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Residential Directive 59: The Beginning of a New Nuclear Strategy
y hgadier General
Edwin F. Black, U. S.
Army (Retired)
dei
The
significance of the recent Presi-
_^ntial Directive 59 is twofold. First, Wa3ccePts the fact that limited nuclear
two *S n°W a ^eas*^^e opt'00 f°r the j superpowers. This being the case, orders the revision of our Single In- ®rated Operational Plan (SlOP) to - 't a more flexible response to a
So'
siat0niat*C counterattack against Rus- ‘ndustrial/population centers.
trineCOn^’ *C recoSn'zes tkat tke d°c_
/. e mutual assured- destruction c,eAD> 0n which the entire U. S. null) ar strategy has been based is no nger valid. MAD has lost its credibil- ;> » Moscow, ashington.
Vlet first strike than that of an
in NATO, and even in
Th
e Mad concept started from the
Pfemi: r
bl,
e b<
, e that nuclear war is unthinka-
strUc
iecause it would mean the de-
Uct|on of civilization. Given a Wor , ■
ers o with two opposing superpow- cle' 0t^ armeci to the teeth with nu- , ar Weapons, it sought to maintain a
tee anCe terror” as tke best guaran-
c against nuclear conflict. This bal- drice
cWas to be achieved by creating v- ltl0ns where both sides were con- j ed that no matter which one ci | ed the initial attack, the victim tab ^ a^sorb this attack and still re- on ate’ 'n^*ct‘ng intolerable damage s ^le other. The mutuality of this as- tL e destruction was to be achieved (A",uSh an Anti-Ballistic Missile M) Treaty, wherein the Soviet n’°n and the United States agreed t° build nationwide defenses
not
a8ainst
fo,
mcoming missiles. le decision to issue PD 59 was
teed
tnassf
°n the United States by the sive buildup of Soviet offensive h"d^ear Tower' 1965, the Soviets s°me 450 nuclear weapons that o reach targets in the United
States; today, they have at least 5,000. The increasing numbers, megatonnage, and accuracy of these weapons gave the Soviets an acknowledged first-strike capability against the U. S. land-based Minuteman force.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown concedes that war game results indicate that the U.S.S.R. could destroy “90% or more of our 1CBM warheads” in such a surprise attack. Moreover, they could do this while still retaining enough weapons in reserve to wipe out the major cities and the bulk of the population of the United States if the United States were to retaliate following an initial Soviet assault. As the London Economist (16/8/80) put it, “In the terrifying logic of the nuclear exchange, this certainty of a Russian third strike would paralyze the American second strike which is supposed to deter the Russian first strike.”
Calculations show that such a Soviet counterforce attack would be a major catastrophe, but far from lethal, because U. S. 1CBM silos are located in relatively unpopulated areas. There could be several million dead Americans, but the nation would continue to function. Under such circumstances, it might be wiser for the United States to respond in a restrained manner, avoiding the risk of a mutually suicidal attack on the population centers of both countries, concentrating instead on the Soviet strategic forces so as to limit any further nuclear exchanges and bring the war to a halt as soon as possible.
Having been forced to think about the “unthinkable,” Secretary Brown now admits that “a strategic force structure designed only for assured destruction is not sufficient for our pur
poses today.” Unfortunately, the world has passed into a far more complex conflict environment—i.e., that of limited nuclear war. In his Fiscal Year 1980 Annual Department of Defense Report, Secretary Brown writes of shifting to an essentially defensive, “countervailing strategy.” This is not defined any more specifically because the United States has not yet “developed a plausible picture of the conflict we are trying to deter.”
As the U. S. Government seeks to develop such a picture, it would be well advised to study the conclusions of the Soviet High Command. It is not necessary to pull off a major intelligence coup to do this. The basic tenets of the U.S.S.R.’s nuclear strategy are set forth in the writings of Soviet military authorities as published in their own professional journals. They have been translated for us by a group of scholars at the University of Miami, headed by Dr. Leon Goure. These concepts began to appear in 1965 and remain essentially unchanged to this day.
The Soviets have never accepted the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. They do not believe nuclear war would mean the end to civilization. In a world of nuclear weapons, they assume that nuclear war could happen at any time and that the Soviet Union would survive. They are convinced that it is possible to devise a nuclear war-winning strategy and have set about to develop one.
The central element of such a strategy is a preponderance of nuclear weapons of all types which will provide the resources for a decisive first strike. The Soviets are not interested in “essential equivalence” or any other “surrogates for equality,” to use Secre-
P
tary Brown’s expression. Their objective is not nuclear war, but a condition where they will possess acknowledged nuclear supremacy. This will allow them to exercise, as we did in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the ultimate sanction of superior nuclear power in the resolution of political disputes.
As the United States enters the critical decade of the 1980s recognizing that the MAD doctrine is obsolete and that the country must plan for the contingency of a limited nuclear war, we Americans find our country already in an extremely vulnerable position. As charts in the Defense Department’s Fiscal Year 80 Annual Report show, if the Soviets were to catch us by surprise with a preemptive strike against the Minuteman force between 1981 and 1984—the period the national Security Council planners call the “window of vulnerability’’—and we responded as best we could with a limited counterattack against their land-based missiles, the Soviets, at the end of the exchange, would emerge with an even greater net advantage in numbers of surviving nuclear weapons than they had at the beginning.
Fortunately, Washington still has an “ace in the hole” which can upset all of Moscow’s planning for a limited nuclear war. Although the United States has gone to great lengths to prepare its nuclear forces to “ride out” the Soviet first strike, there is no reason why our ICBMs cannot be “launched under attack”—that is, before the end of the 30 minutes it takes enemy missiles to reach their targets in the United States. Such an instinctive American reaction to a Russian first strike would wipe out any poststrike advantage they may hope to gain. Secretary Brown has quietly reminded the Soviet High Command of this possibility at least four times in his Fiscal Year 80 Annual Report.
Since PD 59 formally rejects the MAD doctrine as a basis for strategic planning and since the whole purpose of the ABM Treaty was to give substance to the assured destruction concept, there is no further justification for adhering to this obsolete agreement any longer. When it was negotiated in Moscow in 1972, the United States believed that by pledging the lives of at least 100 million Americans—then-Secretary of State Kissinger’s figure—as hostages against the outbreak of a nuclear war, the “balance of terror” would be stabilized, thereby increasing the effectiveness of mutual nuclear deterrence.
Now, faced with the task of preparing to deal with a variety of limited nuclear war situations, it makes little sense to leave the American population wide open to thermonuclear incineration. It makes even less sense, given this new set of circumstances, for the U. S. Government to continue ignoring its constitutional obligation to provide for the common defense of its citizens.
