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Contents:
Aircraft Maintenance and the Paper Chase
December Cover
Under the Cold Gaze of the Victorious
Altering Course for NROTC
Forward Deployments: Deterrent or Temptation
Aviation Training: A Systems Approach
An Almost Ready Reserve A Lost Generation of Mariners
Education and Professionalism
What’s in Store for Arapaho
For Whom the Bell Tolls
The Offensive Surface Ship
Political Awareness Training in the U. S. Navy
The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine
Leadership-Management Training and Education
Underwater Guerrillas
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“Aircraft Maintenance and the Paper Chase”
(See J. C. Roach, D. H. Genovese, pp. 116— 119, December 1983 Proceedings)
Aviation Technician Second Class Harris Walker, U. S. Navy, Patrol Squadron Master Augmentation Unit, Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine—My God, you mean that someone out there is actually listening?
Kudos to Captain Roach and Commander Genovese for exposing the aircraft maintenance records mess. I’d like to say more, but I have to catch up on my paperwork.
engineering of that equipment or system and hardly contributes to the logistics support and readiness required on the aircraft on board ship.
We should take a look at how some of the friendly nations of the world, such as Britain and Germany, structure their lo- gistics/maintenance. They must operate with a tighter budget, under the “lean and mean” concept. Perhaps we should do the same.
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Mr. Louis Gerken, President, American Scientific Corporation—Captain Roach and Commander Genovese have hit the nail on the head about the sad state of aircraft readiness and the paper-computer monster that has been generated under the guise of improving the maintenance in U. S. Navy aircraft. More man-hours seem to be expended on the paperwork than by wrench-turners on the aircraft.
Over the past 30 years I have had many occasions to actively participate with the Navy in operational and maintenance/ logistics scenarios in a civilian capacity, and I can endorse what the authors have said.
Unfortunately, the naval air arm is not the only problem child in maintenance. The surface navy has similar problems, as do the submariners. The Army and Air Force have caught the same disease and are feeding the paper monster.
If one looks at the electronics mainte- nance/logistics in the U. S. Navy today, it seems to have grown in a rather disorganized way. Naval Air (Op-05) has its own avionics/electronics organization, Naval Sea Systems Command is in the electronics business, and Naval Electronic Systems Command has what is left over. I could cite many instances in which a particular piece of electronics equipment has been transferred from one of these commands to the other. This places quite a burden on the logistics/
December Cover
Lieutenant Edward J. Hafner, U. S- Navy—Upon receiving my December Proceedings, I was happy to see a photograph of the “top” naval flight officer aircraft in the fleet today, the EA-6B Prowler, on the cover. My elation faded, however, when I read the caption identifying the aircraft as the A-6 Intruder!
We EA-6B types are used to the A-6 community living off our published pictures and tactical fleet importance reputation; it happens almost daily. But can you this once add the “E” and the “B” to the A-6 identifier? You will make at least one electronic countermeasures officer currently on recruiting duty very happy.
A prowler and an intruder tend to look alike at dusk.
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“Under the Cold Gaze of the Victorious”
(See R. B. Carney, pp. 41-50, December 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Edson W. Card, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)—The caption on Page 50 reads “ . . . signers stood abaft °f the signing table . . .
I wince at the lubberly term “aft of,” “abaft of” must be near the nadir of unseamanlike language. Not only that, 11 s bad grammar.
The caption writer would have done better to quote from Admiral Carney’s narration on page 48: “ . . . signers . . . stood abaft the signing table . . .
I’ve been getting about eight periodiCals, and I had intended to drop them all m 1984. But if I’m going to have to keep y°u straight on things like this, I’ll just have to stick with Proceedings a bit longer.
Editor’s Note: It probably will not surPrise the colonel to learn the caption was Written by the only ex-Marine on the Proceedings staff.
“Altering Course for NROTC”
(See H. J. Sutphen, pp. 52-58, December 1983 Proceedings)
Midshipman R. W. Corrigan, U. S. Naval Reserve, NROTC Unit, Villanova University—Captain Sutphen’s article on (he Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) and the problems it faces voiced many of the concerns we midshipmen in the program have. One additional eoncern that should be mentioned is the dilemma of the three-year scholarship dinner. These alternate selectees must enroll in the non-subsidized NROTC College Program in order to qualify for the three-year scholarship. As college Program students, this disqualifies them from participation in the third class training cruise. With Congress directing that [he obligation for scholarship students be •ncurred at the sophomore year of col- kge, the three-year alternate scholarship student will be forced to sign on before ever serving on board a naval vessel. If the student is ignorant of the large quantity of work a junior officer has to deal "nth, or the drawbacks of life in the naval service, he could be making a career mis- lake. This creates a discontented officer, and he and the Navy will have to deal "nth each other for four years, until his obligation is complete.
With the shortage of billets for scholarship students a pressing problem, finding billets for those alternate scholarship students will not be easy. But the consequences of asking a college student to Slgn on before he has any ship experience
is counterproductive for the Navy and unfair to that person.
