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and a half-million dollars to train him to fly—does
In th‘s
airlines are hiring. Many pilots who stay on active ^ 20 years will not spend much more than half of trie in flying jobs. . dutieS
Clearly, then, the Navy has decided that piloting^ play a subordinate role in the naval aviator’s °ve$t
sponsibilities. The ramifications of this philosoP significant. One, it is economically inefficient _ spending close to half a million dollars to train a J
id
otneer couia nil equally as well/ . ^
Even more significant than wasted resources |S^S feet the Navy’s “aviator-second” philosophy aj safety and operational readiness. First, the truly
Many pilots rack up more time battling with paper than flying real planes. This is not right, but what should the balance be? The Royal Navy may have the answer.
Ask the aspiring naval aviator in flight training what he thinks will ensure success in his future naval career and he will probably reply, “My ability to be the best aviator in the fleet by dropping bombs on target or maneuvering to my opponent’s six o’clock position.” Ask the commander just selected for captain what factors in his naval aviation career enabled him to advance to his current position and he would probably reply, “My ability to be a good division officer, an effective department head, and a capable administrator.”
This disparity between expectation and reality reflects a philosophy many find hard to understand in today’s peacetime Navy: Administrative ability is a more sought-after quality in naval aviators than flying skills—regardless of the aviator’s rank or billet. This philosophy can have some very negative effects, including inefficient management, an increased aircraft accident rate, decreased operational readiness, and lower pilot retention.
This is not to say that flying should be the beginning and the end of a naval aviator’s duties. Squadron organization and the nature of the Navy demand that all naval officers be leaders, managers, and administrators in addition to performing their technical specialty. This is as it should be, and the Navy should not retain and promote officers who are good stick-and-throttle men but who have no interest, ability, or desire to carry out the other responsibilities of their commission.
The successful aviation officer must be both an excellent pilot and an outstanding administrator. Yet, what should be the balance? Is it more important to be a good pilot or a good administrator?
The answer to this question should probably be, “It depends”—on the aviator’s rank and billet. At some point in a naval aviator’s career, it is more important for him to be a manager and an administrator than a flier. This is definitely true at the admiral and captain levels, and may be true at the commander level, including the commanding officer and executive officer of an aviation squadron. But for junior naval aviators, the ability to put bombs on target, shoot down enemy aircraft, or track submarines should be at least as important as getting the reports out on time. After all, effective use of aircraft as weapon systems is the function of a squadron. Every other task must support attainment of this capability.
The Navy, nevertheless, has apparently decided that flying skills are less important than administrative skills at all ranks and levels. In fact, flying skills are virtually overlooked as significant factors in long-range personnel planning. If you do not believe this, consider three factors: the officer fitness report system, the Navy’s promotion policies, and the typical aviator’s career pattern.
Fitness Reports: From the first day he enters fl'S training, the prospective naval aviator is told that he lS “naval officer first and an aviator second.” C^. qualities” include every aspect beyond flying skills- though character and leadership traits are included in 1 category and are undeniably important, most of the gra for officer qualities on the fitness report can be transla into “administrative capability.”) For the fledgling na aviator, however, the fact that the Navy counts his s vices as a communications officer (for example) ns 111
important than his flying skills—after spending two ye
■ ; not D*
home until he receives his first fleet fitness report, multi-page report that evaluates a myriad of qualities’ finds only one block that evaluates his ability as an a tor. And, in most squadrons, his mark is invariably >n ^ of the top three categories unless he is totally inept caught buzzing the White House. The end result is a ^ ited—if any—breakout of abilities among aviators- the more senior the pilot becomes, the less the bre^^ Promotion Policies: Thus, officers are separated “the pack” by excelling in the administrative areas o { fitness report. Therefore, command screen and 0 -eS promotion boards must rely primarily on officer qua ^ in their selection for command and promotion. The re are predictable: The good administrators are the one!A0fS moted. Whether they are strong, weak, or average is left mostly to chance, or, at best, word of mout .f board members who happen to know the pilots or o service reputations. 0|jat-
The Career Pattern: Since flying is considered a j eral duty, the aviation officer’s career pattern is deS to expose him to a variety of assignments that will him for later management and staff positions. The 1 career pattern (as described in the Unrestricted ^,,u freer’s Guide) includes a variety of non-flying bn|e Tjse eluding some that do not even require aviation eXrij£)ate (e.g., certain ship’s company billets, Officer Can , School company commander, and human resource ^ agement positions). This career pattern frequen / ^ routinely removes the aviator from flying billets dur ^ js years of active duty. The number of flying tours he . |e, usually a function of the supply of aviators .a:>t which, m turn, is usually a function of whether o fQf
• nsive ^. tor, the Navy should keep him where his expen ^t:
unique skills can best be used to pay back the mvaVja-
in the cockpit. Also, why pay the added expense tot
tion incentive pay to staff a billet a non-aviation de -
officer could fill equally as well?
