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By Norman Polmar, Editor, Guide to the Soviet Navy
Table 2: Soviet Submarine Force, early 1986
Type Active Classes
The current Soviet submarine program is one of the several enigmas about the Soviet armed forces that plague Western intelligence specialists and analysts. During the past few years, the Soviets have put to sea an unprecedented number of new submarine designs while the rate of construction has dropped precipitously.
Submarines unquestionably remain the backbone of the Soviet Navy despite massive investment in surface combatants, aircraft carriers, and naval-related space systems. Indeed, the justification has been offered—by Soviets as well as Westerners—that the other forces exist largely to support submarine operations. Thus, the Soviet Navy continues to operate the world’s largest submarine force with some 385 submarines in service— almost three times the number of U. S. Navy undersea craft.
During the past five years, seven new submarine classes or sub-classes have gone to sea from Soviet shipyards. (See Table 1)
The introduction of six nuclear and one diesel submarine classes since 1980 reflects an intensive Soviet submarine design and development effort. The three nuclear attack (SSN) classes introduced in a three-year period include three different designs, at least two types of reactor plants, and at least two hull materials. Also in this period, two nuclear research- special purpose submarines have been completed, the “Uniform” and “X- ray,” the latter reported to be a very small nuclear craft, possibly analogous to the U. S. Navy’s NR-1. Since 1984, at least one “Yankee” converted from a ballistic missile submarine to an attack submarine was activated while another ex-“Yankee” nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) was rebuilt as a trials ship for the SS-N-24 land-attack cruise missile.
The reasons for this intensity and diversity of effort are not completely clear, but certainly indicate the place of the submarine as the principal ship type in Soviet naval doctrine and strategy. The Soviets are producing at least three types of submarines for very different missions. At least one more type of cruise missile submarine should appear in the near future. Strategic missile submarines (SSBNs):
Table 1: New Soviet Submarines
Type Class | Lead Unit Displacement Completed (Tons) | |
SSBN Delta IV | 1985 | 13,550 |
SSBN Typhoon | 1983 | 25,000 |
SSGN Oscar | 1981 | 14,500 |
SSN Mike | 1985 | 9,700 |
SSN Akula | 1985 | 8,300+ |
SSN Sierra | 1984 | 7,550 |
SS Kilo | 1982 | 3,000 |
Ballistic Missile Submarines SSBN Modem (12-20 tubes) | 62 |
SSBN Older (missile trials) | 1 |
SSB Older (3 tubes) | 13 |
SSB Older (missile trials) | 2 |
Guided Missile Submarines SSGN Modem | 22 |
SSGN Older | 28 |
SSG Older | 16 |
Attack Submarines SSN/SSXN Modern* | 64 |
SSN/SSXN Older | 21 |
SS Modem | 83 |
SS Older | ~60 |
Auxiliary/Experimental/Special | Mission |
SSQN Communications | 1 |
SSQ Communications | 3 |
AGSSN Research/Experimental | 3 |
AGSS Research/Experimental | few |
AGSS Rescue/Salvage | 2 |
SST Training | 4 |
These are being built to provide a surviv- able, second-strike force armed with long-range, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that can strike the United States from Soviet home waters and bastions in the Arctic, where they can be defended by air, surface, and submarine forces.
“Delta IV-” and “Typhoon”-class SSBNs are each being completed at the rate of about one per year. Older “Yan- kee”-class SSBNs (completed 19671974) are being retired as the new submarines are completed, in accord with the SALT agreements.
The Soviets appear to be building two
Typhoon, Delta, Yankee Hotel III Golf II Golf III/V
Yankee, Oscar, Papa, Charlie I/II
Echo II
Juliett
Yankee, Akula, Mike, Sierra, Victor Alfa, Echo I, November, Hotel II Kilo, Tango, Foxtrot Romeo, Zulu IV, Whiskey Submarines
converted from Hotel SSBN
converted Golf SSB
Uniform, X-Ray, Echo II
Lima, Foxtrot, Zulu IV, Whiskey
India
Bravo
Total diesel-electric units —185
Total nuclear-propelled units 200+
Total submarines in service —385
*At least one Yankee converted to SSN and others laid up or in the process of converting.
128
Proceedings / January 1'^'
land-;
Th,
types of SSBNs for several reasons. While the Typhoons—the largest undersea craft ever built—offer several advantages over “Delta IVs,” their relative eost may provide sufficient incentive to simultaneously construct two SSBN elasses. Another reason may be Soviet concern over the reduction in numbers of SSBNs, as each boat carries more treaty- constrained missiles and re-entry vehicles. For example, in numbers of missiles, one “Typhoon” with 20 SLBMs equates to 1.25 “Yankee”/“Delta III” SSBNs or 1.75 “Delta 1” submarines. (The USS Ohio [SSBN-726] class carries 24 Trident SLBMs.) Accordingly, the Delta IV” helps the Soviets keep up the number of SSBNs in service while hold- lng to SALT limitations.
GuidedICruise Missile Submarines ISSGNs): Two types can be expected in series production for the remainder of this ecade. The “Oscar” SSGN, carrying 24 submerged-launch, long-range SS-N-19 cruise missiles, is intended for attacks against aircraft carriers and other high value ships.
