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Ueuti
enant Commander Kendall King, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander James A. Sanford, U. S. Navy
F. A,lme f°r a requiem for the Charles Critic atf S ^DG-2)-class destroyers? ati0naS, fre Navy’s oldest class of oper- of theestroyers believe that the demise as SuSe S*!'PS's close at hand. They cite- lacj. PP°rt>ng evidence such problems as
battle"‘ri®Conorny, inability to support the w'lh revitalized tactical applica-
ever ®rouP- and “short legs.” How- ti0tls’ ^ul1 revitalized ta prove- he C®G-2 class can retain its
to p]a|) nic*le in today’s fleet and continue The via cruc'al role in the years to come, critical UC t*16 ^DG-2 class will remain
Navy v3S l*le iicet expands to a 600-ship steads mCe requirements in the fleet will be ret ^ mcrease, each useful ship must °£>G^dDin service.
ciSrn Problems: Much of the criti-
age DDG-2 class concerns its
DdglthoU8h built in the 1960s, the 23 195qs, s incorporated state-of-the-art the Vj tecbnology. Workhorses during deploetnam War years and in countless are^ts since, these vintage ships neglect 'n®to sb°w both their age and the Sorce suflered during their early years. nuroer 'i)s °f the class are hampered by a level Uf material deficiencies, requiring ■Hay 01 Mention and repair funding that The rfr t0 overshadow their worth. have r . G-2-class weapon systems
in tec]!iCe^Ve<fl little benefit from advances DDGn2nol°gy. as shown in Table 1.1 The short_rSUr^ace_to-air missile system is tracl( r5n®ec* and limited in its ability to capabii-any a‘r tarSets- The antisubmarine Placing*1^ t*le DDG-2S is hampered by SQq | a nioderately good sonar, the on very noisy plat-
s°nar sb'Ps have no variable depth
c°Pter^nd cannot support LAMPS heli- hy f ja ‘ Antisurface warfare is provided s°nar A30011 missiles, but only the class’s can Datl(? electronic support measures
went relatively unnoticed. Now, however, the DDG-2s’ gallons-per-mile ratio is often a shock to battle group commanders. At a rate of 1% of fuel on board consumed per hour while at high speed, the stigma of “short legs” and frequent refuelings have characterized the class as a logistics problem. Commanders and schedulers would prefer to avoid the challenge of keeping these ships fueled, and would rather see the DDG-2s stay near port.
Another target of the DDG-2 class’s critics is the complexity of the DDG-2 engineering plant, which was designed when 1,200-pound steam was the ultimate propulsion technology. The potential inherent in high-pressure steam propulsion has not been fully realized; instead, the DDG-2s were burdened with repeated equipment casualties that limited mobility. In many instances, these material problems were beyond ship’s
force abilities to rectify and required an extensive shore establishment for support. Even naval shipyards have had mixed results in keeping the ships going. The result has been a ship class with a reputation for unreliability.
Combined with the effects of age and neglect, DDG-2 steam plants have become an engineer’s nightmare. The amount of documentation, the quantity of administrative programs, and the scope of procedures required to maintain a safe engineering plant have grown dramatically. Today’s stringent standards for steam plant operation have exceeded the
By staying close to the carriers, Charles F. Adams destroyers can provide inner AAW and ASW protection, receive the frequent refuelings they require, and hold the fort until the Arleigh Burke DDGs are delivered.
Provide
-.10rm f ~ over-the-horizon targeting hair caatl0n-. flyen refinements in the an- ^Inncp?3^'1'1'68 °h these ships have not t ea their
•nfo.
critics.
, fuel
. aWb- ,unsumPtion is another potential >nexPeac* the DDG-2s. In the era of nsiVe fuel, lack of fuel economy
ships. ., . aood
The SQQ-23 sonar ProV1^,() be a" medium-range coverage and wo ^ajn. asset stationed next to the car'1L ]aCed in better ASW platforms could be P the outer screen while DD —
standards for which these ships were designed. Some ship classes faced with the same level of complexity have been phased out because of expense. The Forrest Sherman (DD-931) class was retired for these reasons. Today, a DDG-2 requires constant attention to every detail by a superior crew to keep her mobile. It can be done, but critics question whether the results are worth the expense.
A final problem is that the DDG-2s no longer appear to be real assets to the battle group. Without the Navy tactical data system (NTDS), the DDG-2s cannot keep up with the battle group’s big picture. In fact, with their short-range surface-to-air missiles, the DDG-2s are basically a close-in weapon system for the carrier, relying on their own sensors to provide a final line of defense. Though limited, this antiair warfare (AAW) role overshadows the DDG-2s’ antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability in the battle group. After all, the battle group commander is not likely to sacrifice his final AAW insurance to allow a DDG-2 to clutter the passive sonar picture with her high noise level.
The modem battle group depends on command and control. Without NTDS and its link, a DDG-2 may not be totally blind and deaf, but her contribution will likely be late and relatively ineffective. The ship will be at the end of a long command, control, and communications pipeline, where her value to the battle group will be greatly diminished. In a fast AAW scenario, a DDG-2 may be left completely out of the shooting war.
Short range and limited battle group compatibility give the DDG-2s’ critics some credibility. But the problems can be resolved, the disadvantages surmounted, and the advantages exploited fully to enable the class to play an improved role— with the battle group or independently.
DDG-2s in the Battle Group: Assigning a DDG-2 to support a carrier battle
carrier, her short-range missile efage
can provide inner air defense ur. for the carrier. Ships with long-m ^ ^ face-to-air missiles can be free ^
pand the group’s AAW defense ^ DDG-2 can also respond to cru ^ siles fired from submarines w 1 »sW penetrated the battle group s inn ^ 0f screen. Against this threat, t eci- NTDS would not be completely1vn fating since the DDG-2 could use ^ sarT1e sensors to detect and launch. Q[. Retime, should the link be jamme^ come inoperative, the DDG- s(j||
combat systems and personne vVt be ready to defend the carrier. ^0.
would be lost shifting to unfarm ^-ps ual modes, as often happens o
group would appear to defy the criticisms expressed previously. Without NTDS and a long-range surface-to-air missile, the DDG-2 class must be tied closely to the carrier or other high-value unit. This role illustrates the DDG-2s’ strengths and how they can best enhance the battle group’s defense-in-depth concept.
If a DDG-2 is stationed close to the
near the carrier. The ASRO v,- marine rocket) weapon system th1-
an adequate standoff weap°n ^reakinir DDG-2s against submarines through the outer screen, 1111 arge|lt’
side torpedoes are available jVe
close-in attacks. The sonar s P’ ranf,
pabilities can also extend detec S|,jps
to enhance ASW defense. Even
/ jo'r
VJr*sum t- pivjuitms ui iuci
Use can^h'011 an<^ *'m'te(^ mobility. Fuel toiler \yu reduced by operating on one ^led r-. en escort>ng a conventionally A shin arrier’ ^uc* W'H be close at hand, battle sratl0ned. c*ose t0 the center of the tr°h will0?’ W'dl a smab screen to pa- screerij e 'ess hkely to expend fuel in ass'gned8maneuvers- With two DDG-2s UeuVenear carr'er- stationing ma- Mobi|W°U*d a*so de reciuced. can ^ ? and 'Maintainability problems Under wCOrrected before the ship gets With snf?.' A trained, motivated crew
suffix
ship
«la:
■*x*cr p u me Dame group com- deskt0D rRelatively inexpensive tactical •'the dis C,0rnPuters could provide real- ^ance ,? a^s °l intelligence data, en-
• "trept;„ ‘ . ovci-uic-iiu
s a siL 8 sens°rs, a DDG-2 could act
^ns
cPresent very real threats to an !*dl,'8s 1 1986
'Standard missile (medium range);2Base point defense missile system; 'Closc-in weapon system; Tndcpcndent variable depth sonar; "Antisubmarine rocket: "Torpedo tubes
FF-1052 | FFG-7 |
None/Mk-25 | Mk-13 |
None/BPDMS2 | SMl(MR) |
Harpoon |
|
None/Mk-115 | Mk-92 |
1 5-in/54- | 1 76-mm Mk-75 |
cal Mk-42 |
|
CIWS3 (some) | CIWS |
Mk-68 | Mk-92 |
SQS-26 | SQS-56 |
SQS-35 IVDS4 | SQR-18/19 |
SQR-18 |
|
ASROC | Mk-32 TT6 |
Mk-32 TT |
|
4,500 nm | 4,500 nm |
/20 kts | /20 kts |
Table 2 DDG-2 vs. FF-1052 vs. FFG-7
Table 1 DDG-2 Characteristics
lent supply support can keep
Displacement | 4,500 tons (full load) |
Length | 437 ft |
Beam | 47 ft |
Draft | 22 ft |
Propulsion | 4 boilers, 2 steam turbines, 70,000 shaft hp |
Speed | 31.5 kts |
Range | 4,500 nm at 20 kts |
Missiles | I Mk-11/13 launcher for Standard-l(MR) or Harpoon |
Guns | 2 Mk-142, 5-in/54-eal, dual purpose |
ASW |
|
Radars | SPS-10 surface search SPS-29/37/40 air search SPS-39 height finding |
Sonar | SQQ-23 (pair) |
Fire Control | Mk-4/13 weapon direction system Mk-68 gunfire control system (SPG-53A/E/F) 2 Mk-74 missile fire control system (SPG-51C) Mk-111/114 underwater battery fire control system |
sensors would increase the
| DDG-2 |
Missile Launcher | Mk-11/13 |
Missiles: AAW | SMl(MR)1 |
ASUW | Harpoon |
MFCS | Mk-74 |
Guns | 2 5-in/54- cal Mk-42 |
GFCS | Mk-68 |
Sonar | SQQ-23 |
ASW Weapons | ASROC5 MK-32 TT |
Range | 4,500 nm /20 kts |
the _ ^ 4
C>Dg,? Effing. For example, one n'Cnt and1?1 every operational commit- ttore th- t l0Se 0 several other ships in Indian o 'Wo years °f steaming in the AmerjCacean’ Atlantic, and Central easy> bu,n operating areas. It was not 10 SuPp0 t k ^eas'hihty of using a DDG-2 Iftprn t0e *3attle grouP was validated, kills couMmentS l° combat sys-
value 1( , lurther enhance these ships’ ceivee battle group. A Link-11 re- hartnersStCm ,would make them silent They couldlthin *'le tactical situation. °ut delav . resP°ntl to assignments with- Part 0f and would become an integral latiop of e AA^ defense posture. Instal- ff-the-arf 0n8er-range missile and state
ass’s v . — iiu lllVlt-UOW UIV.
ttandgr a Ue to the battle group com-
'P C( lisp);
and'accH Contr‘bution of passive sonar, Surfacerate tactical decision making. v'de anom act'on group operations pro-
oan excel ' t r°'e in which the DDG‘2s natpoy ' I he ships are equipped with
'hc sanieT.'Ssiles’ Which are fired from k1'Ss'les \v-Unc*ler as lhe surface-to-air 0f 'th a missile magazine capa- ftight in°| ln8 40 missiles, a good mix ‘in arsen..]Utlc UP to 20 Harpoons. Such ^rface S • w.oulcl exceed the surface-to- eW shin ,1SS'*e inventories of all but a s°niewhat r Althou8h the DDG-2s are be i, •mited in space, box launchers re Warf!nSladed- fading to the antisur- r()tn are inventory without detracting , Attach ",U,mber of AAW weapons. ^'Oing ? ,t0 a surface action group con-
2°P ,ar,„„ShiP w'th better over-the-hori- ‘getir
Pop-SUrface raider. The DDG-2s’ Har- enemy surface group. DDG-2s could also rely on their AAW and ASW suites for defense against the added attention they would attract. Of course, a DDG-2 cannot simultaneously launch Harpoons and surface-to-air missiles unless box launchers are added. With effective planning, however, the Harpoons could be on their way before the scenario degenerated into an AAW defense situation.