Chief Operations Specialist Bruce Dieball, U. S. Naval Reserx’e—Captain Sutphen has fallen into a “numbers game” mindset with some of his observations. The role of the Naval Reserve
Officer Training Corps (NROTC) is to provide the fleet with highly motivated junior officers. Because I believe a career in the Navy is 99.5% uninspiring boredom punctuated by .5% blinding terror and excitement, I say good riddance to an officer candidate who quits after his first taste of an unstimulating experience. When that new division or watch officer
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“Forward Deployments:
Deterrent or Temptation”
(See E. V. Ortlieb, pp. 36-^10, December 1983
Proceedings)
Randy A. Doblar, Naval Ocean Research and Development Activity Representative to Director, ASW Division (CNO OP- 951)—In trying to show that forward deployments of U. S. operational forces constitute an “unrealistic commitment,” detract from the historically proven concept of maintaining a “home fleet,” and unnecessarily place our naval forces “in harm’s way,” Commander Ortlieb convincingly proves the reverse. While arguing that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor “decimated what was at that time and context a forward deployed U. S. Pacific Fleet,” it should be pointed out that the destruction occurred because U. S. forces were concentrated and at anchor and not because they were geographically displaced from our coasts.
If the U. S. fleet had been properly dispersed and truly forward deployed, it is reasonable to presume that the Japanese would not have been able to concentrate their forces for such an attack. In addition, the U. S. forces would probably have provided sufficient indications and warnings of Japanese intentions to divert the entire confrontation or at least allow us to enter the conflict on our own terms. The commentary goes on to state that “. . . neither can the suddenness, speed, range, and lethality of Soviet threats be compared with the . . . threat of 1941.” That is absolutely true. The threat posed today by the Soviet Union is not comparable to the “heyday of Britannia rules the waves,” World War II, or any other time in history. However, if historical note is of importance, then remember that during World War I the German fleet was so excessively cautious that it was not a factor in the outcome of the war.
The keystone to the present strategic policy of global forward deterrence is to posture the fleet in forward areas to blunt an initial Soviet attack, defend vital bases, and contain and negate the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces. It’s imperative that we go forward to deter war today so we do not have to fight it on an aggressor’s terms tomorrow. It’s also time to realize that the world is too small and the economic and political futures of the Free World nations too interdependent to withdraw our forces from the forward areas to marginally decrease the risk and increase their survivability. Therefore, the realistic answer is to build the forces necessary to meet our commitments, and not run for home and hope the world situation changes.
“Aviation Training: A Systems
Approach”
(See N. R. Criss, pp. 100-106, October 1983
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander C. R. Rondest- vedt, U. S. Navy, Instructional Systems Development (ISD) Officer, Strike Fighter Squadron One Two Five (VFA- 125)—My purpose is not to refute Commander Criss’s thoughts regarding an unsuccessful F-14 ISD experience, but rather to describe an ISD process that has contributed directly to aviation safety, combat readiness, and instructor/student satisfaction.
Commander Criss’s description of ISD methodology is correct, and the initial resistance to changes in instructional technique for VFA-125 instructors was also experienced. However, strong command direction and close integration of the ISD efforts of military, civil service, and contractor personnel have made the F/A-18 ISD program dramatically different from the F-14 ISD program. Additional perspective was provided by senior Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Air Forces, Pacific, civil service training personnel who ensured the lessons learned from both VF-124 and VS-41 ISD experiences were not repeated.
Recognizing the importance of ISD, a separate department was established using personnel so designated within the training department by the F/A-18 naval training plan (NTP). Headed by a senior officer knowledgeable in both cognitive and psychomotor training techniques, all officers assigned were highly skilled experts in military tactical missions. This move ensured that ISD priorities were not subordinated to those of training without department head-level discussion. The training officer was charged with day-today and long-range implementation of the syllabus, while the ISD officer managed the media development effort, quality assurance, learning center instruction, contracts, and the training model manager role mandated by the CNO.
Growing pains were experienced. Ini- ’■ally, all six NTP-designated 1SD officers worked as subject matter experts to produce the syllabus and media with civil service and contractor support. The squadron’s training department phase officers, however, were not satisfied with the instructional materials developed by a staff who had not actually interfaced with students. This problem was solved by assigning three ISD officers to the train- 'ug department. Training now provides outlines of desired media and all necessary reference material to the ISD department, where contractor personnel professionally package the product in accordance with ISD methodology. Final approval rests with the military user and ■s formalized through standardization. The remaining three ISD officers manage the highly sensitive, complex ISD department and are also tasked with sharing media quality assurance responsibilities with the training department.
To ensure that the resultant media are always user responsive, an errata process Was developed to give immediate visibility to comments made by students and mstructors. Errata sheets are routed through the training, operations, and ISD officers and. upon approval, can be implemented within 12 hours for computer- assisted instruction (CAI), while errata changes to slide tape, lecture, and work- hook media are implemented prior to the next class. Flight safety items can be implemented within the same day on all media if neccessary. As a result, the media always accurately reflect the current Strike Fighter mission.
