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The United States has reached a strate- L'c crossroads in the Caribbean. After ecades °f “big stick” diplomacy and
years of benign neglect, this country has ast set out upon a course calculated to j\Ve lbe region the attention it deserves. ew or rejuvenated economic, political, military programs have been targeted r the area, and international support has (j CrJ s°licited for the Reagan Administra- °n s Caribbean Basin Initiative.
nderstandably enough, most of this un"'awaitcd effort has been focused °n l|ic embattled Central American j publics which occupy the western bor- ^r°l the region. Yet immediate attention st also be given to the newly inde- reent fations, autonomous states, and ■naming colonial dependencies to the and T?r°rn t^IC ^dgin Islands to Trinidad °bago, these insular communities
share common challenges and mutual concerns—many of a maritime nature.
The magnitude of the maritime difficulties confronting the Eastern Caribbean can hardly be overstated. Although the area’s island populations are inescapably tied to the sea, only a few are adequately protected from the age-old hazards of wind, wave, and shoal. Most of the local governments do not have the necessary resources to ensure the safety of their own citizens afloat. Only a handful are capable of responding to a significant vessel or aircraft mishap more than a few miles offshore, and all are dangerously vulnerable to the environmental threat represented by marine pollution incidents. Few of these financially troubled nations are able to police their own fisheries and offshore economic zones, or guard their exposed coastal borders against the twin scourges of uncontrolled waterborne immigration and maritime smuggling.
Finally, the presence of an openly hostile Cuban satellite on the island of Grenada and sympathetic Marxist elements in a number of other island communities highlight the fact that almost all of the Eastern Caribbean’s democratic governments are ill-equipped to defend their territorial integrity against overt or clandestine aggression.
Arrayed against this imposing collection of regional challenges afloat is a mixed bag of civilian, military, and paramilitary organizations scattered along the whole of the island chain. Of these, the developing coast guards of Barbados, Saint Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago—as well as the small squadron of aging French Navy ships home ported in
and
with providing technical assistance
Martinique—stand as the most credible resources present. The balance of the Eastern Caribbean’s “coast guard” force is composed of a handful of small police department launches and a hodge-podge of privately owned vessels and aircraft manned by an assortment of civilian volunteers. All of these maritime organizations (with the notable exceptions of the French units and the oil-rich Trinidad and Tobago force) are strapped for operating funds, and each is in need of extensive professional training and technical assistance in a number of critical mission areas. This latter requirement has been offset, to a degree, by the Royal Navy personnel temporarily commanding and advising the infant coast guards of Barbados and Saint Vincent. Yet even this important contribution is far from equal to the enormity of the task at hand.
What is needed is a coordinated program of maritime training and assistance throughout the entire region. Ideally, this comprehensive assistance effort should be carried out by a single, disciplined organization already familiar with the area, and manned by individuals well schooled in civilian and military operations afloat. In short, the Eastern Caribbean presents a challenge that is tailor- made for the U. S. Coast Guard.
The British have provided a good example of how to shore up the naval forces of the Eastern Caribbean nations. Here, a Royal Navy advisor trains members of the Saint Vincent Coast Guard in the handling of a Zodiac rubber boat.
The Coast Guard is already deeply involved in this region’s maritime affairs. In fact, the entire island chain falls within the boundaries of the Seventh Coast Guard District’s Greater Antilles Section. Headquartered in San Juan, Puerto Rico, this important “district within a district” assists the local island governments with search planning, rescue coordination, and other professional matters. Periodically, it deploys operational units on a variety of humanitarian missions in the area.
Within the past three years, both of the section’s 82-foot patrol boats have made extensive goodwill tours throughout the island chain. In addition, about 70 Eastern Caribbean students have received training at Coast Guard schools within the United States; Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago each have a cadet enrolled at the Coast Guard Academy in New London. Finally, the Commandant of the Coast Guard has made increased service activity in the Caribbean a priority.
The danger, of course, is that any future Coast Guard programs in the Eastern Caribbean will not go far enough in resolving the tremendous maritime challenges facing the region. Indeed, the special concerns of the area demand nothing less than a dedicated commitment.
Consequently, the Coast Guard’s first step should be the establishment of a new and separate command for Coast Guard assistance to the area. Designated the Eastern Caribbean Training and Assistance Command (ECTAC), the new organization would be under the administrative and operational control of the service’s Greater Antilles Section, and would have its own headquarters located at the Coast Guard’s base in San Juan- Using the maintenance, support, and operational resources at the facility, the command would conduct brief resident training programs for a variety of missions, tailored to meet specific demands of the Eastern Caribbean nations. ECTAC would also create a maintenance assistance team, which would be tasked maintenance support to various maritime organizations of the region. Both ECTAc divisions would maintain mobile teams of personnel and equipment capable o providing specialized training and technical support to those island governments in need of immediate assistance.
The real meat of ECTAC would lie the establishment of resident Coast Guar advisory units throughout the islands- These five-man teams would organize and train capable coast guard organize tions for the island governments to whm they were assigned. Although this feature of the overall assistance program ma> seem to be a prohibitively tall order to fill, it is precisely what the Royal Navy has been doing on Barbados and Sain Vincent. By using U. S. personnel in a similar capacity, the local organizations established would inevitably employ U. S. Coast Guard methods and devices and thus would be more compatible wi the U. S. units in the region. Moreover* as representatives of the world’s tent largest “navy,” the U. S. Coast Guar advisory personnel would be in a positi°n to help these island nations create mar' time forces capable of fulfilling nat*°n^. security roles in addition to acting humanitarian and law enforcement orga nizations. This latter advantage is ma more attractive because it permits the m troduction of much-needed naval asSI^ ance in the region without introducing kind of Defense Department involveme which often leads to hostile popular tion. Thus could the Coast Guard’s l°c, advisory activities lead to a greater le of Caribbean stability while fulfill'11 civil and humanitarian needs. ^
104
Proceedings / I11'-1
I9td
In addition to these proposed EC 1A activities, the Coast Guard should im111 diately put into effect other more conve(0 tional measures. One of the simplest is schedule more frequent Coast Guard ter goodwill and training visits in the gion. Ideally, these calls would be ma by the service’s 82- and 95-foot Patj^ boats, since these units most closely 1 semble the vessels which the Eas e Caribbean nations possess or will Pr° bly obtain. Another early action woul to establish Coast Guard attache biHets U. S. embassies in the region. In s0'
^stances, these new billets could replace “Jose which are currently filled by U. S. Navy personnel.
This proposed Coast Guard assistance Program represents a sizeable financial Commitment. Unfortunately, our Coast Cuard is already hard-pressed to fund its current level of operations. Furthermore, ln this era of fiscal austerity, it will be extremely difficult to secure additional monies from Congress. Therefore, some sacrifice will have to be made if the mari- 'rne programs so badly needed by the astern Caribbean are to be realized. The tentative to implementing such an as- ststance program is to allow the critical lack of maritime self-sufficiency in the region to continue. This, coupled with the serious economic and political woes of the Eastern Caribbean, can only be regarded as an invitation for increased regional instability.
In his address to the Organization of American States on 24 February 1982, President Reagan observed that, “Today, more than ever, the compassionate and creative peoples of the Americas have an opportunity to stand together, to overcome injustice, hatred, and oppression, and to build a better life for all of the Americas.” In a small but important way, the U. S. Coast Guard can help in
The sight of U. S., Saint Vincent, and Jamaican patrol craft together could become a familiar one if the Coast Guard embarks on an area-wide maritime training program.
bringing that better life to the Eastern Caribbean. Indeed, our island neighbors deserve nothing less.
Lieutenant Abel, a 1979 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, served as commanding officer of the USCGC Point Warde (WPB-82368). He is currently a senior instructor at the Coast Guard’s Maritime Law Enforcement School in Yorktown, Virginia.
jjte Naval Gun: Encore! Encore!________________________
Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Mosbrooker, U. S. Army (Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel John A. Murray, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
(Toi
in
new generation of naval missiles ntahawk/Harpoon) and improvements existing systems (Standard and
ROC) seem to have upstaged the Val gun and caused some critics to un- errate the naval gun’s value as part of a rtace ship’s total weapons suite.
^°rne functions of a naval force— g-, sea control and power projection— aye changed little over the years. Since s- 0r^ War II, Navy tactics have empha- c*Zet* the role of naval avfation in the ac- rmPlishment of these missions. More er>tly, new shipboard missile systems th^ exPant*e<J uPon and supplemented Capability of naval aviation. av- ■ e the spotlight has been on naval ation and missile systems, the naval en s capability has been largely under- ‘mated. Yet, analysis of three mission * (antiair, antisurface and amphibi- (h s assault fire support) has highlighted ov Contr‘bution of naval guns toward tjj rah fleet effectiveness. To examine . worth of naval guns, several assump- > were made:
etnality of the various gun systems as based on best existing or feasible ^ ''dopmental ammunition.
Range capability was based on improved ballistic shapes where they are being considered.
► Guided projectiles were considered available for all gun calibers between five- and eight-inch.
► For the base case, gun systems currently installed or currently programmed for new construction ships were examined. (See Table 1 for a breakdown of gun systems by ship type or class.)
► For alternative cases, traditional naval calibers and comparable non-naval calibers whose ammunition might be adapted for naval use were considered as replacements on new construction, reactivated ships, and lightly armed amphibious ships. The 155-mm. gun was considered as an alternative to the five-inch gun on DDG-51-class ships; a five-inch gun was considered as an alternative to the 76mm. on FFG-7-class ships. In both cases, magazine capacity was limited to weight and volume of the replaced system. On the battleships, both 155-mm. and eight- inch guns were considered in place of the 5-in./38-cal. guns presently installed. For LSTs, both 155-mm. and eight-inch guns were considered as alternatives to the present 3-in./50-cal. gun systems. These assumptions were employed in evaluating the capabilities and effectiveness of naval guns. Hereafter, all base case and alternative gun systems will be referred to collectively as large-caliber naval guns.
To assist in the evaluation, a mathematical model was developed. Inputs to the model included task organization of the U. S. Navy fleet, ship weapon systems and magazine capacities, and priority of mission areas for the different type battle/task groups. Threats were represented as a target array at varying ranges. The model optimized the allocation of the fleet’s weapon systems and ammunition to achieve comparable levels of effectiveness in all mission areas. Ammunition expenditure was based on the number of rounds/missiles required to achieve a .5 probability of kill (Pk) with an assurance of 90%.* U. S. naval force attrition was based on a function which considered that the closer to the target the ship must be to conduct an engagement, the more vulnerable the ship becomes.
The most important model constraints *Data sources included Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals," supplemented by DoD/service agencies reports for developmental weapon systems and ammunition.
Miss Distance (Meters) Range to Target (KYD)
Table 1 Large Caliber Gun Systems InstalledIProgrammed
ClasslType | 16750 | 5754 | 5738 76-mm. 3750 |
BB-61 | X |
| X |
CGN-36 |
| X |
|
CG-47 |
| X |
|
DD-963 |
| X |
|
DDG-993 |
| X |
|
DDG-51 |
| X |
|
FF-1052 |
| X |
|
FFG-1 |
|
| X |
FFG-7 |
|
| X |
LCC |
|
| X |
LHA |
| X |
|
LKA |
|
| X |
LPD |
|
| X |
LPH |
|
| X |
LSD |
|
| X |
LST |
|
| X |
Figure 1 Miss Distances for a Projectile | Guided | Figure 2 Guided ProjectilelConven- tional Munition Hit Probabilities |
Antiship Mission: In this mission area, large-caliber naval guns are a necessary complement to antiship missiles, such as Harpoon and Tomahawk. Although mlS siles have a greater range capability than naval guns, they also have some serious shortcomings. First, surface ships carry only a limited number of missiles. When this inventory is expended, surface com batants will be defenseless unless a gun system is available. Second, as was true in antiair warfare, a gun system gives commanding officer the ability to opt' mize the use of his limited missile inven tory. The attack of low value or hig value/low threat targets, such as cargo vessels, disabled warships, and small pa trol craft simply does not require the eX penditure of limited and expensive anti ship missiles when naval guns are adequate for the task. Third, antiship missiles have minimum range limitatio which result in a gap in their coverage capability, necessitating a secondary s)'s
were the amount and type of ammunition that could be stored in each ship’s magazine, since underway replenishment was not allowed. Thus, for a mission area where a missile system offered the greatest Pk, large caliber guns were considered effective if they could contribute to overall effectiveness after all missiles were fired, or could allow U. S. warships to optimize the expenditure of their available missiles by firing guns at targets within their effective envelope. What fol
lows is a synopsis of study findings in each of the three mission areas analyzed.