" “ L“" on ,ble’
j &
A
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WithyProbl,
Al
^inaCvCUrate method to identify dangerous aviators.
nt— ) d Dllot run Kp invnUtpH ir» o nilr\f fontnr onni.
0r Phot can be involved in a pilot factor acci- Veral—and it will not affect his promotion or . cident reports, pilot accident histories, and
eer.
fl
'§ht
Promotion board to know about a pilot’s
av'ators are not necessarily the ones being Thefitant* occuPying key flying slots in the squadrons, lack 0j-ne.ss rePort’s inability to identify aviation ability (or seiecf ' 1S particularly critical in the commanding officer sqUa(]'r°n Pr°cess. Yes, the commanding officer of a Antin'0!1 laS to an outstanding leader and an excellent leads j!S rat.or’ but he also has to be a top-notch flier. He sqUadr6strikes and sets the safety attitudes within the ble f0r°fn' .^e must provide the example and be responsi- head of rain‘n§ the junior aviators. A weak aviator at the and ana ,sctUa^ron does great damage, from both a safety eVery ^°Perational standpoint. Unfortunately, just about st°ries V/ator wb° has been in the Navy awhile can tell downri L°Ut s*c*PPers who ranged from barely adequate to v.'h0 w(f 1 ^angerous. They can also remember skippers With the6 Unttuest'0nably the best aviators in the air wing. atic w eurrent fitness report system, there is no system- Navv’„y to ensure that top-notch fliers are leading the y s ^uadrons.
rSeqUate fhness report format poses another an ;irvern because it cannot provide selection boards
C3t|
^ds. ThJtl°n rec°rds are not available to selection ^ 'he sin„aS’ '*\a Pilot has not been marked down grossly ' for6 av*afi°n grade on his fitness report, there is
^ Drnmrttinn Km rri oKrxnt n rxilz-vt’o
safety record. And the dangerous pilot can ultimately occupy critical senior flying seats. (Many commanding officers are reluctant to mark down an aviator on his airmanship, even if he is weak, or hold a disposition board on a marginal aviator because they do not want to jeopardize his career: “He’s too good an officer.”) A single pilot- factor accident should not necessarily doom an aviator’s career, but selection boards should be aware of a pilot’s safety record and any history of accidents or violations.
The typical career pattern can also have a bad effect on safety and readiness by degrading an aviator’s proficiency. Since the optimum Navy career pattern usually calls for a “disassociated” tour (ship’s company, staff duty, recruiting, etc.) after an aviator’s first shore tour, the flier is removed from piloting duties at a time when he is peaking as an aviator. As a senior lieutenant or junior lieutenant commander, he is at that optimum time in his life when youthful aggressiveness combines with experience and maturity. Yet, it is not uncommon for an aviator to be on back-to-back non-flying orders in the middle of his most productive years as an aviator. When he does return to a flying billet, he faces a long retraining process. It is not difficult to see how this adversely affects a squadron’s operational capability.
It also affects a squadron’s safety performance. A safe pilot is a current pilot who has been logging a substantial number of hours on a regular basis. Experience is one of the biggest factors in reducing pilot error accidents. The outstanding safety record of the Naval Air Reserve is testimony to the effect experienced pilots have on safety performance. In his recent autobiography, Yeager: An Autobiography (Bantam Books, 1985), Retired Air Force General Chuck Yeager discussed the factors he believed were responsible for his success as an aviator; he was never out'of the cockpit during his career of more than 30 years. Was it “the right stuff,” some innate God-given talent that he was bom with? Not at all.
“In the end, the one big reason why I was better than average as a pilot was because I flew more than anybody else. If there is such a thing as ‘the right stuff in piloting, then it is experience.” (p. 319)
Manning a squadron should, therefore, be directed toward building up the overall experience level of a squadron rather than sending second-tour aviators to non-flying billets and replacing them in squadrons with nuggets.