Current media mix includes 30% slide tapes, 19% CAI, 40% lecture, 10% Workbook, and 1% video tape. Instructor-produced pilot training manual and standard operating procedures, together With Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) and classified supplements, enhance formal ISD media. Divided among 1503 PTT, 2F132 OFT, and 2E7 WTT are 52.9 hours of simulation. Total flight time is * 13 hours for a category-one student, of Which 77.4 hours are in the F/A-18 and 35.6 hours are in the TF/A-18. The system is designed to use a building-block approach by initially introducing information during academic events. Simulator events follow academics and provide replacement pilots (RPs) with opportuni- t'es to apply the information. Flights arc fhe final and most important step in refin- lng the RP’s performance. The amount of lecture time in this process is carefully guarded to ensure that adequate opportu- mty is available for classroom interface. The self-paced media release the instructors for intensive one-on-one student training. The end result is a student who is fully capable of refining a technique in the dynamic environment of actual flight.
Simulation is an indispensable factor within the F/A-18 program. While availability of the simulators has exceeded 90% throughout the first year of syllabus implementation, additional flight time could be substituted should the simulators become unavailable. Assuming that a graduate of equal capability is desired, approximately 40 additional flights would be required to replace simulation. Given current student loading, this equates to a student training time increase of one month and more than ten aircraft. Simulation savings become apparent when aircraft and flight hour cost and the additional support personnel required to maintain the aircraft are considered. The cost differential doubles when the East Coast F/A-18 Fleet Replacement Squadron, VFA-106, is included.
Considering this efficient use of aviation resources, the civil service educational specialists and an annual $500,000 contractor support budget are a small price to pay for quality media. The ISD process ensures that much-needed standardization is provided, as well as testing and media feedback after each event, in addition to open- and closed-book NATOPS and phase exams. This system guarantees that each student is being exposed to essential media, and that he must demonstrate proficiency at each step. If nothing else, the volume of testing ensures a constant thought process and improved retention as opposed to last-minute “gouge” sessions before a closed-book exam.
While much of this treatise deals with aviator training, it should be noted that such training comprises only a portion of the total training effort. The ISD Fleet Readiness Aviation Maintenance Personnel consists of nine training tracks in which 1,200 students and instructors are involved annually. ISD military personnel are provided for in the F/A-18 NTP as well as a civil service educational specialist and contractor support. Together, they comprise a team that is developing standardized ISD media in an environment of frequent aircraft modification. The final graduate of this effort has proven to be a competent technician of immediate value to the operational squadron.
ISD is a thoughtful, professional approach to training. Properly managed by the user, it contributes to a competent, standardized graduate, whether aviator or technician. Given today’s limited resources and use of sophisticated equipment in demanding combat arenas, operational commanding officers can accept no less.
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“An Almost Ready Reserve”
(See H. W. Serig, pp. 37-45, September 1983;
C. F. Ward, P. J. Smith, pp. 16-21, November
1983; P. B. Mersky pp. 86-87, January 1984
Proceedings)
John J. Collins—Commander Ward’s comment that the 40 stored F-14As are ten years old and are almost unmaintainable is not quite correct. As of 30 September 1983, there were 51 F-14As in long-term storage.
There are seven F-14As at the Naval Air Rework Facility, Norfork, that are Block 75 aircraft. These aircraft haven’t flown in several years, and most have some damage. These are not fleet configuration aircraft.
There are six F-14As in the boneyard at the Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center. These are preproduction aircraft that served at Point Mugu and Patuxent River. These are far from fleet configuration aircraft and have been stripped of many parts.
The treasure trove is at the Naval Air Station at North Island where there are (as of 30 September 1983) 38 F-14As in bags. Their configuration is as follows:
Block | Number |
75 | 51 |
85 | 31 |
90 | 11 |
100 | 12 |
105 | 32 |
110 | 42 |
'These have been updated to Block 90s. includes four aircraft with tactical air reconnaissance pods.
These aircraft are all of fleet configuration, and many have not had long hours on their airframes. These aircraft could be used by the reserves to maintain a meaningful posture.
“A Lost Generation of Mariners”
(See D. H. Grover, pp. 70-75, December 1983 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Penrose Lucas Albright, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve—How did we get in this fix? What can be done about it?
The problem has its inception in the compromise worked out to resolve the controversy which arose during the framing of our Constitution: the agricultural requirements of the South versus commercial interests of the New England states. The latter wanted to protect their commercial interests, whereas the former wanted to keep its slaves. The compromise permitted slavery to continue and the enactment of cabotage laws which shackled the U. S. shipping industry to U. S. shipbuilding. However, most countries which had cabotage laws had repealed them by the middle of the 19th century because the cure proved worse than the illness. We still have them. They didn’t make much difference until steam- driven iron ships became competitive in the 1850s. We carried tonnage equal to 75% of our trade. As long as ships were wood, we could make them cheaper than elsewhere. In addition, our seamen were more proficient. We could get by with 20 where other countries required 30. Ours were also better paid.
From the mid-1850s, U. S. shipping capacity has steadily declined, to 4%, and it keeps going down. Subsidies, operational and for shipbuilding, have failed.
I see only two workable solutions. One is to nationalize the U. S. Merchant Marine and recognize it as a part of national defense much as the Soviet Union does. The second is to unshackle the Merchant Marine as much as possible from government interference, regulation, and taxation as soon as possible.
