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By John F. Morton
“Today, an altered perception of the Soviet Union and an assessment that global conflict with the Soviet Union appears remote have made it possible to accept a level of risk associated with a lower than 600 ship force level. This risk is acceptable only if our current cordial relationship with the Soviet Union persists and only if the Soviet leadership actually continues to carry out its promised military reductions."
Chief of Information, Winter 1990
Among the many issues addressed by the Navy in 1989 were the nature of the changing force posture in relation to the Soviet Union and its implications for naval arms control, the increasing likelihood of regional conflicts that may require U.S. naval responses, and key technological developments that will affect future naval warfighting. The various Navy communities have studied these and other issues for some time. Far from being “overtaken by events,” as the predictable quarters would suggest, they appear to have planned their programs accordingly. Senior naval officers admit, however, that continued uncertainty in the Pentagon budget drill and the prospect of further budget declines resulting from negotiations with Congress complicate even the best laid Navy plans.
The flexibility of the maritime strategy, they claim, allows the service to respond, without great upheaval, to the changing East-West situation. They say that the Navy is basically deemphasizing some of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area aspects of the strategy—specifically the “Kola scenario”—and reorienting itself for more of a global response in any East-West conflict. (See in this issue, “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s” by Admiral C.A.H. Trost, USN, pages 92-100.)
The emphasis on a global posture serves other non-East-West contingencies as well. The recent Navy statement warns that the highest probability for conflict.in the coming decade will be in the developing world, the result of pursuing national identities, regional issues, terrorism, and religious disputes. “Our primary defense concerns,” it states, “will increasingly be associated with our interests in the Pacific, the Middle East, the Caribbean
Basin, and Southwest Asia; in other words, during the 1990s, no front will be ‘central.’ Since 1980, the President has called on the Navy as his force of choice 50 times in response to international and regional crises affecting United States citizens, and national and allied interests. Virtually none had anything to do with East-West confrontation.”
When Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney announced the Pentagon’s fiscal year 1991 (FY91) budget on 29 January this year, he said that by the end of FY91 the Navy would have 546 battle force ships, including 14 deployable carriers and 13 active and two reserve carrier air wings. While Cheney said that one of his budget priorities was to “preserve maritime superiority,” he announced his plan to retire two battleships, the Iowa (BB- 61) and the New Jersey (BB-62), to deactivate a nuclear cruiser in FY92 and a second in FY94, and to retire and deactivate two Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class and three Permit (SSN-594)-class nuclear attack submarines (in addition to the three Permits planned for deactivation in the FY90 budget).
The Secretary proposed a reduction in Navy strength from 593,000 in FY89 to 591,000 in FY90 and 585,000 in FY91. Navy budget authority dropped significantly from FY88 to FY89, falling from $100.3 billion to $97.7 billion. The FY90 figure was $99.6 billion, and Cheney asked Congress to give the Navy $99.5 billion for FY91. While the current figures appear stable, in constant dollars the numbers still represent real declines, although not as precipitous as those from FY88 to FY89.
The service’s 14 carrier battle groups will still be the centerpieces of forward deployment, along with its two remaining battleships. While antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is still the Navy’s number one warfighting priority, budget constraints are forcing the service to revise its goal of 100 attack submarines. The Seawolf (SSN-21)-class nuclear attack submarine, however, is still the linchpin of the Navy’s evolving ASW concept, says Admiral Charles R. Larson, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06). (See Admiral Larson’s interview in this
issue, pages 126-131.)
The Navy still sees carrier battle groups as flexible, mobile forces that have utility across the spectrum of conflict, that are stand-off and discreet, and that do not depend on foreign access. Senior naval officers argue that the service will need 14 carriers to maintain forward deployment, especially in the Pacific, to promote regional stability for U.S. allies. Atlantic carrier forces will continue to support NATO allies as a deterrent against the Soviets. According to Admiral Larson, sufficient force levels are still necessary for rotation cycles as well, “so that we don’t run our people into the ground.”