As things stand today, it is actually illegal for the U. S. Defense Department to provide the country with the best available protection against incoming missiles. Consequently, the country’s very considerable military technology is being used to try to find better ways to protect missiles, never mind about the American people. A classic example is the “race track” design for multiple launching silos for our new MX missile. Estimates sho"' that the costs of such elaborate passive defense schemes are roughly the same as they would be for a modern anti' ballistic missile system.
Only when the United States releases itself from the restrictions of the outdated ABM Treaty will Americans be able to start construction of active missile defenses that will protect both our ICBMs and our people.
General Black graduated from the U. S. Military Academy with the Class of 1940'and served in the OSS in the European Theater during World War 11. During his Army career, hr commanded a battalion of the 82nd Airborne
Division, served as Military Assistant to three Deputy Secretaries of Defense, and attended the National War College. During his third tour Vietnam, he was Assistant Division Com' mander, 25th Infantry Division. General Bla^
is presently an international consultant on alter' nate energy resources.
S. O. S. for S. W. S. Officers _________
By Lieutenant Commander Lome B. McComb, U. S. Navy
The present acute shortage of qualified strategic weapons system (SWS) officers, who man our fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarines, has been forecast for several years, yet no effective preventive measures have been taken.
So-called solutions have been only temporary, tactical accommodations. Each accommodation has temporarily masked the present problem, but soon allowed either the original problem or a manifestation of it to reappear. And each time, the problem grew a little worse than it was before.
One such accommodation, and undoubtedly the grandfather of them all, was the ten-year plan. Although not officially given this name, the plan came about as an accommodation to overcome the Navy’s inability to man our FBM submarines with all nuclear- trained officers. This manning plan opened up the FBM weapons and navigation billets to officers with prior enlisted service (ten years for planning purposes). Their “career path” practically ended at the 20-year point with retirement (i.e., a ten-year plan of commissioned service).
The only way to become a membef of this newly formed ten-year club was to first be rejected by the Navy’s nuclear power program. Although some resentment at being a “second-class citizen was inevitable, most ne"' members were not terribly upset with this label since it offered an alternative to the surface and air communities and provided a relatively secure path toward retirement. Command at sea* however, was never a viable part of this path since only members of the chosen nuclear power community can command nuclear-powered ships.
Many accommodations have been tried in attempts to improve the Navy's retention of submarine personnel. Few have worked. Two "solutions” are proposed herein.
e cutback in enlisted to unreprograms severely
tr‘cted line officer
input to the ten-year plan.
tee
L tunning technologically superior ardware.
f^f the many other accommodations ttiade
since the ten-year plan was im- ntented, the most significant and most /^successful has been the
^h‘P°ns officer certification program. , e Program’s intent was to increase
Th,
T?ted the - . .
Is shortage was forecast nearly ten
jstfS a8°- But cbe same plan still ex- s- Now, a great many Band-Aids cCj attached, and limited duty offi- • straight line officers, or nuclear th er °^'cers (some dropouts from community) can also man the ballistic missile weapons and na^gation billets.
he complexity of the strategic and *Ca systems on board modern rnartnes makes it almost impossi- e for the Navy to man those ships ^ n commanding officers possessing of1 a^'^*t*es necessary to make full use cbeir ships’ superior weaponry. The gineers run the show, while the tac-
^Clan • •
ns sit in the bleachers. Conse- ntly, we have a tactically inferior
Plei
thi
^capo e F
credibility of the SSBN weapons officer assignment and require formal certification prior to such assignment. The program has failed miserably because: it is administered by the force commanders rather than the cognizant authority;* the written examination has not been appreciably changed in three years; officers have been assigned as weapons officers without this certification; and the program leads to only a subspecialty designation within the submarine warfare specialty system.
As suggested earlier, modern technology does not allow a warfare specialty to acquire fluency in all aspects of complementary systems (e.g., weapons/tactics and nuclear power). That is, however, the impossible requirement we have levied upon the nuclear-trained commanders of our nuclear-powered submarines.
There are two relatively simple, if not popular, solutions to these problems. First, make the SWS officer a true specialist, rather than a .^specialist of the so-called unrestricted line
•Nuclear engineers are certified by the head of the Navy's Nuclear Power Program while nuclear weapons officers are not certified by the Director, Special Projects Office.
officer submarine warfare specialty. The precedent is already set by the ever-increasing number of limited duty officers entering the program. This would eliminate the necessity to offer the false and unacceptable avenues now being advertised as command-at-sea alternatives such as naval facilities and floating dry docks.
Second, make the nuclear power officer the true specialist that he already is (i.e., create a nuclear power duty officer) and eliminate command at sea from his career path. The SWS officers would retain their unrestricted line, submarine warfare specialty and serve in the drivers' seats where they belong.
The fact that the present submarine warfare specialty system cannot adequately support both the required safeguards of nuclear power and the complexity of modern submarine warfare becomes obvious to officers serving in the early stages of their careers. The resulting frustration all too often results in those officers seeking specialties outside the military. Eliminate the cause of this frustration, and more trained people will make the Navy a career.
Commander McComb enlisted in the Navy in 1963 and, after recruit training. Interior Communications Electrician “A” school. Submarine School, and a year of Nuclear Power Training, was assigned to the commissioning crew of the USS Simon Bolivar (SSBN-641). After fwo years on board, he was selected for the Naval Enlisted Scientific Education Program and obtained a B.S. in Chemistry from the University of Idaho. Since his commissioning in 1971, he has served as Assistant Engineer in the USS Dogfish (SS- 350), Assistant Weapons Officer in the USS John C. Calhoun (SSBN-630), Sonar and Electronics Material Officer in the USS Tiru (SS- 4 16), and Weapons Officer in the USS Casimir Pulaski (SSBN-633). He is currently Navigator and Operations Officer in the USS George Washington Carver (SSBN-656).
The German Navy Moves Out
By Dora Alves
In 1980, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) extended the German Navy’s area of operations to 61° North Latitude, and the post-World War II restrictions limiting the tonnage of vessels constructed in German shipyards ended. It was coincidental that the announcements of these two events occurred at the same time. Their combined effect, however, will change the German Navy’s planning for the 1980s.
The German Navy will exercise greater defense responsibilities in the triangular area between Iceland, the Arctic Circle, and the North Cape. The German Navy’s western boundary, on the Dover-Calais line, remains intact. To the West Germans, the northward extension of the operating area, suggested to the NATO authorities by the German Government, seems to be a very natural development.