My prescription for revitalization of the U. S. Merchant Marine covers the following:
► Phase out operational and construction subsidies and replace them with tax credit for those who ship in international trade on U. S.-flag vessels, provided such vessels include national defense features prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy and are largely crewed by members of the U. S. Naval Reserve. Such tax credits must be sufficient so that “Ship American” is financially attractive.
► Tax our ships on the same basis that Liberia does.
► Enact essentially the same labor laws that are currently applied by Liberia. These are more liberal than one might think.
► Permit U. S. citizens to purchase of have vessels constructed anywhere as long as they meet U. S. and Secretary of the Navy standards.
► Provide adequate tax credits for those who operate U. S.-built ships for a specified period, say, five to ten years.
Only by making it financially attractive for U. S. companies to ship on U. S.-flag vessels can the necessary cargo be generated for U. S.-flag vessels. Also, most of those vessels will be built in U. S. yards if it is made financially attractive to do so without a mountain of red tape. Except to ensure U. S.-flag vessels and those who man them are military assets if needed, regulation and government interference are best kept at a minimum. The collateral problem of turning out too many men and officers to man the ships will soon solve itself.
Commander Edward P. Shepherd, V■ S- Naval Reserve—There is another alternative for the recent maritime academy graduate who fails to find employment on U. S. merchant ships: sail on foreign-flag vessels. I have sailed as master of a Panamanian flag cargo vessel. The chief engineer of that ship was also an American and the rest of the officers and crew members were Filipino.
The wage scales on many foreign-flag ships are increasing and are often comparable to U. S. wages. Also, there are considerable tax advantages to sailing under a foreign flag. I am surprised that our leading maritime unions, all of which call themselves “international” organizations, have never organized the many nonunion foreign-flag ships.
\
(Continued on page 84)
Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 30)
“Education and Professionalism”
(,See W. P. Mack, pp. 40-42, October 1983, C.
R. Large, p. 25, December 1983; M. J. J.
Offenbach, p. 87, January 1984 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Daniel H. Else, U. S. Navy—I applaud and agree with the main thrust of Admiral Mack’s article. The Navy must adjust its philosophy on higher education within the officer corps if it is to increase its understanding and effectiveness. However, I do not agree with the statements and implications made concerning the technical and professional quality of education of those officers commissioned through sources other than the Naval Academy.
The Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) program commissions the graduates of almost 100 of the best universities in the United States. The pro-* gram is prescribed by the Navy for the midshipmen and is modeled on the Naval Academy’s curriculum. NROTC midshipmen must demonstrate required levels of accomplishment in mathematics, regardless of their majors, and they must take courses in naval engineering, military affairs, navigation, etc., totaling some 24 semester hours. Weekly professional study and drill periods are mandatory. None of the universities in the program will accept these naval science courses in lieu of those required for degrees, so they must be taken as electives or added to the regular student workload as a requirement for graduation.
NROTC midshipmen take their summer cruises alongside their Naval Academy counterparts for the same length of time and with the same requirements for training. Both NROTC and Naval Academy midshipmen are awarded the same commission upon graduation.
This means that the NROTC midshipman faces a much more rigorous regimen than his or her civilian counterpart, regardless of major. For the typical liberal arts graduate, this could mean up to 20% more class time, not to mention the summer training. For the technical student, the Navy’s requirements often mean an extra, unfunded semester.
It is a common misconception that the average officer educated outside of the Naval Academy is less technologically oriented than his Annapolis contemporary. I hope that this particular sentiment will disappear soon among Navy professionals.
“What’s in Store for Arapaho”
(,See G. O’Rourke, pp. 117-119, July 1983; J.
E. McNulla, p. 144, November 1983
Proceedings)
Captain Gerald O’Rourke, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I take issue with almost all of Captain McNulla’s statements about the usefulness of the Arapaho concept.
For reasons which still confound me in my later years, V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing), LBA (land-based air), and Arapaho (placing an air capability on a merchant ship) inevitably arouse professional emotions to peaks of intensity which obscure the sound logic and careful reason which are the hallmarks of naval officers.
The Arapaho concept is a good idea. When the chips are down, we will want to employ it. Why don’t we invest the little capital required for further Arapaho planning and research now to preclude the squandering of invaluable lives and cargoes later?
Since the U. S. Navy doesn’t seem to wish to make the case for such an investment, it is probably just as well that we pass the whole Arapaho package on to the British. They don’t seem to suffer from the hang-ups that immobilize us on this issue.
“Sealift”
(See J. L. Holloway, pp. 28-37, June 1983;
M. O. Miller, p. 103, September 1983; M.
Adams, p. 122, October 1983; R. V. Buck, p.
24, November 1983; G. H. Miller, p. 88,
January 1984 Proceedings)
Captain T. W. Glickman, U. S. Navy— Admiral Holloway calls for recognition of the uniqueness of the U. S. Merchant Marine’s military role and states that it is just barely adequate for the mission today. Although we appear to have set a relatively firm course to improve strategic sealift in the military context, we have not addressed the larger problem of improving the Merchant Marine as a whole. There can be no sealift for mil*' tary purposes unless there is a viable Merchant Marine. Ironically, some of the programs described to enhance military sealift could be detrimental to the Met' chant Marine’s well-being.
