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S. Coast Guard (Retired)
By Captain G. Stephen Duca, U.
The year was forecast to have its own special challenges.
- The learning curve associated with accommodating a new administration
- Integrating major new players (the Department of Defense [DoD] and the Drug Czar) into the national drug policy infrastructure
- What to do about revamped field support and headquarters management structures that showed imperceptible signs of producing forecast benefits
- Drug interdiction operations that did not seem to affect the drug market
- A military mission promoted as the service’s premier call to duty searching for a threat
- A no-growth environment slowing promotions and breeding grumbling in wardrooms
- The usual interminable budget hassles
Exxon Valdez oil spill (more than ten million gallons of crude oil) and as such was thrust into the national limelight. Industry and government were totally unprepared to deal with the accident. The planning for spill response, containment, and cleanup included in contingency plans did not jibe with the predicaments cleanup forces faced. Moreover, the technology at hand to deal with an environmental catastrophe was inadequate, largely because of academia’s, industry’s, and the federal government’s near abandonment of oil spill research and development during most of the last decade.
Throughout the spring and summer, the public watched and read about an unremitting desecration of nature. It became angry as tens of scores of innocent animals suffered and died. Much of the operations was filled with uncertainty and a jostling for position between state and federal agencies, as to who had what authority. Several contingency plans existed but were not coordinated and integrated into a unified plan of action. There were a number of chains of command. In the first precious hours after the spill’ when decisive action could have mitigated disastrous consequences, command relationships that should have already been set up were still being negotiated.
One important decision was whether or not to use dispersants and, if so, where. Those who wanted to get the oil out of the water quickly tugged one way while those fearful of poisoning the ecology with another potential pollutant pulled in the other. Dispersant applications and in- situ burning of the oil were authorized on a test basis, but results were not convinc-
Some of these problems turned out to be real. Others, such as melding with a new administration and a budget crisis, did not materialize. Whatever the forecasts, a totally chance event, the Exxon Valdez grounding, overshadowed all others in 1989.
As the chief maritime regulator and enforcer of the Clean Water Act, the Coast Guard was an integral part of the salmon fishing season in Prince William Sound was canceled as were cruise ship bookings. A national heritage for environmentalists became a watery dustbin. And as officials of state and federal government agencies first fiddled and then set about a task that could not be satisfactorily executed, public anger turned to outrage.
The critical initial stage of the cleanup
ing enough for full-scale operations- These false starts did bum a precious commodity—time. For maximum effectiveness both techniques need to be used early on in a spill.
There was also the question of which areas the cleanup crews should tackle first. A simple question, it would seerm but ecological, economic, and other interests vying for scarce cleanup resources
As the devastation of the Exxon Valdez oil spill began to penetrate the psyehe of the United States, the Coast Guard arrived (left) to begin its major role in the cleanup. Vice President Dan Quayle visited the area with Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Yost (lower left), and Vice Admiral Clyde Robbins (lower right) was the federal on-scene coordinator for the cleanup.
flayed decision making. Frequently eanup forces waited for authorization t< j*ct while consultations and bureaucrati °n8 wars were waged within the multi ?8ency Regional Response Team (RRT) ‘le nearly two dozen interests repre Sented on the RRT debated these am s,milar questions as they attempted ti rcach a consensus in an ever-changinj °Pcrational environment. The early frui
of this search for common ground was a continuously widening spread of the oil plume. Then mother nature stepped in, replacing the week of good weather immediately following the spill with Alaska’s more traditional clime. The oil spread as if whipped by a sorcerer’s apprentice, eventually covering more than 3,500 square miles of open water and 350 miles of coastline.
Finger-pointing nourished; past state and federal budget cuts and all manner of limp excuses were used to shuck blame for what was patently obvious. Those responsible for insuring the safe operation of the Exxon Valdez and for the subsequent containment and cleanup of the spill had failed. The media portrayed a nation duped by a cartel composed of an indolent, diffident state and federal bu-
reaucracy and rapacious big business. Important results of the spill include a violent public backlash, an almost punitive oil spill legislative package, and, most interestingly, the injection of new vitality in the U.S. environmental movement. The Coast Guard too was taken to task for a host of alleged inadequacies, including one most punishing charge— that it had established a revolving door relationship between the regulator and the industry being regulated.
For weeks, high federal officials shuttled back and forth between Washington and Alaska. Statements that everyone was doing all that was humanly possible, while true, were terribly out of balance with the lack of effectiveness of some cleanup operations and the persistent plight of the victims. The good that was done (particularly a truly massive and comprehensive $1.9 billion cleanup effort by Exxon) was noted, but mistakes were put under a microscope. Eventually, operations were put under the direct control of the Pacific Area Commander and a phalanx of resources dispatched to assist in and manage the cleanup. Although inaccurate, a national image of the Coast Guard emerged that was quite different from the traditional one of professional, humanitarian, operationally oriented, risk-taking life savers.
