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Maneuver warfare, like any kind of warfare, will succeed if there is “special trust and confidence” between the platoon commander, right, and the battalion commander who determines the platoon’s ultimate mission. Even more important to the young officer is the atmosphere of trust he must establish between himself and those who must carry out the mission.
Most discussions about maneuver warfare usually concentrate on its tactical and historical aspects. Marines, in particular, should be aware, however, that the theory is much more complicated than tactical formations of “one up and two back” or the presence of deception plans. Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking that expresses itself in the leadership of commanders who practice it.
Maneuver warfare, as stated by Colonel John Boyd, U. S. Air Force (Retired), in his study Patterns of Conflict, is based on the principle that when unit commanders make a decision, they go through a cycle. The four elements of the decision cycle are observation, orientation, decision, and action. Completing this decision cycle faster than one’s opponent causes his actions to lack meaning. In other words, as the enemy reacts to a friendly unit’s first action, that same friendly unit has already started or completed its second action, presenting the enemy with an entirely new situation to which he must react. As the friendly unit commander repeats this process, the enemy believes he has lost control of the situation. The goal is to cause enough confusion in the enemy’s mind to collapse his thought process. With his decision cycle paralyzed, the enemy’s cohesion falls apart—resulting in his defeat.
One classic example of this process is the German blitzkrieg of World War II. The Germans used reconnaissance forces to find gaps in the enemy’s defense. Dismounted motorized infantry would then infiltrate and penetrate these gaps. The infantry, supported by tanks if necessary, would widen the gaps to allow additional mechanized units to pass through the enemy’s lines. The mechanized units would penetrate deep into the rear of the enemy’s defenses. These deep penetrations by multiple columns completely disrupted communication lines and caused an enormous amount of confusion in the enemy’s rear areas. The confusion, plus the speed of advance of the columns, enabled the Germans to present constantly changing situations which paralyzed the decision cycle of their opponents. The results were spectacular gains in ex-
change for light casualties.
Before the Marine Corps could hope to duplicate the successes of the German Wehrmacht of World War II, definite requirements at all levels of leadership would have to be met. The Marine Corps needs to adopt these requirements, especially two:
* Leadership in maneuver warfare must be built on trust—not mistrust. ^ The leader of the combat unit must command from the front.
These leadership requirements may seem contradictory, or at the very least commonplace and incidental, to many military leaders. The point that needs to be recognized is that they are essential for the success of maneuver Warfare, and they are techniques that m many circumstances are not practiced by marines.
The modern battlefield offers many Problems and challenges to the commanders who will fight there. One of the problems confronting leaders is the speed with which both friendly and enemy maneuver elements will execute their assigned missions. The results of this battlefield quickness are that tactical opportunities created ether by the enemy or by friendly units will be fleeting.
These tactical opportunities can be taken advantage of only if leaders at all levels seize the initiative on every occasion without awaiting orders. A leader will not seize the initiative, however, if he believes that he does not have his superior’s trust. The subordinate who perceives he is mistrusted will hesitate—he believes that he may either jeopardize or detract from his superior’s mission. The subordinate may have a doubt or fear in his mind whether the superior will support his tactical move. In this case, a subordinate leader who sees a tactical opportunity present itself will contact his superior and ask for instructions. While the subordinate requests and receives instructions, his opportunity to seize the initiative will vanish and be lost to the enemy.
A method of solving this problem is to ensure that the subordinate leader understands not only his own mission, hut also the missions of the commanders two echelons above him. For example, a platoon is acting as the advance party of a company which is the advance guard of a battalion. The battalion commander’s mission is to get from point A to point B as fast as possible. If the platoon commander understands his battalion’s mission, he will seize immediately any opportunity to expedite that mission. By understanding the battalion commander’s mission, the platoon commander can act on his own initiative, yet remain within the intent of his superior’s orders. This action will not happen, however, if the battalion commander does not allow sufficient latitude, and if the junior leader has not been trained to accept the responsibility.
Although the knowledge of higher- echelon missions is important, it is not enough to guarantee the success of maneuver warfare. What is needed is what Colonel S. L. A. Marshall says in his book Men Against Fire (Peter Smith, 1978):
“The man who cannot bring himself to trust the judgment and good
faith of other men cannot command
very long.”
An atmosphere of trust can be built only overtime by all of a unit’s leaders training and working together. The leader needs to make his thought process understood by the subordinate. This requirement can be accomplished by personal involvement in the training of subordinates. During training, the leader constantly must advise and assist his subordinates and teach them how to approach tactical problems. At the same time, he must encourage the subordinate to seize the initiative. The commander must train the subordinate leader and himself to think in similar ways. This will give a subordinate the knowledge he needs to operate in harmony with the leader’s thoughts.
The commander should also be aware that the proliferation of communication equipment to aid command and control has the possibility of preventing the establishment of a strong trust relationship. With the increased ability to control, the leader may think he no longer needs to trust his subordinate’s decision. The danger lies in training subordinates to pass decisions to their commander via these modern lines of communication instead of informing him of the decisions they have made. In maneuver warfare, this use of communication is unacceptable. The leader must note that excessive control destroys initiative, and he should make a concerted effort to avoid over-supervision.
