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By the Staff of Destroyer Squadron Twenty-one
Today’s far-reaching political changes are matched by vast technological advances (here, a laser communication system). It is unclear where and how future wars may be fought. To avoid being paralyzed by the accelerating rate of change, military professionals must focus their energies on areas where they can exert influence.
Geopolitical changes worldwide occurring at a breathtaking pace amid calls for budget cuts and “peace dividends” may lead to a redefinition of our missions and our force structure. But we will still have military challenges to face, and we must keep track of technological developments that are changing the way wars will be fought, wherever the battlefield may be.
These changes directly affect the way we put ordnance on target, and^they are so swift and diverse that they provide more than enough tactical challenges to keep every naval officer occupied for the rest of his or her career in trying to understand them. To cite but a few examples:
► Air-independent propulsion systems now under development could greatly improve conventional submarine performance, enhancing the threat from even small- or middle-power navies during contingency operations and reinforcing the importance of antisubmarine warfare based on active sonars, or perhaps non-acoustics with torpedo countermeasures becoming even more critical. i Unmanned platforms are proliferating. Unmanned air vehicles (including remotely piloted vehicles) soon will be paralleled by unmanned undersea vehicles. Such autonomous platforms imply changes in tactics, air and water space management, and rules of engagement that are just beginning to be understood.
► At least some missiles or remotely piloted vehicles with low-observable (stealth) characteristics probably are in the hands of Third World states already, and others are being developed.
► Chemical and biological weapons capabilities are proliferating, along with potential delivery systems. The record of their use in recent conflicts is not an encouraging sign of future restraint.
- The integration of electro-optic, multi-spectral components into many modern fire control systems adds new dimensions to countermeasures and deception, even as the proliferation of lasers increases the need for eye protection for air crews and topside watchstanders.
- Command and control systems for over-the-horizon targeting such as the Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange System, Tactical Data Information Exchange System, Flag Data Display System, Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS), and Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal have enormous implications for future command, control, communication, and intelligence architectures, yet still are not well understood by many users afloat.
- One of the most dynamic areas of scientific research is biogenetics, yet few naval officers have even a vague understanding of its military implications.
- The proliferation of commercial information systems, including private reconnaissance satellites, means that strategic intelligence no longer remains the sole province of governments.
One could list many other important developments. We need to focus on problems that may arise in the relatively near term, and to encourage those who may have to do the fighting to think in terms of emerging tactical problems.
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)__________________ .
Aggressive development is under way in Europe, Canada,°and the Soviet Union on air-independent propulsion for submarines, such as closed cycle diesels, Stirling engines, fuel cells, and nuclear generators. If successful, these systems could let a conventional submarine operate at up to about ten knots for several days without snorkel- ing. Some of the designs have noise levels comparable to electric motors on batteries. Such performance could dramatically increase the submarine threat during contingency operations, even while the perceived likelihood of a fight against Soviet nuclear submarines is declining. In late 1989, some 26 countries outside NATO or the Warsaw Pact operated some 285 submarines, with more than 40 others on order. The presence of even a few air-independent propulsion systems could alter the ASW tactics we would use in future contingencies. In particular, more
emphasis will be needed on active sonars, shallow-water ASW, torpedo countermeasures, and perhaps non-acoustics. .
Despite the more publicized developments in towed arrays, significant progress also has been made in active ASW during the last few years, though fleet tactics generally do not reflect it yet. For example, the digital SQS-53C sonar (being fitted into the later Aegis cruisers as well as the DDG-51s) should give consistently higher source levels than their predecessors. This is done by eliminating the myriad of analog equipment adjustments that had to be done to keep the older SQS-26 and SQS-53A sonars within specifications. In addition, extensive studies have been made of optimal sonar settings for shallow water, and these now are documented in tactical notes to eliminate much of the folklore associated with such operations. Still, we probably can learn much from NATO, Japan, and other allies about active sonar operations against diesels, and this cooperation should be pursued vigorously. Nonacoustic sensors also may have merit, especially in shallow water, although there seems to be no magic solution in this area that will turn the oceans transparent.'