The last significant ramification of the “officer-first” concept is retention. Most aviators join the Navy because they want to fly. They undergo tremendous pressure during the long, arduous flight training program for this reason. In many cases, they put up with deployments, separations from loved ones, and spartan living conditions because they love flying. Take away the flying and you take away most of the job satisfaction for the typical naval aviator. As the aviator looks at a possible career in the Navy, he sees less and less flying the longer he stays in. So why should he make the Navy a career when he can earn better money with the civilian airlines and still fly Navy aircraft in the Naval Air Reserve?
By downplaying the importance of a naval aviator’s fly-
Id
Figure 1 Technical Specialty Supplement—Pilot (1310115117)
General (Applicable to All Communities):
Knowledge of NATOPS.................................
Air Discipline..................................................
Judgment........................................................
Instrument Proficiency..................................
Safety Consciousness.....................................
Basic Airwork.................................................
Aggressiveness................................................
Warfare Specialty (Light-Attack):
Conventional Bombing....................
Computer/Systems Bombing . Nuclear Weapons Delivery. . .
Low-Level Navigation......................
ACM/DCM.......................................
Carrier Landing Proficiency . .
s
(
Qualification (Light-Attack):
Section Leader.......................................
Division Leader ....................................
Post Maintenance Test Pilot....
Aerial Refueling Delivery.....................
NATOPS/Instrument Check Pilot ACM/DCM Instructor
Safety Performance:
Has this pilot been involved in any accidents, groundings, or flight violations this reporting period?
If involved in an accident, was pilot factor assigned?
Accident-Free Flight Hours This Reporting Period:------------
Total Accident-Free Flight Hours:----------------------------------
Comments and Justification:
Note: N/O = Not Observed. N/A = Not Applicable. 10 highest-1 lowest. ACM = Air Combat Maneuvering. DCM = Defense
Combat Maneuvering-
ing abilities, the Navy has created a serious problem. However, it is not insolvable. A few relatively simple innovations to the fitness report format, a somewhat modified career pattern, and a realistic concept of the naval aviator’s role today would go a long way toward rectifying the situation.
The first step—and the easiest to implement—would be a revision to the officer fitness report to better reflect an tcQW
officer’s aviation ability. A single-page supplen^t Wo0' be used. Figure 1 is an example. This SUPP^ re tb° allow a pilot’s flying ability to be scrutinize ^th gen oughly and accurately. The form would conta* eral evaluation areas, such as “knowledge o corn<- procedures” and specific areas tailored to th 0l)s the pilot is in. For example, “non-computer w Jig livery” might be a possibility for a member o
• 2J-.1 * ^VIVUI, VSVSIAIO UIUVVIO ivzi 1UIU1V
P’Peline , subsequent staff assignments. The operational bute?iPs Pilots in flying billets for most of their ca- ae squadr«-^ Prorn°ri°n potential is limited, usually to
ron command level.
S. Navy does not want to make such a radical
senior ^0l^mun^ty • This format would allow the evaluating cal sc 1° kfeak out” his better aviators through a numeri- foema? C Pr°ficiency—one to ten, for example. The
the DWou^ also enable the commanding officer to avoid B0rn^esent; strictly subjective evaluation on airmanship. NatqJI accuracy averages, carrier landing grades, Stancja J- ^aval Air Training and Operating Procedures dures(r IZat'onTcheck flight results, emergency proce- be citPHSt scores’ and similar types of objective data could The l° ■*USt'^ a high score, ation SUPP*emental form should also have a safety evalu- gr0UnjCct'on- Did the pilot have any flight violations, he had'n^S’ °r acc‘c*ents during the evaluation period? If safety 3n acc^ent> was pilot factor assigned? Positive dent-frPerformance would also be recognized in an “acci- This^ ^°Urs fi°wn” section.