With the surprising progress in both the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations in Geneva and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) talks in Vienna, arms control issues moved to the forefront for the Navy in 1989. When Soviet Field Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev visited Washington in July, he told Congress that the Soviet Union wanted naval arms control to be prominent on the agenda. The Soviets reiterated that position throughout the year.
For some time, the Soviet Union has proposed the denuclearization of the navies and the creation of so-called maritime nuclear-free zones. The Soviet proposals have put pressure on the long-standing U.S. Navy policy neither to conlirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board its ships. The Navy regards the policy as a cornerstone ot its nuclear deterrent. The Tomahawk has expanded the Navy’s force to some 200 nuclear-capable platforms that create great uncertainty for the Soviets.
Larson says that denuclearizing the navies would not compromise any Soviet objectives, since the Soviet Navy does not have a forward strategy per se. More to the point, the Soviet proposals do not provide for the denuclearization of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA), i.e., their air-to- surface missiles (AS-4s and AS-6s) that have a range of 1,000 miles and thus would still be able to threaten U.S. carrier battle groups.
These differences, however, have not adversely affected U.S.-Soviet naval negotiations on incidents at sea. The course of these talks continues to im-
Prove. Over the last five years, the number of incidents has declined. Larson says •hat the 1989 Washington negotiations Were remarkably businesslike and professional. The recent trend illustrates the willingness of the Soviets to use the meetings to solve problems rather than to score political points. It also is a further nomic strength will become at once more important and more difficult. The potential for extended warfare in which a battle for control of these lines of communication comes to the forefront may well be increased even more by the prospective reduction of U.S. and Soviet nuclear force and enhancement of conventional
REBM and the expanded battle space of the future.
In the area of surface warfare, the most significant development on the horizon is the arrival of the guided-missile destroyer Arleigli Burke (DDG-51). Last year, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare, Vice Admiral John W.
mdication of the evolving “cordial rela- •■onship” between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In July, three Soviet Navy ships visited Norfolk, Virginia, initiating the first major military exchanges between the two nations. The following month, the guided-missile cruiser Thomas Gates ICG-51) and the guided-missile frigate Kauffman (FFG-59) visited Sevastopol, home of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The Positive interaction between crews during the two visits also spread among the civilians in both ports. The U.S. Atlantic Command described the two historic goodwill visits as “tangible evidence of •he lessening tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.”
New technologies for the next century continued to figure greatly in 1989 Navy Planning. At the end of 1988, the Naval Studies Board issued a report— Navy-21: Implications of Advancing Technology for Naval Operations in the Twenty-First Century.” In its unclassified summary, the report stated: “The defense of the sea lines of communica- hons with our allies and sources of ecowarfare capabilities on the part of diverse potential antagonists. ’ ’
Senior naval officers consistently point to the proliferation in the Third World of two specific systems that can threaten U.S. naval forces: advanced missiles and diesel submarines. Many of those technologies are already familiar, having figured prominently in the previous year’s “Ship Operational Characteristics Study” (SOCS).
Among the many areas discussed in the “Navy-21” report is a recurring concept emphasized by the panel—radio-electronic battle management (REBM). The report said that REBM encompasses “the functions of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command, control, and communications; all technical operations on information; electronic and electro-optic warfare coupled with signature management or ‘observability warfare’; and targeting. We believe that radio-electronic battle management must be treated as an organic whole to ensure success in the ‘information war.”’ The report also discussed a number of key technology “drivers” that feed into
A U.S. Atlantic Command statement proclaimed the summer 1989 exchange visits in Sevastopol (top) and Norfolk (above) “tangible evidence of the lessening tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.”
Nyquist, published the Navy’s Surface Warfare Plan for the first time in an unclassified version. The 1989 plan based its recommendations on the previous year’s “Surface Combatant Force Requirements Study” (SCFRS) that identified the Arleigli Burke class as the battle
force combatant (BFC) of the future. According to the plan, “The BFC is a multi-mission ship equipped with a phased array radar, an AEGIS-type battle management system, a vertical launch system of 90-120 cells, and an advanced SQQ-89 anti-submarine combat system.”