Program Statistics and Highlights
Table 1 Search and Rescue |
|
Operational Activity | Fiscal Year 1989 |
Total SAR cases | 62,630 |
Lives saved | 4,560 |
Persons assisted | 125,260 |
Property saved | $1,140,000,000 |
Property assisted | $2,442,600,000 |
Table 2 Aids to Navigation |
|
Operational Activity | Fiscal Year 1989 |
Floating aids | 14,771 |
Fixed aids | 22,586 |
Private aids authorized | 44,600 |
Vessel traffic service transits | 478,082 |
Table 3 Marine Inspection and Licensing | |
Operational Activity | Fiscal Year 1989 |
New construction | 300 |
U.S. vessels inspected | 31,646 |
Foreign vessels examined | 7,770 |
Marine investigations | 9,300 |
Marine licensing transactions | 40,000 |
Seaman’s document transactions | 30,000 |
Table 4 Recreational Boating Safety |
|
Operational Activity | Fiscal Year 1989 |
Factory visits/inspections | 1.500 |
Boat defect campaigns | 170 |
Persons enrolled in Auxiliary boating education courses | 350,000 |
Auxiliary Courtesy Marine Examinations | 300,000 |
One of the most important strengths of the Coast Guard is the multimission nature of its men and women and the ships, planes, and boats they operate. One day they will be breaking ice, the next setting buoys, the next searching for an overdue boat, and the next on patrol enforcing the laws of the nation. The fruits of this labor at various times have been measured in terms of costs versus benefits to the public. The Coast Guard pays back much more than it receives in appropriations although arguably much of what it accomplishes and represents cannot be put in a ledger. A sample of the normal operations Coast Guardsmen discharged during a year is provided in the workload statistics that follow. Policy issues were selected to provide an overview of the activities of both operational and staff personnel.
Search and Rescue: The search-and- rescue (SAR) operations, policy, and/or program issues listed illustrate some typical events.
► A typical example of the danger to personnel and diversity of the resources and expertise needed to prosecute SAR cases successfully is demonstrated by the response to the distress call of the tug Sea
Robin. The buoy tender Cowslip (WLB- 277) responded to the burning 99-foot tug in Thimble Shoals Channel. The tender put a rescue-and-assistance (R & A) team on board, evacuated the tug’s crew, and took the stricken vessel and her 300-foot empty barge in tow to clear the channel. Unfortunately, the fire quickly raged out of control, and the R & A team had to be recalled. Additional assistance from Coast Guard Station Little Creek and Marine Safety Office (MSO) Hampton Roads was requested, and they responded with several 41-foot utility boats. While these fought the fire, the patrol craft Point Arena (WPB-82346) provided additional pumps and directed traffic. Reserve Training Center Yorktown was directed to send additional utility boats to the scene. Extra fire-fighting equipment was needed, and Air Station Elizabeth City responded with three more pumps.
The Cowslip's R & A team and MSO Hampton Roads technical personnel were ! able to reboard the tug and fought the fire for the better part of the afternoon. They ! finally extinguished the blaze, and when the fire area had cooled so that reflash was not a danger, the tug was towed to Norfolk. Four Coast Guardsmen were overcome by heat and smoke during the incident and were evacuated to a local hospital for treatment.
► Some SAR operations do not have happy endings. One example is the case of the Angara. The Zima reported coming across the overturned hull of the 42-foot Angara in Shelikof Strait, north of KO' ' diak, Alaska. Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak aircraft, a C-130 and two H-3 i helicopters, dispatched to the scene in beastly weather. The Zima had discovered the body of one of the crew members, and the Coast Guard transferred the |
body to the H-3 in 60-knot winds and 12- f°°t seas. The buoy tender Sweetbriar (WLB-405) arrived on scene and joined ln the search for the other missing person. A dive team searched the inside of the bull but this and the surface search effort during the next three days proved fruit- ess. The search was suspended a day atCr pending further developments.
, Aids to Navigation: The work of the "Black Fleet” is never easy, always dangerous, and sometimes tragic. So it was ''uth a proud buoy tender, the seagoing buoy tender Mesquite (WLB-305). The balf century of service to her country aPpears to be over. She grounded while forking a buoy at night in Lake Superior.
hands had to abandon ship in early December 1989. Efforts to free her Proved fruitless. The iced-up hulk with a disintegrated bottom and battered topside sPent the winter off Keweenaw PeninSula, Michigan. After the long, hard win- jer, there is little hope that enough will be ett of her to save.
Marine Inspection and Licensing: The 55-foot U.S. freighter Alec Owen Mait- and reported herself aground on the Key ~argo Marine Sanctuary near the Carys- •°ne Reef Light. The 8,000 gallons of Uel she contained posed a serious threat lo the fragile tropical reef environment. While spill prevention measures were put ■nto place, the mate on watch was given a
On 14 August, a Coast Guard H-3 rescued two people from a capsized boat off Clearwater, Florida. In Maine, the Coast Guard Auxiliary performed a courtesy marine examination on President George Bush’s boat Fidelity.
blood test. It revealed a . 11 alcohol level. Both the master and mate on watch were subsequently charged, and the mate, wanted for alleged crimes in Louisiana, was held pending extradition procedures.