Antiair Mission: In a war at sea, attacking aircraft will generally launch coordinated antiship cruise missile attacks beyond the range of any naval gun. Therefore, the primary defensive weapons used must be naval aviation, whenever available, and fast reaction surface- to-air missiles, such as Standard and Sea Sparrow. However, a ship is limited in any engagement to the ammunition she has on board when the engagement commences. Thus, if a ship has expended (or has some need to conserve) her antiair missiles, and there are still some “leaker” enemy missiles which have survived the various outer air defenses, that ship will be vulnerable without a viable secondary defensive weapon system-
Minor caliber close-in weapon system (CIWS) guns are not wholly sufficient for this purpose, because of inherent limitations in their range and lethality. There is a gap between the effective area covered by antiair missiles and the area covered by a CIWS. Large-caliber naval gunS have the potential to fill a significant portion of this gap.
This was demonstrated when four cruise missiles were assumed to have leaked through a ship’s long-range antiair defenses. The effectiveness of large-caliber guns in such a scenario is largely dependent on the gun system’s accuracy, reaction time, and rate of fire. Reaction time and rate of fire compensate for each other, so that a reduction in system reaction time will allow satisfactory performance with a similiarly reduced rate of fire- Simulation efforts resulted in the determination of the expected intercept or miss distance for both high explosive (HW fragmenting and guided munitions. It was apparent that guided munitions were preferable because of their increased accuracy. The cumulative probability function for achieving a specified miss distance for a notional guided projectile is shown in Figure 1. With their larger warheads, large-caliber guns can achieve a kill within a certain miss distance of the target while a CIWS requires a target hit to achieve a kill.
tem to fill this void. The availability of a gun system could be critical to the ac- c°mplishment of the sea control mission ln restricted waters where the majority of surface engagements, at least initially, c°uld occur inside the minimum effective range of missiles.
tank;
Ployed
Important factors in assessing the con- tfibution of naval guns to antiship surface action include accuracy, lethality, and range. Accuracy and lethality are essentially a double-edged sword. The lack of dther in a gun system would require the expenditure of large amounts of ammuni- !10n to destroy a single target, thus limit- lng the total contribution of the gun sys- em because of fixed magazine capacity. Figure 2 presents a comparison of the tectiveness of guided projectiles versus conventional ballistic munitions against a uotional surface ship target. Available WeaPons’ effectiveness data show that guided projectiles would achieve an acceptable probability of kill against sur- ace ships. The data further identify the CaPability of improved conventional Munitions (ICMs) as an acceptable alter- Uative, because of their ability to disable enemy warships by destroying above- eck weapon and fire control systems.
rite range of a gun system is also an Important contributor to its effectiveness, creased range allows for more opportu- les to employ a gun system, thus per- itting increased conservation of limited lssde resources. Increased gun system ange enhances ship survivability through a h' ac^dI°naI stand-off capability Qf 'eved. Programs under development ■ er the potential of giving gun systems creased range through the use of pro- sion-assisted projectiles.
Amphibious Assault Fire Support Mis- n ' rire support roles for large-caliber la h- ®Uns 'uclude missions in support of sa 1® F°rces during amphibious asset tS’ an<* destroying or neutralizing tar- 8 ts ashore. These missions usually in- v ,. troops, towed artillery, logistics 'cles, and storage dumps, afge-caliber naval guns are well the l° l^C ^lre suPPort r°le m view °f to a^vantages they possess with respect her fire support means. Compared tai ,navaI avtation, naval guns can sus- ods 3r^er vo*ume °F Fire for longer period °f time under all weather conditions. silJ^Pared with surface-to-surface mis- lev / nava* gunfire can achieve the same Cos{ °1 effectiveness for a fraction of the
high1'
cessful attack of soft-area targets. Past studies have highlighted the requirement for large quantities of ammunition to defeat or suppress soft-area targets regardless of the caliber employed. At first glance, this suggests that smaller calibers would have an advantage because of the increased number of rounds available in magazines of the same physical size. However, when comparing naval guns in the fire support role, the increased range and lethality of large-caliber guns offset the advantage that small-caliber guns possess by virtue of their increased number of rounds. Range, as noted before, allows the fire support platform to station itself where it is less vulnerable to land- based defenses, thereby increasing its survivability. Volume of fire is effective only if each individual round has the lethality potential to achieve some level of destruction against the target. Historical data support the effectiveness of large-caliber ammunition.
Analysis identified the lack of sufficient numbers of gun systems for naval gunfire support. This led to examination of the effect that adding two large-caliber guns to each tank landing ship (LST) in the amphibious task force had on overall mission area effectiveness.
Although the range of the gun system and—to a lesser degree—the number of gun systems available are important to the successful attack of hard-point targets, the overriding criterion is accuracy in the delivery of the projectile to the target. Thus, the success of naval gunfire support dictates the necessity for guided projectiles as a portion of the ammunition loadout.
Study results showed substantial improvement in the amphibious assault fire support mission area when 155-mm. guns are substituted for five-inch gun systems on DDG-51-class ships, while effectiveness in the antiair and antisurface warfare areas remained essentially the same. On the contrary, when naval guns were not installed on new ships, study results indicated a substantial reduction in effectiveness in all three mission areas. The reduction in antiair effectiveness when the 155-mm. gun was substituted for the five-inch was because of a decrease in numbers of available guided projectile rounds, rather than differences in gun system performance.
This is supported by results obtained when five-inch guns were substituted for 76-mm. ones on board the FFG-7-class ships. The addition of these guided pro-
Table 2 Mission Area Performance1
AAW |
| ASUW | Fire Support | ||
Alternative A2 — 5 |
|
| 3 |
| 58 |
Alternative B3 — 11 |
|
| 3 |
| 70 |
Alternative C4 6 |
|
| 35 |
| 69 |
Alternative D5 — 13 |
|
| 3 |
| 68 |
Alternative E6 —12 |
|
| 2 |
| 73 |
Alternative F7 —14 |
|
| -19 |
| -42 |
‘The data in the table represent percent differences in effectiveness achieved by the alternative mix of gun systems relative to the performance of the base case gun systems described in Table 1. Effectiveness is measured by the total number targets engaged with sufficient ammunition to achieve a .5 probability of kill with a 90% assurance. 2155-mm. instead of 5754 on DDG-51-class ships 3155-mm. on DDG-51 class; two 155-mm. guns instead of twin 3750s on LSTs 4155-mm. on DDG-51 class; two 155-mm. guns on LSTs; 5" vice 76-mm. on FFG-7 class 5155-mm. on DDG-51 class; two 155-mm. guns on LSTs; six 155-mm. gun mounts instead of 5738s on BBs 6155-mm. on DDG-51 class; six 8" gun mounts instead of 5738s on BBs; two 8" instead of 3750s on LSTs 7No guns on DDG-51 class, CG-53 and newer Aegis cruisers | |||||
Table 3 Ammunition Available for Various Caliber Guns |
| ||||
Ammunition 76-mm. | 3" | 5" | 155-mm | . 8" | 16" |
Fragmentation X | X | X | X | X | X |
Submunitions |
| 0 | X | X | X |
Mines |
|
| X | 0 | 0 |
Laser Guided |
| X | X | X |
|
Terminal Homing |
| 0 | 0 |
|
|
Smoke |
| X | X |
|
|
Armor Piercing | X | X |
|
| X |
Chemical |
|
| X | X |
|
Nuclear |
|
| X | X |
|
Terminally Guided Submunitions |
|
| 0 | 0 |
|
Extended Range |
| X | X | X |
|
Illumination | X | X | X |
|
|
X: in service/undergoing testing O.proposed/undergoing development |
jectile-capable gun systems resulted in substantially improved performance in all three mission areas. The substitution of 155-mm. or eight-inch guns for three- inch guns on the LST dramatically increased performance in the amphibious assault fire support mission area. These results recommend the upgrade of gun systems on the LST to at least 155-mm. as a cost-effective, low-risk approach toward partially solving the requirement for increased fire support in the conduct
of amphibious warfare operations.
Study results also considered the tradeoff issues between different caliber gun systems in the three mission areas. Specifically, the results for either 155-mm. or eight-inch guns as alternative systems to five-inch guns on battleships and three-inch guns on LSTs are essentially the same. These results are reflective of the fact that although an individual eight-inch projectile has more lethality than a 155-mm. projectile, more 155- mm. rounds can be stored in a given magazine, thus compensating to some extent for the difference in individual projectile lethality. The mission area performance results for each of the alternative system configurations investigated
are summarized in Table 2.
The analytical studies conducted demonstrate the contribution of naval guns to overall fleet effectiveness in each of the mission areas examined. The results strongly support a requirement for naval guns in the future. Furthermore, the studies highlight the ammunition requirements for naval guns in future conflicts- To provide effective support in the antiair mission area, and to a lesser degree in the antisurface mission area, guns must have guided projectiles included within their magazines. However, switching entirely to guided projectiles is not necessary f°r shore bombardment effectiveness against soft targets, and in a suppressive fire role- Thus, large-caliber guns should have the ability to accommodate both HE/lCM and guided projectiles in order to opti' mize their contribution to all mission areas.
This study has highlighted the nonnaval 155-mm. caliber as a viable alternative for naval guns of the future. This conclusion is based on the gun’s greater range and lethality, coupled with the broad spectrum of available 155-mm- ammunition (see Table 3). Navy ammunition development programs currently concentrate on the five-inch type, since this is the primary projectile in Navy use today. A problem associated with five" inch ammunition is its relatively limited payload capacity, thereby inhibiting lts growth potential. At the same time, eight- and 16-inch naval ammunitions arc relatively scarce, and the limited numbers of these barrels in the fleet do not warrant a large developmental effort.
Meanwhile, the Army has conducted extensive ammunition development pr°' grams for the 155-mm. gun, including increased range, greater lethality, better fragmentation patterns or mechanisms. and more energetic explosions. In fact- the Army has spent 25 times as much funding on ammunition development an production as the Navy. This development offers the Navy an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of its limited ammunition development funds through participation in a joint development effort. Differences, such as safety certified' tion procedures and the issue of case versus caseless propellant, remain to be resolved prior to achieving full commonality between Navy and Army ammunition development. However, the advantages of an expanded and comffl°n development effort recommend the adop- h°n of the Army’s 155-mm. ammunition Jor use in a naval gun as a cost-effective, low-risk approach toward ammunition development for a 155-mm. naval gun system.
One final question concerns the design °f such a system. A primary considera- tlon in configuring a 155-mm. gun sys- 'em is the requirement for it to accommodate the guided projectiles which will increase the gun’s overall effectiveness. At the same time, the system size and weight parameters must remain commensurate with those of the five-inch gun to be readily accommodated on modem warships. Furthermore, a 155-mm. system should contain features common in existing systems, and should be compatible with existing fire control systems. Such a design would achieve increased performance in the areas of range, lethality, and flexibility.
The day of the naval gun on center stage is far from over. It is truly a multipurpose weapon that deserves co-star status with naval aviation and missile systems. Recent advances in ammunition technology have guaranteed that the naval gun will continue to play a prominent role in naval campaigns.
Colonels Mosbrooker and Murray are senior analysts in weapon systems for the FMC Corporation, Northern Ordnance Division. Colonel Mosbrooker has held a variety of weapon system research and analysis positions in DoD and the Army. Colonel Murray has served as an operations analyst for research and development programs in DoD and the Marine Corps.
^Fresh Look at Combat Systems Today
% Lieutenant David Douglas Winters, U. S. Navy and Lieutenant Michael W. McFadden, U.
