This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
U q lail*ar to those being developed for repl ' ‘filters. This suggests that the A-6 capai!''ljnicnt should have a self-escort ment ‘>!ty anc^or that the F-14 replace- wea.LS °u^ he capable of providing all- Thjs6r escort for the A-6 replacement. altituc|mplies comPat'hle cruise speeds, as anes’ anh radius capabilities, as well for fj aPProPriate radar (or other system) father ^ & ra(^ar escort station in adverse
win b "!S° Pr°hable that AEW systems TheseC “evdoped for the Soviet Navy. ship_b S^stems could be either land- or terns I?' ®'s possible that both sys- the ne '. he developed.) This suggests roissiig6 uf°r an a>r-to-air antiradiation enemy ap cou^ he employed against EW aircraft, jamming aircraft, radiating aircraft of various types, including fighters on combat air patrol, and possibly against some radiating ship targets where the objective would be to knock out the enemy ship’s sensors rather than to heavily damage the ships.
► We need to develop compatible aircraft, missiles, and fire control systems that will allow multiple kills per aircraft in a forward quadrant missile exchange. In particular, we need high-speed missile and fighter radars with some form of electronic scan, to fully exploit multiple- target fire control and missile systems. Future fighter radar and fire control systems should be capable of providing a target count against clustered aircraft formations. (See the author’s “Dogfights of the Future” in the January 1984 Proceedings, pp. 100-104.)
In these days of budget deficits and budget cuts, launching and funding new developments will be problematic. However, it is time to set some new requirements—at least goals—for employing compatible systems in possible future fleet engagements.
Commander Weatherup, a 1940 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, served during World War II as a pilot in the Pacific. On 15 April 1945, while flying an F6F Hellcat from the aircraft carrier USS Independence (CVL-22), he engaged an enemy “George” fighter and sent it crashing to the ground. Its pilot was one of the Japanese Imperial Navy’s top flying aces: Ensign Shoichi Sugita, who was officially credited with downing more than 70 U. S. aircraft. Commander Weatherup retired from a major aerospace corporation as an operations analysis specialist.
S. Navy: Tactical Aircraft
frrian E°lmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet
Whijp
to 600 h he building of the U. S. fleet ^CacilineCP'0ya^e S^'PS has captured the rical aircS’significant are the tac- ric'a] ajrraPt Programs, especially the tac- carrjer ^raPt to % from the planned 15- "Pherg
®>e Cuare three important aspects of ent tactical aircraft buildup:
- The numbers are much higher than in the Carter Administration.
- Having been previously restricted to either/or choices, the sea services are now getting, essentially, their choice of tactical aircraft types.
- New models of several aircraft types are being procured.
Less clear, however, is what will happen with respect to the next generation of naval tactical aircraft—the planes that will fly from carriers in the year 2000 and beyond.
The Navy requires some 300 aircraft per year to build up to 14 carrier air wings, three Marine aircraft wings, and
Table 1 Naval Aircraft Procurement
81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86* | 87* | 88* | 89* | 90* | 91* |
30 | 30 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 18 | 15 | 12 | 18 | 24 | 36 |
60 | 63 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 120 | 132 | 132 | 163 | 163 |
12 | 12 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 18 | 24 | 24 |
— | 12 | 21 | 27 | 32 | 46 | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 |
6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
— | — | — | — | — | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | — |
6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
12 | 12 | 6 | 5 | 9 9? | 9 99 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
_ | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | _ | _ | _ | _ |
14 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 12 | — |
— | 18 | 27 | 21 | 24 | 18 | 17 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 12 |
— | — | — | — | — | Q | 7 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 12 |
_ | _ | _ | — | — |
| _ | _ | 18 | 42 | 58 |
94 | 94 | 114 | 29 | 61 | 41 | 9 | 12 | 24 | 39 | 48 |
234 | 285 | 325 | 227 | 290 | 298 | 271 | 278 | 323 | 403 | 422 |
**Cargo and trainer types.
127
other air units, to modernize the active and reserve forces, and to account for attrition. Table 1 lists aircraft procurement for the Navy and Marine Corps.