The DDG-51 class will enter the fleet in three flights at a rate of five ships per year. Four ships at $2.8 billion were in the FY89 shipbuilding and conversion request; five each are in the FY90 and FY91 requests at $3.5 billion and $3.7 billion respectively. For both years, the DDG-51 program ranks as the third largest program in the Pentagon budget, following the B-2 and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Contracts are going both to Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding. Flight I is already in production, and the first ship in Flight II will be the first ship in the FY92 budget. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, the Flight III DDG-51 is scheduled to have a helicopter hangar. For budgetary reasons, the Navy could not afford to put a hangar on the first two flights; however, helicopters can land on Flight I and II DDG-51 flight decks. Until Flight III DDG-5 Is get into the fleet, the Navy will rely heavily on existing classes of destroyers and frigates that already have helicopter capabilities.
Building upon the previous year’s “Project February” and its “four for eight” goal for the future composition of a carrier air wing (CAW), the Navy aviation community, led by Vice Admiral Richard Dunleavy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare (OP- 05), conducted a three-session review called “CAWs 2010.” Dunleavy admits, however, that the budget makes the worthy four-for-eight goal “unrealistic.”
The first session held last June set priorities for aircraft programs. According to Dunleavy, the study concluded that the Navy’s first aircraft priority is the acquisition of the A-12 aircraft. The admiral says that the program has “strong support” in both Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The A-12, however, is one Navy program that OSD is reviewing for possible cuts. The Air Force advanced tactical fighter (ATF), whose Navy version is the so- called Navy ATF (NATF), the C-17, and the B-2 are three other programs on the line in the OSD review. The fact that the Navy has made the A-12 the top aircraft priority suggests that the plane will survive the OSD deliberations.
The second priority is the advanced tactical support (ATS) aircraft, which would replace a number of support planes such as the EA-6B Prowler electronic countermeasures aircraft. The ATS may have to be a derivative aircraft, as opposed to a next-generation plane as originally planned. Dunleavy says, “It’s an affordability issue, and a new start is not a viable option.”
Not so certain is the Navy’s third prior-
The new guided-missile destroyer Arleigh Burke (DDG-51), here being launched on 16 September in Maine, is considered in surface warfare circles as the battle-force combatant of the future.
ity, the NATF. OSD has slipped the ATF demonstration/validation to June 1991, and as a result, the service has assigned as its fourth priority the remanufacture of the F-14D, the plane that the NATF is supposed to replace. Dunleavy says that the service is fully committed to the ATF program through demonstration/validation, after which the services will make the decision to buy.
The fifth priority is the A-6. The Intruder is entering its fourth decade with the fleet as its all-weather attack aircraft. This January, the first rewinged A-6 entered the fleet with a composite wing built by Boeing for the Grumman plane. The Navy hopes to keep the A-6 flying until 2008 when the last Intruder is scheduled to leave the fleet.
Other Navy aircraft priorities are the introduction of the F-45TS trainer and training system, the V-22, and P-7. According to Admiral Dunleavy, the V-22 has become a “political animal” whose future is no longer in the hands of the Navy. Although the service still has and is making the requirement for the V-22, OSD wants it cut from the budget.
The Admiral says that the CAWs 2010 review did not include the P-7 long-range ASW aircraft, because the program appeared to be running smoothly at the time. However, in December the contractor, Lockheed, informed him that it was having technical problems with increased weight in the program.
In September and October, the second CAWs 2010 session assigned priorities to weapons. Top priority is acquisition of the advanced bomb family with initial operational capability (IOC) by 1994. This family of weapons will replace the Mark 80 series with a 500-pound blast and fragmentation bomb and a 1,000- pound bomb for penetration. Second is the advanced interdiction weapon system (AIWS), primarily for use on board the A-12, but also for the F/A-18, A-6, and AV-8B. Priority number three is the Tacit Rainbow anti-radiation missile, for which the Navy still has a requirement, despite having withdrawn from the joint program with the Air Force because of budget constraints. The rest of the line-up includes the AIM-9R Sidewinder; the advanced air-to-air missile (AAAM)-— which Dunleavy says the Navy prefers over the advanced medium-range air-to- air missile (AMRAAM); inertially aided munitions (IAMs) that will provide a cheap stand-off capability up to 20 miles; and the longer-range stand-off land attack missile (SLAM). Dunleavy says that the Navy has had five successful SLAM tests with “bull’s eyes,” firing the missile from both A-6s and F/A-18s at ranges of up to 70 miles.
