This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
the
of
After serving England faithfully from 1756 until 1783, Sir Ralph Abercromby was retired from the army, principally because his sympathies had been with the American colonists in their revolt against the Crown. But the February 1793 declaration of war by revolutionary France caught England short of competent officers, and Abercromby was returned to active service.
Placed under the Duke of York, he performed very well during the disastrous retreat across Holland in the winter of 1794-95. Sent to the West Indies as commander in chief, he served there until 1797 during which time his troops captured the islands of Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad. Posted to command the army in Ireland, he was appalled by the almost complete breakdown of discipline and issued corrective orders in February 1798. In doing so, he ran afoul of politicians at home with a vested interest in the status quo and was recalled to England. His qualities as a commander were recognized. Instead of being put out to pasture again, he was given further employment.
In June 1799, the British Government concluded a treaty with Tsar Paul of Russia; each party agreed to provide an army for a joint campaign to drive the French and their Dutch allies from the Low Countries. The Duke of York would be Supreme Allied Commander with Lieutenant General Abercromby instructed to land with 10,000 troops and establish a bridgehead for the expedition.
Sir Henry Bunbury, an officer who served on the Duke’s staff during this campaign and knew Abercromby personally, described the 60-year-old general:
“The General was a little too old for hard service and he was extremely near-sighted. Allowing for these defects of nature, Abercromby was a noble chieftain. Mild in manner, resolute in mind, . . . inflexible in what he deemed to be right .... An honest, fearless, straightforward man;
. . . and well skilled in his business as a soldier. As he looked out from under his thick, shaggy eyebrows, he gave one the idea of a very good-natured lion . . . .” (Sir Henry Bunbury, Narratives of Some Passages in the Great War with France (1799-1810) [London: Peter Davies, Limited, 1927] p. 29. All subsequent quotations are cited to this edition.)
Abercromby’s force set sail on 13 August. The general was determined that, if practicable, the landing would be in North Holland—the peninsula lying between the North Sea and the Zyder Zee with Amsterdam at its base. Arriving off the coast on the 21st, the fleet found the weather too bad to land and was forced to beat offshore until the 26th when the transports anchored off the beaches lying between the towns of Helder and Callantzoog.
Helder, at the northern tip of the peninsula, contained a large naval depot and arsenal and was a major objective of the British. Callantzoog was screened from the sea by sandhills. Because of this, it was here the Dutch general, Herman Willem Daendels, with six days to prepare since the first sighting of the Royal Navy, had gathered almost
- infantry with cavalry and artillery support.
The landing began at dawn the following day and is described by Sir Henry Bunbury:
“Vice-Admiral Mitchell with a strong squadron of frigates and small two-deckers drawing little water (Admit3 Duncan was in the offing with the heavier men-of-war). was able to anchor near enough to the shore to protect the transports, and throw a storm of shot upon the beach, while the boats, heavy with soldiers, were rowing to then landing place. But the only boats were those of the mem of-war, ill calculated for such a service and incapable 0 conveying more than 3,000 men at a time. To the officers of our navy this kind of operation was entirely new; n°| did they understand the details, or feel the importance ° arrangement on which military order and military success must greatly depend. Thus parts of regiments were con veyed to the shore, while parts were left behind. Batta ions were intermixed; and companies had to find then proper places after they had landed and were under the fin- of the enemy. The soldiers had to wade and scramble on of the surf as well as they could, and look out for their comrades, and run to their stations in the line which V'’35 growing slowly into shape along the beach. Fortunate) General Daendels chose to keep his men sheltered fr°nj the fire of the ships, and to cling to the strong post he h3 taken near Callantzoog. If he had rushed headlong on
When the troops are to be landed by the boats of the fleet, 8reat care should be had that they are kept at a proper distance from each other, at least fifty feet; and when the situation of the Place will admit of it, they are to dress or take their respective sta- Pons from the right; otherwise, from the centre or left, as may be convenient, or shall be previously aPpointed.