There is another new dimension to both pro- and antisubmarine warfare—unmanned undersea vehicles. These come in two flavors: tethered, or remotely operated vehicles, and autonomous undersea vehicles. Not only will their small size make them hard to detect, but their presence will complicate water-space management and rules of engagement. A related problem is posed by the growing
High-tech developments include (left to right) the digital SQS-53C sonar, going on board Aegis cruisers and DDG- 51-class destroyers; unmanned undersea vehicles and submarines (pictured, Yugoslavia’s Mala); submarine- launched antiship missiles and torpedoes, like the British Mk-24 Tigerfish; and low-observable (stealth) aircraft such as the U.S. Air Force’s B-2 bomber.
fleet of minisubmarines, now operated by some six non- U.S. or Soviet navies, including North Korea, Iran, and Libya. We need to ask ourselves what sensors we would use to detect these submersibles and what weapons we would use to kill them.
If we can draw the fangs of the submarine’s weapons, it does not matter so much if it is hard to find. Thus, torpedo countermeasures and antiship missile defense are integral parts of ASW. Between the submarine-launched Harpoon, the SM-39 submerged-launched Exocet, and other systems, submarine-launched antiship missiles now are in the hands of at least eight countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union, even if many do not yet have over-the-horizon targeting capabilities. We must be able to counter them, even as we also need to understand the appropriate settings on our torpedo countermeasures gear for “friendly” torpedoes such as Spearfish, Tigerfish, F 17, and Seeschlange.
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)
In AAW, the big news in the next few years will be counter-stealth.2 European publications openly speculate on the application of radar absorbent materials to existing missiles. The French advertise their Apache missile, under development by MATRA, as being “stealthy.”
The counters to stealth are not easy. Various techniques have been discussed, including impulse (or ultra-wide rnHai-s iiltra-hieh freauencv and high-frequency
radars, electro-optics, and sensor fusion. However, longterm research-and-development solutions will not help sailors on the deckplates if low-observable missiles find their way into opponents’ hands in the near future, as they may. A parallel focus on tactical countermeasures is needed now, with point defenses and integration of infrared sensors seeming to be particularly important. This subject should be a matter of discussion in the wardrooms of all AAW-capable combatants. There is enough open literature available now to form the basis of a good review.
Antisurface Warfare (ASuW)
ASuW has made enormous strides in the past decade. When Harpoon first was introduced in the 1970s, smooth and successful over-the-horizon engagements were few and far between. Now, mainly through the integration of LAMPS and other air assets, the Navy is learning to use Harpoon to its full potential, even though we still have a way to go with Tomahawk. However, three other developments will have a major impact on ASuW in the next few years. They are:
- Command and control systems designed to support over-the-horizon targeting, such as the Tomahawk Weapon Control System, Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange System, Tactical Data Information Exchange System, Flag Data Display System, Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS), and Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal.
- New detection and classification systems incorporating sensors such as the inverse synthetic aperture radar and multi-spectral imaging, plus platforms such as remotely Piloted vehicles (or unmanned air vehicles).
^ Precise navigation aids like the U.S. Global Positioning System and the Soviet Glonass satellites.
The command and control of widely dispersed forces has concerned the senior Navy leadership enough to have Produced the profusion of systems described. Collectively they show great promise, but individually there are some serious flaws in the systems as now fielded, as well as
are a paucity of skilled operators and an insufficient experience base to generate sophisticated suggestions for improvement. Properly used and refined, these systems have enormous potential. Tomahawk ships probably make best use of them today, because of both the sophistication of the Tomahawk Weapon Control System and the rigorous cruise-missile tactical qualification process. The proficiency must be extended to all JOTS/Flag Data Display System users, but it will not come through casual acquaintance. The programs are too complicated and subtle for that. Commanding officers must get their people trained well in advance of equipment installation and demand that every ounce of performance be wrung from the systems, every flaw highlighted for correction.
