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^nda exhltlcal editorials and propa-
newsmen, mainly in a home :cesses ,,a, °n’ mentioning training
'Sn„.. . and awnrHr ----
__ mentioning training
.s°nnel dnU awards to ships and
WereVy °Perations “threatening” ?>C,aStaple item in the Soviet S. f anuary into April. In Janu-
th 'V° naval °rCeS Were sa^d t0 consist °f ,o! Carriers rCarrier strike groups led by Ja [Cv-6()l- SeU |CV-43i andSara- o, P.s ” So,,; . 0r ' an armada of 26 war- television showed U. S. tj/^jets. rn ’ cataPult launches, and air- AiH f°cUseri ni'd"Pehruary, Soviet atten- \'rica fry J^11 “aircraft carrier tJ^>] have "ipJ and ten °ther warships ’• join f • • ’ for the Mcditerra- J n the “notorious Coral Sea
*din
'8s /
* he o .
receiVes r°Vlet 8eneral public regularly and exerc '30rtS naval operations
Pets, radj’Ses trough its daily newspa- ''^Papers’ 3nd television. Since Soviet ' a tly
OM"da ex, cuuoriais ana propa- n1Peciaiiv f0rtations with little news— ,et stanH 0reign—ireports on the U. S. k Nav °Ut Ifdeed, it is likely the
!l,tymth,k?!ay.actual|y get more visi- aitehti0n frb and Soviet media and more 11 does in°!l ^ored Soviet readers than VVhere a wi,| he crowded U. S. media, Co,tlPete f„ 6 ^ar'ety °f interesting topics On the f u e reader’s attention, fts a*most°ther hand> the Soviet Navy ra* rtiedia 00 ment'on in the Soviet gen- I 'cle citjn^f^Pt an annual Navy Day °Valty 0f ® he growth, capabilities, and »Ct'vities ar 6 navy- The Soviet Navy’s ned■'‘tar ,u rePorted regularly only in toty^ape'r ^,ov'ct Defense Ministry Site,
Pen
to
June 1986 and Saratoga. Red Star carried a United Press International photo of an A-6 in position for a catapult launch.
In mid-March, the Soviet press was again full of reports on “the third provocative show of strength [by the United States] this year.” The operation was described as carried out by a “huge force” composed of “three aircraft carriers, 240 aircraft, and approximately 40 warships.” The Soviet media reported that U. S. aircraft with Harpoon missiles “had sunk or damaged several Libyan vessels, not only warships but also civilian craft. . . . HARM missiles damaged an anti-aircraft defense missile complex near the town of Sirte.”
In mid-April, immediately following the U. S. air strikes against Libya, the Soviet media was fully committed to reporting Soviet and Warsaw Pact protests against U. S. “aggression” and British “complicity.” While reiterating Soviet assurances to Libya and describing world reactions condemning the United States, they effectively preempted any early, detailed coverage of actual U. S. naval operations and capabilities.
During all this reporting on Libya, the Soviet press did not mention the activities of any of the approximately 40 Soviet ships in the Mediterranean, nor did it reveal the presence of a Soviet cruiser and a destroyer off Libya in the vicinity of U. S. forces, or the positioning of the flagship of the Soviet Mediterranean forces, a Don-class subtender, in Tripoli. The Soviet public was given a clue that Soviet ships could have been nearby only after the U. S./Libyan confrontations had occurred. In March, when Gorbachev denounced the U. S. actions against Libya, he also said, “For the Soviet Union, there is no need to have its naval force in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis. It has to keep its ships there permanently for this sole reason: The U. S. 6th Fleet armed with nuclear missile weapons and threatening the security of the Soviet Union. ... If the United States . . . pulled its fleet out of there, the Soviet Union would simultaneously do the same.” In April, when condemning U. S. naval actions, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Loneiko cautioned that the Soviet Union “has the full right to use Mediterranean waters for the movement of military ships.”