On no account must the boats crowd upon each other, nor are frey to break the line, either by getting too much ahead or astern.
fro boats are to come into the first line except the [troop-carry- ,n§] flat boats, and the launches having the artillery on board, frese last towed by cutters. The Second line is to be composed of cutters only, to attend upon the fiat boats, that they may afford unmediate relief should any boat rcquire it, in which case they are '° proceed directly, without wait- ln8 for orders, to give the necesSary aid. The third line is to be composed of the cutters that tow 'he launches; and the boats belonging to each ship will keep in 'he wake of their respective fiat boats.
To distinguish the boats having °n board the grenadier company °f each regiment, they will carry 'he camp colours of that regiment, and the other boats are to form to the left, until the regiment ls completed, taking care that the companies are embarked on hoard the boats in the order they should be in when landed; and 'he captains commanding the divi- Slons will consult with the commanding officer of the troops, and J'x on the best method to obtain 'his object without confusion.
. When the troops are to land, a Sltuation will be pointed out upon 'he shore, where either the right °r left will proceed to; if from the right the boats from the left must observe open order, that the right wing may not be too much crowded together; and the boats to the right will pay like attention when the left is the point from which they are to form.
Upon no account must any flat boat be nearer to another than fifty feet, and this will afford sufficient space for the cutters and launches in the rear to land between the flat boats, agreeable to the regimental order of the troops they have on board.
The flat boats are always to drop their grapnel from their stern at a proper distance from the shore, that they may haul off the moment the troops are landed.
It may often be necessary that the flat boats should pull quick round into an opposite direction, either for retreat or any other cause, in which case it is of the utmost consequence that they should do so together, and in one direction. Strict attention must therefore be paid to the signal that will be made upon that occasion; and if no signal is made, they are always to pull [the boats] to starboard.
The captains commanding the different divisions will repeat all the signals made by the commanding officer of the disembarkation; and each captain should have a rowing boat attending him, with a careful officer to carry his orders to the boats of his division.
In order that the fiat boats may observe the signals as soon as made, a musket will be fired from the commanding officer's boat, which is to be repeated by the captains of the other divisions. Each boat having the signal flags on board must be provided with stretchers, that the flags may be seen should the weather be calm;
and all signals will be made at a flagstaff in the centre of the boat.
The officers commanding the boats must take particular care that none of the troops stand up, as on many occasions it may endanger the safety of the boat.
Each fiat boat must be provided with four or five breakers, or small casks of water, that immediate relief may be given the troops upon their landing should they require it.
When the first landing is completed, the boats (when ordered) will proceed to those ships having ensigns at their fore-top-gallant- masthead; afterwards to those having their ensigns at the miz- zen, until all the troops are on shore.
When the second landing takes place, the captains will proceed with their division of boats to particular ships, that the regiments may be landed in a collective body; and this is to be observed until all the troops are on shore.
The launches that landed the artillery will proceed to such ordnance ship as will be pointed out, to land the light artillery and stores. Should this service not be requisite, they will assist in disembarking the troops agreeable to the last instructions.
The captains of the different divisions will deliver copies of these and all other instructions to the lieutenants under their orders; and they will give others to the midshipmen commanding the flat boats.
No person belonging to the boats is to quit them upon landing, unless by the particular order of the commanding officer of the division.