A well-developed trust relationship will also pay the additional dividend of strong unit cohesion. Maneuver warfare will create new physical and psychological challenges for individual marines. These challenges can be met only if a marine knows he can trust each individual in his unit to take positive action. In maneuver warfare, units must be prepared to demonstrate their cohesion when faced with potential dangers, such as open flanks and extended communication lines. An example of the degree of cohesion needed was demonstrated during the Korean Conflict. The Communist Chinese 9th Army Group, consisting of three armies, with three to four divisions each, attacked and quickly surrounded the 1st Marine Division. Outnumbered and isolated, the marines fought their way to the sea while maintaining their discipline and order. In this potentially disastrous situation, the marines’ cohesion was one of the keys to victory.
Another important leadership technique in maneuver warfare is commanding from the front. The Germans of World War II recognized the importance of a commander’s presence at the front. They used a tool called Schwerpunkt, which is translated as “point of main effort" or “focus of main effort,” that aided their leaders in forward command. The commanders of the assault unit would designate one of their subordinate units as the focus of main effort. For example, a battalion commander, after being designated as the regimental focus of main effort, would designate one of his companies as his focus of main effort. That company commander would then designate one of his platoons as his main effort and so on down through all levels of command. The purpose was to complete the commander’s mission by concentrating all available resources with the main effort. The German commander was always found close to the front in order to support and exploit any tactical advantage his Schwerpunkt created or found. In fact, the 1942 Military Intelligence Service resume German Tactical Doctrine, written “as a German would instruct Germans,” states on the first page: “In the attack, his [the commander’s] command post should be located as far forward as possible;
. . . for tactical reasons, the post is placed near the main effort.”
This situation is especially true in maneuver warfare, where the primary purpose of the leader’s being forward is to read the situation and exploit the actions of his subordinate units. An example of this can be found in the book Panzer Leader, where—during the battle of France as the commander
of a panzer group consisting of two corps—General Heinz Guderian states: “On the 9th of June, the first day of Twelfth Army’s attack, I went to
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an observation post north-east of Rethel so that I might personally watch the progress of the infantry attack and thus not miss the moment for the commitment of my forces.”
The commander must exploit opportunities at the critical moment. His presence at the front will ensure that his decisions are carried out swiftly. A leader's absence forward at the critical moment could lengthen his decision cycle, causing opportunities discovered by his subordinates to be lost.
Again, as discussed earlier, the commander should guard against the danger of over-supervision. The commander’s primary purpose forward is not to make a nuisance of himself and interfere with his subordinates. General George S. Patton recognized this danger. In his Letter of Instruction Number 1, issued 6 March 1944 while he commanded the U. S. Third Army, Patton stated:
“The Commanding General or his Chief of Staff (never both at once) and a member of each of the General Staff sections, the Signal, Medical, Ordnance, Engineer and Quartermaster sections should visit the front daily. . . . The function of these staff officers is to observe, not to meddle.”
The Marine Corps, because of its longstanding traditions of strong leadership at all levels of command, is well suited to adopt the concepts of maneuver warfare. Before this adoption can take place, however, leaders need to understand the two most important elements of this theory: trust of subordinates and command from the front. Far from being contradictory, these tenets are in fact complementary. Some of the tools available for this purpose have been mentioned, but they are not set formulas. Maneuver warfare is a style or a way of thinking, and that fact must be recognized before anyone can really hope to adopt and practice its concepts.
Captain Weimann earned a B. A. degree from the University of Delaware in 1974, and graduated from Amphibious Warfare School in 1980. He has served as a platoon commander, executive officer, regimental logistics officer, and is currently the commanding officer of Company K, 3rd Bn., 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California.
____________________________________________ The Chipmunk’s Revenge--------------------------------
In 1918. while I was a plebe at the Naval Academy. 1 had my first exposure to the social side of military life. On Wednesday afternoons, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy held a reception at his home at which first and second classmen were expected to attend. This would give them a chance to meet the daughters of naval officers on duty at the academy. T his custom was apparently approved by the matrimonially minded parents and their daughters—as was obvious from the number who attended. But it was a source of irritation to some of the upperclassmen who were expected to attend, and who referred to the young ladies as "yard engines"—whatever that meant.
Once. I was “requested” by several first classmen in my Company to attend this function and to place their calling cards on the plate as “proof" of their attendance. Soon others approached me and the number of cards grew.
My recollection of the reception is hazy, as I attended for but a few moments and left. But 1 did my duty. I do remember that there were many young ladies there.
When 1 arrived at the Superintendent's house I placed the cards given to me—there were about 40 to 50—on the receiving plate. 1 had wrapped these cards tightly by rubber bands. 1 also left two of my own calling cards separately in the plate, so 1 might acquire whatever merit there was to be gotten from the first and last time I attended. My visit confirmed that such affairs were for those who had nothing else to do and depended on their social ability and personality to get ahead in the Navy. But I already knew I could never compete in this game; that I had to rely on study and work—not on personality or social charm. 1 was already aware that 1 had the charisma of a chipmunk.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. USN (Retired)