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Looking—aside from their uniforms—no different than a couple of American naval officers, a pair of Soviet submarine officers look aft from the sail of their elderly Whiskey Long Bin guided missile submarine. But there are differences between their officers and ours, between their men and ours, and the differences arise from many causes, of which perhaps the most important is that to be Russian is not the same thing as to be American. Indeed, to be a Russian is not the same thing, either, as to be a Kazakh, or a Tatar, or a Lithuanian; but, in the Soviet Union, it is best to be a Russian.
o ur nation has now recognized the Soviet challenge at sea. We have observed the development of the Soviet Navy into a large force, composed of beautiful, powerfully-armed modern ships. It >s a force steadily increasing the size and scope of its operations, and continually expanding its presence into new areas. The numbers, newness, strength, and disposition of the Soviet Navy’s ships are discernible and impressive.
But our view of these obvious manifestations of power alone does not give us the complete picture of that navy. We must, of course, continue to estimate its strength and capabilities based on its order of battle, on the characteristics of its ships and weapons, and on the extent of those operations which are so readily visible at sea- Such a consideration of the visible, numerical factors, however, *s not enough. We must also assess the Soviet Navy’s operational readiness and combat effectiveness. To do so requires an understanding of the nature of the people who fill the order of battle, the results of their training to operate and maintain their ships and weapons, and the characteristics of the system which supports the operations.1
The Russian People
Nationality
While constitutionally the Soviet Union is a federation comprised of fifteen separate republics and numerous smaller “autonomous” republics and while it includes over 100 nationalities, lC remains virtually a continuation of the old Russian Empire. The Great Russian people, along with their kindred Slavs, the Belorussians and Ukranians, dominate the Soviet Union in the same way that they once dominated the Tsarist Empire. They constitute the largest, most urban, and best educated of the national groups. such, it is they who staff and control the party and governmental apparatus at the highest (USSR) level and who, by occupying the key party and governmental posts at the republic level, possess the decisive influence and control. Similarly, it is they who direct the educational system, fill the scientific and industrial enterprises, command the armed forces, and man the navy.
'See “Naval Officers: Ours and Theirs," by Captain James W. Kehoe, USN, U.S. N»v®* Institute Proceedings, February 1978, pp. 50-60.
Yet, right now almost half of the population of the Soviet Union is non-Russian. The birthrate of those non-Russian nationalities far exceeds that of the Russians. Furthermore, under the protection of the widely publicized official policy of racial and cultural equality, the peoples of these other nationalities cling proudly, and with passive defiance, to their cultures and their languages.
Despite the growth of the non-Russian population and the persistence of non-Russian culture and language, the diversity of the peoples and the low level at which they have come to terms with the modern world will keep them from soon displacing the Russians as the dominating influence in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, for those who desire to succeed in the Soviet Union, a strong unofficial policy of Russification, especially in the armed forces, coupled with the pressures of modern urban living and industrial working which are being forced on them by the development of the Soviet Union, makes them conform to the standards established by the dominant Russians. In essence, not only is the Soviet Union Russian, it is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
What, then, are Russians like?
National character
Their national characteristics and their individual traits have been formed by the environment to which they as a people have been subjected over the centuries and in which as individuals they have had to endure during their lifetime. The geographic' and climatic conditions of their home land, the history of their nation, the origin and cultural evolution of their race, their social structure, and the characteristics of their political-economic system have interacted to create the specifically Russian national characteristics, attitudes, values, and beliefs. These national characteristics influence their behavior and affect their actions. Likewise, the attitudes, values, and beliefs that a citizen holds shape his thoughts and ideas. Together, these give a uniqueness to all of a people’s activities. Certainly, some of the many influences which have acted on the Russian people over their long history and upon the Russian individual during his hard life have created some characteristics, attitudes, values, and beliefs which have a direct bearing on their capabilities and competence as naval men.