The United States has 445 dry carg0 ships—180 in the National Defense Re' serve Fleet (NDRF) and 265 privately operated. Thirty of those in the NDRF are designated as Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships, subject to activation in five to 15 days, if needed. A large part (42$) of the NDRF, including some RRF ships’ is made up of World War II Victory ships or hulls of similar vintage. Of the 265 privately operated ships, an average of 25 to 30 are already under contract to the Navy, dedicated to carry Department ot Defense (DoD) cargo or as the Near Tern1 Prepositioned Forces in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. This leaves about 235 to 240 U. S.-flag dry cargo shipSt some of which carry DoD cargo under various arrangements, devoted to the U. S. foreign trade. Planners indicate that the sealift requirements to support a Km rean- or Vietnam-type contingency v.'iH require 75% of our total assets—341 vessels. Given the time required to activate the RRF and part of the NDRF, we migh1 have some problems mounting such 3 sealift effort.
To improve responsiveness to a contingency, programs have been developed to increase the RRF by 257%, from 30 vessels to 70. The new RRF will include 1^ tankers and 51 dry cargo ships. It isn t clear whether the increase in dry cargo ships is additive to those already in the RRF or whether it includes replacement of some or all of the existing RRF ships’ The ships for this expansion program must come from someplace. On 1 January 1983, four dry cargo ships were undef construction in U. S. yards. Surely, these are not slated for the RRF. Therefore, the expansion must come from foreign pur' chases or our only other resource, the U. S. Merchant Marine. The NDRF and RRF are not productive as far as the mar1' time industry (yards, crews, etc.) is concerned, and they reduce the number 01 U. S.-flag ships engaged in U. S. foreign trade.
Mathematically, 39,000 mariners are Mequate to fill 29,600 seagoing billets, producing a crewing ratio of 1.28:1, "hich does not seem to be realistic or Workable. The current U. S. Merchant Marine crewing ratio is about 2.5:1. Such imbalances do not offer much encouragement to the young people who may desire a career at sea.
Admiral Holloway states the U. S. Merchant Marine is barely able to support "s military role. I agree—to a point. The figures provided do not take into account ship attrition. Material casualties occur "ith regularity as do maritime accidents. If 25% of the Merchant Marine is committed to the contingency, we may have difficulty providing replacements when the unexpected arises.
Another concern is that, of the 11 ac- !|ve Army and Marine Corps divisions based in the continental United States, three are on the West Coast, one in Colo- mdo, and the rest are east of the Rocky Mountains, as are a large number of Reserve and National Guard maneuver and combat support units. Should partial or full mobilization occur, the majority of •he personnel will probably be airlifted, hut the units’ equipment and follow-on Mgistic support will go by sealift from, in most cases, East and Gulf Coast ports. These same ports will most likely receive ships offloading normally imported materials and an additional amount required to support the mobilized industrial base. M'ill the ships and ports be there?
If the Eastern Seaboard, Straits of Morida, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico '''ere “torpedo alleys” 40 years ago, "'hat would they be like in the 1980s? Is *he U. S. Merchant Marine still barely adequate to fulfill its military or any other role?
The United States is an island nation, dependent on sealift. Yet, today, less than 4% of our needs is carried in U. S.- fiag bottoms. Our current strategic sealift enhancement programs may further reduce that figure. And the sealift required to support a Korean- or Vietnam-type eontingency could leave the world’s largest industrial nation in the inconceivable, Tet real, situation of being totally dependent upon foreign-flag shipping for survival. If the foreign operators are not Politically aligned with our military venire or our dollars, we may not even have foreign flags to depend upon. It is time fhat we recognize the Merchant Marine as lhe fourth arm of defense, in an economic context as well as the military one and do something about it.
One method of implementing the imitative improvements is to establish and Uctively pursue a national maritime policy—one that encompasses laws and regulations, shipbuilding and repair, ship operations and mariners.
“For Whom the Bell Tolls”
(See A. D. Nastri, pp. 133-137, November 1983 Proceedings)
William J. Seal—Colonel Nastri’s article brought back pleasant memories.
I was impressed with the experience of Wiley Smith, who enlisted in the Marine Corps about the same time as I enlisted in the Navy on 15 August 1927.
I was transferred to the Pittsburgh (CA-4) on 18 February 1931 and was placed on the “Binnacle list” after receiving treatment at the U. S. Naval Hospital at Canacao, Philippine Islands.
I was fortunate to bring the Pittsburgh home; she was the last of the coal-burning men o’ war under the command of Captain Halsey Powell.
She was a ship to be proud of, especially with Captain Powell as our CO.
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“The Offensive Surface Ship”
wee T. J. McKearney, pp. 64-69, December
1983 Proceedings)
Theodore L. Gaillard, Jr.—Without summarizing Commander McKeamey’s generally excellent article, I suggest, ^lrst, that in one area it went beyond its stated scope, and second, that there are further solutions that need consideration.