Selecti revis'on to the fitness report format would provide b°ards°n ^0ar^s’ promotion boards, command screen cials ’.aevv commanding officers, and other senior offi- his V'ta* information about an aviator’s ability and readilv ^ recorri over the years. It would also give them a This infVlS*^e. breakout of the strong and weak aviators, staffing T^t'on could be used for promotion analysis, f°r in? enianding flight billets, or within the squadron W^i/^ing weak areas of a pilot’s performance. It °perati^1Ve sentor officers a valuable tool for improving Aftefnareadiness, safety, and even pilot training, identif, 3 P’tness report format has been developed that reevahw 8°0(i aviators, their career patterns should be every ^ CtPThe basic Navy philosophy seems to be that Chief ofSagn wb° walks into Pensacola is going to be the 3cc°rdj ,ava* Operations someday. Thus, he is groomed to obta; * ^ 3nc* 8'ven a variety of assignments necessary any jntaAverse background—whether or not he has 'n the MCSt °r'ntenti°n of making admiral or even staying divert avT Until retirement. The cost of obtaining this aviator j ° ass’gnment and background is paid when an *®g ari(jsPulled out of flying positions. While it is flatter- P'P^line1]1 SOme ways a good system to put everyone in a only aeacling to admiral, is it realistic? Statistically, C°mihand Perccnta8e °f officers ever attain squadron ^an half Pewer yet are selected to be admirals. More Service Wr,n0t even cb°ose t0 stay beyond their obligated sarne ' by, then, does the Navy assign everybody the The prCCr Patb regardless of their desires or talents? ans\yer .°yal Navy has a system that could provide the rected to "as tWo different career pipelines. One is di- Saily o ar(^ sen'or command, while the other is operate Cl- S°rfnted- The senior command pipeline, similar to 'band an',, avy’s system, grooms officers for future com-
If
S-ny’iH c°uld at least review billet requirements for .at Can °.J°bs, to ensure that an aviator is the only one 'dots fro1 ibat position. Does the Navy have to pull H 0fbj,T1 c°ckpits to fill billets as hangar deck officer or Cer on board a carrier? Thumbing through the
The
Aviation
Duty
Officer
On 30 April 1986, the Navy started a program that is similar to one of the recommendations made in this article. The aviation duty officer (ADO) program gives aviation officers the option of selecting a career pipeline designed to keep them in flying billets to the maximum extent possible. The ADO will not be subject to the normal “up or out” promotion system, but instead will be retained on active duty based on a one-time continuation board decision. Once he has satisfactorily passed this board, the ADO will be retained “subject to sustained satisfactory performance.” Lieutenant commanders are eligible to be retained on active duty through 24 years of commissioned service. Promotion potential is realistically limited to the grade of commander, although a few captain’s billets will exist. Selection to flag rank is not possible, nor is assignment to any command.
This is a step in the right direction. The program offers an opportunity for naval aviators to pursue a flying career, to contribute to the Navy, and to stay on active duty without the need to demonstrate administrative excellence. This program should go a long way toward improving pilot retention, meeting manning levels, and building up the overall experience/proficiency level of the naval air force.
The program is not without shortcomings, however. That most onerous of all non-flying billets—ship’s company tours—could still be assigned to the ADOs. Also, it appears that the ADO aviators will be assigned to a large percentage of “non-front-line” flying billets, such as Force Support and Training Command. This could lessen the program’s appeal if ADO aviators perceive this as spending their careers in the minor leagues of naval air.
To fine-tune this program, a thorough evaluation should be completed, to identify which “flying- related” billets actually require aviators to fill them. Every ship’s company billet, for example, that can be filled by a qualified limited duty officer makes the ADO program that much more attractive and viable. Also, detailers need to apportion prime flying billets so that the ADO community will not be perceived as the second string of naval aviation.
On balance, though, the program is an exciting, intelligent, and innovative move which should go a long way to help current problems—particularly retention and manning. R. Shipman
Junior Officer Billet Summary reveals these and many other jobs that do not appear to require the in-depth knowledge of flying that only an active aviator possesses. Concurrent with the restructure of the career pattern, the billet descriptions for all non-flying jobs requiring a 13IX (aviator) designator should be reevaluated. Junior aviators in particular—whether ashore or afloat—should be in flying billets.
The current shortage of aviators may cause this to happen simply because there are not enough aviators to fill all available cockpits. During recent years, however, the Navy has fluctuated between severe shortages of pilots
that in
and ridiculous excesses. It is probably safe to say 111 the future the situation will be reversed and the Navy again have the option of assigning aviators. When time comes, every effort should be made to keep avia in flying billets. . >s
The final step in a reevaluation of the naval avia role would be the most difficult. This involves altering Navy’s traditional thinking. The custom of consid&r aviation a collateral duty probably goes back to the bi ^ ^ naval aviation when line officers undertook aviati°ng collateral duty. Naval aviation has come a long way ^ then, and it is no longer realistic to assume that a
Nobody asked me, but...
Commander H. T. Hinman, U. S. Navy
Why not improve combat SAR training now?