At the end of the year, the third CAWs session looked at personnel issues. Dunleavy says that a key operations and maintenance (O&M) issue affecting both readiness and aviator retention is the number of hours he can budget for flight time. Currently, the Navy budgets 25 hours per month per aviator across all aircraft types. Dunleavy wants to increase it to 25.8. He notes the inevitable flight time discrepancies within the aviation community. For example, P-3 aviators, whose missions average eight hours, get about 52 to 50 hours’ flight time per month. F/A-18 aviators, however, whose average mission times are one-and-a-half hours get only 18 hours per month. Says Dunleavy, the F/A-18 aviator needs at least 28 hours of flight time a month to keep him both skilled and in the service. He also reports that the first two squadrons of “under the weather” capability F/A-18C/Ds entered the Pacific Fleet in late fall.
The Navy still regards ASW as its number one warfighting priority, in spite of the fact that it has still not resolved its
Systems, the Strategic Systems Program Office, and Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition. The respective commanders will now serve as program executive officers (PEOs) on only 21 of 51 major Navy acquisition programs. Most of these are shipbuilding programs involving mature, stable designs. The other 30 major acquisition programs go to seven new PEOs estab-
ASW reorganization issues. Early in the year, senior naval officers testified to Congress that four new classes of Soviet attack submarines are now operational ar)d that in ten years one-third (100) of their attack submarine force will have new quieting technology.
On 21 March 1989, the House Armed Services Committee released a report by >ts advisory panel on submarine and antisubmarine warfare that said the adverse trend in ASW is “a matter meriting the highest priority of attention.” The panel said that the importance of ASW research
justifies significant real growth in fund- lng in spite of today’s downward pressure °n the defense budget.” One expert on the panel said that the United States eventually will have to spend some $300 bil- h°n on ASW to counter the Soviet submarine improvements.
The report said that the failure to reaver ASW capability would compromise U.S. abilities across the whole of naval warfare, e.g., the survivability of carrier task forces, the deployment and support of military forces overseas, and the security of coasts against submarine- launched missiles.
While the panel emphasized the impact °f quieting technology, it noted other Soviet advances in submarine technol- °gy. “The Soviets may well be ahead of [the United States] in certain technologies, such as titanium structures and control of the hydrodynamic flow around the submarine,” the report cited. Specificity, it referred to the Soviets’ Akula- dass nuclear submarines. It also recognized significant innovation in some Ital- lan, German, and Swedish designs for nonnuclear subs and quiet nonnuclear Propulsion systems that extend the capabilities of the conventional diesel-electric boat, including closed-cycle diesels, Stirling engines, and fuel cells.
The report noted that the Navy’s almost exclusive reliance on acoustic ASW contributes to the ASW crisis. Promoting further research on non-acoustic techniques such as magnetic anomaly detec- li°n, the report stated: “Apart from SDI, this work is probably the greatest technological challenge facing the Department °f Defense.” Recycling criticism of the Davy's management of ASW, the report recommended that the Secretary of Defense appoint a “broadly based standing committee of recognized experts” to advise him on ASW.
Most noteworthy for the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) was the turnaround in the Trident II D-5 program following a spectacular failure in its first sea launch in March off the coast of Florida. Rear Admiral Kenneth C. Malley,
Pr
SSP Director (see his comment, p. 18, April 1990 Proceedings), had conducted 19 Right pad tests with only two minor failures. The first underwater launch from the Tennessee (SSBN-734), the Navy’s first Trident II-capable submarine, however, suffered a structural failure resulting from water in the nozzle at the time of motor ignition. The D-5 is a missile far larger than the C-4 and its predecessors: about 130,000 pounds compared to 69,000 pounds.