Recreational Boating Safety: Tragedy
struck the ranks of Coast Guard Auxiliary aviation in 1989. While under orders on a training mission, the auxiliary’s Piper Cherokee crashed north of Meigs Field, Chicago. Two of the three crewmen were killed, and the third was seriously injured.
Marine Environment Readiness: This was not a good year for the environment. In addition to the Exxon Valdez, a partial list of oil spills is provided that occupied the attention of various Marine Safety Offices around the country:
- Hess Oil Facility, St Croix, Virgin Islands (Crude Oil): 4,200 gallons.
- Barge, Morania, Hell Gate, New York City (Gas): 108,000 gallons.
- Presidente Rivera, Delaware Bay (#6 Fuel Oil): 300,000 gallons.
- Oil Prodigy, Newport, Rhode Island (#2 Fuel Oil): 420,000 gallons.
- Coastal 2514,-Houston, Texas (Slurry Oil): 252,000 gallons.
- Barge Exxon Kentucky, Tensas, Louisiana (Barge rammed, Gas): 22,260 gallons.
- Super America, Ohio River (Gas): 40,000 gallons.
- Bahia Paraiso, Palmer Station, Antarctica (Diesel): 250,000 gallons.
- Nestucca, Grays Harbor, Washington (Bunker C): 250,000 gallons.
- Aoyagi Maru, Akun Island, Alaska (Bunker C): 104,000 gallons.
Table 5 Marine Environment Readiness |
|
Operational Activity | Fiscal Year 1989 |
Oil pollution reports received | 9,000 |
Oil investigations | 8,100 |
Oil cleanups monitored | 1,900 |
Oil cleanups supervised | 200 |
Chemical pollution reports received | 1,300 |
Chemical investigations | 1,200 |
Chemical cleanups monitored | 200 |
Chemical cleanups supervised | 50 |
Table 6 Port Safety and Security |
|
Operational Activity | Fiscal Year 1989 |
Transfer operations monitored | 4,773 |
Waterfront facilities inspected | 2,916 |
Harbor patrols | 19,231 |
Maritime pollution facilities inspected | 776 |
Mobilization exercises | 98 |
Special interest vessel boarding | 1,802 |
Safety zone patrols | 761 |
Security zone patrols | 141 |
Table 7 Enforcement of Laws and Treaties | |
Operational Activity | Fiscal Year 1989 |
Drugs cutter operating hours | 158,047 |
Drugs, aircraft operating hours | 28,749 |
Drug vessels seized | 152 |
Tons of marijuana seized | 156 |
Pounds of cocaine seized | 15,863 |
Fish, cutter operating hours | 51,744 |
Fish, aircraft operating hours | 7,031 |
Migrants interdicted | 4,923 |
Table 8 Ice Operations |
|
Operational Activity | Fiscal Year 1989 |
Polar deployment days | 346 |
Domestic cutter operating hours | 5,246 |
Domestic aircraft operating hours | 75 |
Vessels assisted | 275 |
International ice patrol aircraft hours | 524 |
Port Safety and Security: The security of our harbors and ports is a complex business made more so by the sensitive international ramifications that can occur during requests for asylum, stowaway situations, and other such incidents. The harbor tug Hawser (WYTL-65610) responded to an unusual call for assistance from the Panamanian bulk carrier Captain Akis, anchored in New York Harbor. The Akis reported that five stowaways had been discovered. They were armed and threatening the crew. The Hawser put an armed boarding party aboard the Akis. They quickly disarmed two of the stowaways who had knives and handcuffed the three others. After consultation with the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the stowaways were removed to the Hawser and detained awaiting the arrival of INS officers. The detainees subsequently were turned over to the INS.
Enforcement of Laws and Treaties: Informed observers understood that promulgating a new national drug control strategy would be difficult. Into an already competitive and complex arena (that had reaped richly deserved criticism for interagency rivalry) stepped a Drug Czar and a poorly thought out operational role for DoD. A national policy was delivered in September 1989, but not without a further Balkanization of drug interdiction—particularly air interdiction. Roles of the players have been written in terms of detection, sorting, monitoring, tracking, interception and apprehension, etc. These would seem to be clear and simple concepts. Actually, the interpretation of what each agency will or will not do, how much money and manpower each will contribute, how and what information will be shared, and the half-a- hundred other details that must be agreed to if the complex mission of air interdiction is to work efficiently, are not universally accepted or adequately supported.
