When the Proceedings published its first international navies issue two years ago, the cover featured R. G. Smith’s fine drawing of the old Argentine carrier 25 de Mayo and the new Super Etendards with which she was to be equipped. Smith takes justifiable pride in both his accuracy and his skill as an artist. But when it came time for life to imitate art a year after the cover was published, things didn’t turn out quite as he had envisioned. The carrier was not fitted to operate these planes in the Malvinas conflict. That left it to the Super Etendards to operate from land bases, and they did so with spectacular success. It was the first naval war of the missile age, fought over a dispute which had been simmering for some 150 years in the South Atlantic. For the most part, readers in this country have gotten only the British side of the struggle. The other side deserves to be told also.
The most persistent error concerning the Malvinas dispute is the belief that the problem had its origin in the recent past. Some have suggested that the Argentine Government was trying to divert attention from the country’s monetary inflation. Another commonly held notion is that the invasion of the Malvinas was intended as a means of forestalling a nationwide labor strike. Simplistic misconceptions such as these can lead to erroneous conclusions that the status quo has been restored and thus the problem solved. In fact, neither is true.
Events did occur during March 1982 in the Georgia Islands that for Argentina were heaped upon years of frustration and became the last straw. In mid-March, 41 Argentine civilians and 80 tons of equipment were landed on the island of South Georgia in order to disassemble obsolete whaling facilities for the purpose of scrapping them. These people were transported to South Georgia by the Argentine naval auxiliary Bahia Buen Suceso, which departed after the men and equipment were landed. This use of a naval ship to support a commercial enterprise is a common practice in developing areas of South America. Much as the U. S. Army was responsible for many services in the western United States during the late 19th century, navies in Latin America have adopted a similar role with regard to their countries because of their maritime environment.
The British embassy in Buenos Aires was informed of the scrap workers’ trip prior to their departure, and the Argentines believed that they had obtained permission for the enterprise. (In fact, the person in charge of the scrapping deal had been in the islands—with British permission—during December 1981 in order to survey the site of the planned work.) Once on the islands in March 1982, one of the scrap workers raised an Argentine national flag. This was a spontaneous event, similar to ones that had occurred in past decades when Argentines visited the islands. In this case, the British claimed that the scrap workers did not have permission to be there and ordered them to leave. Concurrently, Argentine intelligence discovered that the British Antarctic supply ship Endurance was steaming to the area with Royal Marines on board. As a result, the Argentine polar supply ship Bahia Paraiso, a naval auxiliary, was diverted from her Antarctic duties in order to be ready to assist the 41 civilians. On 26 March, the Drummond and Granville, two of Argentina’s Type 69 frigates, were dispatched to South Georgia to support the Bahia Paraiso. The Argentines received word that additional British warships, including the destroyer Exeter and the nuclear-powered attack submarine Superb, were being sent to the area. Much as in World War I, each successive and seemingly minor escalation drew Argentina and Great Britain closer and closer to war. Either could have chosen a different path, but neither could find an honorable way to do so.
Who owns the “Malvinas?” The author’s position is clear from his choice of name. But those who choose the label “Falklands” have also cast their lot. If one wishes to understand Argentine operations during the conflict and speculate about the future, he must study the Argentine claim to the islands, because initial tactical decisions in the invasion of the Malvinas were influenced by British actions more than a century ago. And the status quo has not been restored. British occupation is guaranteed by the Royal Navy, as has been the case since the 1830s. However, the force can no longer be a token one. Instead of the 40-man garrison present at the outset of the South Atlantic conflict, the number will now have to be perhaps 100 times that size. There will be no more cheap trip wires. The Malvinas problem has been temporarily shelved by force of arms. Great Britain, supported by substantial aid from the United States, overpowered Argentina and restored British rule on the islands. It did so in spite of the efforts of the Argentine Navy.
The Argentine Recapture of the Islands
In late March, two naval task forces began to assemble in order to recapture the Malvinas Islands from the British. The amphibious task force (Task Force 40) was composed of the British-designed Type 42 destroyers Santisima Trinidad (flagship) and Hercules; frigates Drummond and Granville; submarine Santa Fe (ex-USS Catfish [SS-339]); tank landing ship Cabo San Antonio (modified U. S. DeSoto County [LST-1171] class); icebreaker Almirante Irizar; and the transport Isla de los Estados. The Second Marine Battalion was embarked in the LST. The supporting task force (Task Force 20) comprised the carrier 25 de Mayo (the former HMS Venerable); the destroyers Bouchard (ex-USS Borie [DD-704]), Piedra Buena (ex-USS Collett [DD-730]), Py (ex-USS Perkins [DD- 877]), and Segui (ex-USS Hank [DD-702]); fleet support tanker Punta Medanos", and the tug Sobral. Embarked in the aircraft carrier were four S-2E Tracker antisubmarine aircraft, eight A-4Q Skyhawk attack planes, three Alouette helicopters and a few Sea King helos. Commanding the theater of operations was Army General Osvaldo Garcia; commander of the amphibious task force was Navy Rear Admiral Gualter Allara.
The mission of Task Force 40 was to capture Port Stanley (soon to be renamed Puerto Argentino) at the eastern edge of the Malvinas. The objectives were the Royal Marine barracks, the airport, the lighthouse San Felipe (known as Cape Pembroke to the British), and the effective control of the population. Rear Admiral Carlos Bus- ser, commander of the landing force, instructed his Marines that this was to be accomplished without death or destruction if possible.1 In fact, the Argentines hoped to so overwhelm the 80 British defenders (a 40-man Royal Marine garrison duming turnover) with their 700-strong landing force that no resistance would be offered. The Argentines were, in effect, trying to reverse events of the 1830s. They would offer the British subjects in the Malvinas a similar choice to that which had been forced upon Argentines a century and a half earlier—new citizenship or compensation and transportation from the islands.
In late March, the fleet prepared to sail. Nineteen amphibian vehicles (all of which were U. S.-built LVTPs) were embarked in the LST at night in an attempt to avoid attracting attention, but the news was published in the Argentine press prior to the landing. All ships took on ammunition and stores at Puerto Belgrano and Puerto Deseado on the coast of Argentina’s mainland. The Almirante Irizar lagged behind while waiting for Army technicians who would be needed to restore and keep running Port Stanley’s public services if they should be sabotaged by 'he British.
The majority of the ships sailed separately on 28 March and took the normal course toward Ushuaia, the Argentine Port at the tip of the continent. That evening, the cover force separated and took up a position about 450 miles north of the Malvinas at approximately 43°45' South, 59°40' West. The Trackers from the carrier flew antisubmarine patrols to the south-southeast for 250 miles. The invasion force continued south along the coast.
The original plan to circle below the islands and approach from the southeast had to be scrapped as a result of deteriorating weather. By midday on the 29th, the amphibious task force had encountered 40-knot winds and accompanying heavy seas. The icebreaker Almirante Irizar, which caught up at 1400, had a difficult time maintaining station; one of the Army Puma helicopters she was carrying was damaged during the storm when its lashings broke. The task force reduced speed from 14 knots to 8 and later to 6; helicopter operations were suspended. On the 30th, the planned amphibious landing was delayed until 2 April, and the task force changed course to the north of the islands in order to reduce the pounding the ships were taking.
By midday on the 31st, Task Force 40 learned that it had lost the element of surprise. Rex Hunt, the British governor of the islands, was openly broadcasting instructions to his military and civil forces. The final decision to recapture the islands was probably made at this time. The Argentines monitored these radio broadcasts and modified their plans accordingly. First, H-hour was delayed so that the landing would not take place in the dark. Second, plans to capture the lighthouse were cancelled. The Argentines knew that this structure had been equipped as a lookout post with a warning system. Now, however, it was fortified as well, and the element of surprise had already been lost. Third, the operations against Darwin, Goose Green, and Bahia Fox were postponed. All forces were to concentrate against Port Stanley.
Task Force 40 arrived off the islands after nightfall on 1 April. The invasion began at 2115. Destroyer Santisima Trinidad anchored at Puerto Enriqueta (Port Harriet) south of Port Stanley. Eighty commandos of the Marine Amphibian Reconnaissance Company and the Marine tactical divers paddled 500 meters ashore in rubber boats on a clear, moonlit night. (Normally at that time of year, the sky is heavily overcast in the region.) The commandos were to capture the Royal Marine barracks and Government House, which was Governor Hunt’s residence and the seat of British administration of the islands. At 0200 on 2 April, ten frogmen disembarked from the submerged Santa Fe, which was off the entrance of the harbor. Their mission was to secure the landing beach.