In the 19th century, the U. S. Navy underwent a great change. The advent of steam-and-steel ships with their long ptoges and rifled guns required a new feed of officers and men, who employed Pr°per methods of operation and maintenance. One of the first problems tackled Was engineering—propulsion and power ad to be dependable and safe. Once that department was brought under control, e Steel Navy turned to the improvement d *ts weapons: it is to this problem that o Navy again must turn. We have de- eloped a successful training and evalua- lon process to keep the screws turning and the lights burning. But, unless our Combat systems are improved and main- air>ed at a similar level, we face the po- enlial problem of fielding a naval force Populated by highly mobile shooting-gallery targets.
I ^'rsL to improve combat systems read- a®ss. priorities must change in a world Pere the biggest alligator runs the Wamp The Propulsion Examining °ard (PEB) has been the biggest “alli- Mtor ’ for yearSj anj it has been running pC swamp quite well—for engineering. ^erhaps a Combat Systems Examining ppard> with authority on a par with the would be a step in the right direc- If a ship can stay tied to the pier cause of inadequate engineering train- § or material condition, then she can 0 remain in port for having an inade- "uate combat systems condition, in h 'lrst stePs *lave already been taken ‘he areas of organization and assign- nt- Many ships’ organizational struc- rcs have been modified to include a a Parate combat systems department. But great deal more still needs to be done. °r the most part, ships’ crews still CrClVe their combat training and testing 01,1 a number of distinct and separate ganizations, each addressing one par
ticular area of the combat systems on board. The training administered in those areas tends to be quite general, usually conducted in unfamiliar environments such as classrooms or in unconvincing mock-ups. Because ships’ systems vary tremendously—even among ships of the same class—constructing mock-ups
which sufficiently approximate them is virtually impossible.
Such an approach to training ignores the fact that antiair, antisurface, and antisubmarine warfare are no longer the easily separated entities they once were. It now takes only seconds for a submarine or ship to turn an antisubmarine or antisurface solution into an antiship missile defense problem. And electronic warfare permeates any encounter today. To deal with such contingencies, the fleet needs an integrated training effort conducted in a familiar and realistic environment— preferably in the environment that combat teams will fight.
A good way to accomplish this would be to combine elements of the various combat training organizations—or their equivalents—to form a single combat systems training team. This organization would act as a fleetwide contact for arranging, tailoring, and transporting to any ship the optimum combination of people and equipment for training an integrated combat systems team. The crew would train on board, using its own gear. This “mobile training team” would be ideally suited to help the crew establish a revitalized and systematic training program. This program might resemble the Operational Readiness and Training Systems (ORATS) developed by General Physics Corporation and already being implemented on both coasts.
The hardware necessary to accomplish this task already exists in limited quantities. Navy tactical data system (NTDS)
. Navy
training programs, T-3 target generators, own ship’s motion simulators, and a new combat systems test set now being evaluated are a few examples. Other such equipment is on the way, but more is needed. The combat systems test set, built by Litton Data Systems, is already proving itself as an invaluable aid to team training (in DDG-993-class guided missile destroyers) by its ability to provide combat scenario information to virtually all of a ship’s sensors simultaneously.
But just as important as the training devices is the presence of assigned personnel who are capable of establishing and conducting a workable training program on board ship.
Most of a ship’s training must, and should be, conducted on board by the officers and senior petty officers of the
One look at a combat information center—with its closely packed interior and exterior communications equipment, tracking and IFF systems, plus computer input console—gives us the reason why an integrated approach to combat systems training may be in the best interest of our fleet.
crew. But training is becoming more of a job for the trained instructor. Knowing how to perform a task is often not enough; one must also know how to teach it. Increasingly complex systems also foster complex training needs. As a result, effective training management has gone beyond the capacities of a part-time coordinator and developer—no matter how knowledgeable. In short, a ship needs to assign an officer for whom training is “his baby,” not just as a collateral duty. This does not mean merely scheduling courses of instruction, but also involves overseeing the development and coordination of proper curricula and on- the-job training to be conducted by the ship’s crew. This evolution needs to be continuous; the planning and coordination of combined combat systems drills and training are formidable tasks.
This concept is a familiar one in the “smokeless” navy, where a full-time “nuclear engineering drills” officer is a fact of life. Again, there is a lesson to be learned from our engineers. The presence of a full-time training officer on board our surface combatants would become a prime mover in providing greater continuity for shipboard training programs, increased and improved use of shipboard training systems and hardware, and a more professional training organization.
This is the groundwork to be laid. Integral to it would probably be the Ships Electronic Readiness Team now emerging on both coasts. The identification of a ship’s training team at the enlisted level might also prove to be useful.
Changes must come. The time is ripe- Let’s get on with the job.
Lieutenant Winters served as electronic warfare officer in the USS Arkansas (CGN-41), and is currently operations and plans officer at Fleet Combat Systems Training Unit, Pacific. He is author of The Boat On1' cer’s Handbook.
Lieutenant McFadden has served as an electronics technician, electronic warfare technician, and elec tronic materials officer. He is also assigned to Flee Combat Systems Training Unit, Pacific, as the train ing officer.
Special Forces for Special Problems
By Major Michael E. Haas, U. S. Air Force
This shotgun-wielding SEAL in the surf—and the other professionals who make up the country’s “Special Forces”—can spell the difference between a quick, effective solution to a “special” military problem and a drawn-out, costly, conventional type of response.
Whether our special action forces (SAFs) should be employed as an integral part of U. S. strategic plans continues to be one of the most debated arguments in national policymaking circles. The employment of these SAFs—Air Force Special Operations, Army Special Forces, or Navy SEALs—continues to generate controversy from both military and civilian strategists, out of proportion to the number of forces involved. Until this strategic debate is resolved, the credibility and capability of the U. S. Government to handle crisis situations—e.g.,
American hostages in Iran—will remain suspect.
Seen in a larger context, the failure of the U. S. SAF in Iran was not so much a problem of sandstorms and broken helicopters, but rather a painful lesson in the limitations of using tactical equipment and forces for a strategic mission. This was especially true with the selection and employment of the helicopter forces. As international tensions continue to intensify in the 1980s, it is highly likely that the demand for special action “solutions” will also intensify. Within this context, the existence of strategically organized and supported SAFs becomes not only an advantage of the United States, but a virtual prerequisite for the successful conduct of foreign policy 111 the remainder of this decade.
The use of conventional forces in the 1980s by Western powers is an increasingly restricted option, if events over the last few years are any indication. Underscoring this point are three recent examples of conflict involving Western powers in Africa, the Middle East, and South America. .
With victory in sight, the South Aft*' can drive into Angola in 1976 was f°rce , to withdraw prematurely when the Unite States, under pressure from world opinion, changed its mind and withdrew t|s support from South Africa. Angolas “hosting” of several thousand soldiers from Cuba and Eastern Europe receive little attention, while the only pro-Western power actively involved was roundly condemned for its presence in Angola. ln 1983, the Marxist government of Angola
still has thousands of communis “guests” within its borders.
In 1981, the Israelis bombed a nearly completed nuclear power plant in Iraq* causing a “spontaneous” political uproar in much of the world. The fact that the power plant shortly would have been capable of producing nuclear weapons material, or that Iraq was a swom enemy 0 Israel’s very existence, had little appare11 impact on published world opinion. Also in 1981, the pro-Marxist regime in Bagh' dad attacked Iran in a campaign of territorial conquest. . .
The most recent example of the pol'u cal unacceptability of conventional, pr0
tracted warfare is the British-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands. What- eyer the merits of the Argentine claim to the Falklands, their military actions were an unusually blatant (for this century) emonstration of “gunboat diplomacy.” Using a conventional force, Argentina ^eized the islands by force in April 1982. *et, even as Britain mobilized forces to regain its territory, an international cho- jus of world opinion urged restraint and reasonable negotiations.” Less than six weeks later, initial political and economic support by Britain’s European al- *es had declined to the extent that the °mmon Market was debating whether to abandon its initial economic sanctions against Argentina, and resume full trade
relations.
in
If
Protracted conventional warfare is
not
While the ultimate ownership of the ulklands may remain to be resolved, the costs of the conflict are somewhat easier o measure. One government was top- Peu, and both countries, already facing Revere economic difficulties, ran up mul- ■million-dollar tabs. In addition, British 'Plomatic relations with its European ^ighbors have not emerged unscathed r°m this dispute.
■ These examples are certainly not alldelusive, but they illustrate one point WeH: for Western governments, the polit- ICa' fallout from almost any conventional rrrjlitary operation can be severe—what- eyer the justification may be.
«is worth noting that the Soviet role in ese examples has not been a minor one. c ability of the Soviet propaganda ap! ratus to generate political pressure on °ncommunist combatants is as swift as ls effective. On the other hand, com- Unist-sponsored warfare in Afghanistan u Kampuchea in recent years, for ex- fUple, has drawn relatively little media Protest compared with other conflicts in e Western world. While world opinion .as flogged South Africa for its warfare a Southwest Africa, the slaughter ii ampuchea receives a comparative frac n of the current news coverage.
j a politically acceptable means of baling vvith aggression in the 1980s, toat options does the United States have /^COrnbat threats ranging from terrorism w ayaguez, Entebbe, Iran) to “national I*f,erat*on” (Nicaragua, Rhode> ■ The United Nations has repeatedly nu I60 'noffeotivc as a peacekeeper, and tj C ear warfare is hardly a viable altema- e- Special action forces may well 0 *?Ve the most acceptable—if not the (j ^ acceptable—option available to a administration in a crisis situation. Uj /'most without exception, SAFs r°ughout the world are highly specialized forces trained for quick, precisely executed missions in politically sensitive situations. Justifiably so, they are (or should be) considered as political or psychological warfare forces. An excellent example of the latter were the forces used for the U. S. prisoner of war (POW) rescue attempt in 1970 at a North Vietnamese prison camp. While no POWs were rescued from the Son Tay camp, the psychological reverberations that swept through the North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet capitals resulted in a major psychological victory for the United States. Unfortunately, the concept of maintaining political or psychological warfare forces continues to have a negative connotation for many Americans; this accounts for much of the American controversy still surrounding the use of SAF-type units. Other democratic countries, however, have shown the potential of such forces.
Israel and Britain are two countries which have successfully demonstrated the strategic application of SAFs as instruments of national policy. Israeli leaders have stated their determination to pursue their enemies anywhere and everywhere throughout the world. Their military SAFs have fulfilled this pledge in either military formations or by supplying trained specialists from such units to Mossad, their chief intelligence agency. Britain’s judicious use of its elite Special Air Service (SAS) units as strategic weapons in the Middle East (Oman, Yemen) and the Far East (Borneo) during the last two decades has typically received far less publicity. Yet, the impact of SAS results on British national policy has been all the more remarkable considering the small number of forces actually employed.
On a larger scale, the Soviet Spetznaz (Special Forces) have been reported active in situations as diverse as Afghanistan and Poland. Soviet “diversionary
The “whiskers” of this MC-130 aircraft are used to recover special forces personnel and equipment tethered to balloon-held cables. The plane is part of the Air Force’s Special Operations Wing—almost done away with four years ago.
troops” were engaged (some wearing civilian clothes) in the takeover of the Prague airport in the Czechoslovakian invasion of 1968. If SAFs have been employed so successfully in other countries, why is the subject still so controversial in the United States?
One argument against expanding, or even maintaining, SAFs is their relatively high cost. But expensive relative to what? Comparing the Air Force Special Operations Wing with any other flying wing is like comparing the lightning and the lightning bug. No other flying wing has the diversity of aircraft, equipment, and combat missions. An Army Special Forces battalion is more expensive to raise and maintain than a conventional infantry battalion, but again the diversity of missions and equipment makes valid comparisons difficult at best. It is questionable whether the entire annual SAF budget could effectively absorb more than $100 million—the cost of one B-l bomber. It soon becomes apparent that if SAFs were employed on a strategic basis with the proper support, it would be by far the cheapest weapon system in our strategic arsenal.
Another argument is that special action forces have such an operationally narrow field, that they lack the flexibility inherent in larger conventional forces. Seen from a strategic point, an SAF would operate as a “fourth arm” of our strategic triad, possessing flexibility and control unmatched by our ICBMs, bombers, and submarine forces. Unlike such weapons, SAFs would not be limited to a de-
and
terrorism, communist opportunism,
terrent-or-Armageddon role. They could be used repeatedly to give the United States options other than nuclear war, protracted war, or national humiliation.