Dated on board His Majesty’s ship Ajax, 24 January 1801 (pp. 103105).
object of the expedition achieved; the Dutch fleet, arsena • and stores were in our possession” (p. 4). ,
If he had now been allowed to reembark his troops an sail away, Abercromby and the Royal Navy would have won a significant victory at little cost. As it was, treaty had been signed and the wheels of war were turning 311 on 1 September, reinforced to a strength of 12,000, hlS army took up strong defensive positions across the pen10 sula while waiting for the rest of the expedition. In antin' pation of this arrival, the French and Dutch attacked on t ^ 10th and were repulsed with more than 1,000 casualty while the English suffered 37 dead, and around 1- wounded.
and perhaps routed these leading brigades. There was time enough to have done the work before the Guards could get ashore: and it was long before the rest of Abercromby’s little army were able to land. It is true that the Dutch might have lost a good many men from the fire of our ships, but it was their business to be quick in their rush, and to have mingled their superior numbers so completely with the British soldiers, that the men-of-war would not have ventured to direct their shots against the confused mass of friends and foes. But Daendels either did not see the chance, or he felt his troops unequal to such a trial. He allowed our forces to land and form without hindrance: fought a merely soldier’s fight, though gallantly, in the strong post he had chosen . . . .” (pp. 35-36).
As the brigades of Major General Coote and Colonel Macdonald finally formed up and moved inland, the Dutch attacked their right flank heavily. The fight continued the rest of the day. The British were reinforced by Major General D’Oyley’s Guards brigade, before the Dutch finally withdrew several miles to the south, leaving the British with nearly 500 casualties.
During the night, the 2,000 garrison troops in Helder melted away, leaving everything intact for the British to occupy the following morning. Two days later, Admiral Mitchell moved his squadron through the channel between Helder and Texel Island and approached the Dutch fleet sheltering in shallow water in the lee of the peninsula. “A summons to hoist the Orange flag and surrender the ships to the Stadtholder, under the protection of England, speedily produced the desired effect. Seven ships of the line, three of fifty guns, and several frigates were given up without firing a single shot. . . . Here was the English
Three days later, the Duke of York arrived, simulta^ ously with the first Russian troops, and on the 19th, 1 Allied Army, now 30,000 strong, launched a general ° fensive. This attack was premature. Although the Br'tlSj gained ground in the center, taking 2,000 prisoners, Abercromby’s force made a successful flanking mane11^ on the left, it was all for naught as the Russian Am1;' comprising the right wing, was totally routed. Two sian generals, including their commander, were capture ' and Allied casualties for the day were more than 3,5 ^ The offensive was renewed on 2 October 'V1 Abercromby’s force, now on the extreme right flank, tacking along the beach at low tide. This advance ^ halted by strong French defenses in the dunes; the Br't'- suffered crippling casualties, including Major Genef John Moore who was severely wounded twi Abercromby had two horses shot from under him dun - the fighting. jf
The French withdrew the following day when in
j9»5
Marmorice, 16 February 1801.
ank was turned by the rest of the British Army. The Asians had almost no part in the battle. On the 6th, a oody battle was fought for a few useless villages—the ussian Army, with Abercromby in support, engaging rench forces of equal strength.
The exhausted Allied armies, now facing superior rench and Dutch armies in strongly entrenched positions, Were forced to retreat to their initial bridgehead and, with j? early winter setting in, to come to terms with the tench. The Allies finished reembarking the remains of e*r armies on 30 November, having sustained more than casualties in a campaign they had allowed to degen- fr.ate into a war of attrition which they had no hope of inning.
After wintering in England, Abercromby took over c°nirnand of the British Army in the Mediterranean, defying for his new post on 13 May 1800.
. The British Government had decided at this time that . e expulsion of the French from North Africa was a polit- C®1 imperative. Less than a year before, the Cabinet had
Extracts from the General Orders of the Army
refused to ratify a treaty that would have allowed the French to evacuate Egypt because the introduction of so many veteran soldiers into Europe at that time would have tipped the balance of power in France’s favor. Now, however, with all of England’s allies defeated, it was most important to drive them from the area before a peace treaty—negotiations were anticipated to begin in the near future—could formally cede the territory to France.
The invasion army departed Malta at the end of December, arriving on 2 January 1801 in the Bay of Marmorice, part of the Gulf of Makri, on the south coast of Turkey. The countryside and local ports were now scoured for horses and the ships to transport them while General Moore was dispatched to meet with their Ottoman Turk allies to ascertain what forces they would commit to the campaign. This, he found, consisted of about 15,000 tribesmen, half of them mounted, moving overland from Sinai. Abercromby resolved to have as little to do with this mob of bandits as possible.