The “Oscar” is far more capable than the “Charlie I/II” SSGNs, which have not been completely successful, and the agmg “Echo II” and “Juliett” classes.
he rate of “Oscar” construction, almost °ne per year, is really too slow to effec- tlVety replace the older boats, though each “Oscar,” with 24 antiship missiles, carries three times the firepower of a Charlie I/II” or “Echo II,” with much more effective weapons. More “Oscars” °r another antiship SSGN are likely.
The second type of cruise missile submarine will be one configured for the and attack role, armed with the SS-N-24
attack, long-range cruise missile. Soviets have rebuilt one former Yankee” SSBN as trials ship for the th ^ 24, w't*1 launch tubes for 12 of ese missiles. A new nuclear submarine 0r up to 24 SS-N-24 missiles is expected
- appear in the near future.
In addition, the SS-N-21, the Soviet Ve.rsion of the Tomahawk land-attack niissile, is being fitted to several classes nuclear attack submarines.
Attack submarines (SS/SSN): These * csent the major enigma of the Soviet
- marine program. Why have the Sovi- n,S ^Ut t0 sea cTiree new SSN designs— j,e ‘Mike,” “Akula,” and “Sierra”? j. °Wevei\ these boats have not begun
'"Scale operations, nor has series pro- nction begun. Indeed, the only Soviet N launched in 1985 has been another *he highly effective “Victor III” class. °me estimates say the “Akula” SSN lsplaces more than 10,000 tons, more nan the new U. S. Seawolf (SSN-21).
Are the new boats having teething problems? Are they being competitively evaluated to determine the “best” design? Or are yards gearing up for series production—as one naval analyst stated, “to flood the seas with advanced attack submarines while the Soviets hold to the SALT limits with strategic missile submarines.”
In 1985, Rear Admiral John Butts, late Director of Naval Intelligence, told Congress: “Over the past five years, the Soviets have launched an unprecedented number and variety of nuclear attack submarines. The emphasis in construction has clearly shifted from ballistic missile units. We believe this construction program is being given primarily by Moscow’s intention to close the technological gap between Soviet and Western [attack] submarines. Since the introduction of the “Victor III”-class SSN, the Soviets have steadily reduced the technological inferiority of their newest submarines.”
The “Mike” is apparently the successor to the revolutionary “Alfa,” with a titanium hull and liquid-metal reactor, providing deep depth and high submerged speed capabilities. The “Akula” may also have versions of these advanced technologies while the “Sierra” is in many respects similar to the “Victor III,” with her greater diameter indicating either an advanced propulsion plant or increased quieting features, or both.
Medium-range “Kilo” diesel-electric submarines remain in series production at the Komsomol’sk shipyard in Siberia, and a “Kilo” startup at a Soviet European yard is expected, both for Soviet use (to replace the outdated “Whiskey” and “Romeo” classes) and for foreign transfer. Also in the offing will probably be a larger diesel submarine, a successor to the long-range “Foxtrot” and “Tango” classes.
The Soviets certainly understand that the diesel submarine still has an important role in modem naval operations. Although they now emphasize nuclear attack submarines, they are expected to continue building and operating a large force of diesel submarines.
In general, Soviet attack submarines appear to be rapidly closing the ship silencing and sonar performance gaps that have long been cited as the principal U. S. submarine advantages. While U. S. Navy officials anticipate that the planned Seawolf (SSN-21) class will continue to give the United States an advantage in this regard, three aspects of the Soviet submarine program are troublesome:
► The rate of development of Soviet submarines—and the number of unknowns— has been greater than anticipated by many U. S. officials. Especially troublesome are the qualitative improvements.
- The large numbers of Soviet submarines and their production capacity are a matter of major concern.
- U. S. technology developments are highly vulnerable to Soviet commercial acquisition and espionage. However, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Melvyn Paisley has astutely observed, “The Soviet submarine technological advances for quieting, strengthened double hulls, higher speed, higher reserve buoyance, and deeper operations are advances which are by and large not stolen or bought from the United States. Some technologies, [classified deletion], are Soviet design decisions which are different from our decisions. Other technologies, [deleted], are the result of Soviet engineered high power density material and high strength hull material. The Soviets are ahead of the U. S. in these technologies.”
Rather, it is in acoustics and production methods that the Soviets have sought the West’s submarine-related technology. It is in the acoustics area that the long- active Walker spy ring may have made a major contribution to Soviet knowledge.
While the Soviets have had major operational problems with their subs, they also seem to be improving in this area.
The large number of classes in production and in service impose a heavy support and training burden on the Soviet submarine force. The multiple classes, however, provide significant design and development experience—not available in the West—while causing Western antisubmarine forces to counter Soviet submarines with greatly differing characteristics and capabilities.
(In comparison, the U. S. Navy has two submarine classes under construction at two shipyards: the Los Angeles (SSN- 688) class at the Newport News Shipbuilding (Virginia) and Electric Boat/ General Dynamics (Connecticut) yards and the Ohio (SSBN-726) at the latter yard. These classes entered service in 1974 and 1981, respectively. The next U. S. submarine class, the Seawolf (SSN- 21), will likely enter service in 1996.)
While the rate of production of submarines in the Soviet Union has slowed during the past few years, there is every indication that production will pick up again in the near future. And, despite the investment in other ship types, aviation, and satellites, based on the statements of the Soviet naval leadership, their construction capability, and their operations, large numbers of advanced submarines will continue to be the capital ship of the Soviet fleet.
129
r°cec<lings / January 1986