Throughout their entire existence as a people, the Russians have been subjected to the rigors of harsh, dreary weather and have gazed upon a vast, flat, dull landscape. These climatic and geographic conditions have combined to develop what we have come to consider as typical Russian physical attributes and mental outlook. Because of these conditions Russians commonly came to accept idleness as an appropri°te condition of man. They developed the patience t0 wait out, and even acquired an apathetic and almost fatalistic regard for, forces over which they had no control. While they developed great stamina and an unbelievable capacity to endure physical and mental hardships and suffering, they also adopted a meaS' ured and plodding approach to the efforts required o them under arduous conditions. A melancholy and romantic nature with a tendency to imagine and dream of the future also become part of the Russia0 nature. Lenin wished to eradicate this quality- Pravda called it “the curse of Russia.” But it remain5 and now is often channeled into grandiose planning for the Soviet idealistic vision of the future.
Although they have been alleviated somewhat by modern living conditions and means of transporta' tion, the climatic and geographic influences on the Russian of today have not changed. Thus, with the survival of the same influences, the traditional characteristics also survive. Modern state and colleC' tive farm workers, construction workers, and eve° shipyard workers, accept long periods of idleness a5 appropriate behavior while they warm up from the bitter cold, wait out a storm, or start late and qult early because of darkness. They share with their ancestors the stamina needed to work under arduo°s conditions, and the modern Russians have learned t0 approach their work under such conditions at the same measured pace as their ancestors.
The Russian national experience with governmeot has been one of rule by autocrats, administration by bureaucrats, and enforcement by police tyranny. 0° the personal level it has been an existence for generations under serfdom followed by a brief period 0 capitalistic—and then a longer one, far fro'11 finished, of communistic—exploitation as worker5’ These have fostered passive submission to authorib and a consequent turning inward of personal opinio0* and feelings. They have created a tendency to avd0 the exercise of initiative and an unwillingness—eve° a seeming inability—to undertake a task witho°c specific direction and constant supervision. These experiences have further reinforced both an apathy toward things it appears one cannot change and *’ measured response to orders.
In the Soviet Union the centuries-old dominant of the autocracy, the bureaucracy, and the police continues. Thus, the modern Soviets have had little reason to reject and have, generally, accepted the val°e* of their forebears. The passive acceptance of the St°' lin terror is legendary, and the limited size of tbe
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ct from a loyalty to any government. The suspi- n and distrust of foreigners, sometimes bordering
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lssident movement, and especially Russian partici- ^at'°n in it, attests to the continued passive accept- at\Ce °f authority by the Russians of today. (The dis- th ent rnovement> °f which we read so much, is less an ten percent Russian. Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov are stand-outs because both the Soviet government and the dissident movement recognize them as pres- ‘fiious leaders simply because they are Russians, ^her than Balts, Jews, Kazakhs, or something else. e Soviet Union is Russian, and though Russians e altnost a minority, they are in the forefront of ReerythinS; state, party, military, even dissidence.) epeated stories in the Soviet press of rigid adher- 6 t0 Plan” by industrial managers despite all e dictates of common sense illustrate the persistent •ctance to exercise initiative. Likewise, a look at Cq ^rouP °f Soviet workers will attest to the need r direction and constant supervision.
Russian history is the story of repeated invasion, t always successfully countered, from both the east j^d west. From this has grown a deep love for the a°d of Russia and pride in the Slavic race. But,
. naps, because of an equally long history of con- internal struggles for power, this love is dis-
Paranoia, is old and deeply rooted. It is accom- to 'e<a ^ a strong fear °f attack and by a willingness 0 defend the country against such attack despite all
Boys at Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine, far from the sea, at quarters on hoard one of a flotilla offour training ships in the Dnepr River. During summer the hoys make a voyage to the mouth of the river, 300 miles distant, and hack. A Soviet source tells us that “they live according to the naval regulations, take part in military games, and perform naval duties under specialists in various naval professions.”
odds. When the Germans attacked in 1941, enormous numbers—whole formations—of Soviet troops defected to the invaders. Flowers were strewn in the way of the conquering German troops. But it wasn’t Russians who did those things. It was Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and other oppressed peoples who thought the Germans would liberate them from the Russians.