Opponents of the SAF concept also argue that the United States has not been consistent even in supporting the SAF units it now has. The cyclical nature of U. S. SAFs has been amply demonstrated in the last decade. Army Special Forces have been cut from seven to three active duty groups. Navy SEALs today represent the smallest of the individual service SAFs. The only Air Force Special Operations Wing was nearly demobilized in 1979. Funding problems, lack of spare parts for old aircraft, and below-normal officer promotion rates continue to plague the Air Force SAF. A strategic upgrade of the U. S. SAF structure will have to address these and other problems common to all services if the effort is to succeed.
Perhaps the most heated argument of the SAF issue concerns the politically sensitive question regarding command authority of such forces. While deterrence and training are the primary peacetime missions of our conventional military forces, SAFs would conduct both overt and covert combat operations in situations where the legal parameters are ill-defined, e.g., Entebbe or Iran. Currently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no direct command authority over specific combat units. Even the heads of the individual services must go through subordinate levels of command to reach their own SAFs. “The Holloway Report”* on the aborted Iran hostage rescue mission
Their Sovremennyy
By Commander Don East, U. S. Navy
When the Sovremennyy was the subject of a Proceedings feature in June 1981,* the ship—less her rather extensive weapons suite—had made only a brief appearance in the North Sea and southern Norwegian Sea. The destroyer has now been completely outfitted. In January 1982, she made a transit from the Baltic Sea, through the Mediterranean, and into the Black Sea. I had an opportunity to observe the new destroyer as she passed through the Mediterranean.
Hull, Propulsion, and General Characteristics: In general hull form, the Sovremennyy is reminiscent of the ‘See J. W. Kehoe and K. S. Brower, “One of Their New Destroyers: Sovremennyy,” June 1981 Proceedings, pages 121-125.
underscores the difficulties that can occur when conventional commands in multiple layers attempt to coordinate a strategic SAF mission.
The advent of satellite communications and air-to-air refueling for U. S. Air Force aircraft are among the improvements that have reduced the need for deploying our SAF forces around the world. With a continental U. S. (CONUS)-based strategic SAF, many of the current problems concerning command authority, training, organizational support, and funding would be greatly alleviated. The next problem would be overcoming the logistics and communications problems involved in the strategic deployment of SAFs overseas. One solution would be to assign the strategic SAF, or at least its air component, to the Military Airlift Command (MAC). With its global responsibilities, MAC has established a network of logistical and communications facilities that could provide extensive support with a minimum of organizational adjustments (or unwanted publicity during a real-world deployment). Within CONUS, the SAF airlift component would be a subordinate command (numbered air force) within MAC for training and logistical support. When strategic deployment is required, the SAF forces would deploy and continue to be supported within the same command.
♦“The Holloway Report” was released 23 August 1980, at the U. S. Department of Defense in Washington. The 78-page report, regarded by DoD as the definitive assessment of the operation, was prepared for the JCS by six senior active and retired military officers.
“Kresta I”- and “Kresta II”-class cruisers. She is approximately 510 feet in length, 58 feet at the beam, and displaces about 8,000 metric tons. During her transit from Baltic to Black Seas, she demonstrated excellent seakeeping characteristics. The ship’s hull form appears to be the primary reason for her stability. Upon reaching the maximum beam width at approximately one-sixth the distance from the bow to the stem, her water plane remains full for the remainder of her length.
Also, like most Soviet combatants, the Sovremennyy's length-to-beam ratio is greater than that of a comparable U. S. warship. Although a wide beam and full water plane design require more power to reach speeds on the order of 20 knots, this disadvantage is largely eliminated at
The air mission commander would also come from MAC to ensure maximuni coordination and support. All of this ot course could only take place after a consensus had been reached from both within and outside the Department of Defense, regarding the status of SAFs in the United States. .
Both communist and noncommunist countries successfully maintain and deploy strategic SAFs. Their example has not been followed in the United States, as our occasional employment of SAFs in a strategic role has not been accompanied by a high-level decision to equip and fund these forces as a strategic weapon- Again, the problems discussed in “The Holloway Report” will serve as excellent guidelines for those attempting to redefine the role of SAFs in the United States- Despite these problems, recognition o the need for a meaningful, adequately funded strategic special action force is growing in many quarters of the government. What changes, if any, that sue recognition will lead to is still a point o conjecture. An easier prediction is tha
Third World instability will continue to challenge the United States with “SPC' cial” problems.
Major Haas is Chief of Weapons and Tactics, Do<j trine Branch, 2nd Air Division at Hurlburt i,|C , Florida. He has had prior service in the Army w Airborne, Ranger, Special Forces, and Psychology Operations units. In Vietnam, he saw duty as a ^ platoon commander and pilot in a III Corps ass^ . helicopter company. He has logged about 3, hours of flight time, one fourth of which are com hours.
higher speeds. Thus, with a considerab e advantage in shaft horsepower, she lS faster than comparable U. S. combatants- It is also possible that she is equippe with active fin stabilizers to improve her seakeeping ability. The ship’s 35 l2-ina,j. life rafts indicate a crew complement o approximately 420, which is comparab c with the U. S. Belknap (CG-26)-dasS guided missile cruiser.
Antisurface Warfare and AmphibiollS Warfare Gunfire Support: Although a general purpose ship, the Sovremenn)) seems to be designed and equipped 1° amphibious warfare support and antisuf face warfare (ASUW). In the amphibio'hj warfare role, she can provide gun*1 .. support and antiair warfare protection 0 the amphibious task group. She has a° impressive array of sensors and elec
tr°nic equipment to accomplish these ^‘ssions.
. To acquire targets for ASUW, to assist amphibious warfare gunfire support, .t0 use in routine navigation, she is Quipped with three “Palm Frond” a ars. These radars are mounted on the ?J?oor portion of the foremast, providing f)0 coverage.
The new generation, probable 130- ■ dual-purpose gun system offers an te Lns*ve capability if modem gunnery ^ chniques are employed. The new twin- ajareled gun system, installed fore and ’ Possibly incorporates such technol- anH 3S rocTet-assisted projectiles (RAPs) jnsemiactive laser/infrared (IR)-hom- Projectiles. These techniques would gtuficantly increase the range and accu- sv ^ Sovremennyy' & 130-mm. gun 13(jCm compared with those of the older
and mm' gUns mounted °n “Kotlin” Skorryy classes. These guns could S(1Vlde barrage or concentrated close PPort fire with conventional shells, and ecise p0jnt plre wjt[1 laser/IR-guided vj;jectlIes- The latter would provide the theS.atility to attack hardened targets in ran and'n§ zone- At the gun’s maximum sery6, 3 ^orward ground, sea, or air ob- taer would be required to illuminate the cisi * a *aser- Such long-range pre- 5ov0n-guided munitions would enable the ash r*mennyy t° destroy fixed targets vui re which were previously considered ■^crable only to aircraft attack. shae 130-mm. mounts are spherically 0pt- and have an elevated probable I'oa'ff ^re contr°l system on the star- ip side. This sighting device is similar aPPearance to those found on the “Krivak-II” and Kirov classes for their 100-mm. dual-purpose guns. The mount is configured to permit the twin barrels to be elevated to very high positions, suggesting an antiair capability. The jackets and lines associated with the gun barrels are typical of a water-cooled system.
A single “Kite Screech” radar atop the bridge, forward, is probably associated with the new gun system. The “Kite Screech” was first observed by Western naval analysts in 1977 on the “Krivak- IIs” for their 100-mm. dual-purpose guns, and was later installed on the Kirov for her 100-mm. dual-purpose guns in 1980. The radar’s appearance on the Sovremennyy for her 130-mm. gun system suggests that this radar has been operationally proven and will be the standard fire control system associated with the larger caliber dual-purpose guns. Unlike most Soviet fore-and-aft gun installations, only a single radar director is installed on the Sovremennyy. Soviet double-ended gun installations normally have radar directors installed fore and aft to provide the redundancy and 360° coverage. In providing ASUW or amphibious warfare gunfire support, if she assumed a broadside profile, the single “Kite Screech” director could be employed for both the forward and aft gun mounts.
In addition to the “Kite Screech,” an unidentified probable electro-optical device, located on the 0-2 level just forward of the bridge, is possibly associated with the 130-mm. guns. This device has been seen previously only on the Ivan Rogov and “Alligator”-class amphibious warfare ships. Like the “Kite Screech,” the unidentified device could serve both the fore and aft mounts with the ship in a broadside profile. The range of possibilities for the function of the unidentified device are daylight and low-light level (LLL) optics, laser rangefinder, and laser illumination for semiactive-guided projectiles. Assuming a RAP capability, the range of the 130-mm. guns could be extended from the normal 15 to 16 nautical miles to approximately 20-25 nautical miles. Assuming a laser illumination function for the unidentified device on the 0-2 level and semiactive laser/IR- homing munitions, the precise gunfire accuracies required for amphibious assault support could be achieved.
Although she bears the logo and name of a conventional destroyer, the Sovremennyy is equipped with what appears to be a new type of surface-to-surface missile system. Two cylindrical launchers (two over two) are located port and starboard abreast of the bridge at the break in the hull line. These launchers are unlike any previous Soviet naval cruise missile system. The presence of a “Band Stand” radome, which is located atop the bridge, tends to link the new missile launchers to the SS-N-9 or the SS-N-2, but the size and configuration of the missile tubes do not match those of the SS-N-9 or SS-N-2. The “Band Stand” has been previously associated with both the SS-N-9 on the standard “Nanuchka” class and the SS- N-2 on the Soviets’ export model of that same ship class.
Spherical radomes are located on a platform on the upper port and starboard sides of the Sovremennyy's stack. These devices could be associated with her new
The “Kashin”-class Provornyy has been modified to serve as a trial ship for the SA-N-7 surface-to-air missile system being installed in the new Sovremennyy-c/aM destroyers. An SA-N-7 single-armed launcher has been fitted aft (covered with tarp, above), and provisions for two additional SA-N-7 launcher groups have been made forward of the bridge. The ship’s after lattice mast was replaced by a far more massive structure to support the new “Top Steer” 3-D radar (also on the Sovremennyy), two “Front Dome” radar directors, and a “Don-Kay” surface search radar, and Severn/ electro-optical devices. In contrast, the foremast now carries a lighter load, with a “Don-Kay” replacing the “Head Net-A” array; two “Front Domes” have been mounted on platforms above the optical trackers.
roba-
cruise missile system in the same manner as the “Fish Bowl” radomes of the “Nanuchkas.” On the other hand, these two spherical radomes could be associated with other functions, such as over- the-horizon (OTH) targeting interroga- tion/reception, radio sextant, or electronic warfare. Assuming that the Sovremennyy's new missile system is intended for antiship warfare, it is likely limited to within-horizon ranges on the order of 30 nautical miles against a destroyer-sized target.
On the other hand, an over-the-horizon capability cannot be discounted, primarily because of the ship’s helicopter hangar located aft of the stack on the 0-2 level. This is the first time a telescoping helicopter hangar has been used on a Soviet combatant. Designed primarily to conserve space on already crowded Soviet warships, the telescoping hangar collapses during flight operations to a stowed position against the rear side of the stack. This allows the helicopter to spread blades and have sufficient room on the relatively small pad for takeoff and landing operations. A helicopter control tower (“greenhouse” type) is located on the starboard side of the hangar and on the same level as the helicopter pad. The location of her helicopter hangar and platform is a departure from the normal Soviet practice of locating them on the ship’s stem. The amidships location provides more stability than a stem configuration. Also, locating the helicopter pad on the 0-2 level places it higher above the water, thus improving flight safety.
Although no helicopter was embarked on the Sovremennyy during her cruise from Baltic to Black Seas, she will probably accommodate either the “Hormone or “Helix” naval helicopters. The “Helix” is the new Soviet naval helicopter recently seen on the Udaloy destroyer- With such a helicopter on board for OTH targeting, the Sovremennyy’s new antiship missile system could have a range o 60 to 80 nautical miles.
Antiair Warfare: The Sovremennyy an impressive antiair warfare (AAW) suite, including a new-type surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. To acquire air targets, she employs the “Top Steer” radar. The first major Soviet combatant constructed in recent years, she is equipped with only one air search radar. The insta lation of two air search radars on Sovie naval major combatants not only provides the desired redundancy, but also the radio frequencies of the dissimilar systems offer a degree of electronic counter-coun
termeasure capability.