Also in mid-February, while the U. S. Navy’s activity off Libya received the principal spotlight in the Soviet press, items also appeared on NATO exercise Anchor Express 86 and Team Spirit 86. Meanwhile, a major Soviet combined- arms exercise was being conducted in the Baltic area involving “nearly 50,000 troops” and naval forces. Yet, the Soviet exercise was not reported in the general press and received only brief coverage in Red Star.
Similarly, on 18 March, when the Soviet Union chose to protest the 13 March U. S. naval activity in the Black Sea, the Soviet public learned that “two U. S. warships violated the state borders of the Soviet Union.” The Soviet media subsequently reported that The New York Times said these ships were “equipped with numerous electronic instruments” and were there “for the purpose of testing the Soviet defense system.” Only when the 22 March Izvestiya, the official newspaper of the Soviet Government, carried an interview with Admiral Chemavin did Soviet citizens learn of the activities of their own fleet. Admiral Chemavin advised the nation that the Soviet ship Lad- niy had reported the arrival of U. S. ships in the Black Sea and received an order to “continue observation.” He reported that KGB border guard craft and naval aircraft also were deployed to observe the U. S. forces. In addition, according to Cher- navin, the order was given to “raise the combat readiness of the naval strike forces. Ships and aircraft were immediately prepared for action.”
By its repeated, lengthy, detailed and highly charged reporting on the U. S. Navy, the Soviet media present the image of a large, powerful, capable, albeit aggressive and provocative U. S. Navy operating worldwide. In contrast, the infrequent, limited, and innocuous references to the Soviet Navy give the impression of a navy conducting constant basic training, reluctant deployments, and cautious operations. Ironically for the Soviets, it may be that the U. S. and Soviet navies are being presented to the Soviet general public and navymen in just the ways the United States would desire.
Presenting the New CinC
Since Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir N. Chemavin emerged as Commander-inChief (CinC) of the Soviet Navy in December 1985, the man and his views have been selectively revealed in appropriate periodicals to various audiences.
Soviet naval officers were introduced to their new commander in the lead article of the January 1986 Morskoy Sbornik, the Soviet Navy’s professional journal. The essay, written by Admiral Chemavin and entitled, “The Navy and the 27th Party Congress,” begins in the standard format of articles produced by Soviet military leaders to mark special occasions. It opens with the obligatory call for navymen to prepare for the Party Congress and cites the growth in the navy’s capabilities since the last congress. In this context, Chemavin writes that, “the Navy’s main strike force is composed of nuclear-powered submarines of various designations.” This is a departure from past practice in which both “submarines and missile-carrying aircraft” have been called the main strike force.
Admiral Chemavin then presents a typical Soviet view of the threat by combining U. S. and NATO naval forces to create a force of “3,300 ships, craft and auxiliaries, 2,600 combat aircraft, and 1,400 helicopters.” He cites, for example, “25 aircraft carriers of which 18 are American, including four nuclear powered,” apparently including U. S. helicopter amphibious assault ships and other NATO air-capable ships in his totals. When Chemavin discusses U. S. nuclear- powered fleet ballistic missile submarines and, later, emphasizes that the U. S. fleet is being equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles, he states that they are capable of delivering nuclear strikes “deep into Soviet territory.” Chemavin does avoid, however, the usual Soviet accusations that these are “first strike weapons.”
Keeping to the standard format, Cher- navin next discusses training, listing outstanding ships, and then turns to party political work and emphasizes that “the question of a general increase in organization and discipline is especially critical.” He states: “. . . it is not enough to see the shortcomings and plan measures for their elimination,” but rather, “It is necessary to make a decisive turn toward improvement.”
Then, in a departure for such articles, Admiral Chemavin provides guidance to his officers on the professional issues which are of obvious concern to him as he takes charge. He stresses command decision making, leadership, and modem training methods. He demands that corn-
manders give up formalism, simplicity, and outdated methods of combat training and use innovative and progressive methods such as electronic tactical trainers, computers, rapid means of communications, and automated systems.