A British Army from India was supposed to be sailing
are to carry no more than any other soldier, and are to mount all picquets and guards with their masters. The smallest number of batmen possible will be permitted; mounted officers alone are entitled to them.
The music, drummers, and men least fit for actual service are to be selected for all regimental duties not purely military; and officers commanding corps will be held strictly responsible for their being at all times, and every situation, in the most effective state.
A proportion of the general hospital staff must be attached in the first instance to each brigade, and will be allowed such orderlies as are absolutely necessary from the brigade. Regimental surgeons are to be allowed one orderly each, to carry the field case of instruments.
The spare arms, tents, and horse appointments of the dismounted cavalry and every article of spare baggage are to be left in charge of a careful non-commissioned officer on board of each ship (pp. 105-106).
carried in kegs, and put under charge of the quartermaster of each regiment, with a party sufficient for the purpose; each man will carry his canteen filled with water.
Three days’ barley will be carried for the horses of the cavalry, and of the staff and field officers.
The staff and field officers must provide themselves with forage sacks previous to the fleet sailing from this.
The men will carry their entrenching tools and the proportion of necessaries specified in the orders 15th August last, viz., two shirts, one pair of shoes, two pairs of socks or stockings, neatly made up in their packs or knapsacks; their camp-kettles and blankets. Regiments having both blankets and greatcoats will leave the latter on board.
It is absolutely necessary that the officers should bring on shore in the first instance, such articles only as they can carry themselves. Officers’ servants are not only on all occasions of service to be present under arms with the corps to which they belong; they
When the troops are ordered to land, the men are to be put into 'he flat boats as expeditiously as Possible, but without hurry or disorder; they are to sit down in the o°ats, and in rowing to the shore 'he strictest silence is to be observed; the troops are positively ordered not to load till formed on 'he beach; the formation is to be effected as soon as possible, the 'nen are to fall in, in line, oppo- Sl'e to where they land; nor is any individual or body of men, in c°nceiving themselves displaced,
'° attempt to regain their situa- tl°n by closing to either flank, till ordered so to do by the general officer on whom they depend or >e senior officer present on the spot.
The troops are to land with S'xty rounds of ammunition and tVv° spare flints per man; the ammunition which cannot be confined in the pouches to be care- ,L‘Hy put in the packs. Three days’ read and three days’ pork ready c°°ked is to be carried by officers Qnd men. The same quantity is to e landed for the troops; it is not, °Wever, to be delivered out but
> &
NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM
At the height of the fighting in the Egyptian campaign,
Sir Ralph Abercromby was saved from being sabered only to be hit by a musket ball in the thigh. He died a week later, but his legacy—the amphibious campaign—thrives.
up the Red Sea to attack from the south, but no word had been received from them. With little external support forthcoming, the general decided to use his own resources and force a landing at Aboukir Bay, the only practicable landing place for a large number of troops on the north coast of Egypt, with the immediate aim of capturing or investing Alexandria. With this objective in mind, he and his officers began working out details.
Sir Henry Bunbury explains: “A sort of council of war was summoned, at which certain officers of the navy as well as of the army were present. General Abercromby informed them of his intentions, and explained his motives; but he desired, before the final resolution should be taken, to receive satisfactory information from the officers of the navy on the following points: 1st. Can the anchorage in the Bay of Aboukir be depended on for the fleet of transports? 2nd. Will the navy be able to put on shore not only the troops, but likewise the ammunition, provisions, and even the water necessary for the army during two or three weeks, as well as the ordnance which would be required for the siege of Alexandria? To these questions Captain Hallowed and Sir Sidney Smith (as being the officers best acquainted with the coast) returned favourable answers. The former, more particularly, declared that he felt no doubt of its being in the power of the fleet, when anchored in the Bay of Aboukir, to land everything that would be required for the troops, and to convey further supplies by means of boats, which might move abreast of the army as it advanced” (pp. 58-59).