Taking the surface action group concept one step further, DDG-2s make ideal escorts for battleships. DDG-2s can provide the same level of AAW and ASW defense as they provide in the carrier close-in defense role. In the battleship escort application, the lack of NTDS is less critical because the ships’ command, control, and communications are compatible with the battleship. The DDG-2s’ range can be extended with frequent refueling from the battleship.
Surface action group operations could also incorporate the revised Harpoon loadout discussed earlier. Two DDG-2s escorting a battleship could provide awesome surface-to-surface firepower. With the battleship's Tomahawks and 16-inch guns, and the DDG-2s’ large arsenal of Harpoons as proposed, the SAG would be a potent offensive force.
DDG-2s could also provide AAW support in naval gunfire support for the battleship. By positioning a DDG-2 on the landward side of the battleship, the destroyer could provide AAW defense against land-based air threats. The battleship could remain secure while still in
range to bombard coastlines.
DDG-2s’ missile magazines are an added bonus to the surface action group. The Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers are powerful AAW platforms, but they can run out of surface-to-air missiles in a hot war. The cruiser could designate a DDG-2 to engage against short-range targets. The cruiser’s missiles could be reserved for targets at long ranges, expanding the battle group’s ability to fight longer without rearming. Equipment modifications and refinements to command and control would be required, but the 40 missiles in each of the DDG-2s could prove to be valuable assets.
The DDG-2s’ critics have been silent about one of the class’s gunfire capabilities. With two five-inch guns and a proven gunfire control system, the class excels at naval gunfire support. Although other classes have two guns, the DDG-2 class boasts certain advantages. The Spruance (DD-963) class also has two guns, but does not have the same level of AAW defenses. With two guns, the 77- conderoga-class cruisers are capable at gunfire support, but represent a greater sacrifice for the battle group. The DDG-2 class is the most logical and viable naval gunfire support platform.
Some ships are going to be needed to support the underway replenishment groups. DDG-2s can perform this task effectively in a multi-threat environment, and the DDG-2s’ skippers will have a keen desire to keep the oiler afloat. The DDG-2s can support the amphibious ready group with the same level of defense capability.
Outside the Battle Group: The DDG-2 class has excellent self-defense capabilities. The ships’ AAW and ASW systems may not be the ultimate in technology, but they provide defense against most threats. Besides, is the threat really going to want to expend torpedoes or missiles against a DDG-2?
Teaming a DDG-2 with another ship class is a possibility for service outside of the battle group. Captain (then-Commander) P. T. Deutermann, in his 1982
Proceedings article “The Matched Pair: A Tactical Concept,” expounds on the advantages of tactically joining a DDG-2 with a Knox (FF-1052)-class ship.2 DDG-2s provide AAW defense, redundant ASW and antisurface firepower, and engineering compatibility. The DDG-2s’ sonar can augment the longer-range capabilities of the frigates. An FF-1052’s passive sonar and LAMPS add outstanding over-the-horizon targeting.
As a matched pair, the ships’ advantages are magnified. The tandem could be used in barrier operations to seal off critical areas of the ocean. With the AAW defenses of the DDG-2s, the frigates’ ability to stay on station would be enhanced. At the slow speeds of barrier patrols, the destroyers could conserve fuel. The tactical twosomes could also be employed in mid-ocean or sea lines of communication operations.
DDG-2s could also be paired with the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) frigates. DDG-2s have a greater missile loadout than the frigates and could serve in the same escort role as with the FF-1052s. In some instances, DDG-2s are the more capable ships: surface gunnery, hull- mounted sonar, and ASROC, for example (see Table 2).3 The FFG-7s’ LAMPS and towed array sonars make for effective tactical pairs.
Operating independently, the DDG-2s could be effective in barrier operations with their ASW and antisurface weapons. Their AAW self-defense capability would provide a measure of security and an ability to steam alone. Loitering at low speeds on one boiler greatly enhances the DDGs’ ability to remain on station. These advantages would apply to chokepoint operations.
As a single ship surface action group, DDG-2 could be overlooked by the enemy and become an effective surface raider. Hiding among oil platforms or islands, a DDG-2 could covertly detect and target an opposing surface action group with her sensors. With targeting information relayed from an external source or her internally generated targeting data,
! a real surprise. The ship is not lost without h
the lone DDG-2 could provide a-^
can protect herself, and can
remain
iflO'
bile for long periods.
" Os: '1
the DDG-2 class steaming into the
of
g perioau. ct
DDG-2s in the 1990s: The Pr°/|990s
these
may appall the ships’ critics. ven
guided-missile destroyers have _
their effectiveness, and with Pr°P can
ation and effective planning, ^Aith
still make significant contribute ^ejve such refinements as a Link- and
—“,t0>
system, tactical desktop an enhanced AAW system, u,“**.n ^eir could be greatly enhanced. Even current configuration, effective
their'
employment of these shlPs. “peet. them viable components ot in jj for Is it time to sound the deat ^
the Charles F. Adams c^SS^ppG-5^
when all of the Arleigh Burke
For
wiicii ail ui me r\i ^ fleet
destroyers have entered the g[naii now, the DDG-2-class ships mus ^ an integral part of the fleet uiem is still years away.
fjh? L 4
'Norman Polmar, The Ships and A‘rcr^^ In4,lJlL
Fleet, 13th ed., (Annapolis, Md Press, 1983), p. 148. p„ir: A Tad*
2P. T. Deutermann, “The Matched 90^
Concept,” Proceedings. January, 1 ’
3Polmar, pp. 162, 148, 170.
ical
, ,, degree i»f.
Commander King earned a bachelor ja an tory from Clarion University of Lsteifls master’s in management information siif‘a
in ionte
c$'
American University. He has serve * c0mpl combatants and is a proven subspeci je is ‘ science and weapons systems techno °,ain (D^ rently the executive officer in the Cony peve 0 17) and has orders to the Surface W ment Group.
1 Acaa”
Commander Sanford graduated fromjn \^ . emy with a degree in electrical engine 5^
After nuclear power school, he serverrlCer, reaC.al Carolina (CGN-37) as auxiliaries or eleC^c controls officer, and reactor contro s ^ NuC j assistant. Following an instructor to sc Power School, he attended departmen^^ of*lC and reported to the Conyngham as oper'
Soviet Airborne and Air Assault Forces—Part I
By Captain Edwin W. Besch, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
ofle
Soviet Airborne Forces (Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska [VDV]) share the mystique of that special breed of soldiers who jump out of aircraft with paratroopers in other armies, yet they are more nearly the Soviet equivalent of U. S. Marines in relative numbers and elite sta
tus. The United States, primarily a sea power, naturally stresses its sea soldiers (Marines); the Soviet Union, primarily a land power, pioneered the development of airborne forces. The Soviets maintain a seven-division, combat-ready airborne force and at least 11 air assault and air-
ibile brigades, compared t0 bl\ ee-regiment division and ies of marines—Soviet Nava orskaya Pehota).
s°vi5
ur^Kuyu reriuiu). ,
3oth the U. S. Army and jssion uld agree that the primary ^ ir respective airborne forces
. ./tub1
,ld
"y of,
billets'."
ttand" Kin sen*or Soviet officers in com-
s*8nific’*^V has, since 1945, undergone s°nnel tr ,changes in organization, per-
■'■fment n®’ ancl modernization of aviationmethods, and combat and
Pioneers of airborne operations in the 1930s, Soviet airborne forces retain essentially the same mission today: disrupting enemy rear areas to support rapidly advancing ground forces that are now called operational maneuver groups.
nd> ^3t® to the Supreme High Com- y the s' .°Perational control exercised
service dress uniform, but
wear distinctive blue berets. Their striped sailor shirt was introduced in the 1950s by a former commander, General V. F. Margelov, who was a heroic Soviet marine during World War II.
Soviet writings stress the use of airborne forces to destroy enemy forces
a breakih 6 ma'n 8rouni^ effort t0 exploit an enem r,°U®^ anc*t0 penetrate deep into evefj , ^ s rear area. The Soviets, how- ti°n 0f ?ce heavier emphasis on disrup- lines „e er|emy’s rear installations and forces i COmmun*cation by airborne ground f COncert w'lh rapidly advancing Gained 0rces- These doctrines have reSovietCs^ent'ally constant throughout rtiore rh3^ ,°rnc history, which began ASoan half a century ago.
