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After nearly 400 years of contending with the influence of four world powers, the islands comprising Micronesia—more specifically, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands—are on the threshold of political independence. Having endured the influence of Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United States, the people who live in this vast region of the Pacific are negotiating for a new status which would make their territory a politically independent entity, able to survive alone economically. It was inevitable that this should happen. Indeed, there are those who argue that independence should have been granted much sooner. How well we negotiate the future political status of this strategic trust will, in large part, determine our ability to develop defense options in Micronesia, should this ever be necessary. Spanish domination of Micronesia began in the early 16th century. Guam, with its natural harbors and abundant quantities of food and fresh water, proved to be an ideal stop for Spanish ships on their journeys from Mexico to the Philippines. Although they made no great efforts at colonization, the Spanish missionaries left the imprint of Catholicism on many of the islands. Spanish influence is also seen in the language of Micronesia. In Guam, for example, the indigenous language, Chamorro, is combined with Spanish vocabulary to give it a distinct flavor. Spanish rule in Micronesia ended in 1898, when Guam was captured by the United States. The end of the Spanish-American War brought the beginning of the U. S. presence, which was maintained until hostilities broke out with Japan in 1941. German presence in the Micronesian islands was the result of Germany’s interest in the lucrative copra (dried coconut) trade late in the 19th century. Spanish attempts to control trade were met by German moves to assume control of the Marshall Islands. Since the Spanish claim to sovereignty in the Marshalls was weak, the Germans assumed a protectorate of this area in 1885; in 1886, the Spanish formally conceded the Marshalls to Germany. With the Spanish- American War, however, Spain was forced to withdraw from Micronesia. It sold all of its possessions except Guam to Germany. German control of Micronesia was terminated abruptly by the outbreak of World War I. In Octo- | ber 1914, Japanese naval squadrons took possess!011 of the Marshall, Caroline, and Northern Mariana |S lands. On 17 December 1920, the responsibility ^ administering the islands of Micronesia was forma ! entrusted to Japan by the League of Nations. In j relatively short period of time, the copra trade $ other farming ventures flourished. Not only was s° ficient food grown for local consumption, but als°' enough surplus sugar cane was harvested to export Japan. Japan controlled all of Micronesia, with the exc°P tion of Guam, for nearly 25 years before the outbC*1 of World War II, and so was able to build a forrni^1 ble defense network away from the home islands. ^ natural strategic barrier from which to defend ag0'111 Allied forces was of unquestionable value to Japan- n each Micronesian island was occupied by Amen^11 troops, it became subject to U. S. authority, in 111 cordance with the international law of belligerent cupation. In July 1947, the islands formally became' United Nations Trust Territory. Hostilities bet^f the United States and Japan left deep wounds in 0 cronesia. Schools had been destroyed, medical tfe^ ment for the islanders was nonexistent, and trade in ruins as the people were faced with the formid11^ task of reconstruction. , Today there are six districts in the Trust Territ0>r' Marshalls, Ponape, Kosrae, Truk, Yap, and Guam is a territory of the United States. The N°ft ern Marianas are destined to become a cornml,n wealth in the near future. The six districts, c()|1| prised of 2,000 islands and atolls, have a total la(1 mass of approximately 700 square miles, or roufn1' half the size of Rhode Island, scattered over apPr°,\ imately three million square miles of the Pacific- 1 population of Micronesia is approximately 120,P excluding Guam, which has a population of roug*1 110,000. ,, The trusteeship status of Micronesia should erm 1981, the date which President Jimmy Carter *1‘ indicated as a target. In a recent referendum, c . people of Micronesia were posed two distinct opfiotV’| to form a union of all the districts into the Feder;lt^ States of Micronesia, or to negotiate separately the United States for a compact of free associafi0.11 free from the necessity to join with the other ^|S |
58 | . 1#$ PmoppHimre / ITpbriinrV A |
Micronesia's most important resource is its fishing industry, which will have to he more modernized and developed if it is to realize its full economic potential. Here a Seahee practices the age-old island method of fishing with a thrown net.
%
th-^ ^lte *n r^e Western district, Palau, and
6 Eastern district, the Marshalls, voted to negotiate j- the United States independently of the other Ur districts to determine their future political Us- The four central districts, which lack the ^ nrercial and strategic importance of Palau and e Marshalls, voted to form the Federal States of Mlcronesia.
^ ne more significant negotiating sessions have gte|' conducted in Saipan in the Northern Marianas, of the Micronesian negotiating parties has been Presented by political status commissions cornel rePresentat‘ves from each of the districts as as by political and legal advisors hired, in most nSes> from prominent U. S. legal firms. The U. S.