The flow of modern Russian cultural development originated in Byzantium, was stimulated and preserved by Orthodoxy, and was influenced by the presence of Asian hordes. A further influence was its isolation from the West. The Russians, not only the peasants, but most of the leaders as well, lacked contact with the concepts of the legal and administrative forms of Rome, the entrepreneurial and political influences of the Italian republics, the artistic and civilizing contributions of the Renaissance, the religious, moral, and individualistic ideals of the Ref-
ormation, and the philosophical and constitutional thoughts of the English, American, and French revolutions. Isolated from the tempering and balancing influences of other ideas, Russian culture developed a religious mysticism which was not, and perhaps could not, be applied as a moral guide for pragmatic day-to-day living. Certainly, there were idealistic, Utopian, and radical philosophic and constitutional notions but generally they were divorced from practical politics and government. The absence of an intellectual market place precluded the growth of tolerance for variety and diversity in philosophic and political views. It also left Russians ignorant of so many things and in such a state of technical and material underdevelopment that, when they encountered the world, they developed feelings of inferiority, often masked by national or racial chauvinism.
Soviet cultural isolation continues today. Censorship goes on. Restrictions on travel continue. Propaganda flourishes. The traditional Russian attitudes towards, and beliefs about, the outside world persist.
There has been a long Russian tradition of life within the extended family, of living in a communal village, and of sharing the collective experience, first of serfdom and then of communism. This has led to an acceptance of a communal rather than an individualistic way of life. It has hobbled the development of self-discipline and self-reliance. It has reduced feelings of personal responsibility for many of one’s actions and of personal satisfaction for the accomplishment of a task and has reinforced bureaucratic tendencies.
Today communism, with its collective farms, industrial collectives, and communal apartments, continues the traditional Russian way of life and fosters the traditional Russian attitudes. Governments have used the feelings of responsibility to the group as an effective form of motivation and of group censure as an effective form of control.
The social structure of Russia long consisted of only a tiny cosmopolitan upper class, a small urban bureaucratic or rural gentry middle class, and a large rural serf and tenant peasant class. The land the serfs and peasants worked was owned by others, and so were the tools provided them. Few received benefits relating directly to their industry or expertise. Thus, most developed a detached, careless approach t0 work.
The industrial revolution was late in coming 10 Russia and when it did it had only the peasant of recently freed (1862) serf class on which to draw f°r workers. In Russia, as in the early industrial age everywhere, the worker was exploited. But, unlike those in Western Europe or North America, in RuS" sia workers lacked the heritage or educational opp°r' tunity to become acquainted with the concepts °r personal freedom, private enterprise, liberal politics- and representative government through which they could shape their own destinies and begin to r|Se above their earlier limitations.
As a result of the Russian revolution, the purges- and the wars which followed, several generations 0 the upper and middle classes containing the bes1 educated members of society were lost as they fle^> were imprisoned, or were killed. The workers lfl whose name all the blood was shed have no greater access to the wealth of knowledge and ideas outsit of Russia’s borders than did their peasant ancestors- Indeed, Soviet industry is still manned by exploited workers and, for its new workers, still draws on the rural peasant class. For this reason the old detached attitude toward the quantity and quality of work aC' complished still remains very low.
These, then, are the major and persistent influence5 which have shaped the national character and the mental process of the Russian people and which, oOe way or another, should affect their performance aS navy men. But there are others. Just as the monotonous Russian landscape and weather can vatf occasionally, so can the Russian character, swingi0? erratically out of its normal passivity and apathy ir>t0 brief moods of violence and overoptimism °f> perhaps, into short, vigorous bursts of activity.
Sometimes the dreary history of tyranny and sub' jugation has been broken by futile rebellions and hopeless outbursts of anarchism. In fact, short-lived- disorganized, and usually futile efforts at resistant
Thus, Mi
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t0 authority still occasionally occur among the usually passive Russians.
Despite the isolation of the masses from contact Wlth the West, a portion of the influential elements ° Russian society, the “Westernizers,” have always tawn ideas from and interacted with the West.
western theoretical concepts, whether they be arxism, impressionism in art, or, today, technol- °Sy, have often had exaggerated and prolonged influ- fnce on Russia. But they have always been opposed y an even more influential element, the Slavophiles, Who distrusted imports from the West.
In the Soviet Navy, the authorities can depend on a^y°ung man’ s patriotism, his idealism, his suspicion 0 foreigners, and his fear of attack to make him ready to accept military service. He will submit ready ro military authority, adapt easily to the close and afed living conditions of a barracks or a ship, rec- °gnize early his responsibility to the unit, and re- ^P°nd effectively to group motivation and control.
e will bring great strength, endurance, and pa- ’nence to his work and, on occasion, will be capable short bursts of feverish activity. On the other ncL the Navy finds that he needs constant motiva- j°n, direction, and supervision to overcome his ten- ncy to idleness, his apathy, his plodding approach "'ork, his reluctance to exercise initiative, and his ^Willingness to discipline himself, or to depend on rnself. He seems to lack the ability to organize his p °ws and his work spontaneously and effectively. 0r a modern sailor he is technically underdeveloped, ^rude, and haphazard in his work. Given authority, ls likely to be bureaucratic and to exercise his P°Wer arbitrarily and harshly.