^arnaniVlh1 m'**tary historian, Colonel N. basic nr eV’ Wrote >n 1982 that “many c°rnbat °VlS’ons >n theory and practice of "'Ofked mpl°yment °f airborne forces as diiring 'n the Soviet armed forces •he 193q e Interwar period, particularly for S’ "ave not lost their significance a's° boa^65601' Colonel Ramanichev to deveiStC^ ^at the Red Army was first c°rnbat 3nd test an advanced theory of forces ^Ployment of airborne assault a'rborneaf0 the world’s largest
^forld \yS *earne(l by the Soviets in Pr°rn the'ar 0pten at high cost, and erat>ons "i StU<^^ op Western airborne op- °n p0sa So had considerable influence borne f031 development of Soviet air- ?evitv „ICes> Partly because of the lon-
ln the gr, ■ .
are a Vj. , Vlet view, airborne operations fhe ca adjunct to ground offensives. Ger|erai Q ander of the VDV, Colonel- 'al envel ‘^uhhorukov, wrote that “aer- at imp0°Pment of the enemy has become aiodernant maneuver without which sible ”2 ens*ve operations are not pos- ,1'aneuvetUurin8 the Zapad-81 military ter,siVe] v ?’ airborne units were used ex- a Soviet “° suPPort the rapid advance of a triobii °perat'onal maneuver group,” 'vhich ha6’ Co,nbined-arms formation, trate deeS aS *tS Primary war role to pene- 'l°nal fc/P Int0 the “enemy’s” opera. "Pbe Vn!? ,500 kilometers) rear area.3 Sipnlr- UV has cins'o 10/1S i
JiPme
Ration s.,n . ■-------------------
avfonkn U,PPort- Lieutenant General P. Said the VDV Chief of Staff- recently T° So] emization will continue. b°viet a'1? Problems of employment, M F0r ’r 0rne forces were taken from fense ,S 3nd put under the Ministry of !?rces be"1 In 1956, the airborne
Gr°Und p3me a special branch of Soviet ^bord|nat0rces- The VDV are directly foai “ ‘ "
by ine Sn ■ pParateVlet General Staff. Virtually a 'r°un(] pCrv'ce but still part of the be Airp0°rce,s’ ^DV personnel retain after a nuclear attack or to hold open a breach in the enemy’s defenses created by a nuclear detonation. Soviet Airborne Forces would be assigned four categories of missions in either a conventional or nuclear environment:
- Strategic: This mission is typically assigned to an airborne division or regiment (with other forces) and expected to have a significant effect on a war or campaign. Objectives include: important enemy administrative-political centers and industrial-economic regions, control centers and systems, a seaport, establish a second front, etc. This mission includes military intervention or power projection.
- Operational: Battalion- to division- size airborne forces are deployed in conjunction with front or army operations. Objectives: nuclear weapons, command posts, airfields, and logistics areas, or establishing a bridgehead, encircling or blocking positions, etc.
- Tactical: A mission usually entrusted to helibome, motorized rifle troops, it is sometimes controlled by and assigned to a reinforced airborne company or battalion. Objectives: similar to operational ones, but inside 50 kilometers of front lines.
- Special or Unconventional Warfare: Conducted by an airborne company or smaller units as well as by “special purpose” (Spetsnaz) forces of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Ground Forces, and Navy, its objectives are: reconnaissance, demolition, arson, sabotage, destruction of nuclear weapons, seizure of new weapons/ technology, and creating panic in the enemy’s rear.
Elements of the VDV have seen semicombat twice since World War II. In 1968, the 103d Guards Airborne Division was airlanded at the Prague, Czechoslovakia, airport and seized other key locations in Prague, kidnapped Czechoslovakian government leaders in conjunction with the KGB and sign-posted the route for other invading Warsaw Pact forces. Before Christmas 1979, the 105th Guards Airborne Division, supported by elements of the 103d, was airlifted into Kabul, Afghanistan, to seize key points. The Afghan leader, Hafizullah Amin, and his family and palace guards were killed in a fierce firefight with Soviet airborne troops. Elements of the 103d Guards Airborne Division remain part of the Soviet occupation force currently in Afghanistan.4
The airborne operations into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan revealed that limited-range power projection in support of a ground offensive, especially against ill-prepared opponents, is well within
gun unnecessary. „n
" The BMD-1 carries a seven-i
Sagger antitank guided system mounted in the same gii" on the BMP-1 IFV.5 The 'a- _ ^
fires fin-stabilized, high exp . ^ titank (HEAT-FS) ammunition citrates 330 millimeters of arm® ^ °
mrfet gufl
•0'
an
1 o firin£ ,<]'
mm. bow machine guns and ^ rnti
Soviet capabilities. Five problems, however, have long plagued Soviet airborne theoreticians (and those of other armies). First, airborne forces lack antitank and other fire support means equivalent to those of defending forces, because their equipment is constrained in numbers, size, and weight by the capacity of transport aircraft and airdrop means. Second, there is the difficulty of linking up advancing ground forces and airborne forces in the enemy’s rear. Third, airborne forces on the ground are vulnerable to enemy attack helicopters and aircraft. Fourth, while they have high strategic mobility, airborne forces (and other foot- mobile infantry units) have low tactical mobility on the ground, especially compared to counterattacking mechanized units. Fifth, Soviet airborne operations suffered a chronic shortage of aviation support during World War II (and still do).
Airborne forces’ general lack of antitank and other fire support means and the link-up problem were graphically shown in Cornelius Ryan’s book (and the movie), A Bridge Too Far, which portrayed the British airborne assault on Arnhem, Holland, in September 1944 (Operation Market Garden). Both the Soviets and their former allies learned similar lessons about airborne forces at the hands of the Germans during World War II; the Soviets, however, have typically invested more effort and money to correct their deficiencies.
The Soviets first addressed the an- titank/fire support problem by fielding the diminutive ASU-57 57-mm. airborne assault gun in 1955, followed by the ASU-85 85-mm. airborne assault gun in 1962 and antitank missiles in later years. The problem of link-up was solved by Soviet theoreticians in the 1960s with the decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons, which would permit large ground units to move rapidly into the enemy’s depth to link up with airborne forces. Today, the Soviets could use massive conventional air, missile, artillery, and chemical strikes to facilitate link-up in a non-nuclear war.
Solution of the link-up problem resulted in a major program in the 1960s to reequip Soviet airborne units with modern antitank and air defense weapons, artillery, and other support means, although gaps in capabilities persist. The problem of low tactical mobility of Soviet airborne infantry was solved in the 1970s by converting it to mechanized light infantry equipped with the BMD-1 airborne infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). A decade later, the Soviet Union still has the only mechanized airborne infantry force in the world, and the BMD-1 airborne IFV remains unique among armored vehicles.
Airborne personnel are carefully selected with emphasis on physical condition, education, training, and political reliability. Many of the two-year conscripts are experienced parachutists, having participated in sports clubs or school programs. Junior airborne officers are graduates of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School near Moscow, other higher command (four-year) or higher technical (three-year) schools, and universities with officer programs. The equivalent to the U. S. Military Academy. Ryazan graduates receive an engineering degree and usually spend their entire career in the VDV.
Soviet airborne training is physically rigorous, mentally and psychologically demanding, and closely approximates actual combat, including simulated chemical-bacteriological-radiological environments. Airborne.training integrates special airborne techniques with ground mechanized infantry tactics because of the BMD-l’s ability to conduct a mounted attack or support a dismounted assault.
The mainstay of Soviet airborne infantry is the BMD-1 amphibious, airdroppable IFV. The pre-series production BMD was introduced in 1970; the BMD-1 series production model followed in about 1973. The Ml979 turretless, lengthened (by one road wheel) variant of the BMD is used in command, communications, mortar prime mover, personnel carrier, and maintenance support versions. Initially assigned to one regiment in each airborne division, all airborne
be fnW
regiments in divisions may no reg|-
equipped with BMD-ls, making |t mental-level ASU-57 airborne ■ borne squad: squad leader/ve n[,er. mander, driver-mechanic, turre. ^ aSSis- machine gunner, antitank grena >L ^ rj. tant squad leader/senior riflcma- ^ua(j fleman/assistant grenadier. „r andr'lle' leader, assistant squad 'eacjf ’ - ^.00- man are armed with AKS-/ r carrieS assault rifles; the machine gunnLchine an RPKS-74 5.45-mm. I'ga‘ „n,jtank
. , gun'1"’:
grenade launcher. The drive and grenadier are armed wltnlonpl 9-mm. pistols. Troops ^ehi^’ ! dismount over the top ot jn ^ ^ut evC, disadvantage while under tire- 0fso01t squad member can fire a vveaP°(jer ah1’1’ type from inside the vehicle-1111 protection.
The main armament ot i0W'PrC^ consists of a 2A20 73-m111-"iXja| f j sure, smoothbore gun, a L°1 an mm. PKT machine gun, an /Mti , o ... • jmissile v . ..sen liquity, to an effective rang ^ meters; the Sagger missile na® dpi tive range of 500-3,000 mete ^ q°. ^ etrates 400 millimeters ol arm .j. 7 addition, the BMD-1 has two po
on each side and in the rear. 1 ment basic load is 40 73-m ^ 7-°' four missiles, and 2,000---
/ Mv
carrjers°Unds- All Soviet infantry squad sion bio‘.ncludin8 Ae BMD-1, have vi- 1I'^ntrvm S 3nd "lr'n8 ports that enable dismount t0 mounte^ as w£ii as i-i. s. : efr’ on,y one current or planned ^radlev scluad carrier, the M2
The bm ’ haS thSm'
'hielcnes ^ ^' ^as maximum armor and 25 SCm°* ^ millimeters in the hull Proving mi 'meters °n the turret, which and iightr(fteCti°n a§ainst smal1 afms fire Pr°bab|v . ra8ments at close range and c*udingy ,a®a'nst heavier weapons, indistance d'cahber machine guns, at a ^cterioi’, r°nta%- It has a chemical- Ptotecio glca*"racliological collective ‘ng wean S^steni and means for exhaust- hu|i P°n fumes from the turret and
uBMn i •
k rsepcvj 1 ls Powered by a V-6, 240- ”Wroje[er diesel engine and uses ' o swim. The driver can adjust
,gurei o . .
•soviet Airborne Regiment_________
the hydropneumatic suspension to vary ground clearance from 100 millimeters to 450 millimeters and change the track tension. The BMD-1 has maximum speeds of 60-80 kilometers/hour on land and ten kilometers/hour in water, and a 320-kilometer cruising range.