It was then that Abercromby’s previous experiences with the confused disorganization of his landing in Hol
land were put to use. With the help of his subordinates foremost among them John Moore, the general beg3 training his men in proper landing techniques and in m3^ ing maximum use of the inadequate boats available them. Along with this physical activity, Abercromby an Colonel Anstruther, the Quartermaster General, with aS sistance from naval officers, drew up detailed instructs for the impending assault with strict orders for navy 311 army commanders to obey them in all details. »
The 180-vessel fleet obtained favorable winds on February and sighted the Egyptian Coast on 1 Marc' Since the sea was too rough to land, it made tactical sen to remain out of sight, but Lord Keith insisted on leading the entire fleet in to look at Alexandria and then anchorin' the next day in Aboukir Bay. ,v
Along with General Moore, Abercromby immediate ■ reconnoitered the beach and found it almost identical that of North Holland, even to the screening sandhi _ Two differences were Aboukir castle and several gunboa threatening the right flank of the landing. That same da)- another French warship ran the blockade into the bar Lord Keith’s excuse was that he could not spare a ship ‘ capture her. It was not until 7 March that the weath ^ moderated enough to allow the general to again sen Moore in to examine the shore. ^
Sir Henry writes: “The space on which it would ^ necessary to make the landing was found to be abou ^ mile in extent. To the right (of the assailants) there T°sCs steep and high sand-hill, the seaward face of which partially flanked by the guns of the castle of Aboukir- ground along the curve of the bay, rising in banks from beach, appeared to be everywhere favourable to enemy, as he could keep his troops concealed and s tered though close to the water’s edge. On the left sand-hills were broken, irregular, and dotted with clu of trees. The picquets of the enemy stretched along whole extent, and individuals, probably officers upon ^ watch, were pacing to and fro; but there were no signs batteries or of new works” (p. 61).
The intelligence Abercromby had received from En- §*and indicated that there were at most 16,000 sick and near-mutinous French soldiers defending the whole of fcgypt. It was on this assumption that he had decided the army under his command (see Table 1) was adequate for }he task he envisioned. In fact, French strength was nearly
- fit troops with 6,000 of them stationed at Alexandria. However, because of the scattered nature of their dispositions, they were ripe for defeat if the entire British Army could get ashore intact. One factor working for the “ntish was that French leadership had suffered since Na-
Table 1
Return of the Army under Sir Ralph Abercromby on the Morning of the 7th of March 1801 (pp. 106-107).
Rank and file present
.__ and fit for duty.
^aj°r General Ludlow
Coldstream Guards...................................................... 766
3rd Guard...................................................................... 812
^aJor General Coote
1st Regiment (Royals)................................................ 626
54th (2 Battalions)....................................................... 974
92nd............................................................................... 529
^ajor General Craddock
90th................................................................................ 727
8th................................................................................... 439
13th............................................................................... 561
18th................................................................................ 411
^ai°r General Lord Cavan
50th.................................................................................. Ml
79th................................................................................. 604
Brigadier Doyle
2nd (Queen’s)............................................................... 530
30th................................................................................ 412
44th................................................................................ 263
89th................................................................................ 378
Br‘gadier Stuart
Stuart’s Regiment........................................................ 929
19e Roll’s Regiment................................................... 528
billon’s Regiment........................................................ 530
eserve—Major General Moore, Brigadier Oakes
23rd................................................................................ 457
28th................................................................................ 587
42nd. . 754
58th................................................................................ 469
40th (Flank Companies)............................................. 250
Corsican Rangers......................................................... 209
Staff Corps...................................................................... 82
Brigadier Finch
11th Light Dragoons (one troop).................................. 53
12th Light Dragoons .................................................. 474
26th Light Dragoons .................................................. 369
H°mpesch’s Hussars................................................... 138
Artillerymen................................................................. 027
r°tal 14,965 poleon Bonaparte had deserted them, and his handpicked successor General Jean Baptiste Kleber had been assassinated by a Moslem fanatic in Cairo.