°otlator is Peter Rosenblatt, the president’s per- sad*1 rePresentative, who has the status of an ambas- r' Assisting him are representatives from various fetrnment departments and agencies, including De- ^^Se’ State, Justice, Transportation, and the Federal Ration Agency. The negotiations show promise of r *nS completed before 1981, although many issues ^am to be settled.
j 116 terms of the agreement involve a key element. cessence, the United States is negotiating for a tQ ,^act which will allow the Micronesian districts rj ave their own internal self-government and the t t0 conduct negotiations with foreign govern- y nts without reliance on the United States. The Sj^.'ted States, however, would maintain the respon- re . lfy and the right to provide for the defense of the ancb to a certain extent, to provide consulta- fen ln foreign affairs. This arrangement has been re- c ^ t0 as the compact of free association. This s^. Pact will be a unique arrangement in relation- tj^lP>s between nations. It provides, among other fed^’ t^le Suarantee °f assistance, in the form of dollars, from the United States for a period of eaSt ^ years in an effort to bring vitality to (h ,(°ni*es which have been dormant and weak since labe8mning of the trusteeship. Although exact dol- ^ *8utes are not available, it is safe to assume that s^b arnount f°r eacb nati°n m the compact will be Stant*ah At the end of 15 years, the compact will „ePlre. and either a new arrangement will be °°tiated or the present relationship will be con-
ings / February 1980
any
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Territory, and in this era of fiscal constraints, increase in either the number of base facilities or P1 sonnel is highly unlikely.
Barring a catastrophic deterioration in our b*5
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More recently, Micronesia has developed into a vacation spot and tourist resort. Above right, passengers board a jet at the airport on Saipan.
tinued indefinitely. Of vital importance to the United States is the provision that we will provide for the defense of the region, which will entail free use of the waters around each of the districts and facilities ashore.
Negotiations with all of the districts except Palau appear to be progressing well. The Palauans have drafted a constitution, but American observers believe that it is incompatible with the compact of free association. The Palauans have incorporated provisions in their constitution which would make it difficult for our nuclear-propelled ships to transit their territorial waters. Moreover, the constitution as drafted calls for an archipelagic concept in defining territorial waters—a concept which the United States does not recognize.
All of the remaining districts now have their own elected government officials and are proceeding toward self-determination. Defense interests in Micronesia have not received wide publicity, but this will probably change in the near future. An assessment of our strategic interests in Micronesia cannot be P°st poned much longer.
Currently, the U. S. defense presence in this fe gion is evident in two locations. The Navy control approximately one third of the land area on G^' In addition to a strategic submarine squadron, c^£ island also hosts the naval communications area ter station in the Western Pacific, an Air Force B-5' squadron, a ship repair facility, and several other inl portant commands. Because of its location and d>e availability of cheaper labor in the Philippines, t‘,e ship repair facility at Guam does not receive the ^ tention it would otherwise. The other U. S. defenS£ site, the island of Kwajalein in the Marshalls distr’cj’ contains a ballistic missile tracking and testing ity. Options for leasing lands in the district of P‘^‘lU and in the Northern Marianas are continually und£f negotiation. Aside from these two areas, no othef|fl stallations of any significance are present in the TfUSt rights in the Philippines, Korea, and Japan,
U. S. military presence in Micronesia will contif to be small. However, our continuing presence in Indian Ocean, our loss of influence in Iran, and undeniable requirement to maintain strategic lino5 communication all dictate that a reevaluation of 0 interests in this part of the world should be undef taken rapidly. The prudent thing to do is to ret?l the ability to exercise our defense interests Micronesia—and most importantly, to deny our versaries the opportunity to gain any type of adv3(1 tage in the region.
Soviet interest is evidenced by the increas1 ^ number of Soviet ships operating close to the terf'c<^ rial waters of the Micronesian districts. Altho^ they are civilian ships with oceanographic miss*ot^s their presence nevertheless indicates Soviet aware11 of the importance of this region. It is therefore 1,11
fish
lng industries consider this area lucrative.
one knows exactly what U. S. defense policy is cronesia. Defense Department presence has been
No >n Mj
guested at the negotiating sessions aimed at ending trusteeship, but representation has been small. It
t|^terrent practices fail to prevent an attack on any of that^ ^ePartrnent of Defense reasoning appears to be at the expense of relocating anywhere in the mid-
Putative that we undertake a realistic and sincere ef- rt to evaluate our interests here. Our vacillating ttitude will earn only animosity for us and the pos- 1 *ty that the Micronesians will make their islands °re inaccessible to us. Additionally, Japan, Korea, r "^a'Wan have shown a keen interest in this vast area f' e ^acific; in particular, thejapanese and Taiwanese
re6lTls °nly logical that a well-defined DoD policy yarding Micronesia would be not only to our advan- i but absolutely essential. The United States s to define a strategy for Micronesia based on a fiiel'StlC assessment our nee<^s *n the face of critical f. sb°rtages and turmoil in an area of the world from ch we import many vital raw materials, is f 6re *S n° ^oubt that our basic strategy for Asia th 'rWar<^ deployment of our forces so as to increase Oth"^ e^ect*veness *n the event that Japan, Korea, or er ‘mportant areas are threatened and the normal
Pacific would be too extravagant and that the area is too remote to offer a viable alternative for forward deployed forces. Nevertheless, low-level plans for the use of facilities in Micronesia—and indeed an increase in our presence here—would ensure that in the event that base rights in Japan, the Philippines, or Korea were lost, time would be bought to map out a strategy for the Pacific. There would be other benefits as well. First, a U. S. presence in Micronesia, even if small, is an assurance to the Micronesians that we support them as partners in their growth as independent entities. Secondly, a U. S. presence is economically advantageous to the region.