The other developments described directly address three long-standing problems in over-the-horizon ASuW: target localization, classification, and relative navigation.
- In the hands of a skilled operator, the inverse synthetic aperture radar imaging allows detection and general classification at very long ranges. It is becoming more prevalent with the introduction of the S-3B into fleet squadrons and the outfitting of more P-3s.
- Unmanned air vehicles can classify targets by day or night with either television or forward-looking infrared radar (immune to deceptive lighting), although they do not yet carry inverse synthetic aperture radar. The smaller units like Pioneer are very hard to detect, even harder to engage, and fearless, so they can close in on suspicious units with less risk than helicopters or conventional air-
incompatibilities between systems. The problems are exacerbated by subtle differences between the algorithms that underlie the operating programs, a lack of logistics SuPport, and a generally poor level of operator understanding . These need to be resolved, especially in the surface forces, where JOTS may be the principal wide-area command and control system. Progress is inhibited by a shortage of equipment, which means that ships, in the Pacific at least, typically do not see the gear until shortly before deployment, and then lose it on their return. The results craft. Although U.S. fleet experience with unmanned air vehicles thus far has been centered on the Pioneer detachments on board the battleships and amphibious ships, the combination of foreign developments and the efforts of the U.S. Joint Unmanned Air Vehicle Program Office should make increasingly capable systems more available in the near future. It is also time to incorporate the use of “attack drones” (such as the lethal loitering drone called Tacit Rainbow) in ASuW operations as well as strike warfare. ► The Global Positioning System still is not fully opera-
tional, but the constellation now is available some seven hours a day and should be completed by about 1993. With its advertised 100 meter or better accuracy (which also is claimed for Glonass), it should eliminate the relative navigational errors that have plagued ASuW (and coordinated ASW) for so long. Some even have projected that it will make ballistic missile attacks against ships possible.3
In sum, the ASuW localization and classification advantage is shifting in favor of the attacker, probably faster than most expect. From the ship’s perspective, more sophisticated cover and deception will be needed, capable of working against sensors in several frequency bands. The Chief of Naval Operations has alluded to signature-reduction efforts in the DDG-51 design, and recent defense exhibitions in Europe and Asia have included models of ship designs with “stealth” features. Still, these will not make the ships invisible, and if attacked, survival will hinge on having a particularly effective package of decoys and point defenses. All of these will demand new levels of operator alertness and proficiency.
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
The diversity of command and control systems for over- the-horizon targeting has been mentioned. But there is a growing number of other communications paths that we must understand to execute our missions. In particular, tacticians must be ready to use the alternative circuits available if primary connections are denied when our com
The Joint Operational Tactical System (above) and other command-and-control systems designed to support OTH targeting may someday restore a measure of autonomy to field commanders. Operators will also see a new breed of “smart” weapons such as the Tacit Rainbow (right), able to loiter in (light before attacking air-defense radar systems. Weapons of mass destruction (facing page, a victim of an Iraqi chemical attack on the Kurds, in 1988) can never be ruled out, even in the Third World.
munications are stressed. No longer is it simply a question of choosing between line-of-sight, high-frequency, and satellite channels. Consider some of the options that an operator on any given ship of a battle group has in trying to reach another unit over the horizon:
Satellite:
- 2,400 baud or 75 words per minute (with 9,600 baud options possible)
- Demand Assigned Multiple Access versus non-DAMA
- Direct interfaces to ships using compatible communications satellites versus gateways requiring manual shore- based intervention for ships on non-compatible satellites
- JOTS operational notes
- Tactical Intelligence or other dedicated circuits High Frequency:
- Ship-to-ship, using either regular or reduced power modes
- Ship-to-shore-to-ship, via either a battle-group broadcast ship, a direct termination ashore, or the common ship- to-shore circuit.