The concentration on the Baltic Sea in the early postwar years was a valid policy. It is still an area of major concern with 50% of the Soviet fleet’s dockyard repair facilities in the Baltic ports. However, the expansion of the Soviet Pacific and Northern fleets has changed German strategic thinking. The German Navy is looked on primarily as a defensive force, and there would be political difficulties in extending the operating area beyond NATO waters. While it is believed that a small contribution to a combined Indian Ocean fleet would be but the proverbial “drop in the bucket,” there is real concern about the vulnerability of the Greenland-Iceland- United Kingdom Gap as more U. S. naval ships are deployed to the Indian Ocean and British and Norwegian ships are unable to take up the slack.
Since the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact are charged with the interdiction of shipping and the severance of Western Europe from the United States in the event of hostilities, the German Navy is determined to achieve greater operating flexibility, in company with its NATO partners, to counter the Communist mission. The Pact doctrine emphasizes attack submarines, large surface ships, and naval aviation bombers to gain control of the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea and prevent the flow of reinforcements to Europe.
The Germans believe that when they concentrated their attention on the Baltic they did a good job in applying their “small and many” concept to the particular geographical conditions of the area. Now, the lacuna in the North Atlantic must be filled, and, with considerable past experience in Atlantic waters, the German Navy is ready to focus on the resolution of new tasks.
Germany’s allies should not expect a tremendous shipbuilding program, the cost of which would weaken the contribution being made to the defense of Central Europe. The Bundes- wehr is proud to be the backbone of that defense, knowing that if it comes to a battle for Europe, that battle will be fought on the territory of the FRG. German doctrine supports a ratio of 6-3-1 for its army, air force, and navy- The government is not ready to trade Leopard tanks for frigates.
The German Navy is small— 38,000 men compared to the U. S. Navy’s 500,000. The German high command has undertaken studies and expended considerable effort to achieve what it considers the optimum balance between equipment and manpower. No ships will be commissioned that cannot be manned completely wi th efficient crews. In Germany, as elsewhere today, there is competition between the services and industry for highly trained manpower.
On 21 July, the West European Union (WEU), consisting of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and the FRG, lifted the restrictions imposed on the maritime forces of West Germany, with the approval of General William R. Rogers, the commander of Allied forces in Europe. The WEU was formed in 1948 with the primary purpose of curbing German rearmament. When the FRG and Italy were admitted in 1954, severe restrictions were
the „' Germans put great stress on To • exi°dity inherent in naval forces.
' Aexibili
Pres'nCreaSe that they are
def 6nt ^ concentrating on stronger air nses, shorter response times, and a er resistance to electronic coun-
^act(l on the German Navy. Sub- g 3ljlnes were limited to the size of the c ass conventional submarine, not to tio ^ tons, and the construc-
n and use of nuclear-powered sub- ^arines were prohibited. No surface nQfS . was t0 exceed 3,000 tons, and 0 ship was to be nuclear armed.
• ^rman industry was generally
the "r t'1C restr’ct'ons because
l hird World nations, which have
become
yards the
the n°nceh>t adopted for sea denial in ci n 3 tlc' The German Navy is espe- n ^ conscious of the extreme vul- it ' tty to minelaying of the area of fcr^maty responsibility, and there- su & ^es'res ships that are the best cd to defend against that threat. tak e German Navy is designed to hid'- Vantage of the opportunities for its t’ amon8 tbe Danish islands with H3 submarines and Type
ejj- ^st patrol boats and their highly eect*Ve armament and new electronic ^U|prnent. More than ten billion sche marks were spent on naval
mprnent between 1969 and 1979. Ihe
great,
Measures. The Tornado attack plane C0SU% referred to as a “multi role as111 8t aircraft”)—or fighter-bomber, jnlt: Is described in Germany—to be r°duced by 1981 is an all-weather
combat aircraft capable of engaging amphibious forces, surface forces, and support units.
Type 122 multipurpose frigates with integrated ship-based helicopters will be commissioned in the early 1980s to undertake antisubmarine missions. The original plan was for six of these frigates, but eight may eventually be built.
It is significant that the German news media, including liberal papers, have been uniformly favorable in their
The German Navy has three primary operating areas: the Baltic Sea proper, the southern approaches to the Baltic, and now the entire North Sea to 61° N. Lat. Building on an already large conventional submarine force (a "Type 206” is seen on the facing page), the German Navy has begun flying the new Tornado (left) and constructing new frigates.
comments on the likely results of the July announcements. Given this response and the changes, the German Navy will probably add an important new chapter to its high-seas tradition in the 1980s.
Dr. Alves is assistant to Dr. Ray S. Cline, World Power Studies, the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her article, "Resupply of Malta,” was published in the Septembcr-October 1980 Naval War College Review.
Fleet Acoustic Prediction Systems: Where Are We?____________________
Lieutenant Commander C. R. Dunlap, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander G. P. Tierney, U. S. Navy
■d
,d
Have you ever picked up a SHARPS (Ship/Helicopter Acoustic Range Prediction System) or ASRAP (Acoustic Sensor Range Prediction) message and wondered just what it was this message was trying to tell you? Chances are that most ASW officers would quickly give up and hand it to someone they thought knew more about it than them. Then one would charge off to flight quarters or to the bridge with high hopes of tracking down submarines.
Actually, acoustic prediction products, prepared by Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center (FNOC) and regional oceanography centers (formerly Fleet Numerical Weather Central and Fleet Weather Centrals), have been around for more than ten years. Their purpose and interpretation have been taught in all fleet ASW schools. The problem is that prediction products like SHARPS and ASRAP are hard to take seriously when one does not see an improvement in finding submarines. As with most complex issues, there are many interacting contributors to this problem. Oceanography, acoustic modeling, command and control, training, and even the research and development organizatipn of the Navy are involved.
Acoustic products describe, as closely as possible, the actual soundcarrying properties of the water in naval operating areas. However, the ocean is an extremely complex medium, constantly in motion, and until recently, almost a complete mystery to man. To think that it is even possible to predict the dynamic changes to the speed and direction of sound anywhere in the ocean is in itself amazing. Because we are only beginning to succeed in this monumental undertaking, we should not expect perfect and immediate results. Unfortunately, like so many technological problems, any attempt to understand a detailed model of sound propagation in the ocean requires “too complex” mathematics for the average sailor.
The SHARPS and ASRAP messages, mentioned above, are only part of the fleet’s bag of tactical range predictions. These prediction systems are always in the process of change, requiring new issues of software which also become part of the problem. To make matters more complex, different warfare communities are using different acoustic models to solve the same physical problem, and unfortunately, the answers are not always the same.
Until a few years ago, the only means to obtain an acoustic prediction was to request it from a shore-based oceanography center. In return, the requestor would receive more information than he was capable of effectively employing tactically.
