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Needed: Teamwork in Naval Aviation
Naval aviation consists of a variety of warfare specialties, each with a separate identity, absolutely and sometimes arrogantly convinced of its own self-worth, and all too frequently unwilling to accept or acknowledge the importance of another aviation community’s contribution to the performance of the carrier air wing’s mission.
In the early days of carrier aviation, air wings were composed of fighter, attack, and torpedo or scout squadrons. This air wing organization proved successful in World War II and the Korean War. Those aviators who survived were eventually promoted to high command positions. They carried with them their own perspectives as to the conduct of naval air warfare and the employment and relative worth of the aircraft that comprised the carrier air wing.
Prior to the Vietnam War, the carrier air wing began to change to face the ever-expanding mission and the increased threat to the carrier (CV). Helicopter, airborne early warning, electronic warfare, and antisubmarine warfare specialty squadrons were added to the air wing. In the 20 or so years since these assets have become integral parts of the air wing, the nature of modern warfare has continued to evolve. These additions to the air wing have become as important to the air wing’s and the CV's mission, survivability, and warfighting capability as those communities which originally made up the early air wing—in some cases, more important.
Although the importance of these late-arriving specialty squadrons is irrefutable, recognition of this state of affairs is slow in coming. In naval aviation, an institutional but unofficial prejudice exists against those aviation communities that do not drop bombs or otherwise deliver ordnance—i.e., those warfare specialty areas that were not in the original makeup of the early CV air wing. Where are the carrier airborne early warning, helicopter antisubmarine, tactical electronic warfare, and air antisubmarine squadron pilots who have become carrier air group commanders, CV commanders, and operational flag officers? To be sure, there are flag officers from each of these communities, but they are typically characterized as having held administrative or shore commands and not as having advanced through the classic aviation admiral's pipeline: squadron command, carrier air group command, deep draft command, CV command, and eventual flag rank.
There is an unspoken perception that the officers in certain aviation communities are either more qualified or more deserving than others for further command. A variety of arguments exists as to why officers of certain communities are not well suited for further command positions. Unfamiliarity with the use and effectiveness of aviation ordnance is the one most commonly heard.
There is also a pervasive notion that those who are not detailed to TacAir communities are in some way inferior to those who are. This particular fantasy begins early in an aviator's career. The prejudices are not limited to the training command.
I recall that the reaction to the first carrier air group commander appointed from among the “support” communities—an aviator with an air antisubmarine squadron background—varied from astonishment to open hostility. The man’s aviation background, however, proved ultimately to be unimportant. His tenure as a wing commander was a success because he was an effective manager and leader of men.
It is ludicrous to believe that the speed of the machine one flies or that excellence in one specialized aspect of the air wing’s mission makes one officer more qualified than another for promotion. Indeed, overspecialization can be a hindrance to a well-rounded naval career. The man who has 1,500 arrested landings could well show surprising ignorance in other areas of importance to the commander, such as antisubmarine warfare, battle group operations. Navy tactical data systems operations, or antiair warfare.
The nature of naval air warfare has changed since the USS Langley (CV-I) first sailed. The introduction of increasingly sophisticated technology has brought preeminence to those platforms that promote the “soft kill” as opposed to those responsible for the “hard kill.” This concept is particularly true in the present era; the air wing will never again be able to operate in a low- threat environment and will probably face a numerically superior and highly sophisticated foe, which, of necessity, must be fought and neutralized by means other than physical destruction. Every aircraft contributes to the success of the air wing; therefore, no aircraft community is more important than another.
The esprit de corps of naval aviation has developed over the past 50 years and is one of its great strengths. Somewhere along the way, this spirit has become misdirected. It is now time to recognize the preeminence of the communities that do not specialize in ordnance delivery. It is time to reemphasize the concept that is given considerable lip service in print but is infrequently realized in fact; teamwork. This term implies shared risk, responsibility, and reward.
It can only strengthen naval aviation as a whole to recognize, in both word and deed, the importance ot all aviation communities to the carrier air wing's mission and the aircraft carrier’s warfighting ability.
124
Proceedings / January