Much as I agree that the United States desperately needs to develop capital surface vessels with high-speed capability (through whatever appropriate technol- °Sy: surfact effect, SWATH type, or hydrofoil), such talk is irrelevant in a discussion of surface action groups (SAGs) based on reactivated World War II battleships. While we may well need to deVelop other state-of-the-art SAGs, the four potential SAGs to emerge from the reactivation of our /owa-class battleships can be examined only in isolation since CaPital surface vessels with 40 + -knot capability are a minimum of 20 years away from fleet introduction.
Furthermore, a basic assumption w°uld be that such a SAG would be in- fended for use in a relatively low-threat environment (although such environments would be short-lived following any declaration of full-scale war involving the Superpowers). Even so, with cruise mis- s,le technology in the fleets of many of ffie smaller nations, the problems pointed °ut by McKearney would still be perti- Uent. Over-the-horizon vision (without fhe “eyes” provided by carrier aircraft) w°uld be one. Not mentioned, but essen- tlal, would be strategic enemy vessel disposition updates from our ocean-surveillance satellites to whatever ships in the group were equipped with satellite command-reception capability and, hope- folly, the Navy tactical data system. Such mformation should be obtained from apPropriate satellites and stored in shipyard data banks before the group enters ''(hat its commander knows will be a sen- sUive area. Once in that area, further uPdates could be obtained without directly breaking SAG emission silence through the use of such remotely piloted Vehicles (RPVs) adapted to shipboard use as the Lockheed Aquila. An RPV catapult launch (with net retrieval system, if necessary) could be easily adapted to Such large platforms, and television, night forward-looking infrared readouts, 0r perhaps even inertial guidance-based digital target acquisition data could be returned from the RPV shadowing the fi°stile ship(s) to the SAG command ship. ‘Srael’s success with similar systems in me sanitizing sweep of the Bekaa Valley Provides a good example of what can be
done. Similarly, the Aquila or stealth- modified laser designator-equipped RPVs could also guide battleship- or cruiser- launched Harpoon or Tomahawk missiles. If development were to continue with rocket-assisted projectiles for the SAG's 16-inch guns, they, too, might be equipped with laser-seeker heads or infrared-seeking heads and terminal guidance. In relatively low-threat situations, a battleship-based Harrier aircraft might also be used as an armed reconnaissance vehicle.
SAG defense is a problem, facing as it does enemy cruise missile technology probably as advanced js our own. And as long as the SAG is centered around a battleship, refueling will continue to intensify the problem, even if other ships in the group are nuclear-powered. Fast fuelers in the form of large nuclear submarine tankers are not about to be developed to support reactivated World War II battleships—and such a tanker would be the only kind able to act as an integral part of such a group and eliminate the need for the refueling rendezvous and all the tactical vulnerability problems that method entails. So we will have to face the problems associated with surface tanker rendezvous, and careful tanker multiple-port prepositioning seems to be about the only ameliorating step we can take—unless we develop 30-knot tankers that will themselves form an integral and permanent part of our surface action groups.
In more threatening tactical situations, additional steps to those mentioned by McKearney will have to be taken. If development of a missile such as Martin’s proposal for the Long-Range Dual-Mission Missile/Advanced Strategic Air- Launched Missile integral rocket/ramjet were continued, it would provide both antiship and antiaircraft/missile capacity at Mach 3.5-4.5. But again, first warning capability of enemy ship or SAG activity in the vicinity should come from ocean surveillance satellites or, on a nearer- term basis, from RPVs or Harriers once the hostile threat’s direction is identified. If McKearney’s suggestion to use Sea Cobras is taken (although that platform seems too slow and vulnerable in the type
The Lockheed Aquila’s catapult launch, with a net retrieval system, could easily be adapted to shipboard use. Television, night forward-looking infrared readouts, or even inertial guidance-based target aquisition data could be transmitted from a remotely piloted vehicle shadowing the hostile ship(s) to the command ship.
of missile environment it would have to face today), it could be equipped with dipping sonar and direct data-link transmission capability to extend our SAG’s submarine detection range.
“Earl Hancock Ellis”
(See D. A. Ballendorf, pp. 53-60, November
1983; J. W. Philbrick, p. 82, January 1984
Proceedings)
Specialist Six Lybrand P. Smith, U. S. Army (Retired)—While reading about Lieutenant Colonel Ellis and his “mission impossible” to Micronesia in 1922— 1923, I could not but be thankful that I live in an age when alcoholism is no longer considered a moral decay but is a recognized disease and help is only a postcard away.
I am a sober alcoholic. Although I have never been court-martialed or faced the civil authorities because of my alcoholism, when I first joined Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 1961, I was under no illusions that, had I not joined AA, I could well have been court-martialed for some crime, because I was on the downward path.
Colonel Ellis and his superiors probably thought that he could take the “geographic cure”—an assignment to a place so remote that he could not get booze— but such a place does not exist. For example, one of my earliest AA friends had welcomed a transfer to the Gobi Desert during World War II, hoping that booze would not be available in that remote spot. Yet he wound up with the unofficial job of making the booze for his unit.