At 0615, the LST Cabo San Antonio entered the outer harbor at Port Stanley and commenced the main amphibious landing phase by disembarking 19 LVTPs at York Beach. Immediately after the landing started, English- language broadcasts from the Santisima Trinidad asked the islanders to offer no resistance and thus to avoid bloodshed. However, the amphibian vehicles were hit by a few rifle shots as they came ashore. They returned the fire, and it ceased. As the landing vehicles neared the city, they received concentrated small arms fire. As Capitan de Cor- beta Hugo Santillan (the on-site Marine commander) explained later, he “. . . ordered the [75-millimeter recoilless rifle] shot on the roof [of the Antarctic Survey Building] with a hollow charge, not fragmentation, not to cause casualties.”2 He successfully dislodged the British without injuring anyone. Hearing the fire, crewmen of the frigate Drummond requested permission to provide support with her 100-millimeter gun. They were turned down, because that was considered to be an excessive response- As the amphibious vehicles proceeded into Port Stanley- they were met by the commandos who had been landed from the Santisima Trinidad. Part of this group had found the Royal Marine barracks unoccupied, then moved on to attack Government House. One Argentine was killed o’ this firefight. At 0915, Governor Hunt surrendered.
In a separate operation, which began about the time the LVTPs began their landing, a Sea King helicopter from the icebreaker Almirante Irizar transported material and men to the airport from the ship’s location south of the San Felipe lighthouse. These men cleared the landing strip, which had vehicles parked on it, and the first Argentine Air Force C-130s landed at 0830. The following day. Army troops who had been flown in on C-130s were transported by ships of the task force to outlying defensive positions at Darwin, Goose Green, and Bahia Fox.
Landing in the South Georgias
Although tactically separate from the Malvinas operation, the landing in the Georgias was linked strategically. In fact, one might say that the Georgias confrontation caused Argentina to land in the Malvinas. When Argentina had determined on a course of military support for the contingent of scrap workers on the Georgia, it realized that it would be in no position to maintain a force in the Georgias alone. They are 700 miles east of the Malvinas and roughly 1,100 from the Argentine mainland. Thus, in order for an Argentine position in the remote Georgias to be tenable, Argentina could not afford to leave the Malvinas under British control. As a result, the landings in both groups of islands were part of the same whole, even though undertaken independently.
On the morning of 3 April, the frigate Guerrico with an Army Puma helicopter and two Marine platoons on board joined the polar supply ship Bahia Paraiso to form Task Force 60. The latter vessel, which was carrying a Navy Alouette helicopter, had been conducting a scientific program in the Antarctic and was ordered to take up position near the Georgias. At 1100 on 3 April, the Alouette reconnoitered the intended landing site for the Marines at the port of Grytviken. Strangely enough, after an hour of flying, the helicopter’s crew saw no movement below. Radio contact was established, and the Argentines were told there were no military personnel on the island and there would be no resistance. As a result, a planned diversionary bombardment by the Guerrico was cancelled. At 1200, the Puma airlifted the first load of 15 Marines to the island; they constituted about one-third of the occupation force. The second load of Argentine Marines was being landed when Royal Marines opened fire from ambush. The Puma was hit by small arms fire. It lifted off, filled with smoke, careened to the other side of the island, and crashed. The Alouette from the supply ship had been flying along for protection, so it followed the Puma and landed at the crash site. There the naval crew, under heavy fire, pulled wounded Marines and soldiers from the Puma. Two Marines were killed, and the helicopter was destroyed.
Meanwhile, Royal Marines opened fire on the Guerrico, which had moved in close to Grytviken. The frigate was hit by an anti-tank rocket just below the Exocet missile launcher on her port side and by small arms fire. One crew member was killed. The ship responded with a few rounds from her 100-millimeter gun, and the British force of 23 men surrendered to the; Argentines ashore, who now numbered roughly 50.
Calm Before the Storm
Following the landings in the islands, the Argentine Navy prepared to defend them and the mainland as well. Immediately after the capture of Puerto Argentino (Stanley), the Second Marine Battalion and its amphibian vehicles were withdrawn, because it had been trained to emphasize amphibious warfare and its job was completed. In moved the Fifth Marine Battalion, which emphasizes land warfare in its training and mission. The battalion was assigned a zone of operations on the islands by the overall ground commander from the Argentine Army.
At 1330 on 3 April, two Trackers from the carrier 25 de Mayo flew to Puerto Argentino. They were stationed on the islands until 13 April in order to carry out local reconnaissance. Principally, they were looking for suitable sites at which to establish future airfields. In mid-April, long- range reconnaissance flights were begun. To conserve the Navy’s aging P-2 Neptune patrol aircraft, the Argentines employed a commercial Boeing 707 with military observers on board. An Air Force KC-130 was used for midrange patrol.
By 7 April, the invasion and covering forces had returned to Puerto Belgrano, Argentina’s principal naval base. The Navy calculated that 9 April was the earliest date that a British nuclear-powered submarine could arrive on the scene, and it wanted to allow time for the fleet to regroup. Also on 7 April, Rear Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo was appointed as operational commander, of all Argentine armed forces involved in the campaign. At mid-month, naval and merchant vessels were used to carry troops and supplies to the islands. In further measures designed to prepare for the arrival of the British task force which was steaming southward from the United Kingdom, the fleet spent the period from 17 to 25 April conducting intensive target practice and antisubmarine exercises in coastal waters. The Guerrico, which had been damaged in the Georgias, rejoined the fleet after three days in an Argentine shipyard.
Table 1 Argentine Navy’s Malvinas Forces1 |
||
Types/Class |
Number |
Ship |
Submarines: |
|
|
“Type-209” |
2 |
Saho, San Luis |
Guppe Class |
2 |
Santa Fe Santiago del Estero |
Carrier: |
|
|
Colossus Class |
1 |
Veinticinco de Mayo |
Cruiser: |
|
|
Brooklyn Class |
1 |
General Belgrano |
Destroyers: |
|
|
Sheffield Class |
2 |
Hercules Santisima Trinidad |
Gearing Class FRAM-II |
1 |
Py |
Allen M. Sumner Class |
3 |
Segui Bouchard Piedrabuena |
Fletcher Class |
1 |
Almirante Domecq Garcia |
Frigates: |
|
|
“Type-A-69” |
3 |
Drummond Guerrico Granville |
Corvette: |
|
|
Sotoyomo Class |
3 |
Yamana Alferez Sobral Comodoro Somellera |
Mine Wafare: |
|
|
“Ton” Class1 |
1 |
Formoso |
Amphibious Warfare |
|
|
Modified DeSoto Country Class |
1 |
Cabo San Antonio |
Icebreaker: |
1 |
Almirante Irizar |
Auxiliary: |
|
|
Bahia Aguirre Class |
2 |
Bahia Aguirre Bahia Buen Suceso |
|
1 |
Punta Medanas |
|
1 |
Bahia Paraiso |
|
1 |
Isla de los Estados |
“Z-28” Class |
22 |
Rio Iguazu Islas Malvinas |
|
1 |
Monsunen |
|
1 |
Rio Carcana |
|
1 |
Forrest |
1 Numerous auxiliaries, support craft, and minor combatants did not participate in the fighting. For example, the “Ton”-class minesweepers worked in the Puerto Belgrano area and did not leave coastal waters. Also, the two Intrepida-class patrol boats remained on their frontier station at Ushuaia. These ships have not been included in this list. |
||
2 Actually, there are 20 “Z-28”-class units in the Argentine Prefectura. However, only two operated in the Malvinas. |
Table 2 Argentine Navy’s Aircraft in Malvinas Campaign |
||
Type |
Number |
Base |
SUE Super Etendard |
4 |
Rio Grande |
A-4Q Skyhawk |
10 |
Veinticinco de Mayo Rio Grande |
MB-339 Acromacchi |
10 |
Puerto Argentino |
T-34C Trainer |
4 |
Borbon |
P-2 Neptune |
2 |
Rio Grande |
S-2E Tracker |
5 |
Veinticinco de Mayo Rio Gallegos |
EMB-111 Parulha Embroer |
2 |
Rio Gallegos |
L-188 Electra |
3 |
Rio Grande |
F-28 Fokker |
3 |
Rio Grande |
WG-13 Sea Lynx |
2 |
Hercules Santisima Trinidad |
H-3 Sea King |
5 |
On boar ship/ASW patrol |
AI-03 Alouette |
7 |
On board ship/security patrol |
Skyvan |
3 |
Near Puerto Argentino |
Puma |
1 |
Puerto Argentino |
As military preparations were proceeding on both sides, so also were diplomatic efforts intended to forestall the impending bloodshed. Until 1 May, a majority of the Argentine people felt that there would indeed be a negotiated settlement, because they simply didn’t think that the issue would result in war. The Argentine Government made a legitimate negotiating effort during the period when U. S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig was conducting air shuttle diplomacy between Buenos Aires and London. When his mediation ended unsuccessfully, the previously neutral United States moved to support Great Britain. Many Argentines felt that their country had been betrayed by the U. S. change in role from impartial broker to an active ally of their enemy. They felt that the United States should have either thrown in with the British at the outset or else remained neutral through the entire conflict.