The 7.5-ton BMD-1 is normally airdropped on a platform by a VPS-8 cargo parachute system, which has multiple canopies mounted to a single yoke with an explosive device to release the canopies on impact. The drop platform may be fitted with a retro-rocket device to lessen speed of descent just before impact. BMD-ls are equipped with a homing device that enables the crew to find their vehicle soon after landing.6
Each airborne company, consisting of six officers and 79 enlisted men, has a company headquarters, three platoons of three squads each, a three-man antiair
In the 1970s, the Soviets began deploying air-droppable BMD-1 infantry lighting vehicles (opposite page), creating the world’s only mechanized airborne infantry force. All airborne regiments may now have BMD-ls. This would make obsolete the ASU-57-mm. guns (left) which have served airborne forces since 1955.
craft missile squad armed with SA-7 Grail surface-to-air missiles, and a seven- man weapons squad armed with two AGS-17 30-mm. automatic grenade launchers. The weapons squad rides in a turretless, “stretched” M1979/1 BMD; the rest of the company is carried in ten BMD-ls. A Soviet mechanized airborne company in BMD-ls has fewer personnel, but far greater firepower and mobility, than any footmobile airborne battalion anywhere.
The Soviet mechanized airborne battalion, 310 strong, has a headquarters, communications platoon, supply and service platoon, repair workshop, and medical aid station in addition to three airborne companies. There are 35 BMD-ls per airborne battalion, about 110 per regiment, and 340 per division.7
Current organizations of the 1,455- man Soviet Airborne Regiment and 6,500-strong Airborne Division are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.8 Additional fire support at regimental level is provided by:
► A mortar battery of six Ml943 120-
mm. towed mortars which can fire 12-15 rounds/minute at a maximum range of 5,700 meters
- An antitank battery of nine BRDM-2 seven-ton, wheeled armored vehicles armed with multiple launchers for AT-3 Sagger or newer AT-5 Spandrel 4,000- meter-range antitank guided missiles
- An antiaircraft battery of six ZU-23, dual 23-mm. towed antiaircraft guns, which use optical-mechanical computing sights and have tactical ranges of 2,500 meters
The airborne infantry also can be supported by 31 ASU-85 85-mm. airborne assault guns in the divisional assault gun battalion. This 14-ton vehicle was introduced in 1962 as a “tank substitute” for airborne forces. The non-swimming ASU-85 usually is airlanded, although it can be airdropped using high-capacity multichute and retrorocket systems, and is helicopter-transportable.
The ASU-85’s 85-mm. gun fires high explosive antitank (penetration: 400 millimeters at 0°) and high-velocity, armorpiercing, tracer (penetration: 180 millimeters at 0° at 1,000 meters) ammunition.9 The ASU-85’s firepower cannot match the 152-mm. gun-missile combination on its U. S. equivalent, the M551 Sheridan, or that of most the NATO Alliance’s main battle tanks.
Fire support in Soviet airborne divisions is considerably less formidable and less mobile than that in first-line ground combat divisions, despite improvements. Division artillery consists of 30 towed D-30 122-mm. howitzers (five batteries compared to 21 in a motorized rifle division) and a battery of six towed Ml975 122-mm., 12-tube rocket launchers. The D-30 has a maximum range of 15,300 meters. The air defense battalion has 18 towed, ZU-23 dual 23-mm. antiaircraft guns (but no radar for target acquisition or fire control), and each airborne regiment has another six-gun battery of ZU- 23s. These are augmented by the SA-7
Grail man-portable, surface-to-air missile (or its replacement, the new SA-14 Gremlin), numbers of which are scattered throughout the division.10
Other divisional support is correspondingly light and includes engineer, signal, transportation and maintenance, parachute rigging and resupply, and medical battalions and a chemical defense company. The Soviet airborne division is entirely mobile with its 461 light armored vehicles and 1,410 trucks and trailers.11
The Soviets have been seeking means to improve the firepower and mobility of their airborne artillery to more effectively support their mechanized airborne infantry. During the 1985 May Day parade in Moscow, the VDV showed off its Ml981 120-mm. self-propelled howitzer (airborne), which appears to be an innovative and highly versatile fire support weapon based on the BMD Ml979 lengthened chassis. Resembling a “toy tank” because of its large, cone-shaped turret on a small chassis, the M1981 offers the capabilities of howitzer, direct-fire antitank gun, and mortar in one compact, lightly armored, amphibious, and airdroppable self-propelled system. Its variable height suspension can be lowered to provide stability during firing. This system has the potential, if its gun/ammunition combination is adequate and it is produced in sufficient numbers, of replacing the ASU-85, D-30 122-mm. howitzer, 120mm. mortar, and prime movers for the latter two weapons in Soviet airborne division inventories. The M1981 could greatly reduce airlift space requirements and add significant versatility, mobility, and survivability to Soviet airborne fire support assets and enhance already formidable mechanized airborne infantry capabilities in enemy rear areas.12
Zhurnal, No. 10, Oct. 82. Moscow, P- '
2Red Star, 11 September 1981. AirboV1
3Maj. James H. Brusstar, (U) The So ujgence Forces, DDB-110-2-82. Defense I"le 8 Agency, 1982. pp. 2, 11. ■ , gloc £l,,e
“Steven J. Zaloga and James Loop, sov Forces, London, 1985, pp- 13-16- j vvitb a 5 A modified version of the BMD- , ^ pen-
tube-launched AT-4 Spigot ATOM ( ^ t;ic re
citation at 70-2,000-meter range) inste 0„ in launched Sagger, was first parade >
1983. „ined in: DC
information about the BMD-1 is cont ‘ Fornti- W. P. Baxter, U. S. Army (Ret.), » ^ pp. 41'
dable Fighting Machine,” Army, Nnrc A 43; DDB-1110-2-82, Defense ns, Org1’"'
p. 26; (U) FM 100-2-3, Soviet Army T'1 4.188-
ization and Equipment, August ,;;;n/irrrKl
5-28, 5-29; (U) Soviet Divisional Yj.-tte* Dc‘
93;
New
0d
Guide, DDB-1100-333-82, D1A. P- tails about the BMD-1,” Defence 9-I •
82, pp. 34-35; Soviet Bloc Elite Fore •
13 ■ ip DV®
1Soviet Divisional Organizational “ p. 931100-333-82, Defense Intelligence Ag ., i0-2-8'' TDB-1100-333-82, pp. 87-92; DD p. 5.
“DDB-l 110-2-82, p. 27 5-45.
‘"DDB-1110-2-82, pp. 5.
"DDB-1100-333-82, pp. p. 5
pM 100-2-3. PP’
88, 89;
DDB
l2“Kanonen-Moerser 120(?)mm
544,
.U10-2-82'
iteli ‘1985. P-
nonen-ivioerser izuv ■
BMD M1979,” Sotdat und Techmk^^jo^
air-P0! intern*"0"
427; “M-1981 SP Howitzer,”
Soviet 120mm^/Pr-
nal, August 1985, p. 3 ?
self-propelled mortar/howitzer, fense Review, 11/1985, p. 1729.
gradual
Captain Besch is a U. S. Naval Academy woUntN Marine infantry officer retired for 1 ^jS / and a former CIA intelligence ana ys^pS and ^ experience includes two parachute J ^74-83- combat operations in Vietnam. ^r0I?e y. S- ^ j, studied foreign armored vehicles at t and t Foreign Science and Technology ecy pro ^ spent a year as a Defense Intelligence^e Hc's n°nj sor of science and technology intelhg niaer»ce a Chief, Asia Branch, U. S. Army I"tc '? The ^ Threat Analysis Center, Washington pefe0 thor’s views do not represent officia jgS Department, or U. S. Government p°
'Col. N. Ramanichev, “Development of Theory and Practice in Combat Employment of Airborne Troops in the Interwar Period,” Voyenno-Istorichevskiy
------------------------ ,. h vtnil (T
Editor’s Note: Part IP w'lU jjScU^s
pear in the August Proceedings’ ^ ait'
Soviet air assault units and air Sodet’ lift capabilities, and compel U. S., and NATO airborne Pr '
Procurement:
, Present, Future
By Captain Stuart J. Fitrell, U. S. Navy
Fueled by newspaper stories of $436 hammers, cost and schedule overruns, and post-deployment breakdowns, it is not in the least remarkable that military executives should alternately be needled about the latest expose, then seriously questioned, not necessarily abofft the accuracy of the stories, but rather about why we seem unable to use common sense and good business practices in the
defense acquisition process.
The Past: The defense acquisitions process has come a long way since the apocryphal blacksmith wrote a letter to the Continental Congress offering to build a cannon. He had never built one, but he was sure he could do it.
Immediately following World War II, the Navy, Amiy, and Air Force independently determined their needs with little
• apP|ic3.
thought given to multiservic® coti tions. In those halcyon times,' fll;in1' ceivable for two or three a'rcr wh'1- facturers to develop a prototyP . to 3 Navy test pilots could then sU “fly-off” competition. burge011.
By the early 1960s, however, typing technology and excessive g cd’11,
costs spelled an end to the har pefeH'1 petition concept. Secretary 0
samara arrived in Washington ■mu pr- ;"at the innovative manage- '^°tor pnciP*es he had used at the Ford Cable in°mPany would be equally appli- ^°b). [j .. Department of Defense ^C(lUanfrC'S'0n ma^‘n8 was reduced to C°r,sicje1 ,able measurement of all of the With subs‘°nS relevant a problem, Dry givinec^Uent application of game the- fj°n. credence to the ultimate deci- heeds ,Cretary McNamara centralized r°.§ativeCterrn'nations” as a DoD pre- W|ttl rWhisnd atternPted to save money l9fiiSerV'ce Procurements.
S|()n of th lad established its ver-
PrograrnC(, ^aPer Chase.” A four-phase c°hcept u, eve*0Ped wherein a system Nsi0n-aas established on the basis of y c0ntra 3 nect*s and was then defined ?°P°sedC °rs w'tpl a Paper proposal. The by Systern was developed and pro- ,ll'0n, an , ® winner of the paper compe- .Pd Updatlnal,y deployed, maintained, l°tal p This concept, known as ?s defjc- a§e Procurement,” had seri- C to accnC'eS' ^ was almost impossi- CUrately forecast research and development/production costs or devise realistic schedules based solely on a written proposal.
By the 1970s, the Defense Department had introduced the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council in response to public pressure against cost and schedule overruns and performance deficiencies. The required improvement in acquisition performance was supposed to come from a milestone concept. The system initially included three milestones. The Milestone I review evaluated proposed concepts for performance and affordability, and a decision was made as to which concept should be further explored. Milestone II evaluated the maturing concept and determined its suitability for full-scale development. At Milestone III, the fully developed hardware was reviewed for a production decision.
The director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued OMB Circular A-109 in April 1976. This policy was designed to emphasize the front-end of the process—i.e., a concept exploration phase in which government, indus-
These bomb fuses, neatly in place on a seemingly endless production line, illustrate the problems of streamlining defense acquisitions. One streamlining initiative now provides several ways to check costs if supply personnel think the price is not right.
try, universities, and “think tanks” were able to develop alternate solutions to problems.
