineering obtained through hard work and close attention to detail in the appropriate technical course at the Naval Academy enables the young, relatively inexperienced division officer to answer these thorny little questions inherent in the day-to-day management of a submarine. It also bolsters his credibility in an area of key concern to his subordinates—the maintenance of their gear. Credibility is an integral qual-
ity; one cannol forfeit it in a technical area and count on it as a disembodied, ethereal “leader.” Without credibility, a naval officer cannot hope to lead a division, let alone a ship or a fleet. Any line officer who maintains that he does not routinely use the principles taught in his technical courses is an officer who is not doing his job to his utmost potential. He is short-changing his troops by being unwilling or unable to back them in their daily technical decisions, and also he is short-changing himself by casually dis
pensing with a key element of his leadership arsenal.
I would also like to discuss the assertion that nontechnical majors take “watered down” technical courses. Anyone familiar with the discipline of a liberal education would insist on challenging courses in science and engineering as a technical counterpart to a study of the humanities. For me, one of the attractions of the English major was that, of approximately 140 credit hours required for graduation, only 30 would be in English,
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enabling me to pursue my interests in science and engineering as well as English. To ensure that I would get the most out of my technical courses, 1 voluntarily chose to take the same thermodynamics, electrical engineering, and physics courses as my technically oriented classmates. I did so because I perceived that these courses were better-taught and had better texts and lab facilities. If the average humanities major takes marginally satisfactory technical courses, that is a charge to be levied against the Academy’s Division of Engineering and Weapons, not the humanities majors. As such, I endorse Midshipman Howe’s suggestion that all midshipmen take the same core technical courses.
I believe that many respondents to Lieutenant McFadden have missed a crucial subtext to his arguments against the Naval Academy’s curriculum as currently constituted. This can best be illustrated by recasting the debate in terms of Division Officer vs. Flag Officer, rather than Leader vs. Technocrat. 1 submit that a principal goal of the Naval Academy must be to prepare midshipmen, in some fundamental sense, to assume the leadership of the Navy in the senior officer ranks. In this belief, I stand opposed to a long tradition of thought, expressed by a Deputy Commandant when I was a midshipman, that the Naval Academy exists to produce division officers. If this rather quotidian goal is all that the Naval Academy aspires to achieve, it is a doomed institution. A recent Navy Times article (25 June 1990) discussing the need to reduce officer intake in this era of glas- nost, estimated that it costs the nation $153,000 to produce a Naval Academy ensign, versus $53,000 for NROTC and $20,000 for OCS. If all we’re getting are proficient division officers for this money, the Naval Academy will be bought by Disney for its theme-park value within ten years.
I would like to think that, in addition to “capable mariners,” the Naval Academy is striving to produce officers who have the long-term dedication to make the Navy a career as well as the openness to new ideas, the sensitivity to the requirements of strategy, the appreciation of the role of diplomacy, and the understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the society they are sworn to defend. In forming such an officer, the humanities play a valuable role at the Naval Academy. We slight them at our peril, and the Naval Academy denigrates them at its institutional risk. At a time when three Naval Academy graduates, all of them career officers, have been convicted of felonies arising from what may be euphe-
mistically characterized as their confusion regarding our constitutional system, it seems foolhardy to eviscerate what remains of the humanities at the Naval Academy on behalf of a technical standard of achievement which is largely, though admittedly not perfectly, attained by most Naval Academy graduates.
“Harpoon”
(See H. E. Dille, p. 115, September 1990 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Thomas K. Parry, U.S. Naval Reserve, and Data Systems Technician Second Class Joseph Rogowski, U.S. Naval Reserve—Since members of the Naval Reserve need to receive refresher training each and every month if they are to be able to interface effectively with their active-duty counterparts, and, since there are insufficient ships, aircraft, submarines, and funds available to provide hands-on training, we must use the best training devices available. One such device is a new computer simulation to augment existing navy tactical gaming (NAVTAG) system and shipboard simulator training opportunities. Harpoon has the potential to expand the influence of of NAVTAG to an unprecedented level because all of the necessary hardware is already in place at the reserve center level and software acquisition costs less than $50.00 per copy.
Harpoon is almost certainly the best naval simulation available through commercial sources: The Naval Reserve should seriously consider the potential of this software to provide NAVTAG-like training at every reserve center in the country.
cause of the relatively small number of aircraft required to accomplish the service’s missions.
Beside being economically infeasible, single-agency acquisition of the V-22 by the Coast Guard would result in lack of commonality with DoD aeronautical systems. This always impairs maintainability. The HU-25 and HH-65 programs are proof that development, procurement, and maintenance of service-unique systems strain the Coast Guard’s limited resources and result in marginally effective
platforms. By contrast, maintenance of the Coast Guard’s C-130s and HH-3s has historically benefitted from commonality with DoD-operated equipment, and the soon-to-be-acquired HH-60J is the same basic airframe already operated successfully by three other DoD services.