Instead, the national policy has created even more layers of bureaucracy (e.g., a Joint Task Force was created to accommodate the new players and new relationships but only for segments of the mission). The first operational initiative of this new organization was to be a massive air interdiction effort off the Colombian coast with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier as the centerpiece. Unfortunately, it was scrapped. Why? DoD blames the Department of State (DoS). Yet State points the finger somewhere else and cite poor coordination. But the bottom line is that now that DoD has entered the drug war nothing seems to have changed. A number of rivals remain in the Caribbean. Operational personnel are forced through excruciatingly complex chains of command where anyone has the right to stop or slow operations. A result is the continued widespread availability of cheap cocaine. This is at least partly the result of Congress mandating additional layers of new players between the chief operational commander, the Seventh Coast Guard District, and his legitimate tasking. In this operational menagerie, the wonder is that any air interdiction takes place at all.
► Some drug seizures are the exception to the rule, the proverbial “piece of cake.” On 19 March 1989, a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDet) boarding team, embarked on the oiler USS Platte (AO-186), located almost 60,000 pounds of marijuana on the merchant vessel Esso Bonnaire III. The Platte stopped the Bonnaire approximately 55 miles east of Great Abaco Is-
lands, Bahamas, and asked to consensually board the vessel. The master, claim- lng Honduran registry, consented. When lhe boarding party arrived, the master stated that he had marijuana on board in the fuel cargo tank, midships. The 75- Pound bales tested positive for TCP and the PD-27 process initiated. The govem- ftent of Honduras authorized the enforce- ttent of U.S. law and the Platte’s LEDet seized the vessel and arrested the ten-man crew. The patrol craft Point Barnes (WPB-82371) soon rendezvoused with the Platte, assuming escort of the Esso Bonaire III to Miami, and the Platte continued her patrol.
- The more customary seizure relies on t°ughmindedness and dogged hard work. Such was the case with the Panamanian coastal freighter Barlovento. The Shearwater (WSES-3) conducted a consensual hoarding of the 160-foot freighter 180 u>iles southwest of Key West, Florida. Results were negative, but the Coast Guard had reason to believe that the Bar- ‘°vento was not clean. A PD-27 conference was initiated, and a Statement of No Objection issued to escort the Barlovento to Key West to offload the vessel and investigate further. After eight hours of backbreaking work offloading a cargo of 200 tons of cement, almost two tons of c°caine was found in a hidden compartment of the freighter’s double hull. The Vessel was seized, and the crew arrested.
- b' keeping with Coast Guard tradition, fhe service responded to unusual tasking ln an outstanding manner. A major crop Cradication and interdiction initiative was needed to dampen coca production (precursor chemicals, coca leaf, and processed cocaine) in the remote Andean growing regions of Bolivia. The area of operations is some of the most isolated and treacherous in the hemisphere. Operational traffic to and from the growing areas in the high Andes had to be achieved using helicopters and taking small boats up dangerous mountain rivers. When DoS looked for support, the Coast Guard’s expertise in small boat operations and drug interdiction was a perfect match to run a Riverine Task Force of Drug Enforcement Administration, Coast Guard, Bolivian Navy, and National Rural Antinarcotics Police forces.
Forward operating bases were established for two- to three-week periods, from which units deployed up-country in 25-foot Boston Whalers, hard-bottom boats. These forces took the battle to the enemy as never before. The key to success was mobility and flexibility and the ability of personnel to adapt quickly to changing situations. The units quickly learned that movement solely by boat along the river was only partially effective, and the element of surprise was added by shifting to an air-mobile concept. Inflatable boats were slung beneath helicopters and launched a few miles from suspected lab sites. Squad-sized forces made quick silent thrusts and then quickly moved to the next lab site or back to the site of larger hard-bottomed boats. These operations have been successful in an area where traffickers previously con-
On 9-11 September, the Coast Guard seized the 236-foot freighter Nerma, 2,712 pounds of cocaine, and 17 people—one of whom is being escorted off the Coast Guard patrol boat Maui (WPB-1304).
ducted business with impunity. They made the largest Bolivian cocaine seizure ever (3,000 pounds), destroying 14 laboratories and interdicting thousands of gallons of processing chemicals. For the first time, Bolivian forces arrested traffickers in this remote area of their country.
- Alien interdiction operations continued at a rapid pace. Two new disturbing elements emerged in 1989. They are disturbing not only for the additional unprogrammed workloads they represent; illegal migrant immigration is a barometer of socioeconomic conditions within various countries. Interdiction numbers for the Dominican Republic west-to-east migration into Puerto Rico more than doubled. Worse still, the northward immigration of Cubans increased seven-fold from the previous year.
- On 16 March 1989, a Coast Guard Air Station Miami HU-25A located the 50- foot Haitian vessel Dieu Si Bon, 30 miles north of Cayo Santa Maria, Cuba. During the same patrol, the aircraft discovered an unnamed 30-foot Haitian sailing vessel nearby. The aircraft vectored the Petrel (WSES-4) to the scene. The Coast Guard crew boarded the Dieu Si Bon and located 155 economic migrants on board. Offloaded onto the Petrel for safety, the other vessel still needed to be boarded. The patrol craft Cape York (WPB-95332) was diverted and the following day located 136 economic migrants on board the tiny boat. INS agents were flown to the scene to interview the refugees. The Coast Guard cutter Escape (WMEC-6) diverted to the scene, relieved the two patrol boats of 291 migrants, and repatriated them to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 19 March 1989.
