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We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, or kid and asked, “Right?” only to be told, “I’m sorry, I wasn’t listening.” Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, perhaps you ought to contribute to our “Nobody asked me, but . . .” column.
Maybe what you have been saying isn’t worth listening to. But, if it is, we may print it and pay you $50.00. If it isn’t, you’ll feel better for having gotten it off your chest.
Nuclear Officer Manning:
Fix It Now!
In spite of a dormant economy and a flat, if not declining, civilian nuclear power industry, the Navy has continued to lose nearly two- thirds of its nuclear-trained officers in each year group by the end of their department head tours. The resultant unfavorable sea-shore rotation has adversely affected the morale of those who have remained, which likely will negatively influence career decisions.
The nuclear officer shortage was originally generated, and then maintained, by two decades of restrictive and arbitrary accession policies. The increasing numbers of officer resignations were first officially denied and then subsequently blamed on a host of external factors. The personnel spigot never provided sufficient accessions to compensate for losses. The increased financial incentives, which were sold to Congress as “the solution.” proved to be mere “band- aid” palliatives which were insufficient to stem the personnel hemorrhage.
The record number of accessions into the front end of the nuclear training pipeline in 1982 can offer little, if any, immediate relief. The serious shortages which currently exist are in senior afloat billets and cannot be filled by a bumper crop of ensigns who will not reach division officer assignments in the fleet until late 1983.
Ironically, several excellent solutions have been available for years, but under Admiral Hyman G. Rick- over each was consistently vetoed within the Division of Naval Reactors (NR). With a new director at NR, the Navy now has an opportunity to implement new approaches and to correct the short- and longterm officer manning problem in the nuclear fleet, with no reduction in reactor safety. In fact, safety and technical expertise may well be improved as a result of the concurrent rise in morale and professional performance made possible by an increased inventory of nuclear officers.
The following administrative actions should be implemented immediately:
► Rehabilitate the vast pool of “political refugees” from the Rickover years. Many talented, highly motivated, proven submariners’ applications for nuclear training were rejected by Admiral Rickover. Many of these officers are highly regarded within their present warfare communities and are available for nuclear training. Other experienced nuclear- trained officers have been discarded in the midst of their nuclear careers for failing to complete successfully some phase of training. The decision to abandon these officers was often highly subjective and sometimes counter to other performance indicators. The causes for the rejections of officers in both of these groups should be carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis. In many instances, these officers could receive the appropriate training and then proceed directly to department hea or executive officer assignments on- nuclear ships.
► Implement a career pattern to a - low general submarine officers (GSOs) to proceed to command ot nuclear submarines. By providing nuclear training opportunities subs quent to a successful GSO department head tour, the Navy can use these proven performers’ experien and skills in commanding officer a executive officer positions. This tyP of career pattern has been used e ' fectively to obtain nuclear aircrat carrier commanding officers and e ecutive officers from our top aviators.
► Encourage more direct inputs from officers in all communities, 1 eluding staff officers at the 0-1 through 0-3 level, for nuclear trai ing and subsequent afloat assignment. Although this avenue has been previously advertised, it has been effectively blocked by arbd1.^ weighting policies within NR, wl1 emphasized collegiate academic grade-point average over pertoi- mance in the fleet and commandi officer recommendations.
► Establish an expanded limited duty officer (LDO) nuclear progr*1 similar to the LDO aviation progr‘ which was established in 1980 to a sist with the pilot shortage and to enhance upward mobility lor enlisted personnel. Nuclear LDOs could fill a greatly expanded role • manning both afloat and ashore n clear junior officer billets and ^0 ^ considerably enhance senior enU motivation and performance. Cut. rently, some enlisted personnel dl ify as engineering watch supervisors—the senior enlisted watch- station in a nuclear plant—duru1® j their first enlistments, and arc >a jr with professional stagnation for remaining tours. Many ot these
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Proceedings
/ .l«nc
fkn?rmers are choosing not to reen- m i f.cause °f restricted upward
ali/™m°te *e8's*at'on to institution- nu ® CUrrent financial incentives for nar eu“r °fhcers to ensure pay com- wrabdity vis-a-vis the civilian sector.
beSte^ra' additional measures can prn^ en t0 improve the long-term si h-pS10na* climate and career de- a ility of the nuclear Navy, revi-
retenlf m°ra'e and improving
Co|T^an8e ^e selection process for the^f 8r.aduates. Remove NR from acc Se ect'°n process, establishing ti0neS|S!Pn Procedures along tradi- the r 'neS unt*er the cognizance of son ?mmar|der, Naval Military Per- douh?f Command (NMPC). It is he n U' l^at ora' interviews would dy ecessarY in the revised proce- nUc|S' Actual performance in the the Q lr tra'n'n8 pipeline should be tor jnPerat've quality assurance fac- base .stea(i °f arbitrary prejudgments dUc| °u short oral interviews coni' Feu by civilians at NR.
' lni|nate NR concurrence on af
loat personnel assignments. Reestablish NMPC as the sole agency for personnel assignment and distribution within the nuclear Navy. Until NR is removed from the process of determining who is going to be assigned to each commanding officer, executive officer, or engineer billet—even to most operational postcommand assignments, including squadron commander—the ultimate allegiance of most ambitious nuclear officers will likely lie with NR instead of the Chief of Naval Operations. This unusual relationship has had an extraordinarily demoralizing effect on many nuclear-trained line officers who resent the presence of a technical bureau at the top of their real chain of command.
► Restore ‘‘pride and professionalism" in the nuclear Navy by using the normal selection board process to rid the fleet of the senior nuclear officers who have consistently squandered assigned personnel assets. Send a ‘‘signal to the fleet” by passing over those officers with a history of poor personnel management and retention.
► Reestablish career patterns outside the “strictly nuclear path" within the submarine force and surface nuclear Navy. Emphasize operational performance, personnel management achievements, and successful shore tours as well as material/engineering assignments as the milestones to flag rank. For example, most nuclear flag selectees have had either no joint service experience or have been permitted to count their tours at the Department of Energy (Naval Reactors) as the equivalent. Broadened career patterns can offer additional incentive to remain in the Navy to those nuclear officers who are competent engineers, but whose greatest talents and interests lie in areas outside strictly propulsion plant matters.
These measures are proposed as a pool of ideas from which various options may be selected for implementation. Some progress has already been made since the beginning of 1982. But additional steps must be taken as soon as possible if we are to man the U. S. nuclear fleet through the 1980s.
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,n8s / June 1983
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