Before the Reagan Administration took office in January 1981, several alternative aircraft buys were being considered. The Navy was expecting a force of 18 F-14 Tomcat squadrons and six F/A-18 Hornet squadrons to provide the fighter components of 12 carrier air wings; no F-14s were being considered for the Naval Reserve. Under current Navy plans, the large carriers will each have two F-14 fighter squadrons; the older Midway (CV-41) and Coral Sea (CV-43) will have only F/A-18s in the fighter role so long as the carriers remain in first-line service. Also, two reserve fighter squadrons now have F-14s; the two squadrons flying F-4S Phantoms—the last Navy squadrons with that plane—recently began transition to F-14s.
Similarly, the debate over whether the Marine Corps would get F/A-18s or AV- 8Bs for the attack role has been resolved: the Marines are receiving both—the Hornet for their 12 fighter squadrons and the AV-8B Harrier-II for their eight attack squadrons (with five Marine attack squadrons flying the A-6E Intruder).
The F/A-18 is also being procured for active Navy A-7 light attack squadrons as well as some reserve squadrons. Two reserve attack squadrons are now receiving F/A-18s, with the four others trading their trouble-plagued A-7B Corsairs for A-7E models. Plans call for two of these squadrons to transition to “medium” attack squadrons—flying the A-6E—in 1989-90.
In the fiscal year 1986 budget there is funding for an austere, all-weather, two- seat version of the F/A-18. (The Navy has already bought a few two-seat F/A- 18A trainers.)
Thus, the Navy and Marine Corps are getting the “best” mix of tactical aircraft needed to support the Maritime Strategy.
Next, following several debates between various offices of the Defense Department and the Navy, the Navy is also buying advanced models of various tactical aircraft. For example, the current Grumman F-14A production line will give way to the long-delayed advanced Tomcat, the F-14D. When the F-14A first flew in December 1970, the intention was to produce only about 80 aircraft with the TF30 turbofan engine, then install an upgraded engine in the F-14B and provide improved avionics in the F-14C. But the B and C models were never produced.
Beginning with the fiscal year 1988 procurement, F-14Ds will emerge from the Grumman plant with F-110 engines,
128 new avionics, upgraded radar, and improved survivability features.
Similarly, the A-6E Intruder “medium’ ’ attack aircraft will be replaced on its Grumman line by the A-6F model, also starting with fiscal year 1988 aircraft. The A-6F will have F-404 engines (replacing J52 turbojets), a state-of-the- art, dual-mode radar, and enhanced avionics and survivability.
Also in the fighter-attack category, the Navy and Marine Corps are procuring two “non-naval” aircraft. The Navy has acquired 12 Israeli-built Kfir C.l fighters for adversary training; the Marine Corps willl fly another 13 Kfirs.[1] In U. S. service, these planes have the designation F-21 A. Later they will be replaced by 26 General Dynamics F-16N (the “N” for Navy) variants of the Fighting Falcon, the lightweight fighter flown by the U. S. Air Force and several allied nations.
There is a certain irony in the Navy’s buying F-16s. In the mid-1970s, the Air Force had a lightweight fighter “flyoff” between the YF-16 and the Northrop YF-17 prototypes. The former won the Air Force contest and Congress directed the Navy to buy the same plane for carrier use. Instead, the Navy selected the YF-
- and then so modified the plane that it was given another designation, the F/A-
- Thus, the Navy will be fulfilling the dictum of Congress, although the F-16Ns will not be carrier capable and will be purchased in small numbers.
One other new aircraft model to be bought in the near future is the P-3G Orion. Earlier models of the Orion, flown by all active and reserve Navy patrol squadrons, are built by Lockheed-Cali- fomia. Boeing and Grumman probably will compete with Lockheed for the P-3G contract under the Navy’s program for competition in weapon procurement.
Clarity is lacking with respect to the Navy’s next generation of tactical aircraft. Two types are being considered. The first is a fighter-type aircraft with a secondary role of attacking ships and point targets ashore. The second type would be a long-range/all-weather attack aircraft with a secondary mission of keeping station several hundred nautical miles from the carrier and launching antiair missiles (what used to be called the “missileer” concept). The latter type is being called the Advanced Technology Aircraft (ATA).