Hostilities Resume
Because of their remoteness and the limited number of defenders available on the Georgias, the Argentine military committee decided that if the islands were attacked, the troops there should offer only token resistance. On 21 April, an Argentine 707 located the British fleet at 19°29' South, 21° West. Four days later, the submarine Santa Fe was attacked and badly damaged by a host of British helicopters. The Santa Fe was then in the process of leaving Grytviken Harbor, South Georgia, after having just delivered supplies. She managed to reach nearby King Edward Cove, where she settled to the bottom and was abandoned. One petty officer was severely wounded during the attack, and another was later killed by a British sentry after the crew had been taken prisoner. The Marines on South Georgia put up a sporadic defense of the island and then surrendered to the British invaders.
On 27 April, the fleet deployed in order to counter a possible British attack against the Malvinas or the mainland. The entire fleet was designated Task Force 79, and it was initially divided into three task groups, each of which included an oiler. Since Argentina has only one naval replenishment oiler, it was necessary to use merchant tankers, and these proved capable of refueling the Argentine combatant ships at sea. The British have received justifiable credit for their mobilization of commercial shipping in this conflict, but it is worth emphasizing that they were not alone in this regard. Indeed, Argentina’s navy is one of the few in Latin America able to use merchant tankers in this role.
With the Royal Navy’s task force having reached the vicinity, the mission of the Argentine force was made manifest—to find and destroy the British if they attacked the islands or mainland. Task Groups 79.1 and 79.2 were positioned to the east of Golfo San Jorge. Task Group 79.3 operated farther south, in the proximity of Isla de los Esta- dos. During this period of watchful waiting, a 300-mile surveillance was maintained by land- and carrier-based naval aircraft. By 30 April, Task Groups 79.1 and 79.2 had moved north-northwest of the Malvinas. Numerous Japanese, Polish, and Soviet fishing craft frequented these waters, and the Argentine ships hoped that the other vessels might help confuse the British.
At 0440 on 1 May, the Malvinas radioed the Argentine task groups that the British had attacked the islands. The British had sent sea-based Harriers and long-range Vulcan bombers from Ascension Island to bomb the airfield at Puerto Argentino. With this attack, all hope of a negotiated settlement ended.
Though it confirmed the seriousness of the British resolve to retake the Malvinas, the air attack caused little real damage. In fact, the only bomb to hit the runway during the entire conflict was dropped during this attack. Two sheds, a small ammunition dump, and some communication equipment were destroyed. As a means of trying to fool British photo interpreters, the Argentines later put dirt on the runway to simulate craters. The dirt was removed at night to permit landings. Flight operations were interrupted during the day to clean up the mess and assess damage. During the attack, three T-34 trainers stationed at the Borbon auxiliary field flew over to Puerto Argentino and narrowly escaped destruction by British Harriers. The Borbon airfield had been discovered by a Tracker during a reconnaissance of the islands in mid-April. Actually, Borbon was no more than a grassy field. The only naval aircraft that could operate from it were the T-34s and Prefecture (Coast Guard) Skyvans. Macchi attack planes could land there in an emergency, but the runway was too short for them to lift off with ordnance.
Probably the primary reason for the lack of British bombing success after 1 May was the effectiveness of the Argentine antiaircraft fire at Puerto Argentino. After that first attack, the British were forced to resort to lob bombing, which proved to be inaccurate.
In response to the British bombing on 1 May, the Argentine fleet commander ordered that the three French- built Type 69 frigates and an oiler be constituted as Task Group 79.4, a possible anti-surface group. At 2330 that night, an S-2 Tracker flying from the 25 de Mayo detected one large ship and six medium-size ones; they were judged to be a carrier and her screen. The British fleet was northeast of the Malvinas at 49°34' South, 57°10' West, which was 300 miles from the Argentines’ position. During the night, Task Groups 79.1,79.2, and 79.4 closed toward the enemy at 20 knots in order to bring the carrier’s eight A-4 Skyhawk aircraft within range. She would have to wait until almost dawn before sending off an air strike. The Skyhawks could be launched in the dark, but her flight deck is too small for night recoveries.
When the time for launching came, the weather of 2 May was calm—too calm. In order to launch a bombladen Skyhawk from the aging light carrier, a brisk wind—almost always found in these waters—was necessary. Under the existing wind conditions that morning, however, a Skyhawk carrying three 500-pound bombs would have had a radius of only 70 miles; the British force was still 180 miles away. The fleet maintained its course toward the British position, but the wind continued to be too light to permit an air attack. Two Sea Harriers were discovered shadowing the Argentine force. The British force was maintaining the 200-mile distance. Unable to close, the task force commander, Admiral Lombardo, then ordered the Argentine fleet to return to safer waters in order to wait for more suitable weather. While these three northern task groups were withdrawing, the cruiser General Belgrano (ex-USS Phoenix [CL-46]) was torpedoed and sunk by the British nuclear-powered attack submarine Conqueror.
Also on 2 May, the corvette Sobral (ex-USS Catawba [ATA-210]) was attacked and badly damaged by a Sea Skua missile fired by a Sea Lynx helicopter. The Sobral was searching for a downed Air Force pilot. The missile destroyed the bridge and killed the commanding officer and seven other men. A week later, the Sobral limped into Puerto Deseado.
The mission of Task Group 79.3, which included the light cruiser, the destroyers Bouchard and Piedra Buena, and an oiler, was twofold. They were to provide an early warning for the southern mainland and to be in position to intercept any British reinforcements which might come from the Pacific. While on station, the cruiser plied back and forth between Isla de los Estados and Burdwood Bank. Her operating area was outside the 200-mile exclusion zone around the Malvinas, a zone within which the British warned they would sink any ships encountered. While she was on the leg toward the mainland at 10 knots, the General Belgrano was torpedoed at approximately 1600 on 2 May. She was about 360 nautical miles away from the British task force and steaming away from it.
The first torpedo hit under the aft 5-inch gun director, and the second hit on the port side, forward of number one turret. The first hit was the death blow; it raised the ship up in the water, tore the emergency generators from their foundations, and sent a heat wave through the ship. The combination of the heat and the explosion itself accounted for most of the casualties suffered. Many sailors were resting in their quarters on the orlop deck just aft of where the first torpedo hit. Immediately forward of the blow, sailors were crowded into the canteen to buy personal items. Most of the people in these areas were killed, and they comprised 95% of those lost. Following the torpedoing, the crew was forced to evacuate in absolute darkness. They were able to do so in 30 minutes, the payoff for months of training. The ship sank 15 minutes later at 55°18' South, 61°47' West. The crew took to the sea in 30-odd 30-man life rafts. The commanding officer of the ship ordered the rafts to remain together in order to improve their chances of being found. Initially the rafts were lashed together, but during the evening they had to be cut apart when the weather deteriorated. Winds picked up to nearly 60 knots, and the seas were running 18 to 20 feet. At about 1600 on the following day, 24 hours after the torpedoes struck the General Belgrano, the first rescue ships were spotted from the rafts. Of the men on board, 880 were rescued; 321 lives were lost. Destroyers Bouchard and Piedra Buena, which were operating with the cruiser, delivered a two-hour depth charge attack without result. They then searched for the cruiser, with which they had lost contact.
At the time the British destroyer Sheffield was mortally wounded on 4 May, there was widespread press commentary in the United States that the attack on her was an act of retaliation for the sinking of the General Belgrano and the attendant heavy loss of life. In fact, the author’s interviews lead to the conclusion that the Argentines were surprised that the British would break their own rules but not outraged when the cruiser was torpedoed outside the 200- mile exclusion zone. The Argentines’ conviction to fight stemmed from the events of 1 May when the British bombed the runway at Puerto Argentino.
What the sinking outside the exclusion zone did accomplish was to demonstrate to the Argentine Navy the unrestricted operation of British submarines. This, combined with the knowledge that Great Britain was receiving satellite and aircraft reconnaissance information from the United States, led to the decision to retire the fleet to secure coastal waters and hope for a favorable opportunity to strike. The carrier’s aircraft were deployed to southern naval bases where they could be effectively used in the fighting for the Malvinas.