The direction of the defense acquisition process became increasingly obvious. In an attempt to minimize cost and schedule overruns, and to generate achievable performance thresholds that could answer established mission needs, the services were formalizing a series of frequent and searching program reviews at every step in the process.
Today: It was well established that decisions made early in a program had serious impact on the total life-cycle cost. But, by the early 1980s, the system had become overly cumbersome. The front- end series of reviews and wickets had so
career program to strengthen i tion specialists. The program s ^nl0n- is to attract officers who hav, ^gt- strated “head mance at the
,u,sitionS ‘and $436
akiu?
was over $100 diodes
As
and
stay'1’"
confronting the contractor.
prices are coming into line ‘ ^
there. . „ n^cuv
Improvements are also hei eInph
the area of contract writing- cts;
sis is now on fixed-price co \\c$' specifications are tailored 101 rslllts A ity to the subject system- j^tef"1
specified rather than outline 4Ures'
nable step-by-step how-to Pr°^ j(S p°s
lengthened the entire process that it was taking 10-13 years to develop and deploy a system, and even then there were overruns. It became obvious that something had to be done to reduce acquisition delays and to develop a rapid development capability for urgently needed systems.
The first streamlining phase was conducted from 1980-83. The objective was to shorten the program initiation process while ensuring only bona fide needs were receiving research and development funds. Under the old operational requirement and development proposal procedure, programs for which funding was not available and for which a warfare need had not been established could be started and significant dollars expended to study the proposal before the program was finally cancelled. Now, the tentative operational requirement, development options paper, and operational requirement series ensure that before time and money are spent studying a proposal, it has an Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) sponsor with adequate support funds and is approved by the Office of Naval Warfare (Op-095) and the Office of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (Op-098). This has reduced significantly the number of spurious ideas that formerly required systems command staffing and approval. Producing the development options paper may be quite time consuming and expensive, but the resulting document provides the sponsor with a menu of choices designed to solve his specific warfare need.
In the process of streamlining the system the number of controlling directives was reduced from 13 to eight. The milestone zero concept was eliminated with the mission element need statement and was replaced by the Justification of Major System New Start, which provided for greater latitude in selecting alternatives.
Other changes included drastic shortening of system concept papers, decision coordinating papers, and the Navy decision coordinating paper. In fact, Navy program documentation requirements were cut from about 20,000 pages to
- pages—eliminating nearly a year from the time required to get to Milestone I. Heavy emphasis was placed on program structure, including proper scheduling of developmental testing, operational testing, and long lead-time tooling to support milestone decisions.
The thrust of Milestone II was to demonstrate that only engineering problems remained to be solved—that the technology was at hand. The Milestone II review also sought to verify that the best approaches had been selected, that risks were identified and under control, that appropriate capability/cost compromises had been made, and that the life-cycle cost of the proposed system was affordable. The objective was to make Milestone II the “critical” milestone. Experience had shown that a program that had passed Milestone II and was in full-scale development was almost impossible to terminate no matter how badly the program had gone, i.e., too much money had been spent. Thus, if Milestone II was a thorough checkpoint and was viewed as the critical review, then a reasonable chance remained to fix or kill the proposal before too many resources were expended.
The cumbersome approval for service use decision was replaced by the approval for limited production or approval for full production decisions at Milestones III A and IIIB, respectively. This provided for economy, quality, and reduced production delivery time by allowing the contractor to begin phasing his production and establishing the manufacturing learning curve upon successful completion of developmental testing and initial operational testing. The concept restricted full production to a decision (IIIB) when the operational evaluation report was published and all logistics, reliability, and maintainability requirements were met. To further speed the process, the Milestone III decisions were delegated to the Navy by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in the case of acquisitions category I (the most important acquisitions category as defined by OSD directive) programs.
In the past, the services did not always aggressively pursue commodity buys. Now, however, if operational test and evaluation can be accomplished and reported on early enough in the program, commodity buys are possible for all “like platforms.” OpNav Instruction 5000.42B provides the approval to make commodity buys to cover all similar platforms. Great cost savings can be achieved in terms of decreased test and evaluation requirements and the standard cost savings that accrue from quantity ordering.
Competition tends to drive down costs. The Navy has been criticized for excessive sole-source contracting. A flag officer is now assigned as the competition advocate; the Navy expects up to a 30% savings in affected procurements.
The Navy is frequently charged with incompetence at the program manager level. The charges generally allege that the program manager is merely punching his ticket for a year or so in Washington and, although a superb operator, really is not qualified to be a project manager.
Nothing could be further from the
are bound
truth. Navy program managers coinCjd- to a four-year tenure with relie dicing with the conclusion of a ma.her the stone whenever possible. ru ^ 2ra()u- program manager generally as ^ion- ate degree, two previous acrjence related tours, and operationa e in a related warfare system- a netv The Navy recently insWu“ acqUisi- 1eCtive
I and shoulders P tfh„ commander level ans have a graduate degree an^°gjtjons °r experience in material acqw- for this support areas. Officers sele rnaterinl
program will be redesignated a ^in-
professionals and will spend niaterial der of their naval careers *^e nevv acquisition/support billets. appro)11' program specifically designates fig- mately 100 billets as flag-maten adre sional billets. The plan is to crecontinU' of material specialists who W1eXpertise ously operate in their area.° p(ae high' while simultaneously attracting ^ tpose est talent available to compe e assignments. . . . s uprl,iir
The most recent acquis it' ., pafli'
____ The Defense Departmen ^ 0yef'
great strides in the eliminate ^se|ves pricing, and it is the service*. 0yet- that are ferreting out many 0 ^leiu- charges and exposing the Properatin-j general, the contractors are cr£Vise
offering voluntary refunds a
priceS' ■ a to el>n5
One program designed ^ snijr
overcharges is the Buy Our p jtuted 1 program. This program, initiati^
1973, includes more than B ]oWS;11 but it can be summarized as 1verpfic .j-
supply clerk thinks a part 05leiU1 there is a mechanism to fix t e one exists. ■ e fight
Another initiative is the ”r -s susp' program. If a purchasing agelengineef cious of a price, he notifies a p^pisUP ing team, which draws the ite ^ a prk ply for an engineering review- „
£ out of line, the data are aval' ^
The Navy is reemphasizing ^ production quality assuran ^ ot process throughout the lilc-cy
WarrantianC* *S cornm'tted to ensuring that ti°n pnn?S are Part °t ail systems acquisi- <S?^,Because of one of these
for F/a io’ laC Nayy w'il not have to pay ~ 'A-18 tail F- 3
commitment to quality.
Althn
systei
lo . J 1,1 UUVt IU
ntay sliov.fi tUl' crac*cs- While warranties •ion cost m ’ncrease lhe initial acquisi- tluced ijf C exPected gains include re- ltlanufacturCy>Cle Costs an^ a continuing
noil K U - iV-jLicmij .
Orderly lae ^avy ^as an established, S'l'0r> wh°CeS^ *-°r weaPon system acquisary, t)1„ en cr’sis response is not neces- fole enouaC|?U'S't'0nS Process ‘s also Oex- tjnick reA. lo ia’l°r procedures when a Pected 'Ctlon *s justified for an unex- resP°nse mergent requirement. A quick stl0rtcuts means |aking shortcuts. Taking Sueruivmeans introducing risks, which l’cering ^ result in numerous costly engi- ange proposals and/or reduced operational availability. But. when the need exists and time is critical, reduced operational availability is better than no availability at all.
The Future: With advancing technology comes a more intricate interdependence of warfare specialties and, possibly, a gradual obsolescence of the traditional division of material acquisition along platform lines. Future efforts should be oriented toward the acquisition of material for a battle group, an amphibious battle group, or similar warfare area. Electromagnetic and oceanographic considerations should be an integral part of all program planning and execution.
A synergistic return might be realized by putting the platform specialists together to solve warfare material acquisition problems with a larger perspective.
At the least, we might assure that units in a landing force would have communications systems compatible with their support forces—such was not the case in Grenada! Since we must train and fight as a combined arms team in any conceivable hostile action, we must design and develop our forces, and acquire weapons with the same warfare orientation.
Captain Fitrell is a 1962 graduate of the Naval Academy, a 1967 graduate of the Air Force Test Pilot School, and has a master’s degree in aeronautical engineering. He has flown A-4s and A-7s, and commanded an A-7 squadron. From 1978-80, he was the chief test pilot for systems at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. He was the director of acquisition programs and policy for the Chief of Naval Material from 1984-85. A recent graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, he is the commanding officer of NAS Patuxent River.
A?l]ing for Victor
------------------------------------------------------
and uA Soviet submarine technol- 'Nation ant'submarine warfare inSpy rin„ COmPromised by the Walkei A anti and ot*lers have jeopardizec *ae Greeni.mar'ne net stretching across pUJlo and-Iceland-United Kingdom a°vice cuUp>' ^ut Gloria, a towed sonai 'vaterSjent’y mapping U. S. coastal discover the undersea topo
vdii
graphical features that are allowing Soviet subs to slip through the G1UK Gap undetected.
The SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) net and its component parts, Caesar, Bronco, Barrier, etc., are the West’s major defense against the maritime segment of a Soviet attack. Each component is composed of strings of seabed- mounted hydrophones, each capable of scanning a number of frequency bands, and identifying a Soviet submarine and its location to within a 50-mile radius.
Once located, hostile contacts would be further localized by ships and aircraft, and attacked if hostilities had broken out. This concept, “barrier and area search,” is the heart of NATO's plan to keep the sea lines of communication open between North America and Western Europe. Over the past 25 years, with the help of more than $8 billion and five major and numerous minor overhauls and upgrades, we have enhanced our ability to track the submarines of Admiral Gorshkov's, and now Admiral Chernavin’s, licet.
But how long can we keep this up? The most obvious risk is improved Soviet submarine technology. We started light- years (or, perhaps, “sound-years”) ahead of the Soviets in acoustic quieting, but our lead is slipping. Now, more advanced. quieter Soviet subs arc prowling the seas. And in 1980, the media reported the passage of a Soviet Alpha-class nuclear-powered attack submarine—not a quiet sub by any standard—through the SOSUS barrier, detected only when she broke radio silence. One suspects that future Soviet submarines, based largely on stolen Western technology, will be
8-9 knots, in open ocean-- squ»*v about 27: ^ s|ze ot ' 60
Rhode Island. Objects as s,“ AaP„
can accurately map kilometers per
from the truth. Gloria was a^sSe\, anj 1984 from a rather modest ^ ^ ne"
- ■*&+
was loaned to the USGS, w |C -
surveying the waters sive economic zone since
mercially feasible for reco
Proceei
dinRs
quieter yet, and Soviet radiomen more discreet.