After strengthening the actuator and the compliance ring at the aft end of the D-5, SSP fired a second sea launch in August, with additional instrumentation and with the submarine moving at a higher speed to reduce the effect of the water jet on the nozzle. This firing was successful. A third attempt reproduced the slower submarine speed conditions of the first firing, but was another failure. This time, the flex-seal that allows the nozzle to vector ripped during ignition. Consequently, SSP suspended the program to incorporate four more design changes. Two of the most important were the addition of a shield on the back of the nozzle to prevent water from entering the chamber and a “snubber” to prevent the nozzle from putting a load on the flex- seal. In December, the D-5 launched successfully three times. January’s two additional successful firings led Admiral Malley to announce that the D-5 is “on track” in development and production. SSP estimates that the total increased cost to the program as the result of the failures is some $70 million.
In July, the Navy also wrestled with the mandates of the Defense Management Report (DMR) that called for a number of changes in acquisition. The service initiated its own review on management upon the release of the report. In October, Secretary of the Navy W. Lawrence Garrett III approved plans of the service review that established a single Assistant Secretary of the Navy as the service acquisition executive (SAE) and its own acquisition corps of full-time career specialists.
The Navy created as its SAE an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition by consolidating its assistant secretaries of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems, and Shipbuilding and Logistics. It also reorganized its various antisubmarine warfare management activities into a single directorate.
The plan also revises the command structure. Previously, the Navy, like the other services, has run its acquisition functions through its five major systems commands—Naval Sea Systems, Naval Air Systems, Space and Naval Warfare
Problems encountered in the failed 21 March attempt at a first-ever underwater launch of a Trident II D-5 missile are apparently solved, and the program is now considered back on track.
lished under the plan. These seven are for tactical aircraft, ASW aircraft and other systems, cruise missile and unmanned air vehicles, submarine weapons and combat systems, surface ASW, space, communications and sensors, and expeditionary forces, plus three direct reporting program managers for strategic systems, Aegis, and the Seawolf (SSN-21) nuclear attack submarine.
Under the reorganization, 1,500 people in 78 programs (including 48 related non-major programs) at $19 billion will go to the new PEO organization from the systems commands. Says the Navy, the projected PEO staff will consist of 10 to 16 persons.
As for the acquisition corps, specialization would begin no later than after 10 to 12 years of service for those officers coming into the acquisition corps from engineering duty, aviation engineering duty, supply, civil engineering, materiel, or weapon system acquisition management. Before rising to key acquisition positions, an officer must have had eight years in acquisition. Selection of unrestricted line officers can be earlier (four to 12 years of service) following initial
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warfare qualification.
The Defense Management Report also mandated a broader role for the Pentagon’s Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) chairs the JROC and is vice-chair of the DAB. The DMR said of JROC that it “will assume a broader role in the threshold articulation of military needs and the validation of performance goals and baselines for all DAB programs at their successive milestones.” Noteworthy from a Navy perspective, the current VCJCS is Admiral David E. Jeremiah, U.S. Navy.
In a second 1989 reorganization, the Navy sea, air, land forces (SEALs) transferred to the recently created Special Operations Command (SOCOM). All Navy special operations funding that previously was included in OP-03’s (surface warfare) total obligational authority (TOA) now is SOCOM’s responsibility. The Navy by no means has said “goodbye” to the SEALs, however. The service retains the Special Operations Division in OP-03 plus branches in OP-06 and OP-07 (Naval Warfare) that will continue to coordinate Navy SEAL requirements, research, development, and acquisition, plus policy regarding their employment. At any given time, nearly half of the SEALs remain forward deployed and/or operating with the fleet.
SOCOM is the “provider” for all Special Operations Forces (SOFs)—Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army. With SOCOM, the SEALs are now an element of a joint command whose primary responsibility is the readiness of SOFs. SOCOM is unique. It has its own budget and authority to procure SOF items. Under SOCOM, the SEALs no longer will have to compete with the “platforms” in the Navy budget drill.
Currently the SEALs are participating in the first SOCOM program objectives memoranda (POM) cycle for the FY92 budget. The SEALs still expect to achieve under the Navy Master Plan their goal of 60 platoons by the end of 1991.