Training
'e new Soviet man”
R is this character upon which the Soviet regime SqS attempted to build the “new Soviet man.” To do > the regime has sought to reinforce the characteris- s of the Russian people believed desirable and to 'minate or modify the others, lo ^ °nC t*me’ Stal*n rebed on the concepts of the ^ng since discredited (indeed, incredible) biologist r°fim Lysenko, who died in obscurity a few years ako. Based on Lysenko’s theories, Stalin had hoped at after developing one generation of new Soviet trieri, the characteristics could be transmitted genet- CalIy to the next generation, then, further devel- ^Ped, continually perfecting the qualities of the new °viet man. With the fall of Lysenko’s theories from
official favor, no doubt as a result of unassailable evidence provided by the new generation, it became evident to even the most enthusiastic Stalinists that the building of a new Soviet man would be a never- ending process which must start anew with each generation.
To this end, the Soviet Union has an educational and indoctrination program starting in pre-nursery school and going through ten years of school. It is furthered by compulsory military service, by the requirement to participate in party organizations in order to get and hold a desirable job or to pursue a career. Finally, it is furthered by continual propaganda.
Organizations controlled by the party occupy the youth from his early years through young adulthood. While these exist to ensure proper political development and to prepare people for military service, they also provide social, cultural, and recreational opportunities which otherwise are not available. They are, thus, both useful to the Party and acceptable to young people, most of whom belong to them.
During summer camp, teenage boys and girls participate in games which teach basic military concepts and skills. From age 14 onward they are members of the Lenin Komsomol. This is the training and selection period for future members of the Party. Komsomol members work to complete a series of requirements proving their qualifications for party membership. They also have the opportunity to participate in a wide range of cultural or social events and, in the summer, to make tours, serve in work brigades, or participate in more advanced military games directed by military officers.
At ages 16 and 17, either at work or in school, a total of 140 hours of basic military training is required of all boys in preparation for their compulsory military service (though so far, in reality only about 75 percent of them yet get this training). It is given by military departments in the schools, factories, or farms under the control of the Ministry of Defense via the local Komisariat. Beyond that required amount, however, there are opportunities for further military-related specialist training through the DOSAAF (The All Union Society for the Support of the Army, Navy, and Air Force). This organization consists of school and factory clubs which provide training in fifteen military-related skills. Not only are young men encouraged to join, many are anxious to do so because it is about the only way they can pursue such interests as auto repair, electronics, radio, model building, marksmanship, flying, sailing, and sky diving.
Enlisted Training
Finally, obligatory military training attempts to shape the Soviet character. On reaching the age of 18, all young men are registered and, usually, drafted for two years’ service (with the army, ashore in the navy, or in one of the air forces) or three years (with the navy at sea or the rocket force). The first choice of conscripts is givin to the rocket force, second best to the navy, others elsewhere. University and other students engaged in higher education are deferred but become participants in a program of inschool training which upon graduation will make them reserve sailors. Whether called up or not, all reservists and all conscripts are forever in the reserve—or at least they are until they reach retirement age. Reserve training is supposed to be for two months every three years, but implementation varies and call-ups are sporadic and incomplete. When they do occur, some serve, some don’t.
for these specialists minimize theory in favor of practical training in specific military-technical functions- Naval training is organized around “socialist com' petition” between watch sections within a ship and between ships. New conscripts are assigned to watch sections to understudy and receive on-the-job train' ing from more experienced sailors, each of whom ,s responsible for preparing the conscript as his relief The pressures of socialist competition, the results 0 which are important to the career of both the com'
Upon entry into the military those conscripts slated for non-technical jobs, having already ha their basic military training, go directly to operational units. Because of the high degree of specialization required for many jobs in the navy, however, those who are slated as specialists receive additiona training for perhaps as long as six months. Schools
mantling officer and political officer of the ship, are ^signed to ensure that the watch officer and watch section will do all in their power to integrate the new conscript as a functioning part of the unit. The train- ,ng year is so organized that the various events of socialist competition, intra-ship, individual ship, and fleet exercises, both force and test this integra- tlon. Thus, the conscript is led by schooling, on- the-job training, and the pressure to integrate into che watch section into becoming a specialist profi- Clent in operating and maintaining one piece of equipment or performing one function. Only recently has cross-training begun to be emphasized as a requirement.