Some messages require a good working knowledge of the sonar equation and many of its associated variables. Such expertise exists in a carrier ASW operations center (ASWOC). With assistance from the carrier environmentalist, the ASW briefing officer (usually a second-tour naval flight officer) spends a great deal of time trying to develop the best passive and active sonobuoy range estimates with the data available. Final figures are provided to flight crews (VS and HS) prior to each launch.
Over on the small boys, the problem is a little different. Unlike the carrier, the ASW destroyer or frigate has no ASWOC officer or environmentalist to assess the environmental data. Prediction reports are usually routed directly to the sonar division, where ranges are determined and used by people with little or no ASW environmental training. Often, the ranges are not determined at all. Even if there is a LAMPS detachment aboard needing daily passive-ranging estimates, the combined technical and managerial talents of ships and air crew often prove to be insufficient to get the acoustical data into an up-to- date and usable form. Even worse, the ASW coordinator or the screen commander, not always in a primary mission ASW ship, often does not get any better information than the ships in his screen.
Even if every ship had a naval environmental specialist, the data would be justifiably mistrusted. This is because of the scarcity of data upon which the predictions are based. A1 present, only a few hundred bathythermograph (BT) reports for the entire world are received at FNOC daily. Thus, fleet oceanographic pre" dictions are based mainly on years d accumulated data (BT reports) and 3 few recent BT drops which are merged at FNOC to produce a semi-synoptic for the area. This and othe( environmental and acoustical inputS are then entered into an acoustical model. The acoustic outputs afe brought mostly into realistic focus by the quality and accuracy of the latest area BT drops. Without a current ^ report, the prediction only gives the “average” ranges for the area. Atmo5' pheric conditions also have a daily e^' feet on the sea surface and subsurface sound-velocity structure. Compute1 forecasts based mainly on five- or stf' day-old BT reports may or may not be sufficiently accurate to satisfy tactic^ needs. It must be realized, however that this fluctuates considerably de' pending upon the ocean variability ,!l the operating area. For example, the middle of the ocean is much less vat1' able than coastal regions.
If we could blend historical an^ on-scene data together in the ta^ group ASW operating area, we woul^ have a much more accurate passive an^ active range predictions and woul^ save communicating back to the fleet oceanography centers except for in front of the task force for which do not have BT data. The Integrate^ Command ASW Prediction System1 (ICAPS) performs just such a mission Spearheaded by the carrier ASW con1' munities, ICAPS is now on board rriOsI CVs. Under the auspices pf thc ASWOC, a carrier with ICAPS equipped with all data files, compute systems, and acoustic models to pef' form all passive and active range pce dictions independent of shore-base* activities.
During many fleet exercises an1
diet' rneSSa^e system for acoustic presurf °nS "^bere *s a method by which Bath6 can send >n their own
ra h y°bs t0 the regional oceanog- ■mm ,Center and get a response on an eordj6 Precedence basis. But, ac- tliis n* t0 ^eet oceanography centers,
range „
to no Breuiction systems are limited s^-ine requests by only some are ^ S^'PS- But, here again, there PatilV|0re carrier/ASW screen noncom- pr0V|jlty Problems. The carrier would
modes6 aCtlVe ranges and operating As\x/0ct0 surirace ships, but most active Bers°nnel are not familiar with ment S°nar capabilities and require- son i_S* Passive n°buoySi
Mont"^1 Readiness Laboratory Moerey- California, acoust^ ASW sb'Ps do not even ask for rier a'C Pred*ction data from the car- for ir^D0^ten times ships that do ask Settin
g °up, but overall efforts to get c operators are sporadic and
information in the hands
of
aeon
°St certainly during wartime, y tssage-type communication is se-
Tlv restr'cte<^’ not eliminated. f6 ablllty to perform one’s own ASW ^ then becomes indispens- e' Operationally, the ASWOC can fro * BT rePort by voice or data link
feej1 ^ ^IfSt ASW ^auncb ob tbe day-
and b at 'nt° the on'board 1CAPS, with 6 a^6 t0 Present the next launch updated range estimates.
rr)ee ships of the ASW screen, in the antirne, are faced with using the Automatic ~ to ^P^on ‘s seldom used. Attempts re carrier-based expertise and
sonar, other than is also unfamiliar to uSefui ■ Pers°nnel. Presently, the only t\veenln °rrnat‘on that could pass be- s°uob carrier and ASW screen is envir()U0^ ranges for LAMPS. Carrier dtUes I|benta* specialists are some- Traini a e t0 assist in this process. r°nrn *n t*le tactical use of envi- speciap13^ Products for environmental tyjfbi *S^S’ however, commenced only d"ech n'C ^aSt year at tbe Geophysical
in
. information have trouble rier 0[^ t*lat 'nf°rmation from the car- f°rts 3 regu^ar basis. Cooperative ef- tasb w'de^y from task group to usefu[
0ften __
Asw u^r°Ve t0 t0° bafB hor many gr°Up ^'tS acting on their own. A task y-task group assessment of the
use (or lack of use) of ICAPS data would probably produce very sobering results.
There is some hope on the horizon, however. The Sonar In-situ Mode Assessment System (SIMAS) is a surface ship on-board acoustic prediction system tailored for a current generation of sonars. Like ICAPS, several recent modifications have adapted it to towed array and LAMPS sonobuoy predictions as well. SIMAS also has an on-board graphic display with probabilities of detection for passive operations. It also provides mode-setting recommendations for active sonar. Like ICAPS, it uses a real-time BT blending procedure. Since a small number of units has recently been ordered, it will be some time before SIMAS is a common feature of each ASW surface ship.
While it would seem that, at least in the future, both carrier and ASW screen will have a rapid reliable means of accurately predicting tactical ranges, there is a problem. The SIMAS, developed by the Naval Underwater Systems Center, and the ICAPS, developed by the Naval Oceanographic Office, do not predict the same ranges in identical circumstances. SIMAS uses an acoustic transmission loss model called RAYMODE; ICAPS uses the FACT acoustic model. Since ocean ranges between the two can vary considerably, there is no means to tell the fleet which system gives the best answers under particular circumstances.
So the problem is not yet solved, but its magnitude is shrinking, and its .nature is becoming better defined. ICAPS and SIMAS both give quicker answers than the acoustic prediction messages, and future systems will provide even more useful and more accurate assistance to the ASW operator and tactician.
One of these new developments is a handheld mini-calculator surface duct propagation loss program. It uses only the surface duct portion of the FACT model, but allows surface ships and ASW aircraft to generate a propagation loss profile from a current BT drop. It is only good, however, for frequencies above the cut-off frequency” and only when source and target are in the layer. Because it is a shortcut approach, there are many cases where it will not provide operationally visible answers.