Personal details about Admiral Cher- navin and his views on naval issues of international interest were revealed to a mainly foreign audience by an interview published in the 16 February 1986 Moscow News, a tabloid published in English and other languages for distribution overseas. The interviewer describes Cher- navin using the adjectives “tough,” “reserved,” and “austere” and suggests that his manner is a result of Chemavin’s wartime youth and the loss of his father at age 13. He reports that Chemavin graduated from the Frunze Higher Naval School in Leningrad in 1951, and served 30 years in the Northern Fleet in diesel and nuclear submarines, including ballistic missile subs, prior to coming to Moscow to be the Chief of the Main Navy Staff and then CinC.
Considering Chernavin’s background, his reply to a question about Soviet construction of an aircraft carrier and U. S. concerns about her, is not surprising: “. . . We have aircraft carriers equipped with planes and anti-submarine helicopters. . . . But aircraft carrying ships are not our chief strike force. This role is played by nuclear submarines.”
With his foreign audience in mind, the interviewer raises a number of questions about Soviet naval operations in distant waters. Chemavin assures, “None of our submarines are in the waters of Norway or Sweden.” He states that Soviet warships are in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean “for stabilization” and mentions the U. S. Naval Institute’s January Maritime Strategy Supplement, saying he has a copy on his desk. When asked, “If the Americans departed, would you issue an order for the recall of Soviet ships?” Chemavin replies, “We maintain reliable communications with the Fleet. But it is unlikely that we will ever have to use them for that purpose. My opinion is that the U. S. Navy will not quit the positions it has gotten so used to.” And when asked if there are other reasons why the Soviet Navy “roams so far from its bases,” Chemavin cites U. S. missiles in Europe and states, “Our strategic missile carrying submarines have responded with an equal threat.”
Finally, the interviewer notes reports in the U. S. press that no one would be able to prevent a U. S. submarine commander from independently launching missiles, a charge that has previously been picked up and repeated by Soviet
propagandists. But Chernavi “No that is not so . . . The decision use such weapons is the ,Prer.°|j0(];es in the country’s supreme politica jel both the United States and t e Union.’
in-
A broader Soviet audience formed that Admiral Chemavin _jn. appointed Soviet Navy rjng in
Chief in another interview app. j^ad- the 22 March Izvestiya. Un, p„straint." line, “The Fleet Showed jqavy’s Chemavin describes the ^ovieof govieI response to the alleged v'°*at'c’n territorial waters by the US -^O) (CG-48) and the USS CaroniVJ' p3-
on 13 March saying, “We di ?n /ypril-a tience and self-control.” Then | ^ ^t broader military audience g° ublish Chemavin as Red Star began ^ e*- short excerpts apparently tto. ernavin’s tended interview. Again, st jn Pr°’ submarine experience and 'ntf • gj,Jight^' fessional naval training were >8
Remembering the Former
the depar
ture
While to Western observers, — v of Admiral Sergei G. pjniofl
Admiral of the Fleet of the
tnd
seemed to occur without wa [0ngel| caused him to disappear into a 1^ carefu' obscurity, the view availab e cjearef-
Soviet observers was soinew ^grin the November 1985 ^.n(iraphy °f
ill me iwvcmm.1 . raP‘v f
nik, it was announced that a . 0
Admiral Gorshkov entitled, ^ settle Fleet,” would be publis \JtttOfl-
nes, Heroes of the Soviet While this journal did not a
the
of
vviuic mis juumai - pVelati°n West until after the Red Stai ^vy con1 Admiral Chemavin as the new
navy
firs1
mander in chief, it was Pr0^,a^et nav/j indication to perceptive ° ut to ^ readers that Gorshkov was ^ Re retired with honor. On 9 Fce(j pe-i Star carried the obituary °rrirSjjcov Admiral S. Ye Zakharov. aVin an
mmiirai o. ie • ^vik 7 ,
