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The A-7: Cradle to Grave
By Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Norris, U.S. Naval Reserve
Imagine augmenting the carrier battle group (CVBG) arsenal with a long-range, multisensor, standpff weapon capable of passive or active target acquisition. Suppose such a weapon was capable of delivering a 15-ton payload at 600 knots into the teeth of an integrated air defense system. Suppose that if it were not actually employed that it could be recovered on board ship and launched again.
This nearly perfect platform exists: it is called the A-7 Corsair II and an unmanned version will be able to do all these things. The hundreds of A-7 light attack aircraft being phased out of active service represent a unique opportunity to develop a sophisticated yet reliable unmanned weapon system of great potential—using off-the-shelf technology.
A Corsair II remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) would offer unmatched mission flexibility while providing better suppression of enemy air defenses. The singleengine A-7, which has 3-4 hours of endurance, is fitted with an inertial navigation system, autopilot, air-to-surface radar, and can carry a forward looking infrared system and various electronic support mission suites. Electro-optical and other tactical reconnaissance systems could conceivably be added for use in high-threat areas to improve target identification and provide battle damage assessment.
The concept of using manned suicide planes—the Kamikaze, translated as “Divine Wind”—was proved by the Japanese in the Pacific during World War II. Easily the most effective single weapon ever employed against U.S. naval forces, the Kamikaze successfully penetrated heavy antiaircraft defenses with devastating results. Israeli tactical employment of RPVs to supplement manned aircraft has proved vital to their successful missions against modem integrated air defenses; applying this concept to war at sea doctrine is tactically sound.
The fleet of highly successful Century- series drones (F-100,-102,-104) is dwindling rapidly, while the potential F-4 drone represents an expensive option. Though most fighter drones have been exploited as airborne targets, none to date has been carrier suitable. But given its honest flight characteristics, the A-7 represents a viable, cost-effective drone candidate potentially capable of recovering on board ship. Its automatic carrier landing system provides a baseline to investigate the feasibility of RPV recovery.
The shift of national priorities to nondefense issues should drive defense planners to exploit existing weapon systems that promise maximum cost benefits. Reduced funding will make it difficult to develop new hardware.
The appearance of a Soviet threat reduction—albeit without concrete evi-
This A-7E catapulted from the USS Independence (CV-62) is carrying a 19,000-pound external load of bombs and fuel. You cannot see the pilot from this angle—and there would be no need for one if the Navy converted its fleet of A-7s to unmanned attack drones.
dence—and a burgeoning Third World threat, means that U.S. naval forces will again be challenged to do more with less. It is prudent to anticipate that those forces oriented toward the (perceived) diminishing Soviet conventional threat will be subjected to disproportionate budget cuts as the Navy budget decreases. Increased operating tempos caused by reductions strength predictably result in the loss of qualified personnel. Our ability to maintain and improve existing hardware is critical to sustaining a balanced naval force structure.
Suppression of Soviet surface action group air defenses includes localization, identification, shadowing, and strike contingencies. Real-time battle damage assessment is crucial in evaluating first attack soft-kill impact to maximize follow-on attack effectiveness. In this role, an RPV may be employed as an enticement to encourage the enemy to radiate early warning, air search, acquisition, and tracking radars. Real-time intercept of these emissions by CVBG electronic warfare assets would provide invaluable data for tactical decisions. Given target acquisition and track capability— infrared, electro-optical, and laser—an RPV conducting overt shadowing could switch to terminal guidance and commence an attack when engaged by the defenses.
The hard-kill potential of a 30,000- pound combination of aircraft and high- explosive munitions far exceeds that of any conventional weapon in the inventory. Faced with such an immediate threat, the enemy surface action group’s missile ships would be forced to radiate— and risk attack from standoff high-speed antiradiation missiles. Tactics potentially could incorporate probes, feints, and off- axis deception maneuvers in addition to a preprogrammed target of opportunity mode.
An A-7 RPV would be a difficult target to destroy. Significantly, the non-afterburning Corsair II has a relatively low infrared signature. This could be reduced to virtually zero by shutting off the fuel flow once the aircraft had achieved a ballistic profile, and allowing the windmilling engine and the emergency power package to supply hydraulic and electrical power. The A-7 RPV can be programmed to dispense chaff or electronic decoys while jinking or it could fly a straight, high-speed profile to improve accuracy. Armed with the Shrike short- range antiradiation missile, the Corsair II RPV could duel with missile launchers, further increasing kill probability while extending the Shrike’s useful service life.
In its simplest form, even a pure vanilla carrier-based RPV without targeting capability is a cost-effective platform that can provide an innovative tactician with intriguing possibilities. Configured with communications or electronic countermeasures pods, the RPV could extend the electronic jamming capabilities of the EA-6B Prowler aircraft—or provide the bait to cause a Soviet surface action group to radiate without exposing tactical aviation assets. The RPV could be controlled by an E-2C, an EA-6B, or its own preprogrammed autopilot; alternatively, it could be handed off to a Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class Aegis missile cruiser for use in probing inbound aircraft formations. In fact, just the RPV.’s potential value as a decoy for enemy missiles justifies serious consideration for this program.
The logistic support base of the A-7 is still viable. Current parts inventory, when combined with cannibalization of unserviceable airframes, should satisfy both test and operational requirements. The lessons learned from years of deployed operations with this airframe should prevent critical component shortfalls while optimizing the prepositioned parts and supplies inventories. Obviously the Corsair II is CV-suitable, which would allow initial test and evaluation efforts to focus on RPV adaptability. Replacement airframes can be flown aboard by pilots and modified by a small crew of technicians utilizing adaptation kits. Terminal guidance capability can be achieved by abandoning the requirement for coordinated flight and incorporating sensor-based, error-nulling guidance commands—centroid steering—within established autopilot buffer parameters. Maintenance expertise abounds in the A-7 community. Allowed to adhere to combat aircraft battle damage repair standards, a hand-picked group of as few as 10 maintenance personnel could compete with any squadron for aircraft availability.
Given the bleak fiscal outlook tor Defense Department weapons acquisition this decade, political support for a program that transitions an obsolete light attack aircraft to a state-of-the-art suppression weapon may be surprisingly strong. Establishing a theme of cradle-to-grave exhaustion of a weapon’s potential would garner solid public support for a Pentagon often accused of wasteful expenditures.
Lieutenant Commander Norris is the operations officer with VFA-303, an F/A-18 squadron at NAS Lemoore. California. He fiew F-14 and F-14A Plus aircraft with VF-101 and VF-32 at NAS Oceana. Virginia and served as an exchange pilot Hying F-15s with the U.S. Air Force at Holloman AFB, New Mexico.