Successful combat search and rescue (SAR) begins with trained forces and a well-rehearsed scenario—none of which the U. S. Navy has, or appears to be seriously considering. We need a continuous, deployable capability—not a sometime thing on weekends and two- week active duty periods.
Fleet helicopter pilots believe that scant attention has been paid to training and capability for combat SAR, but plenty of attention has been paid to projecting power ashore, despite the knowledge that such activity makes combat SAR inevitable. The assets now available for combat SAR are helicopter and light helicopter antisubmarine squadrons (HSs)/(HSLs), helicopter combat support squadrons (HCs), and helicopter mine countermeasure squadrons (HMs)—all essentially untrained for combat SAR. Combat SAR does not only pick up downed aviators, it supports the Navy special warfare community—which now trains extensively with Naval Reserve helicopter assets— as well.
Initially, in Vietnam, the SH-3 Sea King in starboard delta flight pattern performed the combat SAR mission, but the loss rate was unacceptable. HC-7 handled combat SAR, and being the specialists in this mission, did reasonably well. Losses were still exceptionally high, averaging one aircraft lost per 1.4 rescues, and one crew member lost per 1.8 rescues. After the war, the combat SAR squadron was deemed no longer useful as a regular fleet asset, and was transferred to the reserves. In today’s come-as-you-are-
RH-53D SEA STAUJON/K. HARRISON
upticOp1^
wars, the call-up of a reserve nnt is combat SAR squadron or detac not likely. t ^r.9
The vintage H-3s of today s ^ combat support squadron may' Dej- placed with reliable SH-60s. Bj^ sonnel and logistics problem
on g^r^an fly an F-14 or an F/A-18 proficiently and safely Ju ' a^'l*onal duty” basis.
learnni0r °fficers need to devote most of their time to flyi'n® .^Phisticated aircraft systems and complicated r°nsn S^,I**S’ rat^cr than turning out paperwork. Squad- contjn ed caPable and experienced senior pilots to provide a|] av'Ult^ an<^ ^ying leadership within a squadron. And a ma; °rs npe(i to have their aviation skills recognized as •j'ho/)°rt'0n of their contribution to the Navy.
Who are v!^ 'S extremely fortunate to have many officers kators outstancling aviators and excellent adminis- • he challenge, then, is not to create these people
but to identify them. Once they are identified, keep them in flying billets, recognize their aviation skills, and give them career patterns that will capitalize on their expensive and valuable talents. The entire Navy will benefit.
Commander Shipman flew A-4 and A-7 aircraft on active duty. Upon leaving active-duty service, he continued to fly A-4s with the Naval Air Reserve and eventually became commanding officer of VC-686, a reserve force squadron augmentation unit flying A-4E, F, and TA-4 models. As a civilian, Commander Shipman has worked as a writer/editor for Approach Magazine, as an accident investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board, and is currently employed as a pilot for People Express Airlines.
e*i«ts. It •
^ch^nt not feasible to deploy de- tractna s °n a regular basis for a pro-
Jcte(j ~ . •'-£)uuu uaaia uu a pin
SclUadroneri0c* w>th the current reserve ald T^|, fanning of drilling reservists °f Reserv rammS and Administration ^evera|6S^ °^'cers and enlisted.
*“• rec°mmendations for a de-
ON
cent force within the range of a readily available fix are:
- Train and fly one officer in each squadron for the complete weapons and tactics instructor (WT1) course at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) at Yuma, Arizona.
- Use the model used by the Marine Corps with one WTI as the squadron expert (much like a naval air training and operations officer) training the squadron in tactics for combat SAR and special missions.
- Change the required operating capa- bility/projected operational environment for HS, HSL, HC, and HM squadrons to include combat SAR/special mission.
- Task MAWTS-1 and Strike University in Fallon to come up with an indepth program tailored for fleet use.
- Use the talent in HC-9 to initiate the program of combat SAR/special mission for the fleet.
Other alternatives would be:
- Establish regular combat SAR squadrons with detachments in CVs.
- Change the personnel mix in HC-9 in favor of more TAR and active Navy personnel so detachments can be more easily deployed.
- Rely more on the Marines for combat SAR support.
The rotary wing community has multi-mission capabilities—let’s use them all! The Navy wouldn’t dream of
sending pilots on a mission without appropriate training to hunt subs or drop bombs. After all, we rotary wing fliers are the ones who will respond to the first call for combat SAR, and the plea of “no training” will then fall on deaf ears.