A Soviet sailor is also supposed to work toward three career oriented goals which will be marked by P'ns he will be awarded. First he works to achieve a designation as a specialist 3d, 2d, or 1st class, or master. These are proficiency ratings, not ranks.2 Second, he continues his Komsomol membership and w°rks to advance through the requirements of that Or£anization. Finally, he works to maintain a good disciplinary record. If he has obtained a specialist rat- lng» has met certain Komsomol requirements, and caused no disciplinary problems, he will be designed an “Otlichnik” (outstanding sailor) by his commanding officer. It is the technically proficient, llt least outwardly politically enthusiastic, and well •scipfined sailor who is encouraged to remain as an extended serviceman or enter the warrant officer ^michman) program. But less than ten percent stay ln- They are promised promotion to michman, and on for five-year periods. The remainder of the 0rce is a continually changing group of conscripts ^‘th only limited military and technical training. u°st likely it is these who retain, and perform in accordance with, the traditional Russian character.
fficer Training
^egular naval officers are educated in eleven five- ^ear institutions known as higher naval schools. election for these schools is rigorous, based on pre- Vl°us academic and political achievement and competitive examinations. It also includes, however, a objective process which ensures that sons of naval officers, politicians, and bureaucrats, as well as some the more talented sailors or michmen, have a bet- [er than average chance to gain entrance. Thus, the kursant” is most often an urban, possibly well educed, essentially middle class youth. There may still
‘•‘nerally, promotion in rank depends on time in service and a vacancy ’ ^hich one can be moved. Promotion in rating depends on tests. SUally, the two complement each other: If a vacancy for a petty officer Pens up, the seaman with the highest rating gets it.
be some officers who have not graduated from a Higher Naval School, but they are rare and probably all over 50 years old.
There is a higher naval school for surface line officers in each of the fleet areas, plus specialized higher naval schools for submariners, seagoing engineers, shore duty engineers, radio-electronic specialists, and political officers. Aviators are trained with their air force counterparts in higher aviation schools, and some other specialists such as construction or transportation officers are trained in army higher specialized schools. Those men who were deferred from conscription because of attendance at a university or other higher educational institution receive officer training to augment their specialized civilian training and become reserve officers upon graduation. Those who do serve are likely to come from schools for merchant mariners, fishermen, or shipbuilding technicians. Most will never serve, at least not if they can get a job which will permit their continued deferment.
There are no women in the navy as such. But there are some in various auxiliary naval organizations. They are separate, and wear different uniforms from those of the navy.
Training in all Soviet higher schools, but especially the higher military schools, emphasizes knowledge rather than thought, and stresses practical application rather than theoretical understanding. Graduates of surface line higher naval schools are specialists in one of the five warfare specialties (navigation, gunnery/missiles, ASW, communications/ electronics, engineering) rather than broadly trained naval officers. Similarly, graduates of submarine higher naval schools are specialists, such as ASW officers, rather than broadly qualified submarine officers.
The typical graduate of a higher naval line school, beginning a career of from 25 to 35 years, will report to the department in his first ship which corresponds to his school specialty. If the ship is a major combatant, he will generally spend his first four to six years in that ship and in that very department, working up through a series of assignments, each requiring broader technical knowledge, more leadership and managerial ability, and satisfactory completion of a series of tests until he becomes department head. In a smaller ship he has more diversity of service.
Junior officers are not only the managers and leaders but, also, the principal technical specialists of their departments. They supervise and, often, perform the major operational or maintenance and repair functions of the department. Furthermore, they carry a heavy burden of political work. They must fulfill their own responsibilities as a candidate party mem-
ber, oversee the political indoctrination of their subordinates, and organize and administer the ever- continuing programs of socialist competition.'1 They, assuredly, form the backbone and carry the burden of work in the Soviet Navy. It is during these trying early years that the officer is evaluated by his commanding officer for his command potential.