Ice Operations: Nineteen eighty eight was the nadir of the Polar Ice Operations Program. Yet as the operational data shows, a new low was achieved in 1989. Program output as measured by shipdays declined 15%. All the news is not bad, however; the service has received $244 million for a replacement ship. Unfortunately, the money comes from DoD appropriations, which brings its own set of problems. Who is responsible for program management, execution of construction, obligation of funds, and similar rice bowl issues pose a threat to the timely execution of the project. Furthermore, Congress is still waiting (the original joint study began in 1983) for a definitive administration position on the nation’s icebreaking program.
Defense Readiness: Although no actual workload data were provided in the Coast Guard budget estimates, it was active in the defense readiness arena with various drills and exercises.
International Affairs: While no workload data were provided in the Coast Guard’s budget, it continued providing training to foreign nationals in areas of special expertise (i.e., maritime law enforcement, SAR, port security, seamanship, and fisheries enforcement). The training is conducted in the host country (mostly developing nations) by mobile training teams composed of four to five Coast Guardsmen.
The Budget
The 1990 Coast Guard budget, which was built in 1989, reflects continued emphasis on the Maritime Law Enforcement Program, especially drug interdiction, with some movement to improve program performance in marine environmental protection. Like all budgets, it had good and bad news. The good news was the total dollars appropriated— $3,234 billion. The Acquisition Construction and Improvements Appropriation (AC&I) total was $444.2 million. An additional $300-plus million appropriated from DoD hardware accounts is a boon for an operational agency that lives on its ability to acquire the platforms to do its jobs. The money will be used to purchase the following:
Aircraft: $204.2 million
- HH-60s ($132 million)
- HU-25 spare parts and engine improvements
- HH-65 engine improvements and spares
- HC-130 prototype radar installation (APS-125 rotordome AEW proof of concept radar)
Vessel: $376.7 million (does not include DoD funds)
- Replacement polar icebreaker ($244 million, DoD funded)
- High-endurance cutter (HEC) FRAM ($97 million)
- HEC weapons modernization
- Buoy tender replacements, service life extensions
- Cutter, motor lifeboat, and barge replacements.
- Twelve 110-foot patrol boats ($84 million, DoD funded)
Shore Facilities and Aids to Navigation: $71.1 million
- Public family quarters ($10 million)
- Construct and repair stations in Cape May, New Jersey; Florida; North Carolina; and Michigan
- Replacement of the clinic at Elizabeth City, North Carolina
- Improvement of the Vessel Traffic Service in Puget Sound
- $15.9 million for command, control, communications, and intelligence related items
The operating expenses (OE) appropriation is set at $2,245.3 billion. Here there is some bad news. Paltry sums are provided to increase program performance. Out of an appropriation of more than $2 billion, the Increase/Restore Operational Capability budget category provides $21.8 million, precisely .0097%.
The Future: Some Major Policy Issues
The year 1989 closes out the decade. A new commandant will begin his term in 1990. The time is ripe for a clear strategic vision to be devised for the needs of the 1990s. i
The 1980s saw the service adapt to new conditions, but its major program and organizational alterations were just as much a reaction to outside forces as to charting new courses on its own. For example, major new maritime drug responsibilities, the real operational hallmark for the Coast Guard during the decade, were not missions the service actively j sought. Early on, they were viewed as putting too many eggs in one basket. Some apprehensive policymakers worried about what would happen if multi-
Table 9 | U.S. Coast Guard Budget Data [$ in | Millions] |
| |
Appropriation | FY 1989 | FY 1990 (Enacted) | Change 1989-90 | % Change 1989-90 |
Operating Expense $ | 2,122.4 | 2,210.3 | 87.9 | 0.041 |
Personnel (Mil) | 36,836 | 37,260 | 424 | 0.012 |
(Civ) | 4,472 | 4,618 | 146 | 0.033 |
Acquisition, Construction, and Improvement $ 435.8 | 444.2 | 8.4 | 0.019 | |
Personnel (Mil) | 327 | 359 | 32 | 0.098 |
(Civ) | 195 | 227 | 32 | 0.164 |
Reserve Training $ | 67 | 71.6 | 4.6 | 0.069 |
Personnel (Mil) | 599 | 599 | 0 | 0.000 |
(Civ) | 106 | 106 | 0 | 0.000 |
R & D $ | 18.8 | 20.5 | 1.7 |
|
Personnel (Mil) | 42 | 42 | 0 | 0.000 |
(Civ) | 65 | 70 | 5 | 0.077 |
All Others $ | 460.1 | 458.8 | -1.3 | -0.003 |
Personnel (Mil) | 24 | 24 | 0 | 0.000 |
(Civ) | 608 | 632 | 24 | 0.039 |
Total $s | 3,104.1 | 3,205.4 | 101.3 | 0.033 |
Personnel (Mil) | 37,828 | 38,284 | 456 | 0.012 |
(Civ) | 5,446 | 5,653 | 207 | 0.038 |
From DoD Appropriations: $244.0M for icebreaker replacement. $84M for 110-foot patrol boat procurement. |
|