The brunt of the Navy’s fighting now evolved upon its air arm, the Marine Corps, naval personnel in the Malvinas, and the remaining submarines. The Argentine Navy possessed the strongest air arm of any Latin American country. It entered the conflict with three attack squadrons, one antisubmarine squadron, one reconnaissance squadron, two helicopter squadrons, two logistic squadrons, and one training squadron.
The Etendards Draw Blood
The Second Attack Squadron was composed of five Super Etendards. Fourteen aircraft and air-to-surface Exocet missiles had been ordered in late 1981. Ironically, they were not the Argentine Navy’s first choice. The Navy had wanted to buy A-4M Skyhawks from the United States. However, when the Carter Administration refused to sell them to Argentina because of its stand on human rights, Argentina chose instead the only other attack aircraft available that could operate from the light carrier 25 de Mayo. This proved to be a mixed blessing during the war. The French-built Super Etendards were much more advanced than the Skyhawks because of the Etendards’ “fire-and-forget” Exocets. However, the Skyhawks could have operated from the carrier, and many more could have been purchased for the price of 14 Super Etendards. The Etendards were not able to operate from the carrier during the South Atlantic war because the 25 de Mayo had not yet been fitted with the necessary electronics.
From November 1980 through August 1981, naval pilots and support personnel trained in Brittany, France. The pilots worked with flight simulators, and each man received approximately 45 hours of actual flight time. Between August and November 1981, five aircraft and five missiles were shipped from France to Argentina. Five more of each were due to be shipped in the late spring of 1982. The naval pilots began to fly the Super Etendards in Argentina in December. During January and February, the aircraft were test flown to ensure they would meet factory guarantees. On 30 March, two days before the Argentine Marines recaptured the Malvinas Islands, the commanding officer of the squadron was ordered to make the AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface missiles operational.
By now, the pilots had accumulated approximately 90 hours of flight time apiece, but none had received any doctrine or tactical training in the use of the Exocet missile. French technicians had been due to make the missiles operational in mid-April. However, as a result of pressure from the British, the French ceased all aid to Argentina. At least one publication has reported that a French technician already in Argentina aided in the preparation of the missiles for combat use. In fact, the technicians did remain in country but had absolutely no hand in readying the missiles. In addition to the lack of technical assistance, the French did not deliver the remaining nine aircraft.
The days preceding the conflict were spent readying the missiles and devising tactics. During mid-April, the Super Etendards and other Argentine aircraft executed mock attacks against the Argentine Type 42 destroyers, which were quite similar to the British Type 42s they would soon encounter. Besides the Exocet, the Super Etendards could also be armed with bombs and the Magic air-to-air missile. However, because of the limited preparation time available, all effort was concentrated on making the air- to-surface Exocets operational.
The characteristics and tactics used by each of the three naval attack squadrons made coordinated attacks difficult. The Macchis of Attack Squadron One flew from the airport on the Malvinas and were under the operational control of the island commander. The Super Etendards and Skyhawks were stationed at Rio Grande on the mainland and were under the operational control of Naval Air Command. These two aircraft types had differing operational methods. Armed with one Exocet apiece and given targeting information until mid-May by the P-2 Neptunes, the Super Etendards attempted to achieve surprise. They flew in pairs at extremely low altitudes while maintaining radio silence. The Skyhawks relied heavily on numbers to overwhelm their enemy because they were armed with “iron” bombs.
Two Super Etendards armed with Exocet missiles flew their first mission on 2 May, attempting to attack targets reported to the south of Puerto Argentino. However, problems were encountered in the air-to-air refueling, and the mission was cancelled. Naval air had its first success on 4 May. A Neptune detected a target which was identified by her electronic emissions as a Type 42 destroyer at 52°48' South, 57°40' West. The target was about 100 miles south of Puerto Argentino and approximately 380 miles to the east of Rio Grande Naval Air Base. Two Super Etendards armed with Exocet missiles took off at 0945. Fifteen minutes later, they refueled in flight from Air Force KC-130 tankers while 250 miles from the target.
The two planes approached the target at high speed while flying very low. Weather deteriorated as the planes flew into rain and fog. Visibility was reduced to 300 feet and the ceiling to 500 feet. At 1030, the Super Etendards received a target update from the Neptune. Two medium sized ships and one large one were 155 miles away. The closest target was no longer emitting, so the Neptune periodically switched on its radar. At 1104, the pilots fired their Exocets from a range between 20 and 30 nautical miles. One slammed into the side of the Type 42 destroyer Sheffield; the Argentines did not learn the fate of the second missile. After achieving the hit, the two planes streaked away at full speed. Neither during nor after the attack did they encounter any electronic interference; they had achieved complete surprise. The aircraft landed back at their base at 1210, two hours and 20 minutes from the time the targets had been spotted. The Neptune, relieved by a sister, maintained contact with the enemy off and on throughout the day. The Argentines monitored the British plain-language transmissions to their combat air patrol, thus keeping the Neptunes out of harm’s way. British radio transmissions were also what told the Argentines that they had achieved a hit, because there was a great deal of disruption and confusion on the radio circuits after the missile struck home. It was not until they heard British press reports, though, that the Argentines knew the identity of the ship which the Exocet had hit.
Why weren’t high-performance aircraft such as the Super Etendards and the Skyhawks stationed at Puerto Argentino rather than hundreds of miles farther away on the mainland? There are two principal answers. The existing 1,200-meter runway was too short, and it was almost always too wet. A Super Etendard carrying a dummy missile load landed on the island in April. It could have operated from there only by ignoring almost all safety standards, and even then the runway would have had to be dry, which it seldom was. An A-4 pilot also studied the possibility of using the runway for the Third Attack Squadron and came to the same conclusion. In case of emergency, an A-4 could land there, but even that was dangerous.
The Argentines studied the possibility of lengthening the airstrip. A number of factors made this impractical. The existing runway was being heavily used, it was nearly always wet, and time was inadequate. Aluminum decking was used to improve the parking area so that the aircraft would not become bogged down because of the wet climate. To compensate for the shortage of air power, naval Macchis and other light attack planes were stationed at Puerto Argentino. Auxiliary air strips were developed at Darwin and Borbon. The one at Darwin was too short to operate any naval aircraft, and only naval trainers and Air Force Pucaras could eventually operate from Borbon.
Throughout the conflict, Argentine Air Force and naval logistics aircraft supplied Puerto Argentino by air. The First Naval Logistics Squadron was made up of three L-188 Electra turboprops and the Second Naval Logistics Squadron of three F-28 Fokker jets. From 2 to 31 April, these aircraft flew 1,500 persons and 500 tons of supplies to the Malvinas. From 1 May until 14 June, they transported 304 persons and 70 tons. During this latter period, approximately 35 flights successfully ran the air blockade. Most of these flights were made by Fokkers. The last Argentina aircraft to land at Puerto Argentino on 14 June was a naval Electra in full sight of the British troops.
Argentine Submarine Operations
Argentina-began the conflict with two modem Type 209 diesel submarines, the Salta and the San Luis; they had been built in sections in Germany and assembled in Argentina. The work accomplished in Argentina was much more complex than most people realize, with the result that the Argentines learned much in the technology transfer. A Type 209 is capable of 20 knots and could remain on station for about 30 days, or until her torpedoes were exhausted. Small, quiet boats, they were well suited to the relatively shallow water around the Malvinas. The Type 209s were assigned “free-fire zones” to the north of the islands. Any ship entering these waters could be presumed hostile. The Salta experienced problems early on, possibly noise-related, and had to return to port. The San Luis assumed station during mid-April. On 1 May (some sources indicate 5 May), the San Luis attacked a target steaming northeast of Puerto Argentino. She probably snorkeled in the tidal waters off the island, making her detection very difficult. The submarine fired torpedoes at a range of 1,400 yards, but no hits ensued. The submarine was then attacked repeatedly by three frigates supported by helicopters. After 20 hours, the San Luis was able to break off contact.
The Argentines also had two former U. S. Navy Guppy-type submarines, the Santa Fe and the Santiago del Estero (ex-USS Chivo [SS-341]). The former had been used to carry frogmen during the recapture of the Malvinas and then, as mentioned previously, was lost to the British while supplying the Georgias. When the fighting began, the Santiago del Estero was at Mar del Plata, the Argentine submarine base, in a state of disrepair. She could not submerge, so she sailed on the surface to the Bahia Blanca complex where she was camouflaged. The Argentines knew that the British were receiving U. S. aerial and satellite photography, but the Argentines did not know which areas were being photographed or the timeliness of the intelligence. Thus, they hoped to hide the submarine in order to keep the British guessing.
Argentine mining operations remain secret. It is known that the Argentines laid mines around Puerto Argentino.