The commanding officer plays a major role in determining who will progress to command at sea. He selects his own “Starpom” (senior assistant commander, or executive officer) from among his department heads, and it is this officer who has the opportunity to undergo training for and take the command-at-sea test. The captain plans and personally supervises the Starpom’s training which ensures that he receives a broad exposure to and experience in all aspects of the ship and her operations. In addition to the normal administrative, security, and disciplinary duties of an executive officer, the prospective commander understudies in those departments in which he has not served and spends much time on the bridge. This is the first step in turning a highly specialized junior officer into a more broadly qualified officer.
When certified by his commanding officer, the Starpom is tested for his readiness for command at sea by the staff of the operational commander. The test includes written examinations, practical exercises, and an interview with the operational commander and his political officer. Upon successful completion of the objective test and subjective interview, the Starpom generally becomes the next commanding officer of the ship in which he has served so long, or of a sister ship in the same formation. An officer who has commanded a small ship successfully is likely to become Starpom in a larger one, an then, perhaps, CO of that ship. (In the Soviet Navy- ships are divided into four categories, the largest being in class 1. The smallest vessels are in class 4, and may be commanded by reservists or michmen.)
When that happens, one is promoted. Thus, promotion is really controlled by those who give out jobs- A commanding officer gives out the jobs in his ship- so he really promotes the officers in his ship. The operational unit commander, division, eskhadra, °r whatever, chooses the commanding officers, and thus controls promotion at that level. The fleet corn' mander or Moscow writes the orders for higher post' tions and thus “selects.” Clearly, selection is both decentralized and subjective.
Promotion for officers then, depends not only ol^ having sufficient time in grade but on being ordere into a billet which calls for the next higher grade-
A department head who after several opportunities ^as not been selected for executive officer and c°rnmand-at-sea training becomes a career specialist.
usually receives additional training or schooling and continues to be promoted in rank as he progresses up the specialist chain in a series of sea and shore duty billets.
The typical command tour in the Soviet Navy lasts °ur or five years, providing the officer with ample °Pportunity to develop his newly broadened CaPabilities and to master his profession. During his c°rnmand tour the officer carries many responsibilities, but shares the authority. Even though the Soviet Navy officially endorses “one man command” rhe co is subjected to strict professional and political checks. When senior commanders ride a ship as flag- sh'p, they take over many of the commanding offiCer s functions, including conning the ship when entering port. In addition, “flag specialists” from the operational commander’s staff are almost always embarked, directing the shipboard training programs and overseeing the socialist competition. Addition- ahy, as a candidate party member, the captain is li- 1 ‘e to socialist criticism from the lowest ranking Member of his crew through the Komsomol or Party otuts aboard. He is subject to constant monitoring A the political officer who provides advice and guid- ar>ce from the Party and is responsible for much of che work related to crew morale, political indoctrina- tlon and, even, insuring that the plan for, but not che technical aspects of, military training activity is rriet as required. It is not surprising that this constant interference by his seniors, possibility of open Criticism by his subordinates, and scrutiny by the Party tends to stifle any tendencies toward innova- tl0n> initiative, or decisiveness possessed by the commanding officer. In consequence, many officers evelop into cautious technicians and bureaucrats. Upon completion of his command tour in a major c°mbatant, or sometimes if he has already commanded a smaller ship, just before getting that major Cornmand, the Soviet line officer attends the “Naval Academy,” where he receives professional broadening °f a type different from that which he gets afloat, but still usually related to his early specialization. The c°urses vary in length from three to five years and m*ght be likened to a combination of a postgraduate ^egree program and a command and staff course.
Ven then, graduating officers can expect their duty m be specialized by ship type and professional skills, 0r they generally go to a seagoing staff in a job in- v°lving their specialty and concerned with the type ship which they have commanded. For example, a kraduate of the weapons course at the higher naval
school who served in the gunnery department of a destroyer before commanding that ship probably took his advanced degree in a weapons-related subject at the Naval Academy. He will be assigned as a gunnery specialist on the staff of a destroyer unit and will hope to rise to command that formation as an admiral. That is, of course, the ideal career pattern, and there are variations for the needs of the service. Nevertheless, it is typical of the careers of many Soviet officers and is likely to be more so as the reconstruction of the Soviet fleet into a bluewater force reaches its end.