Another risk is the loss of vital information about these detection systems. The U. S. Navy and our allies’ intelligence services have been shaken by the revelations of Soviet “moles” who have passed sensitive information to the Soviets for decades. The Navy’s own sad claim to notoriety includes major breaches of security in communications, attack submarine operations, and, most seriously, antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The losses prompted a former Royal Navy undersecretary to publicly decry the “disturbing implications” of the damage to the Royal Navy’s ASW unit and demand that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher insist that the U. S. Navy reveal the extent of its losses.
In the past decade, numerous articles and books—some purporting to be fact, some informed fiction—have delineated the basic outline and function of SOSUS and other ASW sentinels. The obvious Soviet use for this material would be to find a path through our barriers they could use in war. If the bulk of the Soviet Northern Fleet’s submarines could get past SOSUS, forcing our ASW forces to encounter them willy-nilly rather than in a coordinated effort, it would end our hopes of keeping the sea lines of communications to Europe open and avoiding the nuclear threshold.
Thus, if there are submerged seamounts, valleys, and the like that blank out parts of SOSUS’s coverage, we must find them and emplace more and better sensors; the problem is how.
The Soviets have scores of oceanographic research vessels, even discounting those ships bearing that label but actually functioning as intelligence collectors. With a head start provided by both purloined intelligence and man- years more experience at probing the depths (albeit with less-developed technology in most cases), the Soviets have put us behind the power curve. They may find new bolt-holes faster than we can plug them. We need a way to quickly and definitively map large stretches of sea floor. Once we know exactly what the topography is far below the wind and waves, we can understand the world defined by thermoclines, currents, and sea floor tectonics.
For years, researchers at Britain’s In-
102
stitute for Oceanographic Science worked with a sonar device, derived from the ASDIC (Antisubmarine Detection Investigation Committee), a World War II forerunner of sonar. The device was code-named Gloria, for geographic long range inclined asdic. Designed to map the sea floor, it suffered from a major flaw: it was an analog device which depended on operator interpretation as much as hard data.
The British effort came to the attention of researchers in the United States who were familiar with the digitalized imaging technologies that emerged from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and Land Satellite (LandSat) programs. The research teams’ efforts were combined; the results have been staggering. During the spring and summer of 1984, a United States Geological Survey (USGS) vessel plodded along the U. S. West Coast; its raw data have revolutionized oceanography. Just off San Francisco, only miles from our familiar tidal zones, were found the streams of mighty undersea rivers, canyons that dwarf the Grand Canyon, and volcanoes larger than Mt. St. Helens.
The processed data are even more stunning. They have been compared favorably with the first LandSat pictures, which forever changed the face of modem geography. Using even more advanced image enhancement techniques derived from the space program, the entire ocean floor could eventually be mapped with greater thoroughness and accuracy than USGS topographical maps of the United States.
Gloria is a shipboard system with integral computer processing capability. Like many sonar systems, its sensors are towed behind the vessel. Unlike most such systems, its neutral bouyancy pod—:
eight meters long and 40 ceo , 0f only diameter—is deployed to a eP be|,ind 50 meters and trails 300an oper' the vessel. In that mode, G or ^^an 3()0 ate anywhere the water is deep ^ fanC" meters. The width of the scahe (jistancl" tion of the depth: eight times 0fSeabw to the seabed—a sizeable pteC dot
real estate. At the normal J0^1 Gl°r'a a : sUU* size1
meters high can be resolved a gloria-
depths; with overlapping swa'jng atf-
which functions like side ejects- borne radar, can discrimina centimeters high. roniareS'!-
Performance on thissca. ^gjga-floP sions of banks of multi- naVe: number-crunchers and Cape ^ fUrtl'L control center. Nothing cou jepj0yed 1.
vessel
will fit nicely on board one ^ sur Stalwart (T-AGOS-1 )-dass ^
veillance ships. • operllIlt
The first Gloria apparatus ^ (,as ^
»»f
and will continue through lier spot survey has already ^ _ country’s strategic position- oarc.
States depends heavily on for k vvb<c of certain strategic metals, garren are the cobalt-group miners s- ^ g0u ^ our major source is the um 1° - Africa, but we cannot be su e we can count on this source- g]°tl Fortunately, with the ai alten\
USGS scientists have foUlld Lrs- ^ tive source within our own edcP mal cobalt-group ore is con^'ery at
S/July
of 47 ^or'a found an underwater lode dePth ofvsn cobalt'SrouP metals at a
Hake us sHf°° «eterS °r less—enouSh to market “'Sulhcient. Owing to current tot e[,nC°ndltions- recovery of the ore is within tnh°miCally feas'ble, but it is well
.1 J ''MOU/IV, Lull 11 u well
c capability of current technol- Partner Tk °Se ^outb Africa as a trading and G|„'* econ°mics will fall into line, fr°m ar/Ik W*d bave savetf this country I973 n° er round of blackmail like the
In A0' Crisis'”
loan t0P"''986- tbe Gloria device on Proved ■, ■ was replaced by an im- Gnited J.ersion which is owned by the graphic cateS' Tbe Institute for Oceano- a Version f'ence bas shifted production to "nth a r. 0bc use£l by a British company the exc|rUncb'se 10 use Gloria to survey
states_ ^!Slve economic zones of littoral
c°Urse T,r an appropriate charge, of Cor,>mer ' |IS means that outside of this viet com** .venture—and possible So-
stc>len- .fet'’’on 'f the technology is
°ther e G • S. Government is the only Source of Gloria data. The implica-
{^Per Worth Chasing
yj°hn L. Kmetz
°gy. if
tions are obvious.
With Gloria, we can recover much of what was feared lost to the Soviets through the treason of the Walker spy ring. Picture the Triumph (T-AGOS-4) travelling a carefully calculated course from Greenland, to Iceland, to the United Kingdom, to Norway, and then returning; each crossing taking about a week and crossing a little north of the previous one. In a few months (one or two of the standard 90-day patrols specified in this class’s design), a wide swath of the North Atlantic is mapped in a detail never before conceived. If there are unknown channels, hiding places, or passages, they will be revealed to us. With the detailed maps of the bottom will come detailed knowledge of the mechanics of currents and thermocline formations, which will teach our submarine crews how to avoid Soviet detection and find Soviet subs.
Other Navy communities will be able to use Gloria. The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine support program
maintains a two-ship force of support survey vessels (T-AGSs) for sea floor charting and magnetic mapping. Obviously, the addition of Gloria’s capabilities to current side-looking contour mapping arrays would make boomer captains’ lives easier and safer.
Using boat-mounted sonar devices, a fisherman can chart the bottom of his favorite lake, locating sinkholes where the big ones lie, feeding spots and routes between them, and resting spots. This information lets the fisherman drop his hook where the fish are, rather than endlessly quartering the lake hoping to chance upon a lunker. With Gloria’s sensors trailing behind the Triumph or one of her sisters, we will know where to fish for Foxtrots, chum for Charlies, or troll for Victors.
Mr. Mar is a commissioned peace officer in Colorado and a freelance writer on naval and defense affairs. He would like to thank Dr. Gary Hill, head of Project EEZMAP, and Dr. Bonnie MacGregor, both of whom led the Summer 1985 Gloria Gulf Coast survey, for their assistance.
latlthought-:
■'otishi c"‘~Prov°king article on the retrial mf . etWeen maintenance and ma- requjrern(;na^ernent (3M) data collection ‘•'■'craft m- and tbe consequences for J°hnc p ntenance, written by Captain °ach, U. S. Navy, and Lieuten
ant
-• Qq - A. ,V* , j , W..V* I^IWUICII
u s gander Dennis H. Genovese, '983issuvy. appeared in the December ?r§Umeme°*Proceedings * The authors’ ' 3M dap Can be summarized as follows: end'ng obf Cobect‘on poses a heavy, untile Dr^ !Sat'°n on the repair technician no return in maintenance
?^°Viding
►
s'stan,
\ta
ice.
■henu crea!*eCt'°n Und ana*ys*s require-
^,;mas>atic data
a managerial preoccupation
processing (ADP)
!*y and ,.roSat>ng personal responsibil Mana “Ve leadership.
»vauciMiip.
tef!ment information system "'g resn, no*°8y deflects problem-solv- •he MjWbility from management to
dePendenS^Stern’ whether for reasons of ■ a°rprCe °n computers, invalid input "y to rec°CeSSed outPut- or MIS’s inabil- ^hr°Ugh^mend s°lutions to problems.
"Pply ih_<>ut lhe article, the authors system and MIS in
Wv tk l,c
8eneki ,at thc 3M
nerai ,
^nt an(jllVt reduced personal involve ebectiVe Motivation—prerequisites for aircraft maintenance and im-
^ointenance
and lhe Paper Chase," pp.
proved operational readiness. Although designed to support management at all levels, most MIS reports and output are not used or usable. The authors suggest that “reassessment of where we are headed is prudent, if the course to be considered for the future is to strengthen and support the operational readiness of our deployable forces.’’ They conclude that a study group should not be formed, because it would only reinforce the status quo.
While the frustrations Captain Roach and Commander Genovese have experienced are genuine, they do not necessarily justify a deviation from MIS. What is needed is a more complete and effective development and application of MIS.
From 1976 to 1984,1 was involved in a number of studies and logistics support analyses of I-level avionics maintenance processes, focusing on the NavAir versatile avionics shop test (VAST) system and ■related automatic testers. I made numerous visits to various aircraft support facilities afloat and ashore, and performed several analyses of 3M data to investigate performance variations among sites.
Although not all aspects of avionics maintenance have counterparts in other I-level shops or at the O-level, many of the variables driving maintenance complexity in I-level shops correspond to others elsewhere; the differences are of de-
gree, not kind.
The authors argue that the 3M data collection system requires a great deal of the technician’s time but does not result in a corresponding improvement in maintenance. If this is true, there are two options: eliminate or alter repair cycle documentation. The latter can be either a reduced-burden mode of documentation, such as the maintenance index record (MIR) that preceded the 3M system, or an advanced form of documentation, such as direct electronic data entry, consistent with the concept of the “paperless ■ship” frequently discussed in the fleet.