The Sovremennyy is the first serial pro duction ship to be equipped with the new type single-arm, antiair missile system, seen forward and aft. This new, unname antiair weapon was first installed on a modified “Kashin” testbed, the ^rov, ornyy. The Sovremennyy is equipPe with new double-ended launchers and six probable target tracker/illumination ra dars (three each on port and starboard)- One of the two single-arm SAM launc ers is located forward on the 0-1 level a of the 130-mm. dual-purpose gun system, the other system is located aft on the 0- level between the helicopter pad anc^ ' C 130-mm. dual-purpose gun mount. • single launcher rail is sandwiched be tween two vertical stanchions. These stanchions are affixed to a circular P,a approximately 12 feet in diameter whic rotates the launcher in azimuth. A sing hatch, located at the base of the launched apparently is used in reloading when launcher arm is in a vertical position Possibly 20-40 reloads are located in magazine directly below each ot SAM launchers. ^
Six unnamed radars, located in P
and starboard pairs amidships, are pi bly associated with the SAM target trac ing and missile guidance functions- These radar installations are similar > appearance to the “Bass Tilt” syste associated with Soviet naval Gatlmr guns. The use of six probable indepeI^ ent radar systems indicates a Soviet tempt at solving the raid saturation pr°^ lem inherent in the older SA-H' ’ SA-N-3, and SA-N-4 shipboard SAW systems. . ,
Theoretically, each of the warship ■ six radar installations could house b target tracking and missile guidaIlC transmitters. The relatively small size 0
ese new radar systems, along with current U. S. naval SAM technology and rends, indicates that the type of missile guidance employed with the new SAM is Probably semiactive homing. If these Postulations are valid, the ship’s SAM systems can engage as many as six tar- §ets simultaneously, which would be a ,Vast improvement over older Soviet ship- nurd SAM systems. Like all Soviet s 'Pboard SAM systems, this new system Can be employed in a surface-to-surface mode for ASUW.
The 130-mm. dual-purpose guns can id emP,0yed in antiair warfare. If passive 'guided munitions are within the So- Vlet inventory at this time, these dualPUrpose guns would be formidable weap- °ns indeed in an AAW scenario.
, , *)Uncbng out the Sovremennyy's j capability, and specifically provid- g close-in defense against aircraft and ^.ruise missiles, are four 30-mm. rapid- ^re gun mounts. Her guns are six-barrel at !n8'type systems with an advertised Wlic firing rate of at least 3,000 rounds er minute. Conceptually, these guns are (emi ar to the U. S. Vulcan-Phalanx sys- m- Normally, these close-in weapon Cl em (CIWS) guns are mounted in °S u spaced pairs on other Soviet naval ^mbatants. However, on the Sovrem- eacb pair is widely spaced forward w, j1*1 on each side of the ship. The for- cr m°unt is on the 0-1 level above the then6 m'ss**e tubes, and the aft gun is on o/ 'CVe'—iust forward and outboard “B * 6 ^e*'C0Pter pad- An associated on aSS ^*re control radar is located thean * level wing stanchion just aft of board™'56 m’ssde tubes port and star-
[J'^CCtron‘c Warfare: The ship’s elec- warfare (EW) suite is of a new fourth ant* represents an evolutionary b0a generation of EW equipment on
•ph ^oviet naval surface combatants,
boa (I ^ ■ eclu'Pmenl is in port and star- Cor Pa‘rs and consists of two distinct but T°nents. The first of these is smaller, devSlm'.'ar 'n construction to those EW and'^s installed on the “Kara-,” Kiev-, in th (rov~c*ass ships; it probably serves S(1e Passive detection role of electronic are^0rt measures (ESM). These devices level °CateC* Ptlrt antl starboard on 0-3 Stee ,,stanchions just below the “Top Pon r a'r search radar. The second com- fciur^'h Pr°bable EW suite includes Pair err|isPherical radomes located in each ?0rt and starboard amidships. On
°n thSI<*e’ °ne un't Pa'r*s l°cateci
outb 6 ^ ^ anc* one on the 0-3 level on prob0a;d stanchions. The four devices tne3 O' serve in the electronic counterSUre (ECM) role as tunable jamming
systems. Through a computer-assisted scheme, the ESM devices could detect any incoming direction-finding radar signals, identify them, and then pass them off to either the ECM devices for a soft kill, or to the antiair sensors and weapons for the hard-kill option. In addition to the electronic portion of the EW suite, two twin-barreled probable chaff/flare launchers are mounted port and starboard on the warship’s fantail. These appear to be the same type launchers as those that made their initial operational appearance on the Moskva-class helicopter cruiser in 1967, and have since been seen on almost all large Soviet surface combatants. The presence of the chaff/flare launchers on the Sovremennyy adds mechanical ECM to the range of soft-kill options.
Antisubmarine Warfare: Although the Sovremennyy does not appear to have the extensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability of some of the modem Soviet large ASW ships such as the “Kara” and “Krivak,” she has adequate capability to defend her from hostile submarine attack and assist in ASW protection for an amphibious warfare convoy. The two major sensors/weapons found on Soviet large ASW ships that are conspicuously absent on the Sovremennyy are a variable depth sonar system and the SS-N-14 ASW missile system. Without these two systems, she would be unable to detect below-layer targets or engage targets at considerable distances. Although information on the ship’s sonar suite is not available at the time of this writing, it is probable that a single hull-mounted multifunctional system is installed, which would perform both the long-range search and tracking functions as well as provide fire control inputs. Alternatively, two separate hull-mounted sonars could be installed for these search/track and fire control functions.
ASW weapons that can be identified are four 21-inch torpedo tubes and two six-barreled ASW rocket launchers. Her 21-inch (533-mm.) torpedo tubes are in port and starboard twin-tube mounts, located underneath an 0-1 level overhang amidships. The 21-inch torpedoes used in these tubes could be a mix of antisurface and antisubmarine varieties, employing either wire or acoustic (active/passive) homing, and be equipped with either conventional or nuclear warheads. The ASW rocket launchers are mounted port and starboard just forward of and below the aft SAM launcher. Automatic reloading of the six-barreled devices is effected by tilting the tubes to a vertical position, and reloading each tube in turn as the mount is rotated in azimuth over the magazine hatch. The range of these ASW weapons is estimated to be about 2,500 meters. In addition to an antisubmarine function, it is possible that the ASW rocket launchers have an antitorpedo role.
Mine Warfare: Like most Soviet large surface combatants, the Sovremennyy is equipped with aft rails for minelaying. Unlike the U. S. Navy, the Soviet Navy has not abandoned minelaying operations from surface ships, although airborne and submarine platforms provide extensive warfare capabilities. Twin-rail mine tracks can be seen emerging from the vicinity of the port and starboard gunwale overhangs of the forward superstructure, and running along the extreme outboard main deck toward the fantail. As the rails approach the aft 130-mm. dual-purpose mount, they curve inboard, and finally terminate in two fantail notches. In addition to being employed for the transport of mines, this twin-rail trackage system could be used for general transportation of other munitions or supplies.
Electro-Optical Devices: The Sovremennyy has an impressive array of electro-optical devices for use in surveillance, as well as possibly augmenting weapons control. There are four probable electro-optical devices located in port and starboard pairs adjacent to the “Band Stand” radome atop the bridge, and an additional two immediately aft of the aftermost set of SAM control radars. These probable electro-optical devices are mobile in azimuth and elevation. Because of the proximity of these four devices, they could have a target-tracking function for the new SAM system and/or the 30-mm. Gatling gun systems, as well as functioning as general surveillance devices. In addition, the Sovremennyy has periscopes located port and starboard on either side of the “Band Stand” radome and a periscope on the 0-2 level just forward of the bridge. Just forward of the periscope on the 0-2 level, is the unidentified electro-optical device that is probably associated with conventional and guided munitions for the new 130mm. dual-purpose guns.
Communications: The Sovremennyy appears to have a communications suite commensurate with her mission capabilities. Whips, cage, long wire, wire bundle, yagi, and special function antennas can be seen on the fore and aft mast at various other locations about the ship.
Conclusions: The Sovremennyy appears to be a very capable, multipurpose surface combatant, with weapons and sensors somewhat tailored toward antisurface warfare and support of amphibious assault operations. Assuming ranges for the new SAM system on the order of 25 nautical miles, and 20-25 nautical miles for RAP munitions from the 130mm. dual-purpose guns, she could provide both shore bombardment and antiair warfare support to the beachhead while remaining outside the range of most hostile shore-based weapons. This is a significant improvement over the older Sverdlov-, Skorryy-, and “Kotlin”-class big gun ships which had no antiair missile capability. The Sovremennyy is an excellent example of Soviet incremental evolution in sensors and weapons with a fifth-generation SAM system, third-generation air search, fourth-generation electronic warfare suite, and an eighth-generation surface-to-surface missile system on board.
The Soviets have in their inventory now, or are currently developing, the elements necessary to provide a significant power projection capability. These include improvements in amphibious lift capability, the development of sea-based tactical air power, an improved underway replenishment capability, and the development of a substantial gunfire support strength in cruisers and destroyers. It is in
this latter category that the Sovremennyy makes a major contribution.
After receiving bachelor and master degrees a Naval Postgraduate School during 1972-75, °
mander East served four years with Patrol Squa 26 Special Projects Detachment in Brunswic ^ Maine, flying ocean reconnaissance missions in aircraft. He then attended the U. S. Air Force Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Montgo ery, Alabama. After serving an additional year as instructor in leadership and national security af airs ACSC, he transferred to Fleet Air Reconnaissanc Squadron Two in Rota, Spain, where he is presen the commanding officer.
Navy Family Equilibrium and Nursing Health Care Practice
By Lieutenant Kathleen Ambrose Phillips, Nurse Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve
Delivering quality health services to active duty personnel and their dependents is the prime goal of Navy health care providers. The gamut of health services extends from the hospital or dispensary to the community. The concentration of professional nursing practice should incorporate principles of occupational, family, and community nursing for a total health care approach.
The characteristics of mobility and separation present a special challenge for individual and family military members. Peculiar to the Navy, however, is the confinement of personnel to a ship for periods of deployment ranging from weeks to months. Indeed, health professionals need to be cognizant of this difference, as it affects their health practices for the deployed individual and the family. Separation because of deployments is a significant factor in the continuum from medical morbidity to family equilibrium. Fortunately, most families maintain their stability during separations. But, for many others, the effects of deployment on family stability have important considerations for Navy Nurse Corps practices in the areas of preventive health maintenance, health teaching, community-based practice, and research.
Nursing expertise can be applied to foster family system equilibrium. Professional nurses help to maintain the family equilibrium with high-quality comprehensive health services of preventive care in family- and community-centered practices. While assisting the family to meet their health needs, the professional nurse’s role may include practitioner, educator, liaison, counselor, researcher, and officer. Nursing considerations can be illustrated clearly through the following example:
Two weeks prior to deployment, 16- year-old John was admitted to a naval hospital for one week to receive treatment for his newly diagnosed illness, juvenile-onset diabetes. Diabetes involves the inability to metabolize sugar in the blood because of an inadequate action of the hormone insulin. He responded well to therapy, and the diabetes appeared to be under control. The mother, father, and John worked together with the medical and nursing staff on a therapeutic regimen and dietary modification.
In the weeks following John’s dis-
Navy families can be kept on an even keel during long separations with the help of Navy nurses.
charge from the hospital, he appeared to adapt well to the diabetes and to his father’s separation. Four months later, John was admitted to the hospital in ketoacidosis, an acute illness seen in diabetes resulting from prolonged high blood sugar and low insulin. The deployed father received a message that his son was hospitalized and in a coma.
While the explanation of these events
is complex, a few nursing concepts may lend themselves to understanding Pc^' nent Navy-wide practices. The mot e noticed John had not been eating proper y (an early indication of a problem). 6 e should have contacted the hospital or te ephoned the clinic nurse. Through a home visit, the nurse could have assesse the situation for problems or family nee s before John’s coma, ascertaining inf°r mation concerning John’s compliancy The mother may have provided insig into her son’s meal preparation an^ morning medication administration, visit with the school nurse may have & vealed information concerning Johns academic achievement, school mea > and sports participation. Only John, ho^ ever, could validate and offer input abou his responses to therapy.