Palauan negotiators see a definite strategic advantage in their land. The United States does not deny that there are possibilities for a defense buildup in the region, but neither has it made any firm commitment to the people of this or any other region to acquire land or rights to build for defense. The same situation exists in the Northern Marianas. Not more than a decade ago, the people of the Northern Marianas had high expectations that the Air Force would build a huge facility for the support of strategic bombers on the Island of Tinian. Congressional reaction to the proposal killed the project and dashed the hopes of the inhabitants of the region.
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
0
,di-
tinction in 1970. He enlisted in the Navy if 1971 and subsequently attended Officer C‘in
.ieuteo
Betancourt served as communications i
ne
Commander in
The message to all of Micronesia should be clear. The United States should indicate that it wishes to maintain defense options in the region as insurance against any hopes that its adversaries may have of gaining access to bases.
Just as it is fairly clear that no massive buildup of defense forces in Micronesia will materialize in the near future, the United States should also make it clear that it is firm in its commitment to help the people of Micronesia in their quest for political freedom. The most important concern for the Microne- sians is their ability to survive economically without massive federal assistance. In most cases, especially in the four central districts, the stark reality is that their economic potential has yet to be developed. The fishing and tourist industries offer great potential; also yet to be developed are farming programs, especially in the copra industry. The most important of these, and the one which seems to offer the most promise for economic growth, is the fishing industry. Help in the development of these resources is one way in which the United States can do the most to ensure a prosperous future for Micronesia.
The road to political independence for Micronesia will be a difficult one, but a settlement in the ongoing negotiations is inevitable. The people’s spirit of nationalism and their desire to determine their own political destiny will result in a negotiated end to the trusteeship by 1981. It is hoped that our presence here for more than 30 years, as a result of the trusteeship mandated by the United Nations at the end of World War II, has gained the trust of the people so much that they will accept us as partners in their quest for a new status. Micronesia is just too important to be forgotten.
It remains to be seen whether the people of Micronesia can carry out the formidable task of selfgovernment without a strong U. S. presence. The more pessimistic observers of this transition claim
that the best efforts of the United States to gratlt Micronesia autonomy are destined to fail because corrupted an essentially self-sustaining economy massive welfare programs and federal projects. Thw claim that food stamps and a multimillion-doll‘ir federal bureaucracy for the islanders have essential ensured that a Micronesia free from federal handoiP cannot survive. The optimistic sector points out thc large number of educated young people who are fe turning from American universities with degrees 1,1 hand, ready to assume leadership roles. They p0*nj out that federal funds have built bridges, roads, iin airports and helped to start an interest in the fishin? and copra trades. The optimistic observer argues the framework for prosperity in each of the distrk15 has already been laid down and that chances for sut cess for the independent Micronesians are great. 1 present situation is at neither of these extremes. ^ road to independence in this vast region of c e Pacific will be long and hard. Although it is apP^ ent that U. S. assistance in the form of federal fufl . and programs will be required for at least the next years, a successful transition into a compact of ^ association is attainable within the next two or years. Micronesia is ready for independence— perhaps better prepared for it than any other ternt0 rial trusteeship in history.
Be
tancourt attended Pan American University^ Edinburgh, Texas, and was graduated with
date School, graduating in March 1972. Lien' and operations officer on board the USS Frederick (LST-118^) as weapons officer on board the USS John S. McCain (DDG-- j In March 1978, he reported as flag lieutenant to the s® r
Commander, Naval Forces Marianas, Pacific Fleet representative for Guam.
_________________________________________ Oh Say Can You See?-------------------------------------- --------------------- ^
A friend who was stationed at the Naval Amphibious School at Little Creek, Virginia, often left home in the da" ^ early light and arrived in the full sun after a 30-minute drive. The school offers many one-, two-, and three-week coUf^ resulting in a largely transient student body. One afternoon, as he was leaving work, my friend found a note on seat: “This is the third time this week I have turned off your headlights. I am leaving Friday. Who will take care of y°0'
Uverlene )0<)
(The Naval Institute will pay S25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)