It seems self-evident that the first alternative is unrealistic. We can no more eliminate recording of data and repair actions than we can function for long without recording the personal checks we write. What of the altered modes of documentation? If we opt for a simpler mode of gathering maintenance data, such as the MIR, we will reduce the burden of data collection. This may seem attractive, but as with most managerial actions, a seemingly positive action may produce undesirable consequences.
A number of such consequences can be anticipated with reduced documentation. Recording of maintenance data, including parts replaced, symptoms of malfunction, specific properties of malfunctions, and the like supports the maintenance
data input might req jata n ^ cian time for digging 0 0^-
ed in standard terms, e , rj da
. . __ ictanua’ . tc
fected by sucn a .
authors’ second argu
process. To reduce data collection is also to reduce data availability. If we reduce total documentation, do we also risk reducing our ability to identify recurring complex problems? In the avionics community, the answer would be “yes” in a number of cases.
As naval aircraft have become more complex, so too have maintenance procedures and documentation requirements. The 1946 F8F required 1,180 pages of technical manuals; the 1962 A-6A
- pages; and the 1975 F-14A
- pages.1 F8F-era avionics troubleshooters could examine a weapon replaceable assembly (WRA) to see if tubes were dark, or put them in a tube tester. Logic chips give no visible indication of function or malfunction, and the chips now becoming part of many avionics subsystems contain so many “gates,” or
The success of several fleet-initiated aircraft maintenance management systems indicates that adjusting current systems—not minimizing repair documentation—is the best way to get aircraft technicians back into this hangar to fix the planes.
logic paths, that they cannot be manually diagnosed. It has been estimated that if a technician were to manually probe a chip with 100,000 gates, it would require 1057 days to complete the job. A technician who had begun such a task at the dawn of time would now be about 30% finished.” If documentation requirements were reduced, would that necessarily reduce technician maintenance time? One compelling reason for arguing against that assumption is the effect reduced requirements would have on configuration control. Even with the volume and complexities of 3M documentation, configuration control remains as one of the major problems facing fleet aircraft maintainers. The 3M system not only requires a specified volume of data collection, but also requires standardized data collection, lointly, these requirements should support the collection of enough data to maintain configuration control in a format that permits correct fleet-wide interpretation. As the authors of the 1983 article acknowledged, the different type commanders did not have such standardization before the 3M system. A reduced volume of documentation could become the basis for reduced standardization, and quite possibly for reduced adequacy of configuration control.
t be sim-
In an era when many parts cann0' e(j for ply visually or manually insP^m jnter- repair, and when many Parts seliration changeable but are not, conM control could be destroyed. t:0n is If a certain level of docume ^ne
needed to get th * ording)’
(i.e., minimum information r ^ion do we know how much d that
could be reduced without vio ,^ue is lower limit? In other words, aj-,solute relative change rather t'ian , wjdely change. Studies have Pr0 uc(jnierev-drying estimates of technicia fro111 quired^for documentation, ran^vere- 10% to 50% in the studies i js n0 viewed. To my knowledge, jocu- firm value to guide us in re u oerations mentation, and given the con ^ybe raised above, the potential s3p ^ refar smaller than we expect-
umu ^ . ^..ir u****1
cian time for diggin? rS o'vl ' ed in standard terms, e , r(j d‘ interpretation of nonSta :,,n tii’ie ;ments for more techni net ti’1 t errors, and the like- t[oH , mies of reduced data . pUt a ative. Maintenance thf ional readiness could ffected by such a c*ian?nt is !l‘
ProceedioS*
create • ect'on anc* analysis requirements ADp a managerial preoccupation with s°na] the detriment of per-
ship an<^ act've teader-
SOns- First* , "
Th' ’ . j ‘
ls is difficult to test for two rea- person^|St’ measuring attributes like
leadershin»reSP°nsibility’
ciaiiy a- ■ ls difficult in itself, espe-
strurr1en!Sanm'nat'ng among levels.' In- e ■ quantitative measurement of
and “active
such
but also'3 u'CS 'S tbe most reFable form. tUrecj lhc most problematic. Struc- by train °,ntro**ed» multiple observations best f0rai °^servers is probably the next
■ted hv''i°f measuremcnt. Both are lim- ua their i
changes the nature of the
^ta r^i,tbe'r °htrusivcness. The act of
varin bein§ measured and is subject there f).US errors- To my knowledge, Suteirio«fS „been no controlled mea-
p . uu VUllUOllCU IllCd*
0r activ i C'lber Personal responsibility CornrnutV ea<^ers^'P in the maintenance draw 'y’ wh'ch necessarily forces us vatiQnsCp ncius>ons from personal obser- ently ?,.L. rsonal observations are inher-
Th,
subject
to error and uncertainty.
‘tssertionCC[>n^ difficulty in testing this b<i\v m derives from the question of active ]e | Pers°nal responsibility and nance ersb'P contribute to mainte-
of
effectiveness relative
to the effects
ble chananiZation—one °f die most visi- av'onir-c®eS 'n a'rcraft maintenance in the c°mmunity. Mechanization re-
dui
antes
dtetit in ?i_ Potential for worker involve-
■ ■
etlrichme >.r tbe recent interest in “job in many organizations, is intended to increase
SP0|
job and has been partly re-
K>ers- 1? for
V* TTWlls- vvuipwci trol, noP°ns'l5,e for jobs they sible \V|1'S 11 iikely they will feel respon- Contr0| j~n lhey recognize they cannot d'ut as m C It has also been found 'de )e j^hanization increases, so does tCchniCja °P training required for the does thg0 ^ut as training increases, so r°ra ear| quantity of material forgotten > an ,y training unless there is common 0[Jsrepetitive practice. This has as 0ne ofCrVcd in the avionics community lecbnic;~-SeveraI contributors to deficient an du,
‘^hnici; "k Persona' responsibility in Servati0nn bcbavi°r (assuming these ob- ^Pcrwopk are correct) are a function of ^asive rcclu'rcmcnts or other, more MeZ\changes in maintenance. f>r lea(jlniZat'on a*so reduces potential ,)rttt c control. Leadership in any lrde 0|- n°t influence the required run
°i which feeli
i’ility f0 ' p6llngs of control and responsible ^e*r Work.3 Workers cannot be
'cannot con-
]C: '-uimiouiors to uenciei
°Pen n,PCrf°miancc.4 Therefore, it
cti0ns dUestion whether observed re
doted ' 8 test
program set. It has been
, U ] 1 O 1 * Ovl. At I1UJ I I
Substitutacademic literature that many cs for leadership” often serve
to neutralize leadership influence.5 For example, if a hydraulic system tester indicates that a system is working because it has been repaired correctly, the leader does not need to tell the worker that he is doing a good job—that feedback is obtained from the tester. A faulty tester giving erroneous or ambiguous feedback, however, simply frustrates the worker. The leader may say that the worker is doing a good job, but the worker knows that the leader is only reinforcing the worker’s persistence, or worse, that the leader does not know what is going on. Either way, leader influence is limited. I have observed that many avionics shop supervisors and managers become as frustrated by their inability to control the process as do technicians.
However, I have also observed considerable initiative by both technicians and their leaders. Intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) officers at several sites— afloat and ashore—have changed the physical location of inventories when frequent trial-and-error parts substitution is required for WRA repair; they have created forward parts depots, near the avionics shops. They have also created feedback and worker reinforcement tools to counter some of the effects of mechanization, and have co-located supply support and production control officers to maximize interaction and coordination.
Technicians have also shown considerable initiative. Technicians use ready-for- issue WRAs as comparison standards when they receive ambiguous avionics fault isolations from testers. If available, they study test logic diagrams and circuit drawings for both testers and avionics. The personal notebooks (“wheelbooks”) used by avionics technicians to record alternative repair procedures for problematic WRAs and/or test program sets require tremendous individual effort. Avionics supervisors and officers are aware of the wheelbooks, and take considerable personal risks in some cases by allowing them to be used. The procedures in these wheelbooks are not the approved procedures for avionics troubleshooting and repair. The “safe” route for managers would be to disallow these, but this would undercut operational readiness.
Management has also shown an interest in ADP applications, and the results I have observed are very positive. Several afloat and ashore site managers have developed automated procedures to assist aircraft maintenance, ranging from development of local supply support programs, permitting direct maintenance technician query of inventories, to nearly complete automation of production control processes.
My observations regarding personal responsibility and active leadership differ from those of Captain Roach and Commander Genovese. Many factors can influence personal responsibility or leadership initiatives that are quite apart from the personal properties of technicians and managers. My visits revealed enough variation in these properties to suggest that they have not changed that much. I found managers who truly did not manage, but I also found those who demonstrated tremendous personal leadership. Happily, I found more of the latter.
The authors’ third argument is that management information system technology has deflected problem-solving responsibility from management to MIS. In one sense, I agree. However, my agreement is based on the frustrations created by an MIS system that does not properly support decision making, not on a change in responsibility.
Unfortunately, there is no uniform definition for the management information system, but it is generally taken to mean some form of automated system for data collection, storage, processing, and dissemination, and now clearly implies the involvement of computers. It may be instructive to compare this concept to the definition of C. West Churchman, who defines “a MIS (whether computer-based or manual) as a communicative process in which data are accumulated, processed, stored and transmitted to appropriate organizational personnel for the purpose of providing information on which to base management decisions. As such then an information system consists of, at least, a PERSON of a certain PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE who faces a PROBLEM within some ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT for which he needs EVIDENCE to arrive at a solution, where the evidence is made available through some MODE OF PRESENTATION.”6
We have not “created” an MIS with the 3M system; we merely changed it. The maintenance index record and the data processing used with it were every bit as much an MIS as the current system. This may seem an insignificant bit of academic rhetoric, but it directs attention to the relevant question—whether MIS meets the performance criteria suggested by Churchman.
In many respects, the 3M/maintenance action form (MAF) system was ahead of its time when introduced in the 1960s. Much of the information gathered then was not really needed, and, indeed, there are still blocks on the MAF that are never completed. Since then, however, some maintenance technology caught up with the 3M system and overtook it. Aircraft
%
tus report be requested 0 ^eStatus ion on a cruise, for examp e> repair. an Ex Rep (highest pnoW’ 0f the IMS would report comp red by air immediately after itwaS. ollgh the repair technician, even ,'repaif
'sical item might still be m sllpply
awaiting transportation "*
pmiup tl-iuc a true 1
maintenance managers now need information the 3M system cannot provide, for example, information on short-term local events, or site-specific information. When the 3M system was designed around a centralized mainframe system, the capability for such informational support was hardly more than a systems analyst’s concept; it has since become an everyday reality, but one that cannot be realized in the current 3M system. The effect has been to create a tremendous information-gathering capacity without appropriate analytical and reporting support. This is widely recognized in the fleet; I have reported it elsewhere.7
This suggests that we consider computer support and data collection separately. A large part of our aircraft maintenance MIS problem is computer support. But does that necessarily imply that those data collected are not useful? If so, we should find no operational utility for data collected through the 3M/MAF system.