In any event, John had difficU ' adapting what he learned in the hospda to his home, school, and social » e' While it is recognized that every hospim ized patient is not necessarily a Candida for home visiting and that such visits arc not a substitute for emergency treatme in the hospital, patients simply do no live in sterile hospital and clinic environ ments. For situations such as this adoie cent patient, who was coincidentally 1® ing the additional stress of separate from his father, a home visit may ha prevented his second hospitalization.
Occasional home-visiting services provided by the pediatric nurse Practl tioner, off-duty Navy nurses, and civil* Navy Relief nurses, depending on vary ing command policies. The Navy Nurs Corps, unlike those of the Army and A> Force, does not participate in a compr® hensive public health program. While t benefits derived from such a Navy-wi community health nursing program numerous, they are beyond the scope
,s art'cle. Instead, a more specific community nursing program focusing on the amily health needs of deployed Navy units will be considered. A major step in Publishing operational nursing care is to sign a family nurse practitioner to a urnily practice clinic. The Navy has tried ls approach in the experimental pilot eahh care module at Naval Air Station ^ucksonville. The experimental model cognizes the importance of providing omprehensive care to families as well as j. e Unique health needs inherent in fami- Dht dePloyed units. Extending this P 1 °sophy, the family’s needs should so be met in their home environment. t Assigning a Navy Nurse Corps officer j? eP'°ying units to which a medical of- ^Cer is attached—such as a ship or air l lnS would help to provide comprehensive nursing care to families of fleet tvice members by implementing com- unity health principles. The nurse then °uld be designated as a Navy fleet fam- “y nurse.
The fleet family nurse would not move ' *be unit, but rather, would remain ’ the nondeployed family members, to 6 ^eCI med*cal officer would continue ccare f°r the active duty member, exwhen specifically referred to the f rs.® 'n port. The nurse’s entry into the f m! y system would be initiated from the mmi,y ntembers or from the family’s pri- icary care provider at the hospital or clin- •n arranging home nursing visits. The b 61 family nurse would bridge the gap fa Wfen l^c Physician (hospital) and the thm'ly- Collaborating with the hospital, vid nUrse w°uld act as the liaison in pro- mg continuity of care for this unique nihtary population..
d n example of such intervention was in^onstrated for the diabetic adolescent [P^A'ding the possibilities of domestic clo i Care' The nurse would also work (scf.6^ Parallel systems of education
beai°°* nurse), religion (chaplain), and h care (physician, social worker),
making referrals and follow-ups for continued guidance and support. Emphasizing the need for prevention, the fleet family nurse would counsel and teach individual and large group health classes concerning family health issues.
Another important role of the nurse would be the ongoing exchange of information between the fleet medical officer and the fleet family nurse concerning the active duty member and the family’s state of health. This function is paramount during at-sea periods when the deployed physician would otherwise not have immediate family health information available. In the example used here, the message the father received, that his son was hospitalized and in a coma, says little about the son’s present status and could create unnecessary anxiety. Commanding officers may also use the fleet family nurse in providing pertinent information concerning the family, which may help the command to support the active duty member through periods of turmoil.
The fleet family nurse would be assigned to the deploying group and, similar to the fleet medical officer, the immediate chain of command would be the line unit. The Nurse Corps officer would be qualified as a family nurse practitioner, pediatric nurse practitioner, or as a baccalaureate-prepared registered nurse with public or community health certification. The Navy nurse would also come to the billet having completed a fleet family nurse orientation course and at least one tour of duty assigned to a Naval Regional Medical Center, naval hospital, or Navy clinic. The nature of family needs would demand nursing flexibility in accommodating to family schedules. For example, visiting hours and classes may have to be arranged during the early morning, the evening, and on weekends.
Implementing the fleet family nurse program. for identified deploying units introduces numerous possibilities for maintaining family system equilibrium, as well as offering one means of extending naval Nurse Corps practices to the operational Navy. This community nursing would focus on the family, prevention, and continuity. Because the family would have direct contact with the nurse, many concerns would be immediately handled or triaged, thereby reducing the number of hospital visits. The new program could be viewed as a job motivator for the active duty member, knowing that the family was being cared for, and for the Nurse Corps officer, in terms of the special services provided to the fleet.
Program structures and concepts have been identified, although details may vary in relation to specific communities (amphibious, aviation, marines, submarine, surface, etc.). A three-year pilot study ought to be conducted to ascertain feasibility and document program needs. Nurse Corps and line administrators would have to rely heavily on program results prior to position implementation. Because the number of newly created billets would be equal to those held by physicians attached to deploying units, a reassignment of present billets or the accession of new ones would be necessary for the program’s success.
Military medicine has the responsibility of delivering comprehensive health care to assure fleet readiness. A family whose overall health needs are satisfied, and is assisted in maintaining system equilibrium, will favorably affect the active duty member’s level of performance. The Navy fleet family nurse program is one means of facilitating optimal family well-being.
Lieutenant Phillips earned a B.S.N. from The University of San Francisco, and an M.S.N. in the pediatric nurse practitioner sequence from The Catholic University of America. She served on active duty in the Nurse Corps at San Diego Naval Hospital and at Lemoore Naval Air Station Hospital. Lieutenant Phillips is currently a member of the Naval Reserve, and is a nursing instructor at the University of Rhode Island.
that’s in Store for Arapaho?
8y CaPtain Gerald O’Rourke, U. S, Navy (Retired)
con °re dlan a decade ago, the Arapaho volv6f>t was bom. The original idea in- tar^ed die temporary placement of mili- COr5ed cargo containers on top of normal chamerc’‘d carg° containers of a mer- Crafttman t0 Prov'de a sea base for air- j, ln times of national emergency. c0d. ' Naval Reserve antisubmarine helium CrS’ tlle'r a‘r and ground crews, and ntenance, habitability, command and control, logistics, and fuel tank modules made up the Arapaho kit. This kit could be installed overnight at any container- ship port, and the ship sent to sea the next day with a limited warfare capability.
Over the years, Navy research and development efforts have produced a single Arapaho kit of numerous militarized containers, deck plates, and connecting plumbing. When put together in massive erector-set fashion, a 100 by 40-foot double-door hangar and a 200 by 64-foot flight deck come into being. The rig can be securely lashed to the hatch covers and main deck of almost any commercial con- tainership. Arapaho has successfully passed a series of tests and evaluations, the most recent involving day and night flight operations by various military helicopters from the deck of a merchantman
of the aircraft interceptor appears to be changing from a weapons delivery vehicle to a sensor guidance vehicle for surface-launched missiles. If this trend continues, Arapaho could prove to be even more useful.
The British proved in the Falklands that V/STOL aircraft could be operated from merchant ships under combat conditions.
in the waters of the Chesapeake Bay.*
Several, other related programs have been proposed and studied over the years; all were essentially similar to the current Arapaho kits. One program planned to modularize various weapon systems and insert them—in container-sized components—into a merchant hull to produce an “instant cruiser.” Another program was aimed at providing rapid augmentation for limited Marine Corps sealift resources. This effort involved sub-containerizing military cargoes to enhance helo-lift to combat troops ashore, thereby lessening the need for an established port facility or vulnerable amphibious beachhead operations typical of World War II. The Royal Navy, traditionally charged with grossly under-budgeted maritime duties, has always shown a keen interest in the Arapaho concept, and has been an eager and enthusiastic—albeit relatively penniless—ally in its development.
The Falklands Conflict moved Arapaho out of the realm of curiosity and into a naval warfare environment. To meet the urgent need for air power in the South Atlantic, a number of British container- ships and transports were hastily modified to ferry both helicopters and fixed- wing V/STOL Harriers to the British fighting forces some 8,000 miles away. Although most combat evolutions involved only one-time aircraft flights from the merchantmen to warships or a field ashore, the potential for more extensive air operations was apparent. Given more time for some rudimentary engineering, a number of “bargain basement” aircraft carriers could have been made available—instead of aircraft ferryboats.
The British experience with the Arapaho expedient in the Falklands serves notice that a practical alternative to the high costs of seagoing air power is possible. Almost any maritime nation can build or buy a fleet of merchant contain* For details of these operations, See J. J. Mulquin’s “Arapaho Update,” January 1983 Proceedings, pp. 103-106.
erships, and helicopters are readily available on any side of a given political fence. V/STOL airplanes are somewhat harder to come by, but if the British won’t sell a few Harriers, the Soviets might provide some “Forgers.”
There are, of course, some clear limits to the expectations of any Arapaho customer. The ships themselves are not men-of-war; they are fragile, noncom- partmented, slow, poorly maneuverable, ill-equipped for large military crews, and have few communications and control features. The V/STOL aircraft which can conceivably be operated from an Arapaho containership do not have the range, speed, endurance or payload of an F-14, F-15, or MiG-23 fighter. Helicopters can be of first-line quality, but their numbers are limited by deck and hangar space considerations.
Still, Arapaho carriers are cheap— $15-20 million for the kit, and $40-60 million for the aircraft. With careful planning, most of the basic costs for the ship herself can be covered by earnings in the peacetime commercial market. When a national emergency crops up, she can be converted into military dress in a matter of hours.
The key to exploitation of Arapaho lies in the kinds of naval warfighting duties which this concept can be logically expected to perform. In a Battle of Jutland scenario, Arapaho is probably a loser. But for close-in ASW convoy protection, Arapaho could be highly cost effective. A wide spectrum of naval missions exists between these two extremes, and Arapaho offers many attractive possibilities. In mine warfare, for example, the intrinsic need is mobility for heavy, ponderous equipment—much of it by air. Helicopters such as the CH-47 Chinook or the CH-53E Sea Stallion, based on board 20 to 25,000-ton containerships could provide valuable offensive and defensive mine warfare capabilities. In amphibious warfare, Arapaho-based Harriers and helicopter gunships offer an excellent potential for providing close air support. In strike warfare, Arapaho is probably limited to special circumstances in unforeseen circumstances (like the Falklands). But if the threat to the fragile sea base can be minimized, V/STOL attack aircraft such as the Harrier could perform.
The Harriers did remarkably well in air defense missions in the South Atlantic, but much of this success must be attributed to the unusual constraints placed upon the Argentine attackers. In a fullblown war at sea, Arapaho concepts will not provide much help in antiair warfare. However, as time goes by and missile technology continues to bloom, the role
For a number of logistical missions, the Arapaho potential has been proven and accepted. Less understood, but 0 even greater potential, are the possibilities for Arapaho to satisfy future command, control, and communications (C ) requirements at sea. And in the broa area of ocean surveillance, Arapaho o - fers an effective, inexpensive means for keeping a vigilant eye on national mantime interests.
In the ponderous nature of naval plan' ning, decisive action toward the explolta tion of Arapaho has been slow in coming- despite the good lessons learned in m South Atlantic. However, the Britis seem to have embarked recently on least two Arapaho-oriented ventures- One, arising completely from the private sector, is the shipbome containerized ait
defense system (SCADS). SCADS wi include the customary Arapaho fl*8 deck, a ski-jump ramp, more extensive aircraft refueling and maintenance facm ties than Arapaho, a modicum of set contained radars, surface-to-air missileS’ countermeasure systems, and C facl) ties. The second British action is an in1 pending lease of the U. S. Navy’s prot° type Arapaho kit for use in deployments to the South Atlantic. The investmen costs, however they may be accounte for, appear to be low enough to warm m cockles of the most penurious Scotsman heart. .
Strange as it may seem, Britain’s rising interest in Arapaho has apparen ; sounded the death knell for the LI- ' Navy’s pioneering efforts. There are no plans for any further U. S. developmen of Arapaho: no funding has been requested; no testing is scheduled; ar) there is no evidence of long-range stu ) or planning. The U. S. Navy cites inade^ quate helicopter inventory as its basis i disinterest in Arapaho. The program director, a highly respected civil serva who has devoted most of his career to t concept, has been assigned to otn duties. And Arapaho’s strongest Con gressional supporter, Senator Gary Ham also appears to have lost interest.