There is not a medical cure for alcoholism, as Colonel Ellis found out. Doctors can treat only the immediate physical
problems of alcoholism; the long-term cure remains within the alcoholic and support from other alcoholics.
Unlike Colonel Ellis, after I joined AA, I had that support regardless of my assignments—to Hawaii, to Okinawa, and to the Corpus Christi Bay, an Army helicopter repair ship. I could always attend meetings while on shore duty, and participate in correspondence meetings by mail while in remote assignments. My career flourished after I joined AA; I received one more promotion to specialist six, became a calibration specialist; and I retired honorably after 20 years’ service.
“Political Awareness Training in the U. S. Navy”
(See K. P. Weinberg, pp. 162-166, October 1983; C. H. Schmidt, p. 28, December 1983 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Tom Bortmes, U. S. Navy, Director, U. S. Navy Soviet Seapower Education Program—I was pleased to see
Proceedings readers who attend the Soviet Seapower Education Program team’s next presentation will recognize one of the slides as the cover of the October 1982 Soviet Navy Special
that October’s outstanding special issue on naval education and training included Commander Weinberg’s observations on the lack of political awareness training in today’s Navy. According to Commander Weinberg, the lack of such training has left the Navy with a dual-homed dilemma. To paraphrase him, our naval personnel are being asked to fight for a system they understand only marginally against an enemy about which they know nothing. Commander Weinberg offers a solution: “Institute a bold new political awareness program to educate our sea service personnel.”
I can echo the author’s consternation with U. S. educational shortcomings and hope that the naval community will consider his suggestions. Regarding the other horn of the dilemma, however, the Navy has already instituted a "bold new political awareness program” to educate our sea service personnel about the Soviet Union—the U. S. Navy’s Soviet Seapower Education Program.
Established in August 1983, this program is an elaborately produced, multimedia presentation designed to increase our people’s awareness of the Soviet Union and its navy. Developed by the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Atlantic, and sponsored by the Directors of Naval Warfare and Naval Intelligence, this program’s charter directs that the presentation be given by a five-member team at every major U. S. naval facility in the world. The Soviet Seapower Education Program is not another intelligence threat briefing for senior officers. Its purpose is to educate all naval personnel and their families about the Soviet Union and its naval doctrine, tactics, and motivation. By the end of 1983, this program had been presented to 15,000 Navy personnel at 19 bases from Norfolk to Hawaii.
Two versions of this program are presented. The first is a six-hour, classified presentation designed to be given to large audiences in a base theater. Based on the premise that such awareness training does not have to “hurt,” the program is presented in a highly entertaining format using a scriptless delivery, slides, numerous video tape segments, and role playing. To create the proper “learning environment,” theaters are decorated with Soviet propaganda posters, flags, and naval regalia. Soviet martial music is played throughout the presentation.
The morning portion of the presentation concentrates on the Soviet Union’s history, government, and people and traces the evolution of the Soviet Navy from its Russian origins under Tsar Peter the Great through the worldwide operations of its most modem warships. It then provides a look at the militarization of Soviet society and the process whereby young men and women are inducted into the Soviet armed forces. The morning concludes with a “firsthand” introduction to a Soviet naval officer and con- scriptee through role playing. Using only phrases and concepts taken from actual Soviet writings, this role playing has proven to be an effective teaching technique. In this portion of the program, the specific topics Commander Weinberg identifies as fundamental to an understanding of the Soviet Union are identified: 1,200 years of despotic rule justified by a state-sanctioned ideology; a historical legacy of repeated invasion, highlighted by the loss of 20 million lives in World War II, which manifests itself today in a national paranoia with defense, the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism, the deification of Lenin; the premier position of party apparatchiks in a “classless” society; the predominance of Slavs among Soviet nationalities; and the awful power of a militarized police state to control its citizens.
But the presentation does more than this. In the afternoon session, it examines how these factors have shaped Soviet naval wartime strategy, doctrine, tactics, and capabilities. The program concludes with an appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union and its navy.
In addition, an unclassified two-and- one-half hour evening version was developed to give Navy families a better understanding of the Soviet Union and why it is necessary for the United States to maintain a global naval presence. Basically a compendium of the morning p°r' tion of the program, this evening presentation is also intended to improve the civilian community’s understanding of a threat that imposes significant demands on the U. S. Navy, its members, and them families.
The overwhelmingly positive response to the Soviet Seapower Education Pr°' gram proves it to be an effective start at increasing our service members’ political awareness of the Soviet Union. More important, the program encourages Navy personnel to learn more about the Soviet Union and its navy, so that we can steer a course around their strengths and take advantage of their limitations.
Editor’s Note: See OpNavInst 3057-1 for amplifying information on how Navy activities can schedule the Soviet Seapower Education Program.
The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine”
(See P. Schratz, pp. 105-107, December 1983 Proceedings)
0ean Holley—This book review contains many of the errors of the book itself. I am thinking in particular about the section of 'he book (and the review) dealing with 'he Army’s M-l tank. As a member of 'he Association of the U. S. Army, I am ^stressed that the reviewers apparently hid not attempt to learn the “real” facts about the M-1 tank instead of passing on ^*r- Cockbum’s distortions.