I have found several cases of personal and collective site management initiatives taken to develop local MIS support, including the following:
- Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana developed its own Wang-based program for avionics pool repair assets, the special program for Oceana repairables tracking (SPORT) system, which used data entered through MAFs to maintain a 24- hour-current supply support data base, and permitted avionics technicians to make direct queries of parts availability for WRAs in repair.
- Before entering Philadelphia Navy Yard for service life extension maintenance, IMA officers on the USS For- restal (CV-59) developed an MIS based on the readiness milestone management system developed by the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Support Office (AIMSO) at Naval Air Test Center Patuxent River. This system used two leased TRS-80 microcomputers obtained from the Jacksonville Beach Radio Shack and off-the-shelf Radio Shack software. Cruise report data indicated the most successful cruise the Forrestal had was on its next Mediterranean deployment, with all three VAST stations working both on deployment and return, and with several instances of zero awaiting maintenance (AWM) WRAs in the VAST shop. Neither of these events had occurred previously.
- Production control officers at NAS North Island modified the fixed allowance module management system (FAMMS) to function as a production control program. This was limited by the need to run it on the base mainframe Burroughs computer, which was not available on weekends or during certain administrative-task periods, such as paycheck preparation. When available, the FAMMS program was credited with significant reduction of aircraft not mission-capable supply/part mission-capable supply system levels, improved inventory control, and better scheduling of AWM avionics.
These examples illustrate four points. First, local personnel developed these systems to meet local needs, although they needed assistance. Second, these efforts relied entirely on 3M data gathered through standard MAFs. Third, there is no commonality of hardware, software, operating systems, or most of the other attributes often considered necessary for an “integrated MIS.” Most importantly, they worked. In interviews with personnel involved at all levels of these systems, I heard no comments suggesting that nothing useful resulted, or that it just created more paper to file, or the like. On the contrary, most wished the system existed elsewhere, or were exasperated that it was so long in coming.
Have these programs made any difference beyond enthusiastic endorsement by their users? I will not attempt a full report here, but instead report a few data from previous analysis.8 I analyzed 3M data for calendar years 1978 and 1981, examining VAST shop elapsed maintenance time (EMT) and turnaround time (TAT) for VAST avionics repair actions. EMT is measured in hours, TAT in days.
Between 1978 and 1981, NASs Oceana and Miramar (both F-14 shore sites, although Miramar also supports E-2Cs) made procedural changes in their avionics repair processes. In 1978, Miramar had a forward parts detachment to support the VAST shop, but this was disbanded and moved back to the central supply support building by 1981. During the same interval, NAS Oceana began using the SPORT system. Table 1 compares effects on mean EMT, for 1978 and 1981, between these two sites.
Sample sizes, randomly drawn from the total of repair actions for the calendar year, ranged from a minimum of 294 repair actions to 1,212 repair actions. All differences were statistically significant at or beyond .01, i.e., there was less than one chance in 100 that these were chance differences. The effect on mean TAT was also dramatic (see Table 2).
The difference between mean TAT values for NAS Miramar were not statistically significant, but all other differences were.
A fourth program to examine the utility of MAF data is the status inventory data management system (SIDMS), deployed
in the 1970s in AirLant can'etS^comported by a Harris Corporation ^
puter. SIDMS is a group of p|y
provides a number of 1-leve aera- support status-keeping and reP° ?0l)S, it tion functions. Among other u ntory will report various on-boar KCOlis, statuses, keep awaiting Par sirnPonent maintain a current individual repair list, provide personne jnC|Ud- tion, and a variety of other tas jj48 ing automatic preparation o requisitions. |aCe
SIDMS is designed not to W ^ MAF system, but to augmen capa- more importantly to provide gener. bility to process and use MA gr
ated on the carrier. While porrnati°n work goes on as usual, inthe entered on MAFs is also entere a IMS program as it occurs. fepair ransponaiw - ctive
ort. SIDMS is thus a truejibing tase system, capable ot i jnf0rrvia' reporting the most curren entered into it. . ? qable •’
as SIDMS been effectlVfirLantand /s mean TAT values for rfaedv' ac carriers for 1981- ice has been attributed c’. n vvefl' imple sizes for this comp :rLant an.- 7 repair actions for q-jie di 7 repair actions for ^
ice between these I At
CW't
Carrier TAT
c£ica"y significant nce m 1,000.
ip”
shi
1 J V] p • |
^Aps r Wl“ prepare all subsequent unit nnj°r technicians. After data on a Promp( ®r test are entered, VAMP will Map" technician5
to make additional VAlVip fles as required. Moreover
'he term?n°!!lpares data entered through
beyond one
is the^V/fc^11 Reserving special mention gram t\,ij autorr|ated management pro- opedin A,MP)- VAMP has been devel- craft •'nt y ander the sponsorship of air- °ffice errne(iiate maintenance support North i r *^*A management at NAS to cnJ,and' VAMP is the first program
qnihm t0 *
JUe- The
'n';level maintenance.
1 tech
Cal dat u UI6,UCU vanaoies trom its essentiajak3Se Specifically, the mission suhsystem matrix weight for the set, rur) ®tuP time for the test program age induct!!? f°r the test program, aver-
and numhtl0ns °f the WRA Per month>
rePair „ er °h the same WRAs in the Pair pi-i0reue) t0 determine an initial re- °’her Va h j The program then uses six °rity atl(j,a es to modify this initial pri- t'e'v Wr ASCta. hnai priority. Whenever a vi°Uslv >, . ls inducted for repair, all pre- and renc edldec* WRAs are reevaluated
.ViJS—r
Fs for
and aav^al against the initial MAF data ^Alvip? a'rcraft maintenance program COfrect j.reciuhements, and requires both S'stent w:!!a entries and data entry con- lhe l0caj "h NAMP policy. In this way, Curate ata bases become increasingly VAMpUS ‘hey are accumulated.
^ vaiiLautomatica|iy cross-references ltS c°ntribICS Severa* internal data bases; ’Peru eff u‘‘°n to maintenance manage- Ptonths ^‘IVeness was apparent after six ■3/\ y. e configuration manual for the Ptaster e ‘s the consolidated aircraft ’he seconHUlPment list (CAMEL); when ePterecj ■ edition of the CAMEL was Ppted ton‘e VAMP memory and com- ,%ns '^A illustrated parts break- !ndcx ? ‘he master test program set Va. v?r 300 CAMEL errors were Thg ately identified.
%h lS|Veral1 effect of VAMP at NAS ^aitin and.is dramatic. VAST WRAs h° andITIiann‘enance declined between Uecernber i ^ Prom -*anuary through *983. During the same inter-
Deteriorating technician performance, which some attribute to management preoccupation with data processing, can also stem from other factors—for example, the increasing complexity of hardware, systems, and training.
val, mean WRA TAT was reduced from an average of 12.2 days to 5.5 days, a 55% decline, and VAST station availability doubled. An average of 15 WRAs were removed from awaiting parts and returned to the supply support pool during each week of VAMP operation. VAST also took on the repair of shop replaceable assemblies which previously had been repaired on another specialized tester. VAMP supports local problem resolution: When one WRA was removed from an aircraft several times and found to have no fault, a search of the MAF data base revealed that these WRAs had been removed by the same O-level technician. An investigation showed this worker had been improperly trained. When he was retrained in the correct troubleshooting procedure, the false removals stopped.
These results were achieved with two of six stations idle for the last six months of 1983, and all six stations idle on three occasions for lack of WRAs in the repair queue. In this same period, one station was turned over to NAS North Island’s and Alameda’s naval air rework facilities for test programming and WRA engineering services, since it was no longer required for aircraft WRA support. During 1984, one idle VAST station was placed on permanent standby, and the other was physically removed for installation on a new carrier. Thus, NAS North Island’s increased production is now being achieved with one-half of the VAST stations originally provided. NAS Cecil Field, operating with six VAST stations, but without the VAMP program, had an average EMT of 6.9 hours and average TAT of 13.8 days at the end of 1983. Both of these values are much higher than those achieved at North Island with VAMP, and the likelihood that these differences are due to chance factors is less than one chance in 10,000.
These programs indicate MAF data are extremely useful, and that if adequate data-processing support is locally available, the completion of MAF entries can hardly be construed as a “paper chase.”
I cannot agree with Captain Roach and Commander Genovese that we may need to move away from reliance on data- intensive management systems, nor do I agree that these systems have damaged the fleet’s quality of leadership or technician involvement with their jobs. That we need to plan carefully where we go with these systems is undoubtedly true. But if the future of fleet aircraft maintenance is with increasing automation of test and repair processes and more complex weapon systems, then learning to use information and information management is the challenge to be met if readiness is to be improved.
'J. Tcnefrancia, keynote address to 1981 CATE 1LSMT (San Diego, CA: Proceedings of CATE ILSMT. 16 March 1981).
2lbid.
3R. W. Griffin, Task Design: An Integrative Approach (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1982). ■•"Productivity Enhancement of the Versatile Avionics Shop Test System: Site Evaluation and Final Report. Vol. II" (Falls Church, VA: Systems Research Corporation, 1979).
5S. Kerr, "Substitutes for leadership: some implications for organizational design," Organization and Administrative Sciences. Winter 1976, pp. 135-146. 6C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1971).
’John L. Kmetz, An information-processing study of a complex workflow in aircraft electronics repair. Administrative Science Quarterly, June 1984. pp. 255-280.
'“Common Automatic Test Equipment Logistics Support Analysis Update Study—VAST Shop Workload Analysis” (Syosset, NY: Harris Corporation. Government Support Systems Division, November. 1982).
Mr. Kmetz is Associate Professor of Management at the University of Delaware. His primary teaching and research interests are in organizational structure and performance, decision making, and information processing. He is a member of the Academy of Management and the Society of Logistics Engineers. He holds a BS degree from Penn State University, and MBA and Doctor of Business Administration degrees from the University of Maryland.