This negative reaction comes as no sur prise to those who have been “pushing Arapaho in one way or another over t past decade or longer. In the pragma!' world of Pentagonian budgeteers, an' dollars spent on Arapaho are dolia^ “stolen” from the large nuclear-power^ aircraft carriers, land-based Patr
P anes, new destroyers, new submarines, anding craft, service force ships, etc.
most every bit of Arapaho funding has ,een force-fed down the Navy’s reluctant mat by congressional actions. The Brit- ls willingness to pay the Arapaho bill 0 ers an irresistible opportunity for some Parties to get rid of this annoyance.
, .^raPah° warrants better treatment than ls- It is no panacea for our Navy’s ? °rtcomings, but neither is it a hare- rained scheme which calls for a multi- 11'on-dollar budget.
The future threat to this nation’s mari- 'me interests is awesome. To stay abreast P ta*s threat, our Navy, Air Force, and oast Guard will need more aircraft at .Ca tf|an we now have on hand, or than ce w*h have on board our planned 15 arrier battle groups. Arapaho provides a Proven means for getting more aircraft to sea. The old arguments against the c erne—that Arapaho aircraft could not Perform the required missions—largely yaporated in the Falklands experience, f e Harriers did well; helicopters used °rJogistics, assault, and antisubmarine arfare also did well.
£ Admittedly, the problems facing the °yal Navy are not necessarily the same as those facing the U. S. Navy. But the problems we contemplate—protecting NATO convoys, supporting an expeditionary force in the Persian Gulf, rapidly recapturing Iceland or some Norwegian fjords from Soviet paratroopers—cry out for additional sea-based air power.
We should have an active, forwardlooking Arapaho program within our Navy. A good start would be to build six to eight Arapaho kits. Two could be used for several years to test and evaluate a wide assortment of missions and aircraft types. One or two could be set aside for mine warfare duties, and several more for what appears to be the concept’s primary role—convoy ASW. The rest could be outfitted, prepositioned at appropriate locations, and exercised once or twice a year by Naval Reserve personnel on active duty training periods. The idea of using civilian helicopters—drawn in times of national emergency from the commercial market—should be studied, assessed, tested, and put into a workable standby program. The idea of sending land-based ICBMs to sea, possibly in an Arapaho context, warrants a serious look. Means for reducing our overseas basing vulnerabilities should never be overlooked; Arapaho may also be a big help in this regard.
When a conflict comes, we will undoubtedly need Arapaho to help get the job done at sea. To be ready then, we need a stable, ongoing program now for further investigation of Arapaho applications in mine warfare,' amphibious warfare, C3, and ocean surveillance. British applications in the Falklands Conflict over the next few years will also be helpful, but they will not provide us with the range of developmental details that we need.
Passing the Arapaho concept off to the British and playing Pontius Pilate with its research and development future is imprudent and unimaginative.
A 1944 graduate of the Naval Academy, Captain O’Rourke commanded several all-weather fighter squadrons, an ammunition ship, and the USS Independence (CVA-62). Prior to retirement in 1974, he directed the Navy Fighter Study Group. A former member of the Naval Institute’s Board of Control, Captain O’Rourke authored “A Good New Idea” (on the Arapaho concept) in the March 1980 Proceedings, and ‘‘CVNs Forever! Forever?” in the July 1982 issue. He is currently vice president of Maritime Associates, Inc., of Burke, Virginia.
tyhere Are the Battleships?
By H°ward W. Serig, Jr.
_ ( le U. S. Navy, which in years past r ormed most of its peacetime spectac- liiTM-011 tBe Sadiron, g°t back into the slight recently just a few miles from
an°i ■’ W°°H' a Precise display of pomp ^ ceremony at Long Beach, the Presi- United States recommissioned Navy’s first modernized battleship, raelJ^ey, before a gathering of top- ,ln8 administration officials and thousands of VIPs.
p Reagan Administration, unlike its sh ecessors> sees the utility of battle- nav-S| n0t *n the traditional framework of ca §unfire, but as major cruise missile °Pe'erS caPaHie of sustained frontline incTa-°nS a§ainst a variety of threats, irn UB*nS Rte Soviet Navy. This view was t(lea®'nat'vely summed up by Secretary of We i/avy J°hn Lehman earlier in the erse when he told a gathering of report- ll^ at the White House, “You’ve seen innry Kissinger stand here in this build- quem timeS cr‘sis and say the first the St'0n lBe President asks is, ‘Where are he C,?!J'ers?’ Now the first question will shi sT “Cre 3re tBe carr'ers anci battle-
qu ^here are the battleships?’ ’ is a good eshon, one that the President might be
well advised to ask now. On 19 December, just nine days before the New Jersey was returned to service, Congress dealt a serious blow to the Navy’s battleship program by deleting reactivation funding for the Missouri (BB-63). The decision will delay the Navy’s plans to have all four Iowa-class dreadnoughts returned to service by at least a year, and perhaps indefinitely. On that hectic day at Capitol Hill, a “mini-conference,” composed of the two chairmen and the ranking minority members of the House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, hammered out an appropriations bill that differed between the House passed bill (which included funding for the Missouri among the thousands of program line items) and the Senate committee reported bill (which did not). In light of the many important matters before the four conferees, such as the MX missile, even the Navy’s highly touted battleship program was only briefly considered. Funding of $300 million to complete the Iowa (currently undergoing reactivation and modernization at Ingalls Shipbuilding) was approved.
However, at the urging of Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee, $94 million in advance procurement funds requested by the Navy to begin reactivating the Missouri at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard were denied. Stevens, who has twice before tried to block funding for the battleship program, argued that the Navy was moving ahead too fast in reactivating the World War II-era ships, and that Congress should be given an opportunity to evaluate both the peformance of the New Jersey at sea and the private sector’s handling of the Iowa. Just how much of an opportunity Stevens believed Congress should have was not discussed.
The Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Appropriations Bill, a bill within the Fiscal Year 1983 Continuing Resolution, was passed overwhelmingly the following day: the Missouri will continue her long sleep at Bremerton for yet another year.
The congressional decision to scrub the Missouri came as a surprise. Administration lobbying had been considerable and only a few days before the work of the mini-conference, there was confidence in naval circles that the battleship program would move ahead as planned. But few anticipated the last-minute deliberations or the continued intransigence of Senator
Stevens. In regrouping for the next session of Congress, the administration has again requested advance funding for the Missouri in the fiscal year 1984 budget—this time.$57.7 million. Secretary Lehman, the battleship’s biggest supporter, is expressing renewed confidence that the program will get back on track, reasoning that the two ships already funded will prove the battleship’s worth.
In early summer, the world’s only active battleship heads to sea for a three- month shakedown deployment, probably to the Western Pacific. Meanwhile, at Ingalls, reactivation work on the Iowa has been proceeding so smoothly that her scheduled recommissioning has been moved up six months to July 1984. In addition, the Navy believes that the President’s personal involvement and enthusiasm at the New Jersey’s recommissioning will provide the needed influence to ■ convince reluctant members of Congress to back fully the battleship program.
It is expected that Congress will be kept well informed on the progress of the Iowa and New Jersey. But whether certain members of Congress will feel they have, had adequate time to consider the New Jersey's performance is another matter. Assuming- that the Missouri is again authorized, she will be reconsidered during the appropriations hearings on the fiscal year 1984 defense bill, which are expected to begin about the same time the New Jersey leaves for her first deployment.
Since Senator Stevens is majority whip and holds a position of power on the Appropriations Committee, his vocal and seemingly unshakable opposition to the battleship program would appear to cast a shadow over its future.
Aside from this consideration, some observers feel the biggest problem facing the battleships—as well as other proposed weapons programs—is the sad state of the nation’s economy. With 12 million people out of work and funding for social programs being cut back, the association between the projected record fiscal year 1984 budget deficit and defense expenditures is unavoidable.
The highly visible Missouri, despite the administration’s support, may be particularly vulnerable to the budget cutter’s axe for two primary reasons. First, she lacks the strong defense industry lobby of new, more expensive weapons and systems; and second, the Missouri—like her sisters—has an image problem that derives from the name “battleship” and vague perceptions about the exploits of General Billy Mitchell and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Some battleship proponents speculate that things might be different today if the Navy had, years ago, redesignated the Iowas as “large cruisers.” What particularly worries proponents is that a second year’s delay w funding a third battleship could break the program’s momentum and discourage battleship supporters in Congress. Thus, this year’s session of Congress could well mark an early turning point in the reactivation program.
If, in future sessions of Congress, funding for the Missouri and Wisconsin (BB-64) is not approved, prospects for the Navy’s current plans to use the battleships already funded become less certain- OpNav currently estimates that with on y two battleships available, one worn probably be . home ported on each coast and operate under a one-in-three deployment cycle typical for most surface combatants. The.New Jersey on the West Coast and the Iowa on the East Coas would therefore be deployed on the average of only six months out of 18. Training, upkeep, and repair work would occupy the remaining 12 months. ln addition, if one assumes the battleships will be kept in commission for their entire estimated 15-year service lives, eac would be out of service for as long as one year out of five during major overhauls—and another year, should Congress approve a Navy plan to upgrade th ships to a Phase II configuration.
What makes this limited availability a
The Adversaries: Congressman Ted Stevens led the successful fight to deny funds for reactivation of the Missouri; Secretary of the Navy John Lehman (seated next to former CNO Admiral T.B. Hayward) has been a force behind the return of the battleships—and he likely will continue to be.
special problem is the modernized battleships primary mission as missile ships. ° understand the relationship between uttleships and cruise missiles, one must review the beginning of the current reac- lvation effort. At that time, congressional concerns over the Carter defense Policy and U. S. foreign policy set- acks—-principally in Iran—elevated the attleship reactivation proposal to the at- ention of Congress. Besides the fact that e lowas, could be returned to service re atively quickly and cheaply, what rriude the proposal particularly appealing a majority of congressmen was the Possibility of arming the ships with 0ng-range Tomahawk cruise missiles— seen by many as a great equalizer that °uld enable an outnumbered U. S.
sea ep*°yable Tomahawk launchers at by a* beginning of fiscal year 1984, Pha 6 6IK* f*scal year 1991, four Se I battleships will carry only 5% of
Fiscal Year
Source: Joint Cruise Missile Office, January 1983.
tl a'h' t0 meet 3n^ ^ov*et challenge. Bat- artr PS by themselves were impressive; b|elng cruise missiles made them credi-
^ paling the cruise missile-battleship or>d is Secretary Lehman. As deputy 'rector of the Arms Control and Disar-
tio ment Agenc>' ‘n t^le Ford Administra- ,,n’ Lehman was an early advocate of cow>ng the deployment of the nuclear- apable Tomahawk on ships, more re- ently calling them “one of the most ef- ctive weapons of war at sea.” Their ? °yment on board battleships is a pri- ry Part of the secretary ’s current goal achieving naval superiority over the Soviet Union.
l <“r't*cs °f the reactivation plan argue, '■‘•ever, that in order to deter the Sovi- s rom attacking U. S. forces in the first IT|ace’ the Navy’s Tomahawk capability ust be deployed continuously in signifi- tj ? numbers and in all regions of poten- all .Con^'ct- They point out that even if on °Ur battleships are reactivated (two Cy.each coast), a one-in-three rotation de f C0U^ not provide continuously a^.0^ec* battleships off each coast. In (j0ltl0n> a limited number of battleships e ,not have the operational flexibility To °?'ec* by the growing number of rnahawk-armed destroyers, cruisers, ^.submarines.
Slj ’Sare 1, updated to reflect the recent cat ^ *n t*le Tomahawk program, indi- 0(- Cs ^at—in terms of the total number 1^. ePloyable launchers—the relative rari rtUnCe °P battleship as a long- s(cruise missile carrier diminishes exist’ 3S new sh'Ps come on line and haw,lng ships are upgraded with Toma- battl Capability. Whereas one Phase I all nf i ^ew Jersey) wih carry 25% of that total. Notwithstanding their superb survivability characteristics, the battleships’ importance as a cruise missile carrier will decline even further during the 1990s when—despite the retirement of older vessels—as many as 40 new DDG-51-class guided missile destroyers (each with vertical launch cells) are expected to join the fleet.