The System
The armed forces are not just a part of the Soviet system. They are the most important part. They receive the highest priorities in both the quantity and quality of material and personnel and in the authority for flexibility in their use. In contrast, many parts of the civil sector are hampered in their development by shortages of funds. Military research and development is segregated from civil R&D and directed carefully, while civil efforts are diverse and diffuse. In industry, the emphasis is on meeting military goals, if necessary, at the expense of the civil plan. In fact, the entire economy remains oriented towards supporting the military effort.
Thus, closely integrated with the Soviet system, the navy, like the army and the other armed forces, shares the characteristics of that system. Because of the favoritism shown the armed services, however, the strong points of the system are enhanced and the shortcomings ameliorated, thus making the accomplishments of the military greater than those of the society as a whole and the problems fewer. Consequently, the navy’s performance is generally similar to, but significantly better than, the performance of the system as a whole.
Success and Problems
The Soviet system is usually successful in meeting its goals despite enormous problems.
It owes much of its success to the many heroic qualities of the Russian people. Their strength, endurance, persistence, determination, and seeming ability to continue their efforts despite all hardships have been the key to the development of Soviet industrial and military power. Their romanticism, dreaminess, idealistic approach to life, and willingness to suffer have, likewise, contributed much to the continued progress of the Soviet Union toward world power. Relying on these characteristics, the
the Soviet armed forces overcame all adversity to turn back the enemy at Moscow and Stalingrad. There is little doubt, then, that the most important characteristic which the navy shares with the system as n whole is the determination to achieve the goals set for it despite all difficulty or cost. When considering the quality and evaluating the operational readiness and combat effectiveness of the Soviet Navy, this characteristic should be emphasized.
rulers of Russia and the Soviet Union have generally been able to set and achieve goals in the face of adversities which might discourage or dissuade other nations.
As the Soviet system progresses toward its goals despite all difficulties and costs, so does the Soviet military. The enormous difficulties which the Russian fleet overcame in sailing from the Baltic to Tsushima are well known. History documents how
Manpower and skills
Another characteristic of the Soviet system has been that while it has been long on manpower, it has been short on skills.
In the past, the existence of a large serf or peasant class and, today, the expanding population of Central Asia, has insured a ready pool of manpower for expansion and development of the Tsarist empire or Soviet system. Yet the limited exposure of the old Russian peasant to machinery or the present Soviet citizen to •nodern and sophisticated equipment, or even consumer gadgetry, has limited the number of persons qualified to be skilled workers without extensive training.
The Soviets have a fetish for training large numbers of researchers and engineers and establishing a Myriad of research institutes. This has permitted many less-well-qualified people who could have be- c°me skilled workers to receive marginal training and be drawn out of the labor force for employment ,n what often becomes non-productive work. Further, the involvement of the Party and government in every facet of life demands huge numbers of bureaucrats and again draws many of the country’s most capable people out of the labor pool to be en- 8aged in counter-productive efforts.
In addition, there is a very low birth rate among tbe skilled urban workers whose children, just by their environment and better opportunities for schooling, would have become the leaders and skilled Workers of the future. This leaves as the main source °f skilled workers the rural population, now increas- lngly from the republics of Central Asia. The technically backward environment of these people and their hmited opportunity for schooling means that to be- c°me skilled workers they must have extensive train-
fog.
The most visible evidences of this shortage of skilled manpower are the permanent help-wanted Slgns at every factory gate and the large training schools established and run by every enterprise.
These same charateristics of the Soviet civil sector als° seem to apply to the Soviet Navy. Today, conscription provides a numerically adequate manpower mput for the rapidly developing and expanding naval force, requiring more skilled personnel every year. Nevertheless, the navy also faces problems getting and retaining those men who make the best techni- Clans. By the time the men of sophisticated urban upbringing reach draft age they have already become •nvolved in professional training or Party work which exempts them from service or, at least, qualifies them to become officers.