mission ships and aircraft (justified mainly for drug interdiction) lost this mission. Afraid to be caught out on what was perceived to be a programmatic limb, the opportunity to carve out a dominant role in maritime interdiction was not a conscious philosophy that drove strategy. Initiative in this direction was stifled with a policy posture that contended there were more than enough boats for all to interdict. Thus there was no need to put the Coast Guard into a position where it would find itself in a potential adversarial role with other agencies. For a long time, the Coast Guard inexplicably avoided the air interdiction mission. By default, for years, the role went exclusively to a civilian agency with a general jurisdiction of only 12 miles offshore that had to start from ground zero to build an air force. In the mid-
One Law Enforcement Operation
Leaving San Francisco Bay on 6 July 1989, most of the officers and crew of the USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC- 722) believed they were departing on another long, cold Alaskan patrol. The men and women on board the 378- foot cutter, however, were to begin a law enforcement operation that would take them across the entire Pacific Ocean to the coast of Taiwan, concluding with a well- deserved rest and resupply port call in Yokosuka, Japan.
As the Morgenthau sailed west instead of north, the captain outlined the new mission. A Taiwanese fishing fleet would be transferring 500 tons of illegally caught salmon, worth one and a half million dollars, to a U.S. cargo ship, the Redfin, at a rendezvous point several thousand miles west of San Francisco. Part of a bigger sting operation stretching across the Pacific to Seattle, two National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) agents were undercover on board the Redfin to catch the lawbreaking Taiwanese fishermen. Posing as fish buyers, other NMFS agents enticed the kingpin of the illegal salmon trafficking, a Taiwanese businessman who had been advertising and selling salmon worldwide, to Seattle to pick up the cash when the deal was consummated. Fishing for or retaining salmon is illegal for the Taiwanese.
The Morgenthau % part in this caper was to travel undetected to the rendezvous point where she would ensure the safety of the NMFS agents once they made their arrests. The Morgenthau's crew would then board and detain the Taiwanese fishing vessels involved in the illegal activity. Keeping the large, white cutter, with her bright red-and- blue stripes, out of sight was not going to be easy. More than 500 driftnetters were fishing in the region. Whenever fishermen see a cutter, they often radio a warning to others that the Coast Guard is in the area. If they sighted the Morgenthau, the mission would fail.
For 11 days and nights, the cutter steamed under darkened ship, maintaining strict radio silence. Based on intelligence estimates, the Morgenthau traveled well south of the fishing areas, resulting in a trip of more than 3,600 miles. Each day, the officers and crew trained for the final phase of the operation. Using International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) and Secure Telephone Unit III, the cutter maintained constant communications with the Pacific Area Operational Commander, who was in continual contact with NMFS Seattle.
After a tense night of ducking numerous fishing vessels, the Morgenthau stopped on 17 July and drifted only 25 miles south of the rendezvous point. The cutter waited at the edge of the fishing fleet for the NMFS agents to make their simultaneous arrests on the high seas and in Seattle. That morning, the weather cooperated with reduced visibility and heavy fog. The Morgenthau remained in her stealth mode, staying outside radar range and employing electronic surveillance measures (ESM) and direction-finding equipment. Pilots flew the deployed Coast Guard
HH-65 helicopter covertly and identified three radar contacts within 12 miles of the proposed rendezvous point. This turned out to be the helo’s last flight as it experienced a major engine casualty upon landing that grounded it for the remainder of the operation. At this point, the cutter had not received a firm position on the Redfin in four days, and no one could positively say the cargo vessel was one of the contacts. Based on last known position and intentions, however, the evidence pointed to one of these three.
At first, it appeared the bust would go down much sooner than planned, but hopes quickly faded as the set-up got back on track. Another night of waiting went by.
On 1 August, a joint U.S. Coast Guard and Taiwanese law enforcement boarding of the Taiwanese Fishing vessel No. I Sung Citing uncovered 100 tons of illegally caught salmon. The Coast Guard cutter Morgenthau (WHEC-722) traveled 6,500 miles during this law enforcement operation.
Early the next morning, a Coast Guard C-130 out of Hawaii, staged in Midway, took off to be on scene at first light to videotape the event. It was already airborne when another call came through about additional delays. A gamble was taken to recall the C-130, refuel, and send it back. Hopefully, it would arrive on scene at the right time if the bust went down later that afternoon. With the C-130’s return on deck, the pilot was briefed on the details of the operation, learning the C-130 was to substitute for the helicopter as the covert surveillance platform. Coordination was arranged between the aircraft and the cutter.