Ironically, largely ignored in the debate over the battleships are their most obvious assets: 16-inch guns. Nothing more distinguishes these ships than their capability to hurl 16-inch projectiles weighing more than a ton a distance of 23 nautical miles. The power of the 16-inch projectile is awesome and, for a variety of land targets, more potent than any other single conventional air-dropped weapon or cruise missile.
New technology currently available, such as rocket-assisted projectiles, laser guidance systems, and enhanced munitions could further improve that capability. With adequate air and submarine defenses, the Iowa battleships could wield their improved guns with devastating effectiveness against armored vehicles, airstrips, and industrial complexes 50 miles inland. Considering the vulnerability of tactical aircraft, this is an important capability that exists nowhere else in the fleet, and one that does not have to be deployed continuously to be useful.
However, even a cursory review of the recent Senate battleship debates strongly suggests that it would be very difficult to convince Congress to fund the lowas on the basis of their guns alone. A more meaningful (and credible) operational concept and mission for the battleships must be developed—one that recognizes the distinct possibility of only two battleships being funded. One option currently being examined to enhance the battleships’ capability as cruise missile carriers, and to capitalize on their “presence” value, is to forward deploy the New Jersey and Iowa to major operating theaters (i.e., Western Pacific and Mediterranean). Forward deployed ships experience increased availability, eliminating the weeks to transit between U. S. ports and operational areas.
But this may only be an interim solution. Somewhere down the line, given the likelihood that a future administration may not view the controversial ships the way Reagan and Lehman do, a long- range mission strategy is needed if these last major naval guns are to be retained and improved. One interesting possibility might be to eventually assign the Iowa and New Jersey to the Naval Reserve, as was done with the Missouri just prior to the war in Korea. The battleships’ up- to-date weapons and systems would provide an ideal training environment for the reservists. As units of the Naval Reserve, the battleships’ limited at-sea availability would not be a problem, since much of the naval reservists’ shipboard training is done at pierside. And with a reduced active duty crew, operating costs could be lowered considerably. An equally attractive advantage of this plan is that by home porting the battleships in large cities, they could be seen by the public; a variety of promotional activities could be held using the battleships as a backdrop to engender goodwill for the service.
After all the statements made concerning the battleships’ frontline cruise missile capability, it will not be easy for the Navy to consider a lesser role for the /owns—one designed primarily to preserve 16-inch guns. But if it does not, a future President, facing a crisis for which carriers and submarines are of little use,
may indeed ask, “Where are the battleships?”
Mr. Serig earned his B.S. and M.B.A. degrees from New York University in 1965 and 1967. He is economist for the Department of Transportation, an specializes in ocean transportation and port projects. His article, “The Iowa Class: Needed Once Again, appeared in the May 1982 Naval Review Issue oft c Proceedings and his professional note, “Update on the Iowa Class,” appeared in December 1982.
Iowa vs. Yamato: The Ultimate Gunnery Duel
By Thomas Hone and Norman Friedman
When considering the outcome of a hypothetical clash between one or more of the /own-class battleships and the Yamato of the Imperial Japanese Navy, we must find sensible answers to at least four questions. First, were there any circumstances under which the great ships actually could have engaged in battle? Second, what were the comparative ranges, rates of fire, and penetrating potentials of the respective vessels’ main battery guns? Third, which ship would have been capable of more accurate shooting? Finally, how well could the armor built into each type of ship have resisted the shells of the other? To answer these questions, we combined historical research with calculation and discussions with gunnery specialists.
After reviewing the October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, we decided that U. S. and Japanese battleships might have clashed on two occasions. The first was on the morning of 25 October, when four Japanese battleships (the Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna) with cruisers and destroyers sailed through Ban Bernardino Strait on their way to an epic engagement with U. S. destroyers and escort carriers off the island of Samar. No U. S. battleships blocked the strait because Admiral William F. Halsey had taken all six—the Iowa (BB-61), Washington (BB-56), South Dakota (BB-57), Massachusetts (BB-59), Indiana (BB- 58), and the fleet flagship New Jersey (BB-62)—with him in his pursuit of what he thought was the Japanese main body. Admiral Willis A. Lee, commander of the battle line, had asked Halsey to leave several battleships behind to guard the strait; if Halsey had done so, there would have been a daylight battleship engagement. Later that same day, Halsey sent the Iowa and New Jersey, plus three light cruisers and eight destroyers, south at high speed to catch what was left of the Japanese surface squadron as it retreated back through the strait. They missed the
Japanese battleships, but not by much. If Halsey had responded faster to the calls for help from the units off Samar, the Iowa and the New Jersey might have tangled with the Yamato in the dark in the waters of San Bernardino Strait.
Table 1 gives pertinent ballistics data for the Yamato’s 46-cm. guns and for the Iowa's 16-in./50-cal. weapons. Table 2 compares the penetrating power of the two guns; also included are figures for the 16-in./45-cal. pieces carried by the other U. S. battleships. Table 3 lists the horizontal and vertical armor protection given the Yamato and the Iowa.
These tables show that, at the maximum ranges of their guns, neither battleship was immune to the other’s gunfire. Both the 46-cm. and the 16-in./50-cal. guns could penetrate ten inches of deck armor at about 38,000 yards. When the Yamato and the Iowa were designed, however, accurate shooting at such a range was extremely difficult. The Yamato, in consequence, was designed to fight at closer ranges, and at those ranges she had an advantage in protection over the Iowa. The latter was designed to a treaty limit of 45,000 tons; on that displacement, she could not be given high speed and heavier protection than that already planned for the South Dakotas. But the Iowa was given a better gun than previous classes; as Table 2 shows, the 16-in./50-cal. was clearly superior to the 16-in./45-cal. when matched against armor protection on the scale of the Yamatos.
More to the point, the tables illustrate the Navy’s development of radar fire control, and a firing doctrine which stressed getting in the first hits at very long range. The Yamato’s armor advantage did her very little good at ranges beyond 35,000 yards. Her deck armor was vulnerable to even the 16-in./45-cal. at extremely long range. The issue, then, is whether the Iowa’s gunners could have hit the Yamato while the latter was still over the horizon
The Japanese battleship Yamato is caught in her death throes off Okinawa in April 1945; had she encountered one of our lowa.v on equal ter"lS’ which ship might have been the one 1° turn her keel skyward?
lem
rate
Parts at 40,000 yards.
°th sides were unable to distinguish Parate targets at 40,000 yards; in addi- y°n’ salvo patterns of the Iowa and £*> were very tight. Tight patterns
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Table 1 Comparative Ballistic Data
Yamato Iowa
was the resolution of the Mk-8’s
Gun Size/Caliber |
| 46 cm (18.1")/45 | 40.6 cm (16")/50 | |
AP Projectile Weight |
| 3,200 lbs. | 2,700 lbs. | |
Maximum Range |
| 45,000 yds. | 42,000 | |
Rate of Fire |
| 1.5 rounds/min. | 2 rounds/min. | |
Table 2 | Armor Penetration Ranges (in yards) |
|
| |
| Yamato | Iowa |
| Other BBs |
12" (side) | 38,300 | 38,000 |
| 31,600 |
16" (side) | 28,700 | 28,200 |
| 23,000 |
8" (deck) | 35,100 | 33,600 |
| 31,000 |
10" (deck) | 38,300 | 38,000 |
| 34,400 |
| Table 3 Armor Protection |
|
| |
|
| Yamato |
| Iowa |
Main Side Belt (Maximum) | 16.1" (410 mm.) | 12.1" | (307 mm.) | |
Armor & Splinter Decks |
| 7.8" (200 mm.) | 6.6" | (169 mm.) |
before she could return fire. All the ■ S. battleships with the Third Fleet earned Mk-8 fire control radars. During the night engagement at Surigao, the three 0 d battleships equipped with the Mk-8 Were able to compute firing solutions on eir Japanese targets at ranges of nearly .000 yards. It is not certain that, even 'Vlth similar solutions, gunners on the a and the New Jersey could have hit e Yamato at such great range. The prob
radar. Its beam width was 2°. At 40,000 yards, a radar with that beam width could not distinguish between two adjacent tar- jjnts W'th a combined length (including e space between them) of less than a out 1,400 yards. The Yamato was 288 yards long; at Leyte, she was accompany the Nagato, 240 yards in length.
,. 600 yards dividing them, the two
1 or\AW°U^ ^ave covered a total of about ’ yards, and they would not have Ppeared as two distinct points on the s Mk-8 radar.
or the Yamato, matters were much ^ orse. She had no radar fire control at • Her surface search set could have een used only to guide her gunners, and ven then it could not have been of much Q? P 3140,000 yards. The reason was res- Wion, which at that range was about ten *ess precise than the U. S. Navy’s n t h s*10rt’ the Japanese radar could o have resolved the combined image of „„f whole U. S. battle line into its sepaeasier to spot and correct in a day- engagement, or when radar resolu- ■un was precise; resolution improved as v6 ,ran§e closed. For example, at 31,000 1 n«S reso*ut'on °f the Mk-8 was tin ^ ^arc's; at 20,000 yards, the resolu- th 0 <WaS *ess than 700 yards. As a result, rae ovva could target better at extreme the^6 ^Ur'n8 fhe day. At night, to achieve (jaSame degree of accuracy, she would plrVe to reduce the range. Yet accurate trjC at. *on8 range was the preferred doc- tl^e, it was also the best way to deal with yQ^mass've armor protection given to the
,0nrhc kcy factor in any engagement at W( ® ”'an8e between the Iowa and Yamato lonU ** *1ave been fire control. At very Woui range’ 35-4°.°°0 yards, the Iowa rad- ^ •*13Ve tke advantage, because her itar fire control fit the ranging capabil- tatke 16-in./50-cal. gun. The advan- sta W°u*fi have held as long as the Iowa outs'cle the Yamato's immune e> between 28,200 and 33,600 yards
h (see Table 2). At longer ranges, however, the percentage of hits, even with radar fire control would not be great; a few hits might disable the Yamato’s fire control, but the chances are not high that they would have destroyed her ability to steam and fight at close range.
The task facing the Iowa would have been to hurt the Yamato without reducing her own ammunition supply so severely that her gunners could not inflict more damage on the Japanese giant later. The Yamato’s reliance upon optical fire control was her weak point, especially at night; she was also vulnerable during the day. Had the U. S. battleships covered themselves with a smokescreen, they still could have ranged on the Yamato, but she could not have returned accurate fire.
The Yamato had superior armor, slightly superior range, and somewhat greater striking power. But these strengths would have been offset by the more accurate fire control of the U. S. Navy’s battle line (Iowas, South Dakotas, and Washington). This difference would have applied no matter who commanded the ships. But—given his handling of the Japanese battleships at Samar—we believe that Admiral Takeo Kurita would not have performed well against the likely U. S. commander, Admiral Lee. Lee was an ordnance specialist; he well understood the need to strike quickly in a surface battle, and at the greatest possible range. He knew that the 16-in./50-cal. gun, linked with radar fire control, gave his ships the chance to do so. Having looked closely at the available evidence, we believe that he would have maneuvered them so they could have done precisely that.
Author’s Note: The following persons were generous with their assistance, but do not necessarily agree with our conclusions: VADM L. M. Mustin, USN (Ret.); VADM E. B. Hooper, USN (Ret.); RADM John Chase, USN (Ret.); CAPT Charles Allen, USN (Ret.); and CDR L. A. Short, USN. Dr. Dean Allard, head of the Navy’s Operational Archives, suggested we consult the Naval Technical Mission to Japan reports and Paul Stillwell of the Naval Institute gave us our initial start.
Sources:
1. Morison, Samuel E., History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. XII, Little, Brown & Co., Boston,. 1958.
2. Armor Penetration Curves (Revised), U. S. Navy, Bureau of Ordnance, ORD #653, Washington, D. C., January 1942.
3. “Japanese 18" Gun Mounts” (0-45N), “Japanese Surface and General Fire Control” (0-31), and “Japanese Fire Control” (0-29), U. S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan, in the Classified Operational Archives of the U. S. Navy, 1946.
4. Dulin, R. O. and W. H. Garzke, Battleships: United States Battleships in World War II,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1976.
Mr. Hone is employed by Delex Systems, Inc. in Arlington, Virginia, and holds a PhD. from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Dr. Friedman is an analyst at the Hudson Institute in Croton-on-Hudson, New York, and author of U. S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (Naval Institute Press, 1982).