The Naval Environmental Data Station (NEDS) system is another exciting environmental data system of the future. Presently found at major oceanography centers, it is also planned for installation on carriers. Using a worldwide data bank, the fleet will be able to receive an updated summary of meteorological and oceanographic information from ashore. Thus, it will provide synoptic information at ranges far beyond the task force’s data acquisition ability. This should provide important data for optimum task force acoustic routing and tactics in the future.
efOc
The emphasis of new systems is on “tactical decision aids.” Instead of giving the operator a tactical range prediction, these decision aids will give the operator the parameters to a selectable set of tactics. Thus, the time required to apply the environmental data is drastically reduced. These tactical decision aids should be the next big step forward in using acoustic information to improve our probability of finding submarines. While canned tactics are never the ultimate answer, at least these decision aids will provide a first guess at environmentally optimizing tactics.
So where are we? Certainly we are moving in the right general direction, but there is a lack of coordination in our various approaches to ASW acoustic prediction problems. The carrier ASW world seems to be pursuing one type of solution, while the surface ship contingent apparently is developing its own approach. One begins to wonder whether the lack of coordination at sea is driving the separate and parallel approach to prediction systems development ashore, or if parochialism at the design and funding level is driving a wedge between the carrier-based and small ship-based ASW communities. Until the task group ASW problem is looked upon as a common concern, we will continue to see piecemeal solutions to major problems. Developers and planners alike need to consider the total task group information management problem and develop one plan that amalgamates the whole task group ASW community.
But a major portion of the problem is fleet environmental training. We need to upgrade the level of training of our sonar gangs, our ASW officers' our flight crews, our tactical action officers, our ASWOCs, and our mission commanders. Then, we need to train more often in more environments and in coordination with each other. If the weakness in acoustic prediction systems is not readily noticed in the fleet, it is because the fleet is not yet at the level of sophistication to notice the weakness. The systems being developed now in the labs and on the test ranges require a highly tuned' technically and tactically competent community to understand and effectively employ them. We can no longer afford to pass off our SHARPS and As" RAPS messages as message traffic fillet' The ASW problem has become too complex to avoid the need for tactic^ environmental support.
Commander Dunlap is presently an assistant professor of oceanography at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a Geophysical Specials' (1800) Officer and his most recent assignment was as oceanographer at Fleet Weather Centfd Pearl Harbor.
Attached to HSL-34, Commander Tierney served as the LAMPS Maintenance OfFicer l)[1 board the USS Koelsch (FF-1049) and as th£ LAMPS Officer in Charge on board the Spruance (DD-963). A recent graduate of th£ Naval Postgraduate School ASW curriculum. is presently attached to HSL-33. He CO" authored "The LAMPShip Team," March 19^ Proceedings, pages 154-158.
Proceedings / January 198*
*
Coast Guard and Liquefied Natural Gas Safety Research
Alan L. Schneider
'256°p
As the nation’s chief maritime regu- ha»ty agency, the U. S. Coast Guard as the responsibility for protecting Pe and property from the dangers jj'.ented by marine commerce, in ad- U)n to the more familiar duties of saf *tar^ readmess and saving. The go ^ recor<^ °f fbe marine mode is a is °ne’ ^Ut continuing this record not easy, particularly with new ^ dous materials entering com-
^One material that at first seemed to gasV''ry dangerous is liquefied natural has p G^’ ordinary natural gas that 0een liquefied by cooling it to
W urrierS ‘n the late 1950s. By the w became clear that there
th; ma)or imports of LNG into
country
me fir- 1
, urst accident, ter . lts research into LNG safety, de- LNg min® fe ‘r was feasible to ship kindsSafely by water and, if so, what etlsS regulations were needed to re that safety.
^ests: The Coast Guard’s first The W°f^ was performed in 1968. 1-Ng airn WaS t0 determine how far Point C°U^d rravel before reaching a By where it is no longer flammable, test nal°8y wicb spills on the ground, jng believed ice would form, reduc-
raPid h .^od‘n8 rate- However, the meant °ding and natural convection ratent dttle ice formed and that the With • VaPor production increased iriCr jtlrne as the LNG spread outwards, bejj as,ng the surface area. It was also thanVt^ r^at t^le vaPor was less dense sipat-air ar*d would rise, rapidly disco^ n8' Actually, the vapor is very it atld hence heavier than warm air; warm-runinly through mixing with the • air' fbe LNG vapor warms,
hea, • co°is> and the mixture remains c“Vier rt,
cl0udnan warm air. Thus the vapor Vapo y>ers’sts downwind. Also, peak rnUch ^0ncentrations were found to be trat: *gher than the average concen-
n’ showing that flammable gas
pockets exist even when the time- averaged concentration was below the lower flammable limit. A vapor cloud dispersion model, the first ever developed, was prepared. Another discovery was that of the flameless explosion phenomenon (FEP), in which there is a sudden release of energy immediately after the LNG strikes the water.
In a second study for the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Mines considered the FEP and spilled larger quan-
er0c
Kaiser. Although insurance companies have settled, the three tankers must be sold for a total of $50 million, or El Paso will have to absorb the difference as a loss. The ships have been placed in storage in an Army terminal in Boston. The second and third ships of the class are named El Paso Savannah and El Paso Cove Point.
The LNGs That Failed________________________________
Three new LNG tankers built for El Paso Natural Gas Company by Avondale Shipyards are up for sale. In July 1979, the El Paso Columbia, the first of the class, flunked the U.S. Coast Guard certification tests to carry the supercold LNG. Experts, called in to solve the problem, decided that any corrective measure would cost too much—about $100 million per ship. The tankers were designed to carry the fuel in huge rectangular, aluminum tanks insulated with a “secret” formula of polyurethane foam developed by Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales Inc. However, when tested with a partial load of LNG, tiny cracks developed in the insulation—the Coast Guard refused certification, and a legal battle began between Avondale and
tities of LNG. From this work and that of other groups, it became clear that the FEP was highly dependent on the methane concentration in the LNG (it must be less than 60%) and was not likely to increase in destructiveness with increases in the amount of LNG spilled. Thus, the FEP was not a sig
nificant danger. These tests verified the vapor dispersion model. This meant that an accidental spill even miles offshore if not ignited immediately might form a vapor cloud that could travel to shore.
Fire Tests: By 1973, the Coast Guard felt that the major hazards from
an LNG accident would be pool fires and vapor cloud fires, with an undetermined chance of vapor cloud detonation. A detonation, with its high overpressures, would do more damage than a fire. Therefore, an extensive research program was begun at the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California.