peared as a signatory after poli*'ca, the admirals heading the 1'/v.jnjStry ;|I\ Directorates of the Defense £ pep11; Soviet Navy but before the ^ soir Commander in Chiefs of t e ,. ^ p°_s. gesting he retained a high o ^ 2 tion. Further, in early Marc - of Congress of the Communis jeCted Soviet Union, Gorshkov was £0Ttiia'
his membership on the Cen j,v6 pa tee, indicating his continue ^js 1 ticipation in national affairs- ^ :ured even as Chernavi u pa
' that
UICU CVC1I aa ' , .0 IJJir - . M
icumbent CinC, was adde p.„f Ii'r onal lone navy position 1
fCb
iarty body. 0f the *
Then, with the availability ^ "uary Morskoy Sbornik, We
1 inn*
known Wllat Soviet insiders had is assj()()^somc time. Admiral Gorshkov the Def16^ 10 General Inspectorate of r'ndin!,^e^inistry- an honorary fact- ments an adv*sory body. Such appoint- retirem °W sen'or officials to delay full aii(jDriei't and thereby retain their pay try toVl e§es> while allowing the minis- ence f„0ntlnue t0 draw upon their experi- r special assignments.
^2^iiary Relations_________________
Part •
Which p P°*‘c'es> programs, and statutes ratifiecj Ulde ad aspects of Soviet life are held ev ^ Promulgated at congresses C°ngei> flve years- (The 27th Party March iLV!as k'eid during February and rriunist p The Program of the Com- is a i0narty of the Soviet Union [CPSU] fhat des<? cornPrehensive document tic, ar)(j .nbes Soviet ideological, domes- viet lnternational tasks, and states So- Politjcaj n°!n'c strategy and social and Party P°llcy- Under this last category, stated 'ry toward the armed forces is u as follows:
strenou? u,timate foundation of the s°ciening of the defense of the Partv,ISt,rn°dler*and ‘s the Communist °pmS leadership of military devel- in t.n and the Armed Forces. Policy e sphere of defense and the
country’s security and military doctrine ... are formulated and implemented with the party playing a leading role.”
“The CPSU will make every effort to ensure that the Soviet Armed Forces are at a level excluding strategic superiority on the part of imperialism’s forces and that the defense capability of the Soviet state is comprehensively improved. ...”
“The party will continue to show invariable concern for ensuring that the Soviet Armed Forces’ combat potential constitutes a strong fusion of military skill, ideological staunchness, organization and discipline on the part of the personnel, their loyalty to their patriotic and international duty, and a high level of technical equipment.
This new policy of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev is different from that established by the regime of Leonid Brezhnev in 1981, principally in terms of the promise of party support for the military. From now on, the party “will make every effort to ensure” that imperialism does not gain strategic superiority. For the past five years, the party had been committed to “constantly ensure that the armed forces have at their disposal all modem means necessary for defense of the homeland.” This subtle change in policy guiding resource allocation could not have been welcomed by Soviet military leaders. Having probably argued against it in party and government councils, they now choose not to personally publicize or endorse it.
While Soviet military leaders dutifully acknowledged party leadership and top- level involvement in military development and doctrinal decisions, in their 23 February Armed Forces Day speeches and articles, they did not acknowledge the prospect of reduced resources. Rather, they continued to use phrases reminiscent of earlier policy.
Party policy toward the military, however, includes more than outside, top- level political involvement in military development and doctrine and holding the pursestrings. Most important, it stresses party oversight of military loyalty, discipline, and training. That policy is carried out from within the military.
Thus, by exercising its prerogative for top-level involvement in developmental and doctrinal decision making, by making resource allocations, by coopting senior military leaders as party members, and by giving party members within the ranks the responsibility for overseeing most day-to-day activities, the Communist Party exerts a strong and all-pervasive influence over the Soviet military.
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