In a third Navy reorganization, the Surgeon General of the Navy, Vice Admiral James A. Zimble, issued in November his second annual report on Navy medicine that detailed reorganizing the Navy Medical Department. The Navy reactivated the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to strengthen the link between the medical and line communities. “Navy and Marine Corps Responsible Line Commanders will have military command of medical and dental facilities aboard their bases or stations,” the report states. “The Surgeon General of the
Navy will be responsible for primary and technical support of our facilities.” The Navy disestablished the Naval Medical Command and its subordinate geographic commands, freeing most of the geographic command staffs to return to direct health care facilities. The report said that the process will be completed by October 1990. The Navy is also dissolving the Naval Hospital Bethesda and National Capital Region and reestablishing the National Naval Medical Center, at Bethesda.
The Surgeon General said that the Navy is now treating 12 million outpatients, a 12% increase. In addition to its 33 hospitals, the Navy now has 10 NAV- CARE (Naval Care) clinics operating and expects to expand current capacity by about 20% during fiscal year 1990. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) costs have decreased from 53% to 47% of the medical budget. In January 1989, thenSecretary of Defense Frank Carlucci implemented a $30 million discretionary physicians’ bonus. Of eligible Navy physicians, 50% are participating, and 82% of those have made a four-year commitment. More funding and more accessible programs are now available for continuing medical education (CME).
The Navy has streamlined its Mobile Medical Augmentation Readiness Teams (MMARTs) by reducing the number of teams from 59 to 14. Of the 779 hospital staff members assigned to MMARTs, 551 will return to hospitals for clinical and support operations, eliminating personnel duplications. A new initiative established Fleet Surgical Teams (FSTs), two on each coast, to assume what have been MMARTs’ responsibilities for operational deployments. One full FST is in training on each coast. The second teams are forming.
In addition, the Navy is establishing two Management Assist Teams (MATs) with six-month assignments to render “technical assistance in support of management effectiveness by enhancing local management practices at other CONUS facilities.” Noteworthy among medical action during the year was the work of the Portsmouth Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Teams (SPRINT) following the Iowa tragedy.
The year was also noteworthy for the Navy in a number of other respects:
► The Navy is well represented in the NASA astronaut program. Eighteen naval officers are on duty as astronauts, of which ten are Naval Academy graduates and five are members of the Naval Institute. Four Navy astronauts flew missions in space in 1989. Nine are sched-
The collision between the destroyer Kinkaid (DD-965) and a merchant vessel near Singapore was the last in a string of naval accidents that led to Admiral Trost’s November Navywide safety stand down.
uled for missions in 1990. One Navy astronaut is slated to fly in 1991. Of these missions (totalling 11), Navy astronauts will command seven flights and pilot one.
One Navy astronaut, Captain Daniel C. Brandenstein, commanded the January 1990 STS-32 mission that deployed the SYNCOM IV-5 satellite and retrieved the Long Duration Exposure Facility. He is also Chief of the Astronaut Office. Senior among the 18 is Captain Bruce McCandless, who became an astronaut in 1966 and has since logged 191 hours in space including four hours of manned maneuvering unit flight time. McCandless served as a mission specialist on the April 1990 STS-31 mission that deployed the Hubble Space Telescope.
- Headlines early in the year on 4 January revealed that two F-14 aircraft from VF-32 attached to Carrier Air Wing Three on board the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) shot down two Libyan MiG-23s in a brief engagement over the Central Mediterranean. Navy reports said that the F-14s took defensive action after executing repeated maneuvers to avoid the Libyan aircraft.
- The Persian Gulf drawdown of forces assigned to the Commander Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME) continued through the year. On 30 March, the Peoria (LST-1183), the Fearless (MSO- 442), the Illusive (MSO-448), and the Inflict (MSO-456) departed the Gulf. Still remaining are three mine warfare ships, the Esteem (MSO-438), the Enhance (MSO-437), and the Conquest (MSO- 488). The U.S. Central Command says that the three ships will soon return to their West Coast home ports, however. In December 1988, JTFME deactivated the first two mobile sea barges. The joint task force deactivated the second barge on 18 September.