Natural gas can detonate when confined, as in a pipe or a building, but the unconfined cloud was not known to detonate. This question , was studied, and it was found tha( whether or not a vapor cloud can detonate depends on the concentration of higher hydrocarbons in the fuel.
Vapor cloud burning is more likely to occur than detonation. In a series of vapor cloud fires, flame speed, flame dimensions, and thermal radiation were found. LNG was rapidly spilled onto a pond, allowed to vaporize an^ drift over land where it was ignited- The flame speed was fairly slow, buc the thermal radiation at the flame suf' face was about twice that from a conventional gasoline fire.
Because of ship design regulation5 that protect the LNG cargo tank5- probably the only way to breach a cargo tank is through a high-energy collision, which is likely to lead to nn immediate ignition of the spille® cargo. Thus pool fire is even more likely to occur than a cloud fire. In pool fire tests, up to 5.7 m3 of lN^ were rapidly spilled onto water and ignited immediately or after a shoh delay. The flame diameter, height spectrum, and thermal radiation were measured. In particular, the thermal radiation at the flame surface wa5 again about twice that from conventional gasoline fires. To some exten1 this was compensated by evident from the flame spectrum showing th;lt the radiation from LNG fires is absorbed more by the atmosphere than the radiation from the gasoline fire, a5 is probably also true for the vapot cloud fire. Mathematical models were developed for both pool and cloud fires. In neither type of fire was thefe evidence for detonation.
As part of improved detector work- the Coast Guard sponsored the development of a laser device and a tw'O" band differential radiometer at the Je*
trom shore
vGis’
purpose was to describe the
er outside the cloud. This work unde^'Ven ^'oast Guard a better modTi^H^iHg t^ie many disp ersion
tfacted ^a^ety: The Coast Guard con- to 6 W't*1 University Engineers (UE) catri°nS'^er ^*re safety on board LNG fjtstlers and at shore terminals. The Part was a non-experimental
has
^rt)pulsion Laboratory. Both instru- rnents measured the methane concen- tr‘>tion and were successfully tested uting dispersion tests. Because of the ‘milarity between the laser device and ‘Mother under development by the ' S. Department of Energy (DoE), ork has been concentrated on a JUt-band differential radiometer, lcn will report separately the con- ^‘ntration of methane, ethane, and Pane, the three major constituents
of LNG.
Coast Guard tests at the Naval in ta^°ns Center proved very valuable pj lncreasing the knowledge of LNG in^ WOfk has been very helpful eveloping regulations. fera^°r Cloud Modeling: Many dif- j tnt mathematical models have been p^vtloped for LNG vapor dispersion. sjt°essor J. A. Havens of the Univer- el ^r^ansas evaluated seven mod- gav°r tbe Coast Guard. The models j (Vapor cloud travel distances ranging r0lT1 km. t0 km. accord- Sej t0 tbe amount in one tank. A ves- w°uld have to be further away not to pose a threat. Ha-
modek •
Pro u ’ rePort inconsistencies in ap-
stujC ’ and identify models for future
arn'11 1 ^°^0WUP effort, Havens ex- ^c‘ence Applications, Inc. an I m°del, performing a sensitivity ysis of various input variables. He
snotyeH ,1 •
rriQcj tf|at, according to the SAI
stabl. ’ ^ c^oud produced its own
^eath Weat^er’ independent of the
arri|J ‘nv°lving several topics. For ex- t0_s, e ’ they concluded that the ship- ProK Car£° transfer was the most Q0 l le location for an LNG spill. sih)eat*n^ SP'U fires is not really pos- larwhen the spill volume is too re„ui UE established the fire fighting tinlrement for the maximum ex- Pared'S ^'re' These were com-
t0 the requirements established
by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.
In the second part of this work, UE conducted small-scale LNG spills, reaching several conclusions. Water spray and fog should be aimed at structures to be protected rather than between the fire and the structure. Minimum extinguishing times as a function of the dry chemical application rate were determined for three dry chemicals, along with the minimum application rate. Finally, obstacles in the pool of burning LNG were no problem as long as dry chemical covered the LNG pool. This research has helped the Coast Guard with both vessel requirements and operational procedures.
Ship Structure Committee: The Ship Structure Committee is sponsored by the Coast Guard and several other agencies; over several decades, it has considered many topics involving hull structure. Sanders Associates, Inc., was charged with investigating the effects on the hull after an LNG tank fails, including calculating the stresses and temperature distribution. The dangers from overpressurization resulting from rapid vaporization of the LNG were examined.
A study by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) dealt with the expected tank loading forces in an LNG tank, and how they compared with the requirements of eight regulatory agencies, including the Coast Guard. Ship motions and LNG tanks were evaluated. This work was in progress when a partially filled LNG tank suffered damage because of sloshing.
In a study in progress, SwRI is examining existing sloshing models and performing scale experiments giving information on sloshing forces. New methods for calculating forces are being developed, with recommendations for methods allowing calculation of sloshing forces in designing LNG tanks.
Crew Training: It has been claimed that more ships have been lost because of crew error than to all other factors combined. With LNG ships, an emerging technology, on-the-job training is insufficient for training crew members. In a study performed by Operations Research, Inc., and Engineering
Computer Optecnomics, Inc., both training and licensing were studied. Using a version of the technique called functional job analysis, the many jobs on board an LNG carrier were broken down into individual tasks, such as “monitor the exiting gases in order to assure that the oxygen level is less than 2% by volume prior to starting tanks’ cooldown spray operations.’’ The general educational level and the training required were established. Training, followed by a provisional license, is needed for a fixed-term license, renewable only if the crewman has completed a certain number of voyages or a retraining course. This work has been instrumental in the development of tentative regulations.
To ensure that the Coast Guard has not omitted any important research project, the service asked the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Marine Hazards (sponsored by the Coast Guard) to evaluate the LNG research program. A group from industry, government, and academia, including four Academy members, recorded their findings in a report entitled “Safety Aspects of LNG in the Marine Environment.” All phases of the Coast Guard’s research and regulatory efforts are covered.
The results of the Coast Guard’s extensive research into LNG have demonstrated that LNG is not as dangerous as many other chemicals that are shipped today. The work has shown that there are no major surprises with LNG. Finally, it has formed the basis for a comprehensive body of regulations. The Coast Guard will continue to monitor the research performed by others, including the Department of Energy. To date, the safety record of the LNG industry has been excellent. Only with strict enforcement of LNG regulations and the cooperation of industry, however, will this record be continued.