As money negotiations unfolded many miles away in Seattle, fishing vessels loaded with salmon came alongside
•980s, the Coast Guard was forced to Play what has turned out to be a remarkably successful game of catch up.
■n the same vein, the Coast Guard did n°t actively seek responsibilities for the "iterdiction of migrants. It has turned out to be one of the most successful of federal programs, saving the lives of thousands of the hemisphere’s poor each year and avoiding costs for illegal immigrant support counted in the billions of dollars. Happily for the nation, this retiring policy posture in law enforcement was replaced by one that sought opportunities to keep the Coast Guard out in front of this major mission.
When the Coast Guard did try to set a new course, it seemed to follow an errant compass. The reorganization of the service and introduction of area commanders as meaningful, realtime operational
. By Captain Fred Ames, U.S. Coast Guard, and Ensign Pete Hatch, U.S. Coast Guard
*he Reclfin, and samples were inspected. After more than 30 hours of anticipation, an INMARSAT call came early that afternoon to stand by. All morning, the Morgenihau slowly worked closer to the rendezvous point, localizing the position of the Reclfin by ESM, using what they assumed was the cargo vessel’s radar emission signature.
Just prior to receiving the standby call, the Morgenthau obtained her own radar contact at 12 miles, and it correlated with the ESM contact. Normally, Taiwanese fishing Vessels (100-150 feet in length) are detected at only eight 0r nine miles. The larger Reclfin (180 feet), with possible Vessels nested alongside, was expected to be seen from •arther away than ten miles.
While waiting for the final call to move in, we noted a high-speed radar contact. The C-130 had arrived! Cov- f%, the C-130 marked on top of our radar contact as a group” of vessels. With the captain ordering radio silence broken at the last minute, the C-130 pilot was ques- honed as to exactly what he observed. “Definitely a few Wssels nested together," he replied. The Morgenthau now knew exactly where to pounce. With visibility less than Slx miles, anything less than a pinpoint location would t-'ause a complete mission failure, jeopardizing the lives of the undercover agents.
Rnally, the INMARSAT call came from Pacific Area: The Taiwanese businessman and an accomplice were ar- t^sted just moments ago in a Seattle bank vault with their hands on the money—go do it!”
The Morgenthau had had her gas turbines on line since •he standby call. She quickly accelerated to Hank speed aild charged through the fog. As she closed rapidly at utmost one-half mile per minute, the undercover agents Ufrested a Taiwanese captain, a “deal maker” from another vessel, and one interpreter, who were all on board •he Reclfin. At about six miles, the Morgentliau's lookout r°Ported the the Reclfin's blue hull and white superstructure. Two Taiwanese vessels were within 100 yards of the US. ship, probably trying to figure out how to get their People back. The C-130 passed 200 feet above the vessels to begin videotaping, taking the Taiwanese completely by SUrprise. Abandoning their people, the two vessels began
flee, and the remainder of the fleet scattered. A board- 'n8 team from the Morgenthau soon arrived at the Reclfin. k*nce aboard, they provided protection for the NMFS ugents and helped guard the prisoners. The time from the cull to go in, until the cutter’s small boat and boarding Party were in the water en route to the Reclfin, was just 29 Minutes.
With the boarding team in control of the Redfin, she motored after one escaping vessel while the Morgenthau chased down another, the No. 1 Sung Citing. For several days, the Morgenthau and the Redfin pursued the fishermen who sailed with their running lights extinguished ^hile changing course erratically in the darkness. One
fleeing vessel deliberately struck the Redfin and threw nets into her path. Down to minimal food supplies, running low on fuel, and pressed to get the arrestees arraigned in a U.S. court, the Reclfin was forced to break off the chase. The Morgenthau, however, continued while the State Department attempted to persuade the Taiwanese government to allow the Coast Guard to board the tleeing vessel.
After days of political discussions with U.S. officials and a message from Secretary James Baker as the Morgenthau approached its coast, the Taiwanese government finally agreed to a joint U.S. Coast Guard and Taiwanese law enforcement boarding of the fishing vessel. On 1 August, two weeks after the bust and 3,300 miles later, four holds full of about 100 tons of illegally caught salmon were videotaped on board the Taiwanese fishing vessel. Taiwanese law enforcement officials then took the fisherman and their ship into custody.
The cutter was now 40 miles off the coast of Taiwan and more than 5,600 miles from her home in the San Francisco Bay area. During the 26-day operation, the Morgenthau had depleted many of its supplies. More importantly, fuel was getting low, and she was riding high in the water. Being lightly loaded in the middle of the typhoon capital of the world is not a desirable situation. The Morgenthau arranged a last-minute underway replenishment with a U.S. Navy oiler.