- From 7 to 12 December 1989, the New Jersey (BB-62) became the first battleship in modem times to enter the Gulf. Completing the goodwill operations in the North Arabian Sea area, she added port visits in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.
- In August, Pacific Fleet units participated in a combined exercise with Australia called Kangaroo ’89. The exercise was the largest U.S.-Australian exercise since World War II. Combined forces conducted mock air, land, and sea battles over an area roughly the size of Western Europe. The exercise tested Australia’s ability to defend its Northern Territory under its new defense doctrine of selfreliance.
- In September/October, the U.S. Pacific Command conducted its largest exercise ever, PacEx 89. The joint and combined exercise was noteworthy for its size and its zero accident rate. Participating units included about 100 U.S. Navy ships and many more from foreign navies, including three aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings, two battleship groups, and three amphibious units with their embarked Marine expeditionary units. Navy aircraft flew more than
- hours.
PacEx demonstrated command and control, interoperability, and logistic sustainability of Pacific-wide resources. Senior naval officers say that units benefited from extensive simulation and training in port before deploying for the exercise, providing a better return on their time at sea. Not wishing to upset the cordial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union by operating large naval forces near Soviet home waters, the Navy duplicated conditions in the West and Northwest Pacific by conducting the exercise in the East Pacific and around the Aleutian Islands.
- On 29 September, the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) and Secretary of Defense Cheney hosted a retirement ceremony for Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Crowe (USNA, Class of 1947), a submariner, served for two two-year terms as the eleventh chairman beginning in October 1985.
- On 17 October, an earthquake measuring almost 7.0 on the Richter scale hit San Francisco. Construction battalion personnel and equipment from Alameda Naval Air Station assisted in rescue operations at the collapsed 1-880 Cypress Street Exit interchange. MH-53 helos from HM-15 Alameda also assisted in the rescue efforts.
A three-ship battle group consisting of the Peleliu (LHA-5), Fort Fisher (LSD- 40), and Schenectady (LST-1185) responded to provide food, fresh water, manpower, helicopters, small boats, and emergency berthing. For four days, the Peleliu provided emergency shelter for more than 300 displaced persons. Also present was the hospital ship USNS Mercy (AH-8). In addition, the Lang (FF-1060) provided more than 200,000 San Franciscans with two days of emergency power from its generators.
HM-15 and HC-l’s helos lifted food and water from Alameda to Santa Cruz; three MH-53s supplied Watsonville and Hollister, the epicenter areas. One report accounted for some 60 tons of supplies that the Navy delivered from Moffett Field to Santa Cruz, Watsonville, Hollister, and Redwood Estates.
A number of sailors and Marines formed “Tiger Teams” to inspect heating and air-conditioning systems. Units from the Samuel Gompers (AD-37), Construction Battalion Unit 416, and the 15th MEU Marines also provided outstanding assistance. The Navy counted more than
- sailors, Marines, and Navy civilians who had assisted in the relief effort, along with 15 ships and a multitude of helicopters, small boats, and service vehicles.
► On 14 November, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ordered a Navy-wide, 48-hour safety stand-down following a series of unrelated Navy accidents over a period of several weeks. The order required every ship, squadron, and shore training facility to interrupt normal operations and review basic safety and operating procedures.
On 16 November, the CNO reported to Congress that at 67 major mishaps for 1989, the accident rate for the year was still lower than the previous year’s alltime low of 69 major mishaps. The Navy defines a major mishap as an accident that results in a fatality and/or damage exceeding $1 million.
The CNO told lawmakers that some ot the accidents in question resulted from machinery failure, while others were acts of God or errors by personnel. Noting an operating tempo for a typical day, the CNO said that “on the 30th of September, 219 of our ships were under way and operating. Our aviators on that day flew over 6,200 aircraft sorties from our land bases.”