Operations in Early and Mid-May
On 5 May, the day after the success against HMS Sheffield, a Tracker had a submarine contact in the Golfo de San Jorge at 44°01' South, 64° West. The plane dropped depth charges and antisubmarine torpedoes. A second possible contact was made in the northern part of the gulf. It too was attacked by Trackers and Sea Kings. Neither attack was successful.
On 9 May, the Argentine commercial trawler Narval was attacked and sunk with one man killed and two wounded. The survivors were rescued by a British helicopter. The following day, the Malvinas command lost radio contact with the transport Isla de los Estados. She may have been laying mines. The tug Forrest started to search for her, and the following day she found British commando boats near the San Carlos Strait. On this same date, the Rio Carcana was attacked by Harriers and abandoned. She had already been offloaded, and there were no casualties. On 13 May, the Forrest found the remains of the Isla de los Estados and continued the search for survivors. Eventually, only two were found.
The second and last reported submarine attack was made on 10 May. The San Luis attacked two surface ships north of San Carlos Strait at about 5,000 yards. The Argentines believe that a torpedo hit one ship but did not explode. No counterattack was made.
During the night of 14-15 May, British commandos attacked the auxiliary airfield on Borbon Island. They destroyed a number of aircraft on the ground, including several Air Force planes and four Navy T-34C trainers. Following the attack, two naval Sea King helicopters flew from Rio Grande to evacuate Argentine naval pilots now without planes. The flight was carried out past the point of no return for their normal fuel capacity—a one-way distance of more than 330 nautical miles. Outbound, the Sea Kings were loaded down with 55-gallon drums of aviation gasoline. Once at Borbon, this fuel had to be pumped into the helicopters by hand so they could make the return trip. During this same mission, the Sea Kings carried munitions to various outposts on the northern part of Soledad Island.
Naval air received a more serious setback later that same day. Because their radars and electronic countermeasures systems were inoperative, the two P-2 Neptunes which had been performing the only long-range aerial reconnaissance were grounded and took no further part in the war. Contrary to published reports, the Argentines— to the best of the author’s knowledge—received no satellite intelligence data from the Soviet Union and, in fact, no intelligence support of any kind from the Soviets. In like fashion, there were many rumors about Argentina receiving arms and other material aid from outside the Western Hemisphere, but to the best of my knowledge, all such reports are false.
From 15 May until the close of the conflict, the Argentine Navy had to rely on the Air Force radar at Puerto Argentino and on the S-2 Trackers, which had shorter legs than the Neptunes. The Air Force operated a Westing- house three-dimensional radar at Puerto Argentino. It enabled the Argentines to calculate the vertical and semivertical takeoff positions of the Harriers from the British carriers. The information allowed them to approximate the positions of the carriers. The carriers would operate from 90 to 120 miles to the east of the islands for a number of days in a given area. They would advance at 0830, and from 1200 until 1500 they would remain in a very limited ellipsoid approximately 12 miles by 8 while conducting their air operations. The fleet would then retire at 1700. The pattern of the British fleet was mathematical and repetitious. With long-range reconnaissance no longer available, the problem became one of catching a mathematician. The Super Etendard attacks after 15 May were based on such calculations.
On 16 May, Harriers attacked and sank the Rio Carcana at Port Rey, which had been abandoned on the 11th. The transport Bahia Buen Suceso was damaged by Harriers at Zorro Bay, also on the 16th. Moored to a light pier, she broke loose in a storm and was driven, powerless, on a rocky bottom where she was later found by the British. On 17 May, Puerto Argentino reported British ships to be southeast of town. Two Super Etendards took off, refueled in the air from Air Force C-130s, and tried to locate their targets. They could not find the enemy and returned to Rio Grande without launching any missiles. The shortage of tactical intelligence proved to be the Navy’s greatest handicap during the war.
Another substantial handicap was that of logistics involving the air-to-surface Exocets. Following each mission, such as the one just described, missiles which had not been fired needed to be serviced. To use an analogy, the missiles were like batteries. As they went out attached to the aircraft, their charges of programmed information ran down. Before they could be used again, they had to be essentially reprogrammed and recharged. But this could not be accomplished at Rio Grande where the Super Etendards were based, because the necessary equipment was too delicate to be moved there from Espora in the short period of time available. So it became a case of transporting each unused missile 400-500 miles north to be serviced and then returned again to the air base. This transportation was accomplished by Argentine cargo planes, probably a combination of Navy Electras and Air Force C-130s.
Skyhawks Against San Carlos
Early on 21 May, an Argentine Army outpost reported numerous British ships in San Carlos Strait. This information was confirmed at 1004 when a Macchi flew an armed reconnaissance from the airfield at Puerto Argentino. The plane attacked with 127-millimeter rockets and 30-millimeter cannons. The pilot believed he damaged a destroyer, possibly a Type 42, in the access to Puerto San Carlos. She might have been the Leander-dass frigate Argonaut. After the reconnaissance mission, air strikes were called in from the mainland.
The Third Attack Squadron was ordered in. The first attack was made by three A-4Qs, followed by three more 15 minutes later. Each plane was armed with four 500- pound bombs. The pilots did not know the exact position of the enemy units, nor did they know that a landing was taking place. Each plane successively attacked the same Type 21 frigate, later learned to be the Ardent (see the below account by one of the Argentine pilots). The bombs from the first two Skyhawks hit near the stem of the ship; the bombs from the last plane, of course, could not be observed. As the planes were pulling out, one of the pilots shouted; “Harrier, Harrier!” The third plane was hit, possibly by small arms fire. Escaping at low altitude, the pilot made his way to Puerto Argentino where he bailed out after determining that his plane could not make it back to the mainland or land on the islands. He was fished out of the water by an Army helicopter which submerged its landing skids to enable the pilot to climb on. The first A-4Q may have been hit by a Sidewinder; the pilot lost control and ejected. Both of these pilots were rescued by Argentine forces. The second Sky hawk was lost without a trace.
A second group of A-4Qs attacked at 1530. They had been monitoring the fate of their comrades. They approached undetected and attacked another Type 21. Bombs from the first aircraft straddled the target. Those of the second landed very near the ship’s hull; the bombs from the third were not observed. The ship attacked was not identified. All three aircraft returned safely. During the 21st, large numbers of Argentine Air Force planes, which included A-4C Skyhawks, also attacked the British position.
Numerous publications have likened the Argentine attack pilots to the Japanese kamikazes of World War II. One need only to read the account at the bottom of this page to realize that the Argentines were aggressive but not foolhardy. In fact, prudent tactics dictated a low-level approach to get under British radars and Sea Dart surface- to-air missiles. The Argentines have two Type 42 destroyers equipped with Sea Dart, and their pilots had practiced against them. One of the things they had learned was that the Sea Dart’s radar has a problem in picking up low- flying targets, so they were convinced that such an approach was the most effective. Some British observers have since claimed that the low-level tactics may have contributed to the failure of a number of Argentine bombs to explode after hitting their targets. They claim that the bombs did not fall sufficiently far for their arming mechanisms to work. The author believes the Navy’s bombs, which had snake-eye tails to slow their flight, probably had a higher explosion rate than the Air Force’s. Even so, this is speculation, and the author has no reliable explanation on such bomb failures.
The weather on 22 May was too poor for air operations. However, the Argentines believed that a British force was positioning itself for an attack against the airfields in Tierra del Fuego at the tip of the mainland. The destroyer Segui was positioned off the Southern coast to act as a radar picket and other ships were positioned along the sea frontier; however, nothing happened. In the islands, the Rio Iguazu was attacked by two Harriers in Choiseul Bay. The Coast Guard craft had just delivered an artillery piece. The Argentines believe that one of the Harriers was downed by a 12.7-millimeter machine gun. One Argentine crew member was killed. While evading the stafing aircraft, the patrol boat ran aground on a rock and was lost. Her sister, the Islas Malvinas, was later captured at Puerto Argentino by the British; she had damaged propellers.
On the 23rd, with improved weather, the A-4Qs renewed their attack on the British position at San Carlos. Three of the eight aircraft had been lost up to that point. Unlike the attack of the 21st, the Skyhawks refueled from an Air Force C-130 on their way to the islands. Once again, the attack was made at low level. The antiair defense was strong as the ships and land-based antiaircraft positions created a crossfire. At 1405, one plane .attacked a “County”-class cruiser; another attacked a Type 21 frigate, which proved to be the Antelope; and the third failed to release its bombs. The leading aircraft was extremely short on fuel because of transfer problems but made it back safely. The second plane returned without incident. The third A-4Q successfully dumped its bomb load and then crashed upon landing. The bombs did not release during the attack. The pilot was killed while attempting to eject. The plane itself, although damaged, has since been repaired and returned to service.