Again, Sir Henry: “The General determined to make his landing the next morning; but as the infantry were all on board of the large troop-ships, (The ‘troop-ships’ then in use were for the most part old two-deckers, sixty-fours or fifties, without their lower deck guns. It was a badly arranged service, and equally disagreeable to the officers of the army and the navy, who were always quarrelling.) which were anchored six or seven miles from the shore, much time was required and much arrangement necessary for the proper performance of the service. In the evening of the 7th two of our lighter vessels of war changed their stations, and anchored as near to the shore as they could conveniently lie. One of these vessels served to mark the risht of the intended attack; and alongside these two vessels all the boats, containing the leading divisions of the army, were ordered to assemble in the darkness of the night. It had been found that the boats altogether were capable of conveying a greater number of men than the Guards and the reserve could muster. The 54th regiment, belonging to Coote’s brigade, was therefore added to those which had been held in readiness under the former order. At the same time (the evening) the rest of the troops were removed from the large ships into others of a lighter draught of water, that they might be the more quickly landed in support of the first division, when the latter should be on shore, and the boats should be at liberty to return for a second debarkation” (pp. 61-62).
The transfer of the troops began at 0200 with the loaded boats arriving at the start line soon after dawn. The novelty of the attack caused some confusion and much time was wasted getting the nearly 200 boats arranged.
“The reserve, led by Sir John Moore, Hildebrand Oakes, and Brent Spencer, formed the right; and their division of boats was under the immediate command of Captain Cochrane. (Captain Cochrane had the command of the whole of the boats employed on this service. Under him Sir Sidney Smith had the particular charge of the launches which conveyed the artillery, and he afterwards commanded the seamen who were landed to assist the army.) Alongside the vessel on the left were marshalled the two battalions of the guards, under General Ludlow, and the detachment belonging to Coote’s brigade. It was 8 o’clock a.m. before the line of boats pulled on abreast, and in steady order, towards the shore, and till that time the enemy had lain in silence observing our movements; but as soon as our boats came within their reach, fifteen pieces of cannon opened upon them with round shot, though the enemy’s fire was somewhat disturbed and confused by that of several English gunboats which had been thrown in advance of our line. So closely were our soldiers packed in the boats that they could not move, and indeed the strictest orders had been given that they should sit perfectly still. The seamen pulled steadily onward, the pace of each boat being regulated by that on the extreme right. In this calm order on they came, till they were within reach of grape shot, and then the fire became terribly severe and destructive. Some boats were sunk, and many of our men were killed or wounded as they sat motionless and helpless under the storm of shot, to which both seamen and soldiers answered occasionally by loud hurrahs!”
“When still nearer, the musketry of the French was poured in, quick and sharp, and our men were falling fast; but at length the boats upon the right felt the ground. Out sprang our hard-tried soldiers, each man was in his place, and with Moore and Spencer at their head, the 23rd and 28th regiments, (The 28th seems to have been kept back in support of the rush made by the others.) and the four flank companies of the 40th, breasted the steep sand-hill. Without firing a shot, they rushed at one burst to the summit of the ridge, driving headlong before them two battalions of the enemy and capturing four pieces of field artillery. After reining in his men, that they might recover breath, Moore opened their fire upon the French who were retreating rapidly across a little patch of plain ground, and then again he pushed forward, again driving the foe before him, till he occupied some rising ground which afforded a favourable position. There Moore halted till he could leam what had happened on his left.”