In December, the CNO reported his
U.S. NAVY/K. BURKE
Explosive ordnance disposal teams (inset) worked to ensure a safe summit at Malta in December. Between talks with Gorbachev, President Bush stood on the deck of the guided-missile cruiser Belknap (CG- 26), with her Soviet counterpart, the Slava, in the background.
findings from the stand down, saying, “The level of effective supervision on the scene was often inadequate when accidents occurred.” He added that incomplete job indoctrination, supervisors lacking safety training, and a lack of compliance with set procedures were areas that needed improvement.
► On 2-3 December, the Sixth Fleet flagship Belknap (CG-26) and the Soviet guided missile cruiser Slava met in Mar- saxlokk Bay, Malta, to support a meeting between President George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev scheduled to take place aboard the two ships. A winter storm, however, forced a change of venue to the Soviet luxury liner Maxim Gorky at a pier
- yards away from the two warships, which rode out the storm at anchor.
President Bush, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, the President’s Chief of Staff, his National Security Advisor, and top aides stayed on board the Belknap. The ComSixthFlt flag barge crew shuttled the senior officials in high winds and heavy seas to meetings on board the Gorky. EOD Det Sigonella, EOD Mobile Team Two Little Creek, and a Marine Stinger team and Rigid raider patrol boats from 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit augmented security.
The President mingled freely with the Belknap crew members during his stay and joined the ship’s Sunday morning worship service held on the mess decks. Although Gorbachev did not visit either of the two warships, the Belknap and the
Slava conducted crew exchanges before the two leaders held their meetings.
- On 6 December, the White House announced the nomination of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, U.S. Navy, as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the time, Admiral Jeremiah was Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. A surface warfare officer, he received his commission through Officer Candidate School in 1956. Admiral Jeremiah relieved General Robert T. Herres, U.S. Air Force, on 27 February to become the second Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
- On 8 December, the Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, temporarily relieved of command the commanding officer of the Houston (SSN-713) following three incidents involving the submarine. The relieved officer had taken command of the submarine in March.
On 14 June, the Houston snagged a submerged tow cable from the commercial tugboat Barcelona off the coast of Southern California. The submarine pulled the tug underwater, and one civilian crew member was lost. On 9 July, the sub partially flooded through an open ventilation induction system valve resulting in an emergency surfacing procedure that went awry causing the sub to resubmerge with a large down angle to a depth of some 350 feet. Fortunately, the ship was able to resurface with a second emergency main ballast tank blow. A third incident occurred in November when the sub cut her towed sonar array because of improper navigation and ship operation procedures.
- In its FY89 budget, the Navy got just less than $80 million for long-lead requirements for the nuclear refueling and modernization of the Enterprise (CVN- 65). The ship will begin her nuclear refueling and modernization at Newport News Shipyards in January 1991. The Enterprise is the Navy’s first nuclear carrier, and the refueling of her eight reactors along with repairs/alterations and modernization will extend the 28-year- old ship’s service life from 30 to 45 years. FY91 Pentagon budget documents put the FY90 bill for the refueling and modernization at just over $1.4 billion. ► Throughout the year the strategic homeporting program continued. New homeports are under construction at Staten Island, New York, Pensacola, Florida, Mobile, Alabama, Pascagoula, Mississippi, Ingleside, Texas, and Everett, Washington. At Staten Island, the pier and ship maintenance facility are virtually complete for the Iowa and her escorts, due for arrival in August. Construction of new ports on the Gulf Coast is just getting started on site improvements and the piers. The Kitty Hawk (CV-63) will go to Pensacola in the late summer of 1991; the Wisconsin (BB-64) will arrive in Ingleside that summer. Mobile will be ready for its first arrivals in August 1991; Pascagoula, in October 1991. Ultimately, both ports will get two DDG-51s. Everett will take its first ships in the summer of 1992. Site improvements there are well along and dredging is under way. Everett will eventually get a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission terminated work at Lake Charles, Louisiana, and Galveston, Texas, that were originally part of the strategic homeporting program.
John F. Morton is editor of Defense Forum, a weekly publication distributed from Washington by facsimile. Previously, Mr. Morton was congressional editor of Armed Forces Journal. He received a B.A. and an M.A. in international affairs from The George Washington University.