Before heading to Alaska to resume the enforcement of U.S. fisheries laws, the cutter headed toward Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan, to resupply. With a large typhoon closing from the south, the Morgenihau sprinted for two days on gas turbines, arriving safely. Without delay, personnel began preparing the ship for the oncoming typhoon as Naval Forces, Japan, set their highest typhoon alert. After 36 hours, the sun came out, and the Morgentliau's, men and women received a well-earned three-day rest.
During the operation, the Morgenthau had traveled more than 6,500 miles in the third case in almost as many months, of discovering the Taiwanese illegally taking salmon. As stated by the Coast Guard Pacific Area Commander, “It is easy to discuss tactics of coordination and deception around a conference table. It is quite another thing to put them into practice thousands of miles at sea.” The high seas driltnet fishing agreement was subsequently signed with Taiwan on 24 August 1989.
Captain Ames is currently commanding officer of the USCGC Munro (WHEC-724), recently recommissioned after an extensive Fleet Renovation and Modernization (FRAM). Simultaneously, he decommissioned the Morgenthau for her FRAM. He has served nine years on 378-foot high-endurance cutters.
Ensign Hatch graduated from the Coast Guard Academy in May 1989. He has served as a deck watch officer on the cutters Morgenthau and Munro.
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commanders has not demonstrated perceptible improvement in operational performance. The initiative has assumed the quality of a cure in search of a disease, and in important areas, such as the new maintenance and logistics infrastructure, severe strains are evident. Unfortunately, in many critical areas, the Coast Guard is moving into the 1990s with the support infrastructure of the 1970s. This is partly the result of the service not having a clear view of itself in the long term.
Defense readiness is a prime example of the difficulties the service faces in understanding itself and articulating this to the people and Congress so that it can position itself to effectively serve its constituents in the new decade. The program presents a fundamental paradox. Absolutely essential to the Coast Guard because it provides a military command, control, and communications structure for effective decision making, operational execution, and discipline, it does not possess the same quality in terms of the security (in defense terms) of the nation. (Total budget authority for all program activity costed to defense readiness is $128 million. DoD’s is more than $300 billion.)
A perhaps inadvertent, but telling demonstration of this program’s real importance is the attention it is paid in the budget. It is given one paragraph in the Program and Performance portion of the Coast Guard’s 1991 budget:
“The Coast Guard operates as a service in the Navy upon declaration of war or during times of national emergency at the direction of the President. During peacetime, the Coast Guard maintains an effective state of military preparedness through individual and unit training, through joint naval training exercises, and through Coast Guard single and multiship operations.”
No operational data are provided to catalog achievements to the Congress and the people. There is no list of necessities this program will provide to the national defense for 1991 and beyond—no threat thwarted, current or future. And this is the program that the service has touted to be one of the most important of its programs. Yet in the recent past the mission has been championed as the way for officers to get ahead. A specific rating category was added to Officer Evaluation Reports. New buzzwords like LIC (low- intensity conflict) and old buzzwords like MDZ (Maritime Defense Zone) are used to flog what reason should identify as a programmatic “dead horse.” As we start the decade one needs to wonder about the wisdom of the continued emphasis of this program internally, in such close proximity to the breakout of peace in Eastern Europe and imminent declaration of a “peace dividend” at home.
The budget speaks with silent eloquence of where the real future of the Coast Guard lies. Initiatives that attempt to acquire roles and resources by hyperbolic rhetoric on the importance of the military missions of the service are sure to run into difficulty. First, in the era of perestroika, DoD can be counted upon to ferret out every mission, defense or otherwise (e.g., defense planners now view drug interdiction much more favorably than they did just a short time ago), that offers the opportunity to provide flight hours, ship days, manpower, and dollars. Secondly, Congress has not signaled its need or desire for a Coast Guard that provides national security defense as an important fraction of its functions. Instead, the sharp rebuff in 1988 on using Coast Guard assets in the Persian Gulf was persuasive testimony of what the Congress really wants from the Coast Guard. Future program opportunity lies somewhere else, such as in joining with President George Bush who declares himself as an environmentalist.
The newly created Strategic Planning Council of the Coast Guard seems to be one of its best-guarded secrets. Yet it is in strategic planning that the service needs to be the most discerning and honest with itself. To succeed in the new decade and gain a position for growth in the new century, the Coast Guard should be practical enough to see itself in terms of what the country wants and needs from it, not hoW it has defined itself in the past. The Coast Guard’s best role is as a small, widely dispersed, low-tech, multimission, humanitarian, military organization with most of its responsibility residing outside the defense arena. The military character of the service is essential to effective operational performance, but in the total defense arena, its contribution to the security of the nation is small.
A new Commandant will have to articulate his vision of the Coast Guard’s contribution to the health, strength, and security of the nation for the long term. He will have to signal the real program arena the service will emphasize—military or traditional maritime safety. He will accomplish this by designing policies that look at least as far as into the new century. The first State of the Coast Guard address should provide this.
Captain Duca is retired from the Coast Guard and is a past contributor to the Proceedings.