‘ ‘That wing of the reserve which had been entrusted to the guidance of Brigadier Oakes touched the beach a few minutes after their comrades, whose exploit has been just described. The 42nd regiment was the first on shore, and the 58th a few minutes afterwards; the ground in their front was of a more gentle slope than that upon the right, and here the French stood prepared, not with infantry only, but with some troops of cavalry. The enemy attacked at once, but the admirable order in which the 42nd had been landed enabled them to repulse the assault by their heavy fire; and as the French drew back, Oakes, leading on this regiment, followed by the 58th, attacked in his turn, and driving the enemy over the sand-hills, captured three of their guns.”
“Farther to the left the Coldstream and 3rd Guards ought, according to the plan prescribed, to have prolonged the line beyond Oakes’ brigade, but the boats which carried them and the 54th regiment fell into confusion. These battalions were consequently hurried into the shoal water, intermingled and disordered, and as their difficulty was observed by the enemy, the Guards were charged by the French cavalry before they could form their line. However, the attack was bravely repulsed, and General Ludlow soon got his brigade into its proper place—to the left of Oakes and the reserve” (pp. 62-64).
“While the fight was going on, the boats returned to fetch the remainder of our infantry, and the whole of them were landed in the course of the afternoon, with some field-pieces and a few horses. In the evening the army moved forward some two or three miles, leaving a detachment to blockade the castle of Aboukir” (p. 64).
British casualties were fairly heavy. The army suffered 102 dead, 34 missing, and 515 wounded; the navy, 51 dead and 127 wounded, though this was light compared to what might have happened.
During the next three days, the British moved only a short distance inland as heavy surf made resupply difficult. This changed on 12 March as the army advanced along the peninsula on which Alexandria was situated, the
Mediterranean to their right, salty Lake Maadieh on their left.
In the afternoon, they came in sight of the enemy en' trenched in a defensive position. They attacked early the next morning. After a savage battle, the French retreated to their main positions in front of Alexandria, which the British immediately attacked but were thrown back front, with 1,300 casualties on the day.
Digging his troops into a strong position around some Roman ruins, Abercromby found himself with some hard decisions to make. He now realized the French Army 'va!j much stronger than he had believed and that he would have to move before they could concentrate. He resolved to make one more attack on the French line, this time supported by heavy artillery. If unsuccessful his army would be forced to retreat back to the beach.
He was saved from carrying out these plans by the arrival, on 20 March, of General Jacques Francois de Menou, the French commander in Egypt, who marched iu the back door of Alexandria with 6,000 men. These, added to the remains of the garrison and reinforcements that had come in earlier, gave him 11,000 men to attack the British position before dawn the following day.
The surprise-attack failed because the British ArmyvvaS under standing orders to be in position an hour bel°IL’ daylight and because John Moore was general officer o the day and successfully countered the initial thrust. The battle lasted five hours, at times waxing so hot the opP°s ing forces were reduced to throwing rocks as ammunitm11 ran out. Three French generals were killed and more than
- French dead were buried by the British who too 900 prisoners, 700 of them wounded. British losses were 244 dead and 1,160 wounded, including General Moore-
At the height of the fighting, the French cavalry broke through the overextended 42nd Highlanders and cut o» Abercromby, who was on the verge of being sabered when his assailant was shot by a soldier of the 42nd. It was but a temporary reprieve. The general had already been hit by a musket ball in the thigh. He was transferred to Lot Keith’s flagship and died a week later.
General Hutchinson took over command, and no m°(e major battles were fought as Menou stayed penned with111 the walls of Alexandria, finally surrendering on 3 Septen\ ber. This followed the surrender of the rest of his army a Cairo near the end of June. ,
A combination of experience, meticulous planning. a° audacity gave England its first major land victory °ve post-revolutionary France. With the death of Sir Ru^P] Abercromby, the unique form of warfare he pioneer became a footnote in British military history, until it 'va resurrected with disastrous results at Gallipoli, 114 year‘ later.
Mr. Rogers lives in central British Columbia, Canada, where he man*1?6' his family’s summer resort.