The tiltrotor’s revolutionary performance—as fast as a turboprop airplane yet with true hover and vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability—is the result of several design compromises. These compromises and their costs must
“Coast Guard and Tiltrotor: A Perfect Match”
(See D. A. Goward, pp. 83-85, June 1990 Proceedings)
Lieutenant J. E. Holbert, U.S. Coast Guard— Several points raised by Lieutenant Commander Goward’s article deserve comment. Fundamentally, the V-22 program involves an unusual degree of budgetary and technical risks because the tiltrotor is not just a new-and-improved model of an existing aircraft, but an entirely new type of vehicle. Current and forecast reductions in defense spending make the status of the V-22 program problematic. If DoD, the largest potential V-22 customer, does not press for acquisition, Congress will almost certainly not fund the program. The Coast Guard’s demand for tiltrotors would be of little economic or political consequence be
AFCEA and the U.S. Naval Institute have joined forces to co-sponsor the 12th Western Conference and Exposition, the largest C-»I and Naval Systems event on the West Coast.
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- Space Day, featuring luncheon speaker Gen. Donald J. Kutyna, USAF, Commander-in-Chief,
NORAD and the U.S. Space Command, and panel moderator LTGen. Donald L. Cromer, USAF, Commander, Space Systems Division, Air Force Space Command
A More than 150 exhibitors displaying the latest technology and services in electronics, information systems, 0*1, aircraft, shipbuilding and Marine Corps and Navy weapon systems.
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be considered. First, the tiltrotor will be heavier and have higher drag than a turboprop airplane of identical performance, resulting in higher specific fuel consumption and less range. Conversely, a hovering tiltrotor’s high induced downflow velocity impinges on its wing and fuselage geometry, degrading hover efficiency compared to that of a conventional helicopter of identical weight. In sum, a tiltrotor with conventional fuels and current technology turboshaft engines cannot match either the payload and range performance of turboprop airplanes or the pure VTOL and hover capabilities of conventional helicopters.
The tiltrotor offers more potential safety-of-flight redundancy than the helicopter, but less than the turboprop airplane. While additional cross-shafted engines could be imbedded in the wing or fuselage, tiltrotor (as differentiated from tilt-wing) geometry precludes an associated prop/rotor for those engines. Thus rotor gearbox failure remains a critical limitation. In addition, in the hover/tran- sition mode, the V-22’s nacelle design directs a hot engine exhaust plume vertically, which would cause a significant foreign object damage hazard during all vertical takeoff and landing operations and present a fire hazard to vegetation in unimproved landing zones. This exhaust plume and the tiltrotor’s high-velocity hovering downwash would cause problems for vessels, survivors in the water, and rescue swimmers during Coast Guard hoisting operations.
Many aviation experts have acknowledged that although a civil aviation tiltrotor might be a partial solution for airspace traffic jams in the United States, operational development and Federal Aviation Administration certification by the private sector is unlikely because of the extremely high costs and risks involved. Even if public funds were used to develop a mature tiltrotor system in military service, several potent arguments against commercial tiltrotors remain. First, compared to commuter airliners of similar capacity and cruise performance, a tiltrotor would be extremely expensive to acquire and maintain. Second, the economic benefits of VTOL passenger transport are marginal without metropolitan vertiports, and politically potent citizen opposition has been very effective in defeating proposals for vertiport construction in numerous cities. Civil tiltrotor proponents tend to ignore these facts. Third, and most important, the tiltrotor design is too complicated and expensive for commercial aviation. The vehicle’s rotors allow cyclic and collective pitch control so that the vehicle can
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perform effectively in all helicopter flight regimes, and this design complexity adds weight and increases maintenance costs.
By contrast, a VTOL aircraft economical enough for civil use really needs only sufficient control authority to take off and land vertically, and to transition to and from high-speed flight. A vehicle currently under design by Ishida proposes to accomplish these tasks without the necessity of cyclic and collective pitch control. The Japanese design would tilt its entire wing and embedded nacelles, which contain cross-shafted engines driving oversized propellers. The propellers supply vertical thrust and roll control (by means of differential power). Yaw control results from prop airflow acting on the vertically tilted ailerons, and pitch control is supplied by a tail-mounted hydraulically driven horizontal fan-in-fin which is powered only during the hover and transition regimes. This or some similar design without unnecessary costs and complexity—rather than a V-22 derivative will probably be privately developed to give the civil marketplace a vehicle capable of both VTOL and high-speed cruise.
Commander Goward argues that the Coast Guard should procure the tiltrotor along with DoD—if that occurs—in order to retain preeminence in search and rescue (SAR), because recovery operations beyond helicopter range will go instead to “the DoD unit down the coast [which] has V-22s assigned . . .” There are at least two objections to this assertion. First, the Coast Guard is, and will remain, the nation’s premier (SAR) organization, because (SAR) is only an adjunct mission for the majority of DoD. Second, almost all Coast Guard Air Stations are staffed and organized to launch a SAR aircraft with a trained and highly experienced crew within 30 minutes, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; by contrast, the typical DoD unit’s response might be delayed until a flight crew—perhaps without substantial SAR experience could assemble.
In a different sense, however, Commander Goward’s point is well-taken. When the distance to a rescue exceeds helicopter range, a DoD asset does have to do the Coast Guard’s job—because the Coast Guard, alone among America’s military services, has no helicopters capable of air-to-air refueling. Air-to-air refueling capability should be added to the Coast Guard’s oncoming HH-60Js. even at the cost of some procurement delay, and a strap-on system allowing limited tanker capability for Coast Guard C-130s should be developed. If this were done, few maritime rescue scenarios would be beyond the Coast Guard’s capabilities. The Coast Guard should direct its efforts toward correcting existing deficiencies in the ability of its proven aviation platforms—patrol turboprops and conventional helicopters—to protect life and property at sea, instead of joining those of the DoD services who are lobbying for the tiltrotor.
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