Dr. Schneider is a chemical engineer in the Hazards Evaluation Branch of the Cargo and Hazardous Materials Division of the U. S. Coast Guard's Office of Merchant Marine Safety.
efoc
Shipboard Information Handling Tools
By Lieutenant Dell C. Toedt III, U. S. Naval Reserve
Having created computer-based “Management Information Systems” to keep track of the fleet and the shore establishment, top Navy officers have demanded more and more information from the fleet to feed these systems. They have built enormous paper empires to acquire and process this information. Yet, they have been consistently negligent in providing the fleet the information tools it needs to run ships.
The inadequacy of tfie information tools the fleet has available is a prime cause of crisis management which leads to shoot-from-the-hip decisions, to needless mistakes, to reinventing the wheel, and to badly confused officers and enlisted personnel. Advance planning, material readiness, and tactical proficiency fall to needlessly low levels because of the waste of time this inadequacy causes. Personal frustration caused by these phenomena is a major factor in low retention rates among both officer and enlisted personnel.
A shipboard officer must use existing information systems to answer four fundamental questions that arise in every decision-making or action situation: What is really going on? What went on in the past that bears on the situation now? What exactly must I cause to happen and when? How do I make this happen in the best possible way?
Because of the continuing neglect by the Navy high command, the shipboard information system that now exists has evolved on its own, with no central theme, and has become dinosaur-like in its unwieldiness. The directives, manuals, files, and other tools the fleet has to use are sadly lacking in usefulness.
Finding out where to get answers is tough. The junior (and more senior) officer is responsible for maintaining ever-tighter control over increasingly sophisticated technologies, and over maintenance, training, and diminishing budgets. Adding to the junior officer’s problem is the short time he can hope to keep his job, before being rotated to another billet or another ship. These billet changes always seem to happen just as the junior officer is starting to really master his present job. In his new position, the learning process painfully restarts.
I will examine some weaknesses in the information system in fleet use today and propose some simple improvements that should be implemented immediately. These improvements would upgrade the effectiveness of shipboard officers, and would lend greater stability and continuity to shipboard organizations.
Unsatisfactory Tool #1: The Navy Directives System. Directives (manuals, instructions, etc.) should be the backbone of a good fleet corporate memory. They should be easy to browse through for job familiarization. It should be easy to find a specific answer in them. Directives should be easy to update and refine, so that they reflect the “real world.”
Too rpany directives, from too many authorities, make policy in the same topic areas, and frequently on the same subject. Too many scattered locations exist for these directives. The result is that the junior officer has trouble determining exactly what is expected of him. He is frequently ambushed by a policy of which he knew nothing. And since the directives system takes too long to update, and seems too difficult to refine, the junior officer sees it as something to be ignored, as too out of date for his needs. He soon quits checking directives altogether.
Unsatisfactory Tool #2: Files and Filing systems. A good filing system should serve as a supplement to the directives system. A shipboard officer should be able to find the answer to the question “how did they solve this the last time around?” when the answer is not incorporated into directives. Most shipboard filing systems, however, are badly organized, with a plethora of possible file folder titles. Since shipboard officers are not in the habit of filing information in an orderly fashion, the junior officer’s search is likely to turn up a mass of undated scribblings, cryptic words, and meaningless phrases. He quickly gives up on the file cabinet information system and all the experience acquired by his predecessors has been f°r naught.
Unsatisfactory Tool #3: Compute Technology. The fleet has been shortchanged by the shore establishment in this area. Cheap, rugged microcomputers and program-menu software arc available on the market that could take over much division office drudgery: producing lists of qualified firefighters, lists of dental PMS candidates by Social Security numbers, lis[S of who-hasn’t-been-to-Ieadership and management training, etc., etc. I understand that a legal restriction- stemming from a conflict-of-interest and subsequent congressional investigation, is at the heart of the problem- Put why hasn’t the problem been tackled?
For example, when I became reactor training assistant in the EnterprF1 (CVN-65), the master qualification fist of over 350 propulsion plant personnel was being maintained unsatisfactorily by the antiquated S-7 UYK-5 computer- I wrote a relatively crude program 10 take over maintaining these files, on s “programmable calculator” (different- I'm told, from a “computer” . . .) belonging to another department. Sailor5 with no computer training are (at tin5 writing) keeping the files current and producing customized lists for division officers, senior watch officers, career counselors, and others. The data base has been expanded and includes if" formation on qualifications achieved, schools attended, and much more- The point is that we knew of n° “canned” programs that could have served our purpose as well as oUr home-grown program did. WW should shipboard personnel be forced to develop programs such as these- Where are the high-powered expert5 in the shore establishment?
Unsatisfactory Tool #4: Officer Train' ing. Source programs and warfare- specialty training teach a new office certain specific information he wijj
^tunately, officer training in ^'s quite inadequate.
We 'mprove the directives system,
^ ti /' '
tjv "n‘nate redundant directives. Direc-
P°ss K^°U^ ‘ssued by the highest Co1 e authority consistent with
OpNT'0nality' ^°r exarnple> one av instruction should cover proc- of report chits.
the~hl‘^Ult l^eSe directives with fill-in- f0rjnan* 5Pac^ for local implementing in- zoJ?tl0n' Type commanders, fleet cersmand«s, and commanding offi- hej t0Ldd customize directives and rrito e*'rn’flatd redundancy (not to evr. 10n rhe burden of writing the y JJ0cal directives). direi[e>e^ limit the scope of any single Ve- ‘Oh-by-the -way” policy
Propul
'Ps instructions dealing with
oper-
nee<J as a division officer or officer of | e deck. They are deficient in teach- nf Him how and where to find an- VVcrs to the thousand-and-one ques- !"ns must answer from his first day on board.
Tw° examples from the Surface ^arfare Officers School (SWOS) Basic Urse are instructive. The average £1Vl:Sion officer writing a Casualty e^nimary Report (CASREPT) must use er °^d CASREPTs or his tattered k °S S°uge as a model; SWOS may staught him that instruction ci)C and"suc^> issued by so-and-so, do C^e sub)ect> but be certainly tSn t remember that. The SWOS 3M course i_
> on the other hand, makes ex- Slve use of the yellow and orange ^anuals (OpNavlnst 4790.2K) in homework, PMS schedules, etc. f: nsecluently, most surface junior of- to fS ^n°W where to look for answers specific 3M questions.
r°Per training is probably the CerC lrnP°rtant tool a shipboard offi- f0uCan have in finding answers to the sjQf Undamental questions of all deci- answ S*tdat‘ons- If he knows that an tli • ?r. eX*StS and can 8° stra*ght to it, forn 'S WOr^ *s much simplified. Un-
this
statem . ^"'Dy-tne-way
y ” \(tntS must be eliminated.
st“nd 1X'an^~matcl}” directives into
Won) ' . secti°naliied manuals. This
h'milj 8*Vt C^e shipboard officer a
inst *ar Place to start researching. For
of r,nCt’ che Enterprise has a number sni-’ •
Slon plant watchstanding
ations, etc. These instructions were filed in separate binders according to originator, and were less than useful in training new operators. 1 tried reshuffling them into a binder with seven broad topical sections. Each section contained all local policy pertaining to its broad topic area (logs and records, watchstanding requirements, tag-out procedures, etc.). This binder and the exhaustive index compiled for it were soon implemented as a manual, and placed in all propulsion plants. It serves as an effective tool for trainees and qualified operators alike.