Line-of-Sight (VHF/UHF):
- Manual relay
- Automatic rebroadcast
- Connectivity with or without frequency-hopping radios such as Have Quick
In addition, there is another path that is growing in importance—the commercial MariSat (maritime satellite) telephone. It is not cheap, and so far usually is found only
on flagships, but it has proved its worth on many recent occasions. With the STU III (encrypted telephone) it can be made secure, and facsimile probably will be added.
A further development is in the area of reconstitutable communications. Several emerging technologies, from the air-launched Pegasus booster rocket to super-pressure balloons, can deliver rapidly deployable communications packages to tactical users. How we call for and tap into them remains to be worked out.
Bosses expect to be kept more informed than they have
been in the past. It does little good to decry the lack of autonomy accompanying these communications advances. Rather, tactical commanders should turn these conduits to their own advantage by providing timely sitreps that anticipate the questions of higher authority. In the process, they can buy themselves back much of the initiative that otherwise will be surrendered.
Closely related to this massive influx of information are tactical decision aids. Some of these reside within the JOTS; others come in stand-alone packages. A few are excellent. Many are not worth the electricity to erase them from the disk. However, some form of tactical decision aid is essential to keep decision makers from drowning in the enormous amounts of data that our high-capacity communications channels can deliver. There should be an urgent and insatiable demand from the deckplates for tactical decision aids that are accurate and user-friendly enough to lighten the watch’s burden rather than adding to it.
Other Areas of Interest
Weapons of mass destruction include chemical and biological agents, as well as nuclear warheads. Chemical weapons were used extensively in the Iran-Iraq War and are clearly available to potential belligerents throughout the Middle East. Biological toxins probably also are being stockpiled. Nuclear proliferation remains a serious concern. Future contingency operations may well involve weapons once thought to be reserved only for U.S.-Soviet conflicts. Training, especially with chemical-bacteriological-radiological equipment, should be a part of the workup for all ships going to the Middle East.
A few years ago, overhead photographs of Soviet bases along the Kola Peninsula were published. These had been taken by the French resources satellite known as SPOT I. In early April 1990, commercial satellite photographs of a suspected Iraqi biological-warfare research facility were shown on the network evening news (the Cable News Network has become not only an important source of global real-time information but also a vehicle for bomb-damage assessment in the case of strikes ashore). SPOT II now has joined SPOT I and several U.S. LANDSATs on orbit. Their multi-spectral images may be complemented before long by day-night, all-weather radar imagery from either a Canadian-U.S. commercial satellite or a follow-on French project. In any case, government monopolies of near realtime sensitive information—what would have been termed strategic intelligence not so long ago—are rapidly eroding. Military planning, even tactical planning, must take this into account. Mis-aimed rounds and errant missiles will not go unnoticed. In addition, covert approaches to regions of tension may be reported even if the littoral states do not have the resources to look themselves.
Finally, it may be worth investigating how recent biogenetic research relates to operations at sea. Every day we hear descriptions of medical miracles wrought by gene splicing, or new enzymes, or drugs with wonderful properties. The field has been characterized as one of the most dynamic areas of scientific research today. Surely some spin-offs must apply to defense—practical applications such as blood-clotting agents or bacteria to clean fuel tanks. It is an area we should know more about.
The threats and capabilities discussed will be here sooner than many realize, and at least four steps will be needed from those of us on the waterfront:
- Begin talking about and researching the problems.
- Look for tactical solutions while the research-and-
development establishment is working on long-term fixes. Do not wait for the next new gizmo to come along.
- Develop a training plan to formalize brainstorming.
- Provide feedback to the agencies charged with tactical development.
Rather than being paralyzed by the pace of change beyond our control, we must look for areas we can influence, and focus our energies there. Professional opportunities abound, even in times of fiscal adversity. It is up to us to seize them.