The Air Force has a program under way to develop an Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), and the services have been directed to coordinate their efforts. Nevertheless, when the requirements of carrier operation and logistics maintenance support are superimposed upon the
Development of the ^a'T.craft is Advanced Technology Al <■ just beginning. But ib>a8 „ in 1,16 what is to come can be ^
artists’ conceptions ofler .\ir
contractors competing 0' tjcal Force/Navy Advanced ta Fighter contract.
aircraft, the probability of a common Air Force/Navy aircraft will be small. The situation is similar to the TFX/F-111 joint fighter development effort of the 1960s and the YF-16/YF-17 fiasco mentioned previously. Modern-day joint Air Force/ Navy aircraft programs have worked only when the Air Force was forced to accept a naval aircraft—as with the F-4 Phantom and the A-7 Corsair.
Still, as directed, the Navy is working with the Air Force on the ATF program, with a potential Navy buy of 500 ATF variants to replace the F-14 and an Air Force buy of at least 750 aircraft to succeed the F-15 and F-16. Production would start in the 1990s, thus the ATF would be the last major U. S. combat aircraft developed in this century. The nearparallel ATA development would result in the procurement of perhaps 450 units to replace the A-6 aircraft.
More likely than joint aircraft production, the joint Air Force/Navy effort will result in the development of materials, avionics, displays, and other components—possibly including engines—for use by both services.
While these next-generation tactical naval aircraft will include stealth features, the degree to which they will be stealth aircraft is questionable. Obviously, certain features—modified shapes, composite materials, etc.—will be incorporated to reduce the possibility of detection by radar, infrared, and other sensors. However, a true stealth aircraft may require a shape now incompatible with carrier operations and could be very costly. While the Defense Department has not released cost data for the F-19 stealth fighter being developed by Lockheed and Northrop for the Air Force, Joseph F. Campbell, a defense industry analyst with Paine Webber, estimates that the Pentagon has spent $2.6 billion on the stealth fighter in the past four years and that it plans to spend $4.7 billion more in the next four years.* [2] Another problem with stealth is that aircraft carriers are highly visibile—in U. S. and foreign ports, and under constant surveillance by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft and satellites. Thus, stealth aircraft would be more easily “seen” on board U. S. Navy carriers than in hangars at remote U. S. and even overseas airfields.
In the category of rotary-wing aircraft, production of the 200 SH-60B Seahawk LAMPS-I11 (light airborne multipurpose system) ship-based antisubmarine warfare (ASW)/targeting helicopters is continuing. At the same time, production of the carrier-based SH-60F variant is starting up to replace the long-serving SH- 3D/H Sea King. About to end is the small procurement of SH-2F LAMPS-I helicopters. Other ongoing helicopter programs include the AH-1 Sea Cobra gun- ship for the Marine Corps, the VH-60 VIP version of the Army’s UH-60 Black Hawk transport flown by the Marine Corps, the UH-60A helicopter for the Naval Reserve combat search and rescue mission, the three-engine CH/MH-53E Super Stallion, and a number of training helicopters.
Described by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman as “one of the most innovative and exciting new aircraft development programs in the world,” the tilt- rotor V-22 Osprey will enter production in the fiscal year 1989 program. Initially, the MV-22 variant will replace the CH-46 and CH-53A/D in the Marine Corps assault role.
This agile aircraft, developed by a Bell-Boeing Vertol team, will also have competitive production lines. The Navy is considering the V-22 only for the search-and-rescue role; some in the Navy see a wider application for this aircraft, including the possible successor to the E-2C Hawkeye in the airborne early warning role and to the S-3 Viking in the ASW role. The Army and Air Force are also planning to employ this aircraft for various electronic, medical evacuation, and long-range special operations roles. Thus, a very large production run, probably by two firms, can be envisioned.
An ambitious naval aircraft procurement program has been mapped out for the next few years. The success of this program—like the planned ship programs—will depend upon many factors, most of them political and fiscal.[3] The aircraft programs also suffer from the large number of types purchased each year (14 in the fiscal year 1987 program) and the significantly higher numbers proposed for the out years. But the ambitious and audacious naval aircraft programs of the past few years have set a course for providing a modem and effective naval air arm.
'Israel Aircraft Industries built 27 Kfir C.l aircraft; of those, one was lost, one is being retained by Israel for the Air Force museum, and the remainder will enter U. S. Navy-Marine service on a no-cost leasing arrangement.
[2]Fred Kaplan, “Stealth technology has basic flaws, former officials say,” Boston Globe, 27 July 1986, p. 3.
[3]See Norman Polmar, “The U. S. Navy: 600 Ships— Plus or Minus?” Proceedings, August 1986, pp. 107-108.