While the war was raging, the United States embargoed military-related items from going to Argentina. This included the ejection canisters from the Navy’s A-4s that had been sent back to the States to be rebuilt. Some Navy A-4Qs were flying with expired canisters, and others had canisters borrowed from the Air Force. Whether this was a contributing factor to the loss of the pilot mentioned above is unclear; some Argentine pilots believe that it was.
These air attacks, and those made by the Air Force, were unsuccessful in dislodging the British. The Argentine ground forces on the islands did not have helicopter mobility, nor could any advance by the ground forces be given air protection. Therefore, a ground assault had to be ruled out. At 1630, two Harriers attacked the emergency airfield on Borbon. Although the British special forces had destroyed ten aircraft, the field was still operational and in Argentine hands. The Harriers caused little damage.
Despite the successes the British achieved through the use of the vertical takeoff and landing Harriers in a number of roles, the Argentine Navy never attempted air-to-air combat. By the time the Argentine planes had flown with the necessary fuel and added tanks all the way to the Malvinas, there was no way they could face the British aircraft on an equal footing; they were simply too overloaded. Even with drop tanks, the Skyhawks were at their extreme range when flying to the islands from the mainland, which didn’t leave any fuel for air combat maneuvering. In addition, the best air-to-air missile available to the Argentines was a Sidewinder B, which was much inferior to the Sidewinder L, particularly when used with the British Bluefox radar. For all these reasons, the Argentines made the conscious decision that their best chance for success lay in going after British ships and ground troops rather than Harriers.
The Super Etendards Return
On 25 May, the radar at Puerto Argentino again fixed the general location of the British fleet. It was approximately 100 nautical miles to the northeast of the port. The enemy was about 500 miles from the Argentine naval air base at Rio Grande. The refueling aircraft was positioned 160 miles to the east of Puerto Deseado. By refueling in this location, the Super Etendards would fly more than 100 miles north of the Malvinas and thus avoid possible detection by British warships close to the islands. The aircraft refueled without incident and began their 270-mile Final leg. At 1632, the two planes launched their missiles, and they both hit the containership Atlantic Conveyor in position 50°38' South, 56°08' West. Flying but 50 feet above the water, the aircraft raced toward Puerto Deseado. The faithful Air Force KC-130s had remained circling at the refueling site and awaiting the return of the naval aircraft. After refueling a second time, the Super Etendards returned to Rio Grande. The entire flight took almost four hours.
To the best of their knowledge, the Argentine pilots say that their Super Etendards were never detected while in the process of making an attack. They received no indication through cockpit warning devices, from monitoring British radio circuits, or by what would have been the most convincing sign of all—attempts on the part of Harriers to intercept them.
On none of their attacks did the pilots of the Super Etendards see their targets visually. They had to rely completely on the images on their radar scopes. In the absence of visual targeting information from reconnaissance aircraft, the pilots thus had to aim their missiles at the biggest targets and hope for the best. As a result, they couldn’t discriminate between the Atlantic Conveyor, a merchant ship carrying aircraft, and the bona fide aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible. Even when aerial reconnaissance was available, as in the case of the attack on the Sheffield, it was difficult to establish precisely the class of ship being fired at.
The fifth and last Super Etendard attack took place on 30 May. Puerto Argentino reported a general location of British units to the southeast at about 100 nautical miles. The Argentines planned an attack sweeping in from the south in a counterclockwise motion. Capitan de Fragata (Commander) Jorge Colombo, commanding officer of the squadron, explained: “In this opportunity to attack, we decided to go with the air-to-air refueling a little farther to the east in order to be able to attack flying from the east to the west, because all of the other attacks were from the west. We knew that the British always concentrated their defenses on the side toward the islands. They did not believe we could attack from the direction of South Africa.” This sweeping approach, of course, was intended to have a radius outside the range of the British shipboard radars. In order to reach the target, which was more than 500 miles from the Rio Grande base, a double refueling was necessary on the way. Two Super Etendards, one armed with the last air-to-surface Exocet, were accompanied by four Air Force A-4Cs. The second Super Etendard was insurance in case the missile-carrying plane experienced electrical problems. As they had planned, the Argentines took the enemy by surprise. After the Exocet was launched, the A-4Cs followed the missile contrails. They observed a ship shrouded in black smoke at approximately 52°44' South, 55°45' West. They believed her to be the Invincible, but the identity of their target remains a mystery.
Following the firing of the last air-to-surface Exocet, the Super Etendards began training in bombing tactics; however, the conflict ended before they could be used in this role.
Land-Based Exocets
The Exocet missiles, which the Argentines had purchased from the French in limited quantities, came in two basic versions—air to surface and surface to surface. It was not possible to convert one type to the other. Shortly after the first British ship bombarded Puerto Argentino on 1 May, the Argentines started to evaluate the possibility of installing some of their surface-to-surface Exocets in the islands to try to discourage the British from approaching. Taking an entire shipboard system ashore would have taken 45 days, which was far too long. Instead, an officer and two civilian technicians managed to come up with a makeshift system in only ten days by putting together various components. Two old trailers were used, one for the generator and supporting hardware and the other for construction of two missile ramps. Success in operating the primitive system depended on turning keys in the proper sequence, using a stopwatch, and having some luck.
After the installation was airlifted by C-130 to the Malvinas in late May, its operating location was dictated by the weight of the trailers, which could be used only on paved roads. The only paved road on the island was a short stretch between the airport and the town of Puerto Argentino. At about 1800 each night, the system was dragged out, and by 2030 all was in readiness. Nights went by without a target; at about 0400 each morning, the system had to be hidden away to avoid aerial detection. When the first missiles were fired, they were ineffective but also undetected by the British. During the night of 11-12 June, the Argentine naval personnel manning the makeshift battery succeeded. Their patience was finally rewarded when they hit the “County’’-class cruiser Glamorgan from a range of 30 kilometers while she was returning from a bombardment of Puerto Argentino. The Argentines saw an orange glow coming from the ship prior to observing the impact of Exocet. The cruiser had fired a Sea Cat missile, which missed the incoming Exocet. Three Exocets were captured by British ground troops before they could be fired in the campaign. Amazingly, the Exocet battery, despite operating under very difficult circumstances, had achieved one hit during the campaign.
The Campaign Ashore
When the British staged their amphibious landings in San Carlos Strait on 21 May, they surprised the Argentines who were prepared to defend against an invasion on the eastern side of the Malvinas, in the area around Puerto Argentino. One result of landing between the islands was that the British Were able to gain for themselves a day or two of unopposed landing time. Of course, the air attacks against the landing force started on the day of the invasion and continued thereafter, but it did take some time for the Argentine ground forces to be able to engage the assault force ashore. It took even longer for the Argentine Marine force in the islands to be engaged, because their assignment was in the defense of the Puerto Argentino area. Because the British wound up advancing from west to cast, the Marines were not immediately involved in ground combat. But they had already come under attack several weeks earlier.
The Fifth Marine Battalion had been on the island since early April, and its assignment in the overall defensive Perimeter had come from the Army commander. Including 'ts reserves, the Marine battalion was about 1,000 men strong, representing about one-tenth of the combat troops on the Malvinas. Typically, an Argentine Marine Corps battalion is made up of 70% conscripts, 25% noncommissioned officers, and 5% commissioned officers. Each healthy male citizen is obligated to serve one year in the military. Practically all of the enlisted personnel of the Army and Marine Corps are conscripts. Typically, one- twelfth of a Marine Corps battalion consists of raw recruits just out of boot camp, and one twelfth has two months’ experience, and so on. Marine Corps officers and NCOs are all volunteers and thus career soldiers. In addition to their small arms, the Marines had 106-millimeter, 81- millimeter, and 60-millimeter mortars; anti-tank cannons; and missiles. The Fifth Battalion had, upon arrival, established positions on Mount Tumbledown, Mount William, and Sapper Hill to the west and south of Puerto Argentino.
The Marines faced a number of difficulties in waging their part of the defense of the islands—the weather and terrain, lack of tactical mobility, and inability to prevent attacks from British naval units offshore. After the campaign was concluded, Rear Admiral Eduardo Otero, Commander Naval Forces Malvinas, explained:
“The climate was terrible. . . . Freezing temperatures were very common, and we had particular problems where the people lived in defensive positions. It was difficult to live in those places, because the water spilled over from the moss, and the rain was accompanied by surface water so that the people’s legs were often in water day and night. . . . The land is very bad. It is a land where halftracks or ordinary trucks, although having special wheels, sink. This happened to us with excavators, power machines, tractors, trying to make the defensive posts for ammunition dumps. At times the machines were buried completely and could not be moved.”