This approach could be used to create a Division Officer’s Manual (a current Enterprise project), an Engineering Administrative Manual, and others as needed. Careful thought must go into the choice of broad topic area titles as the user must be led straight to the section in which he will find the answer to his question.
► Produce operational-type manuals and instructions in two distinct sections: a readiness section listing duties and responsibilities, general discussion, etc.; and a series of action checklists such as those used in aircraft NATOPS (Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization) manuals and engineering plant procedures.
► Upgrade the indexes available to the shipboard officer. CNO, fleet commanders, or TyComs should issue exhaustive indexes (possibly as a manual of its own) of all Navy-, fleet-, and type-wide instructions, listed by key word.
► Eradicate the use of passive voice in directives. A directive should read: “The Officer shall . . .” Blanks can be filled in by the issuing authority, or locally, as implementing information.
► Make directives easier to read and handle. Print a key word or three at the top-right-hand corner of each page. Print double-space, on one side of the page, and on tear-proof paper. Pre-punch everything and use loose- leaf binders—they are easy to lay flat on a table to read and to update. Use tab sheets to mark off broad topical areas and important action checklists.
► Simplify the refinement process. Develop a fill-in-the-blank change request form (similar to a PMS Feedback
Report) which could be approved, shotgunned to directive holders, and filed with the appropriate directive until a change or revision came out. While awaiting this revision, the shipboard officer still need look in only one place for policy guidance, rather than at letters, messages, etc. (The Enterprise used such a form [“Temporary Operating Procedure”] with some success to refine propulsion plant directives to cope with a complex overhaul.)
► Eliminate policy promulgation of every other type. Get rid of XO memoranda, TyCom letters and messages (except message-format change authorizations), standing orders, and every other kind of fiat. They confuse the shipboard officer, and serve only as one more place he must look to find a particular answer.
To upgrade the Navy filing systems, we should:
► Develop a standard. Navy-wide, functional set of file titles. As with directives, the topic areas must be so logical that the researcher is drawn to the correct file.
► Take a meat cleaver to the Standard Subject Identification Code system. Reorganize it into more functional categories as described above. Reduce the number of tedious subdivisions associated with systems, system components, component parts, etc. Keep the tool simple for fleet use.
► Develop a few simple fill-in-the-blank recordlreport forms for everyday division officer use. These forms should ask questions a superior or a relief might ask: What happened? What will happen later? Who should do what? When? Who should be contacted? At what address/phorie number?
To upgrade officer training, we should:
► Shift the teaching emphasis in officer training from imparting specific information to fostering practice at finding answers in the information sys- tem(s).
► Teach shipboard officers to use the information system for everything. This burden will fall on COs, XOs, and department heads. They should continually ask their subordinates where a given answer was found.
► Teach shipboard officers to document the "real world” in orderly files and in
directive refinements. This step alone, by reducing the confusion associated with working in a new job, would be a significant upgrading of officer effectiveness. This again must be pushed by local senior officers on a continuing basis. Any crisis, once surmounted, should be incorporated into ship’s routine, so as not to be a crisis again.
If today’s senior officers have the vision and the courage to tackle the Navy’s overblown paper empires, and to reshape them into a workable fleet information system, they will see young officers finding answers more quickly. They will see them spending more time training and maintaining. They will see them making progress, instead of fighting to avoid backslid' ing. And they will see them staying in the Navy.
Lieutenant Toedt's professional note was written after three years’ duty in the USS Enterprtit (CVN-65). A qualified surface warfare office' and engineer officer of a nuclear-powered ship- he left active duty in 1979 to enter law school-
____________________________________ Tickets Please----------------------------------------
Soon after our induction into World War II, heralded by the bombing of Pearl Harbor, I waited for the motor launch from my ship amid utter confusion on a dock at Mariveles, a small harbor on Bataan just West of Corregidor. Nearby, nearly loaded, another launch was about to cast off with passengers for a Catalina patrol plane. An Army second lieutenant was checking their authorizations.
A dubious type, dressed only in shorts and a baseball cap, climbed out of a jeep and dropped into the boat. “Okay, son, you can cast off now,” he called to the cox n.
“Hold it,” the checker yelled, “let’s see your pass.’
“Pass? I guess I got an ID somehwere, but I never heard about any pass.”
The lieutenant quoted a paragraph from his orders, and added, That means just what it says: No pass signed by General MacArthur’s headquarters, no fly!”
The character hadn’t shaved in several days, and he scratched his whiskers in thought. “Well,” he mused, “I guess you’ve got to carry out your orders, lad, but I’m the goddam pilot!”
Jack Remington
___________________________________ The Damn Ferry ---------------------------------------
After a rough trip from Hong Kong to the Cavite Navy Yard for light overhaul, our ship’s doctor decided that a good night out was what he needed to unwind, so he boarded the little naval ferry that operated between Cavite and Manila.
Upon entering the cabaret, the doctor arranged with the bouncer to have a taxi available in plenty of time for the doctor to catch the last ferry leaving Manila that night.
With that assurance, the doctor discarded any worry about a high-level conference that was scheduled for the next morning. He enjoyed a good dinner, several cocktails, and danced the' evening away. The bouncer had a cab waiting, escorted the tipsy doctor to the cab with instructions for the cab to deliver the doctor to the head of Pier 3, where the ferry took on passengers.
After several traffic delays, the doctor became nervous. After another tie up, he became frantic. When the cab finally reached the pier, the doctor jumped from the cab, noted that his watch had stopped, ran toward the landing, fearful he would miss the ferry.
As he staggered toward the ferry entrance, he glimpsed the ferry slowly heading toward Cavite. He increased his speed, dashed to the next side door and, as the ferry was about three feet from the dock, leaped without hesitation and landed on his bottom, right in the midst of several high-ranking officers and their ladies.
The ladies shrieked and the officers were speechless as the befuddled doctor struggled to his feet, apologizing, and muttering, “I just had to get this dammed ferry.
An unimpressed senior officer, smilingly asked, “What is your hurry doctor, this damned ferry is coming in, not going out. ”
Chief Warrant Officer Leon E. Dahlstedt, USN