The cost of the M-l tank is about $1.8 Million apiece as compared to $1.4 mil- ion apiece for a new M-60A3 tank. This ls a far cry from what the review states, 'vhich was that the M-1 costs three times as much. Also, the M-l is already more reliable than the “ mature” M-60, contrary to the review (and the book). And it 's true that the Army could buy more M-60s for a given amount of money than 'hey could buy M-ls, but it is also true hat the Navy could buy a lot of A-4s for 'he price of one F/A-18 or F-14, but what a°es that prove? It is comparing apples to oranges. The M-l Abrams tank is a suPerb tank, and it does not deserve the smear it took.
‘Leadership-Management Training and Education”
fSce J. Browning II, pp. 21-26, October 1983
Proceedings) ^aymond J. Barrett, U. S. Foreign Serv- l<e Officer (Retired), Associate Professor °f Management, Glassboro State Col- ege, New Jersey—I am not sure what Commander Browning seeks when he ealls for “further research ... to help Crystallize the elements of leadership and Jhatiagement.” Leadership is probably he most studied element of management; °ne survey counted more than 900 studies
this topic!
Some studies have brought forth several significant points about leadership. 0r instance, they have made clear that h° single set of personality traits identi- les a leader. The list of traits, as it accumulated, came to include almost all uman characteristics.
. Research then tried to identify behav- l0r that made leaders successful. Two ^e|l-known sets of studies were done at mo State University and the University ' Michigan. They made clear that suc- Cessfui leadership has two components.
One component is a concern for the task at hand—the ability and desire to get done what the organization needed done. The other component is concern for the expertise and needs of the subordinates involved. The point was that both elements are needed for effective leadership.
Expertise and a concern to get the job done are not enough for a prospective leader. This approach makes clear the key role of communication, especially the need to ask and listen to subordinates. Participation for subordinates in discussing and analyzing the problem must be regularly done. Explanations, it is clear, are an essential ingredient.
I know from discussions with many of my military colleagues that their reply to these injunctions is, “I don’t have time for that!” You don’t have time to be an effective leader? I reply, “Nonsense!” How often have you had to go back and straighten out something not done the way you wanted? That is worse than wasted time, it is poor command. The way a leader gets himself obeyed is by becoming a credible order-giver. That means the kind of involvement and explanation that the task/people concept of leadership highlights—then subordinates will obey when there really isn’t time for a lot of talk because they have learned that the orders you give do make sense.
In fact, research in leadership has gone on to provide some insights on how this interaction between leader and followers operates. The “path/goal” interaction is one of these insights. This approach points out the leader not only needs to set goals for his subordinates, but he must identify to them the path to reach those goals. To get the followers to follow that path to those goals they must see a reward they find fits their needs more than the cost to them of following that path.
“Underwater Guerrillas”
(,See C. A. Barton, pp. 46-47, August 1983;
R. A. Hundevadt, p. 94, November 1983
Proceedings)
Captain Donald E. Young, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Barton provides some insight into a little-known aspect of World War II, to which Captain Hundevadt added some very interesting observations.
There is another side to the story—our side—and little is known about it. I was a part of it as commanding officer of Underwater Demolition Team Eight (UDT- 8), June 1944-December 1945.
We had more than 30 UDTs ready for the pre-assault operations scheduled for Japan, and we were satisfied that we were not called upon to carry out that mission; losses on both sides would have been incalculable. (I heard, during my two years of active duty in the Korean War, that one estimate included the loss of. all 30 UDTs.)
The defenses constructed in the water and on the beaches at our training base at Fort Pierce were condensed versions of German defenses in Europe and of known Japanese defenses. These were attacked in around-the-clock sessions with tons of explosives—64,000 pounds in one phase of pre-D-day demonstrations on breaching German defenses early in 1944. My team, along with others with whom we had worked, and others on other operations had encountered man-made obstacles, Japanese mines, and coral reefs. We had experienced about a dozen days and nights of Kamikaze attacks—in the air, in boats, and some swimmers in the water at Lingayen Gulf in January 1945. (Incidentally, UDTs did not use scuba gear on any operation of which I have any knowledge, though all had been trained in it.)
Since we operated under secrecy, it is understandable that not many knew of the total UDT capability and adaptability. We did not operate as a unique entity, nor was it our objective to “win the war single-handedly.” Our primary task was to see that no soldier or marine would lose his life in the water adjacent to the beaches over which he was to land, because of man-made or natural obstacles.
The pre-assault reconnaissance was conducted from the three-fathom mark to the high-water mark some days before the landings, sometimes by day and sometimes by night under fire from the guns of the bombardment groups. Reconnaissance would determine the need for demolition operations.
WE'RE FIGHTING FOR YOUR LIFE
American Heart Association
My UDT-8, along with the UDT-10, on “standby replacement” at Guam for the ten UDTs operating at Okinawa, received our reward from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who upon inspecting our teams in March 1945, said, “I know that you cannot write home about what you are doing, and the press does not know, but the old man knows, and that is what is important.”