As a result, ground transportation was at times impossible. Much of the terrain was like a sponge, and when it rained a man could sink up to his knees in what appeared to be solid ground. The problem was compounded because the Argentine Marines did not have troop-carrying helicopters available; the Royal Marines did and used them to good advantage. Capitan de Fragata Carlos Robacio, commander of the Fifth Marine Battalion, told the author:
“We presented an immobile defense, totally immobile to an enemy who distributed himself freely. Moreover, if my battalion had attacked, I know that we would have surprised the English, because the principal reality of the Fifth Battalion was its capacity to attack. It was what we knew how to do best but what we could not do.”
Beginning on 1 May, the Marines were bombarded from air and sea for 40 days. Two Harriers seemed to keep a vigil over the Marine position. Capitan Robacio recalled:
“Naval artillery had tremendous precision. Some may say otherwise, but I can assure you of this truth, because I was the first to have casualties on the 1st of May—one dead and seven injured. They fire at an impressive speed. You, as the enemy, must be well hidden—about 10 meters underground—to escape injury. We were hidden well enough, but if we so much as lifted our heads, we would be decapitated.”
Following six weeks of this sort of bombardment and the steady eastward advance of the British ground forces, the British closed in on the defenders of Puerto Argentino. Approximately 8,000 Argentine combat troops held the perimeters. On 11 June, the British made an amphibious landing at North Basin, an area which the Argentines had neglected to occupy. As the British advanced from the beachhead, Argentine forces advanced along two footpaths on either side of the mountain in an attempt to block their progress. The attempt was futile; they were constantly being outflanked by British mobility. On 12 June, Argentine Air Force A-4s attacked the British beachhead. They made their attack through a cloud cover and, much to their surprise, encountered little antiaircraft fire. They badly damaged the landing ships Sir Tristam and Sir Gala- had. Nonetheless, the British pressed on with their land attack.
A day earlier, on the 11th, the British had attacked the defensive perimeter of Puerto Argentino from the west. This section was held by 3,000 Argentines, including the Fifth Marine Battalion. British air superiority, sea bombardment, and the lack of mobility prevented the Argentines from bringing up reinforcements. The attack began at 2300, and after an intense artillery duel, the British controlled most of the high ground around Puerto Argentino; this had been the last barrier to prevent recapture of the port city. On the 12th, the British consolidated their position. At 1700 on the 13th, a British attack was repelled. A second attack began at 2200 and gained some ground but did not dislodge the Argentine Marines. The Marines then started to prepare a counterattack, but they had run out of the means to fight. All of their mortars were without ammunition, and their anti-tank guns had been destroyed. Now, when small arms ammunition ran short as well, the Marines were ordered to fall back. At 1230 on 14 June, the Fifth Battalion and supporting Army units were ordered to cease fire and retire to the center of the town. The Marines destroyed all equipment that they could not carry with them. They had been on the front lines for 66 days, but now all fighting ended.
To provide for the welfare of the island defenders, Argentina converted two of its most valuable auxiliaries into hospital ships, the icebreaker Almirante Irizar and the supply ship Bahia Paraiso. The ships were well suited to this role. They were new, and each had an operating room. The Bahia Paraiso was converted just in time to take part in the rescue of the survivors from the General Belgrano. The two hosptial ships plied between the mainland and the Malvinas, evacuating the wounded. They had to go in harm’s way to Bahia Fox, Howard, Borbon, and Puerto Argentino.
Summing Up
The Argentine Navy did not operate in a vacuum during the conflict against the British. It did not take nor defend the Malvinas Islands by itself. However, it would be accurate to say that the Navy was primarily responsible for the capture of the islands and played an important role in the air, sea, and land war which followed. The Navy did sustain the heaviest losses of any of the services, most of them resulting from the sinking of the General Belgrano. Overall, approximately 375 naval personnel died, 260 in the Army, and 55 in the Air Force.
Victory has no substitute, and the Argentines lost. The Navy’s greatest disappointment was its inability to hold the recaptured islands—regardless of the size and capability of the opposing forces. Also, the Navy was unable to cope with the British nuclear submarine. All the years of UNITAS exercise in conjunction with the U. S. Navy and those of Latin American nations had been for nought. The inability of the two Type 209 submarines to score a success was disappointing. The fleet lost one cruiser, one submarine, and a few small auxiliaries. In addition, a few units were damaged; all have since been repaired. Of the fleet losses, it is the cruiser which will be missed. The General Belgrano provided a unique dimension with firepower that might have proved useful for support. The submarine, however, was old and less capable than the Type 209s.
Tactical errors were made. Positive control of tactical air operations was never achieved. Also, more than half of the naval aircraft lost were destroyed on the ground by British forces. Aircraft losses were moderate. Naval aviation lost three A-4Q Skyhawks, five MC-33 Macchis (three on the ground at Puerto Argentino), four T-34s on the ground at Borbon, two Skyvans on the ground, one Puma, and an Alouette lost with the General Belgrano. Only four Navy pilots were lost.
The successes are also important. The Navy remained intact in spite of confronting the third most powerful fleet in the world; this preserved the regional balance of power. Naval personnel who manned the “island hoppers” which provided logistical support in the Malvinas and those who devised and operated the land-based Exocets contributed significantly to the defense of the islands.
The Marine Corps performed admirably. The Second Marine Battalion captured the islands in a classic amphibious landing. Admittedly, it was opposed by only a handful of men. In spite of receiving and returning fire at the landing beach, at Government House, and on the outskirts of what was then Port Stanley, the Marines inflicted no casualties on the British—in keeping with their orders to avoid casualties if possible. The Fifth Marine Battalion and the Marine Antiaircraft Battalion fought very stubbornly in defense of the islands. As mentioned above, they did lack mobility. Prior to the war, the Navy acknowledged that the Marine Corps needed the kind of air mobility that only helicopters could provide. The recent war should increase the priority of their acquisition.
In recounting the successes of the campaign, the Navy must be pleased with the performance of its air arm. The Super Etendard pilots had fewer than 100 flight hours in the aircraft prior to the conflict. Five Exocet air-launched missiles were in Argentina, but none was operational. The Argentines not only got the missiles ready to fire but also devised the necessary tactics during gruelling hours of practice after the capture of the islands. The aging Sky- hawk squadron, initially composed of eight aircraft, sank the Type 21 frigate Ardent and possibly the Antelope. They also attacked other British ships and believe they damaged some. Naval support aircraft—Fokkers and Electras—completed 75% of their supply runs to the islands and operated up to the last day of the war. Naval reconnaissance aircraft, including the Trackers and Nep- tunes, were capable of locating British units and maintaining contact. None of these planes was lost.
What were the military lessons for Argentina? Only premeditated wars can be planned around this or that piece of military hardware. Why didn’t Argentina wait six months for more Super Etendards? Why didn’t they wait a year until the plan to pay off much of the Royal Navy had been carried out? The answers are simple. This war was caused by an unanticipated series of events heaped upon years of frustration. Until war did begin, few believed that the dispute would result in hostilities. The most important military lesson is not a new one but is one that bears repeating—few wars can be scheduled; most must be fought with what is already on hand or immediately available.
A long-term lesson is that the Argentine Navy must learn to deal with the nuclear submarine. A few attack submarines were able to neutralize the Argentine surface fleet. Argentine newspapers have reported that the Nuclear Commission is studying the possibility of an indigenous nuclear submarine. In the author’s opinion, such a development would squander national resources. A better alternative might be the development of an indigenous SOSUS barrier- The continental shelf off Argentina is very wide and would lend itself to such a defensive system. During the war against Britain, the Argentine Navy exhibited great ingenuity, particularly when it came to modifying electronic equipment to meet its immediate needs. These skills might be able to develop a SOSUS barrier. Such a system would have to be backed up by P-3 type patrol aircraft and antisubmarine helicopters. The aircraft without SOSUS, though, would force the Argentines to look for a needle in a haystack. The entire proposed system—aircraft, SOSUS, and all—would probably cost Argentina less than one nuclear submarine.
What does the future hold? The Argentines will exert as much political, economic, and military pressure as possible upon the British-held islands. Argentina will continue the embargo of all commerce with the islands. Prior to the war, all petroleum and many other imports had come from Argentina. Politically, Argentina will continue to influence other Latin American countries not to allow their territory to be used for transshipment to the islands. Prior to the war, Montevideo, Uruguay, had been an important terminal for the islands’ production of wool and mutton. Uruguay and Brazil are now closed for traffic to and from the Malvinas. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s recent gruelling trip to the islands should underscore the success of the Argentine effort in making transportation difficult. Militarily, the Argentines will develop a threatening force. For the Navy, this can best be achieved by the completion of its new submarine fleet. By the late 1980s, the two Type 209s will have been supplemented by six new boats.
The Argentines and the author continue to believe that the Malvinas are theirs, even though their diplomatic and military efforts have so far failed. The British have held the islands for 150 years, and in that time the Argentines have not been able to conclude successful negotiations concerning the sovereignty of the islands. But the war has achieved one goal. The world now knows the seriousness of the issue. Admiral Ruben Franco, Commander in Chief of the Argentine Navy, puts it thus: “The objective established, to recover the Malvinas, Georgias, and South Sandwich Islands, remains intact; our desire to win has not been crushed. We will never give up our seized southern territory.” And Marine officer Robacio offers his outlook for the future: “I think that the Malvinas will be tranquil for a brief period, but we will be back. Maybe it will be my son or grandson, but we will be back.”
The Odyssey of a Skyhawk Pilot
By Capitan de Corbeta Alberto Jorge Philippi, Argentine Navy
The Third Naval Attack Squadron embarked in April in the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, but did not participate in operations against the British fleet because the weather was unfavorable. Before the sinking of the General Belgrano, the aircraft carrier was ordered to return and the A-4Q airplanes were dispatched to the Rio Grande Naval Air Base in Tierra del Fuego.
The first combat action took place on 21 May when we deployed three airplanes. The targets were the ships that were supporting the San Carlos landing. We knew that the attack would be carried out without escort and without the existence of air superiority. We found ourselves in a disadvantage; it was impossible to combat against the Harriers. Not because they were tremendously superior to our A-4s, but because we carried a heavy cargo of bombs and fuel on a clear mission.
We were flying at 27,000 feet in radio silence in order to avoid detection. One hundred miles before arriving at the coast of Gran Malvina, I ordered a descent to 100 feet over the island. There we turned to the right following the coast to Cape Belgrano. It was raining with very low clouds. Cape Belgrano was as a finger indicating to us the course. All was dark and obscured. There we followed course 069° until the south entrance of the San Carlos Strait, where we accelerated to 450 knots, flying at no more than 50 feet. The alarm of my radar altimeter was set at 30 feet and sounded frequently during the flight. We arrived at the west coast of Isla Soledad and we changed course to 025° toward San Carlos. Passing over Puerto Rey we saw the ship Rio Carcana, grounded following combat; we continued to the north.
Before arriving at Bahia Ruiz Puente, I saw at 11 o’clock among the rocks the masts of a frigate that seemed to have detected us and appeared to be leaving rapidly from the coast toward the center of the channel with a course of approximately 240°. I signaled the target to my companions, they had already seen it, and bordered us to open attack. I veered toward the right in order to take cover in the [radar] echo of the coast and in order to attempt to blend in with the dark rocks. When the angle of fire was adequate, I turned to slope toward the frigate [HMS Ardent] with the point of my left wing almost scraping the waves, and when I finished the turn, I was already in position to fire, crossing from the port quarter to the starboard bow. Before I carried out the attack, I saw the bow gun, the cannons on the ship’s sides, and the Sea Cat missile fire. [The Sea Cat was] visible and elusive (it was my luck that they did not have Sea Wolf).
At 1,000-1,500 meters from the target, I ascended to 300 feet and I concentrated to arrange the crosshairs of my sight on the stem, without thinking of anything else; it was aligned. When the center of the crosshairs was superimposed on the target, I pressed the button that launched the bombs. I increased speed and commenced a violent turn to escape to the right, descending in order to once again fly just above the waves, later turning to the left. Meanwhile, I listened to the voice of my fellow pilot Jose Cesar Area shouting, “Very good, sir.” I looked over my left shoulder and saw the frigate with much smoke in the stem and a splash 20 meters from its starboard bow. I could no longer be preoccupied with the ship and ordered, “We will escape by the same route,” to my companions, therefore indicating to them that we would use the same route to return to insure the absence of the enemy. Then I listened to the voice of Marcello Gustano Marquez saying, “Another in the stem,” referring to the bombs of Area. We do not know the effects of Marquez’s bombs. Later I learned that Area entered a plume of debris and smoke caused by my bomb; for that reason he was not able to maintain 20 seconds between aircraft as was stipulated.
Already there was considerable risk. In a couple of minutes an attack arrived, and a shout by Marquez stopped my heart, “Harrier, Harrier.” Immediately I ordered external cargoes ejected and to escape with the hope of reaching refuge in the clouds that were in front of us. But I felt an explosion in my tail and the nose of the airplane elevated uncontrollably; I needed the support of both hands on the stick that was unresponsive. I looked to the right and saw a Sea Harrier at 150 meters coming in for the kill. I communicated and said, “I am going to eject; I am well.” I reduced speed, opened the speed brakes, placed my left hand on the lower ejection handle and fired it. I felt a forceful explosion when the canopy was ejected, and immediately there was a forceful pain in the nape of my neck. My final thought before passing out was, “I am falling like a rock.” When I recovered consciousness I was hanging from my parachute, in a cloud, with drops of rain moistening my face, and I had lost the helmet and the mask. Just below, I saw the Rio Carcana and a large splash in its vicinity. Perhaps it was my plane or that of Marquez.
I gave thanks to God that I was still alive and meditated to resolve the emergency. I inflated the life vest, unfastened the left fitting of the harness, and removed my boots, so that they would not inflate when I hit the water. I landed 100 meters from the coast and unfastened the parachute. I cut with my knife some of the lines that had imprisoned me, and I swam arm over arm to the coast. I arrived so tired that I was not able to walk. I tried to rest. Meanwhile, I had launched in the air the emergency radio signal. I looked at my watch; it was 1530 a little more than one hour until the sun set. 1 took stock of that which remained of my equipment and with the knife I carved a foxhole in the ground to protect me from the wind. When I finished, it was already night and I managed to sleep. Each hour I got up to walk and to dig a deep pit in order to build a fire.
At 0200 in the morning, the sky lit up as if it were day due to the light from English starshell, and a frigate began to bombard the poor Rio Carcana. Certainly they must have heard my emergency signal and believed there was someone on board. As the over shots passed very close to my site and before the possibility that troops would disembark, I commenced a strategic retreat that did not stop until I was a number of kilometers from there.
1 continued to walk to the south, where according to a map that I had tried to memorize, there were sheep ranches. Sunday, the 23rd, I captured a lamb that I slaughtered, cleaned, and roasted over a slow fire that 1 lit with a bengal branch because the matches that I had were wet. I ate a shoulder and a leg; the next day I ate the other shoulder; I saved the other leg in the jacket and I continued my trek south. Then at midday I found myself reclined against a post, resting and eating, when I observed vehicle movements in a ravine some 3000 meters distance. I made a signal with my mirror and a tractor and a land rover approached me. From a distance a person got out walking and after he learned “no weapons” he approached and presented himself as Tony Blaile, manager of a ranch, and he offered me his help. He presented me to his companions who offered me their lunches when they learned that for three days I had been walking across country. I was lucky because this was an uninhabited area, they come each six weeks in order to work one day with the herd.
Tony took me to his house and presented me to his wife and two children. He prepared for me a hot bath and gave me some of his clean clothes. I rested until dinner time; a very pleasant family, we did not speak at all of the war, but of our hobbies—hunting, fishing, and radio. We had much to chat about, the time was made very short for us. The following day he informed Puerto Argentino of my position by the emergency radio band. Later he took me to the little town of North Arm that had 17 houses.
At midday an Air Force helicopter came to look for me; that carried me to Darwin, where my problems started over. Along with the refugees, I watched the attacks of the Harriers every 15 or 20 minutes and observed the English troops that were taking the Alberdi and Rivadavia heights preparing for the assault. I left Darwin in the last helicopter that flew to Puerto Argentino the following day. There I encountered much optimism in the defenders. Two days later, a C-130 removed me from there, flying 500 miles at night at 50 feet altitude.
I wish to put emphasis in the fact that at all times 1 felt the presence of God near me, removing obstacles from the path. At all times, before and after each mission two verses of the Bible were permanently in my thoughts and helped me in everything: “Not one leaf shall fall from a tree if it is not the will of God.” And the 23rd Psalm: “The Lord is my shepherd I shall not want. He maketh me to lie down in green pastures. . . .
1. Unlike officers in the U. S. Marine Corps, who follow the Army’s rank structure, Argentine Marine officers such as Admiral Busser are identified by naval ranks
2.This would translate as captain of a corvette; the equivalent U. S. naval rank would be lieutenant commander or major in the Marine Corps.