Recent reports of sailors from all Soviet republics aboard such ships as nuclear-powered submarines and Missile-armed surface ships rated as outstanding illustrate that the Soviet Navy also has experienced an ■nflux of non-urban and Asian personnel and is as- s,gning them to its first-line units. While this has aPparently been done successfully despite poor relationships among ethnic groups, the fact that 25 percent of all Central Asian men conscripted cannot speak Russian adequately indicates the high cost in training time and effort required to build and maintain the navy. A Kazakh speaks a different language from a Russian, has a different alphabet and, if he hasn’t studied Russian, will be lost in a ship in which all that is said and written is in Russian. A good indication that the training time, effort, and expenditures have increased to the point where the Soviet Navy has become seriously concerned is provided by the establishment of the “michman” program in 1972. (With different meanings, the word “michman” has been used off and on since the time of Peter the Great.) The program was clearly designed to retain trained and skilled enlisted men beyond their initial three-year tour of conscript service by providing them increased training, pay, benefits, and prestige. It hasn’t enticed many. Aside from the charms of life ashore anywhere, there are good jobs to be had for trained men in civil life where they are under the surveillance and pressure of a political officer only eight or ten hours a day instead of twenty- four. Moreover, men get weary of the constant high tension of Socialist competition, of the training which never ceases, of the total absence of leave, of the scarce liberty, and the poor pay which the navy offers them. So, the navy still faces a shortage of trained rated personnel. Just recently tour lengths of reserve personnel have been increased, in some cases to two years.
Design and Construction
Soviet design practices, like the fine arts to which they are related, tend to be grandiose, artistically romantic, and classic in style. Because of the long standing autocratic and bureaucratic experience and the resultant cautious attitudes, they also tend to be conservative. The continuum of serfdom, peasantry, and exploited worker and the resultant continued existence of a population with limited technical capabilities and crude work traits has caused Soviet designers to emphasize ruggedness and simplicity of construction. These are fine attributes. Yet, because of some of these same influences, Soviet construction practices have come to be affected by crudeness of assembly, roughness of finish, and lack of detail which frequently causes equipment to fall short in performance.
For example, in the just concluded five-year plan the construction of housing was given top priority on the civil side of things. There is no doubt concerning the Soviet recognition of the seriousness of the housing shortage and the regime’s dedication to overcoming it. The best urban planners, architects, and engineers developed plans for the rapid construction of large amounts of new housing. The concepts were
grandiose. The plans featured thoughtfully laid out areas of well-designed buildings to be constructed by the most advanced methods. On paper, these concepts, plans, and designs appeared to be the ideal solution to the housing problem. The execution, however, was turned over to large centralized construction trusts, poorly managed by bureaucrats and staffed with unskilled labor. One result has been that from a distance Soviet cities look impressive, with
Vast areas of modern buildings. On inspection, however> those buildings are revealed to be shabbily conducted, deteriorating rapidly, often sitting in a sea mud and construction rubble, often unfinished, unsafe, and unsuitable for habitation because of faulty electrical systems, plumbing, or other finish 'v°rk. In essence, despite the excellent design, poor management and crude workmanship have spoiled fke solution and, in fact, created more problems for the future. The situation seems to be the same throughout the industrial system. Two of the main eatures of the press are continuous praise accorded to Soviet science and technology and endless complaint about the shabby workmanship of Soviet goods.
Evidence of the excellence of design of Soviet naval ships lies in their beautiful proportions and the thoughtful use of space for the maximum number autl variety of weapons and sensors. Evidence of poor instruction practices is more difficult to ascertain. a)°r problems due to poor workmanship have,
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Wever, been noted in the Posyet class of fishing j'hips built in Leningrad by the same shipyards which u,ld submarines for the Soviet Navy and in the snpertanker Krym built in the Black Sea by a shipyard which also constructs naval combatants.
liability and Repair
Those influences which cause Soviet equipment to . e rugged and simple in design and less sophisticated ln Workmanship also contribute to insuring that the t(lmpment is reliable or, at least, that it is inexpen- SlVe enough so that duplication can provide reliabil- l[y- This is important in light of those traits drawn r°m the Russians’ long experience as serfs, peasants, °r exploited workers, doing someone else’s work with s°meone else’s tools, which have created a certain isregard for the preservation or repair of equipment, bis attitude seems to continue today as the worker andles the equipment of the state which he recog- ni2es, despite the propaganda, as not his own.
E)espite their importance to that huge country, °v*et aircraft and trucks suffer from poor repair and ^aintenance. During one period in 1973 the acci- ent rate on the only airline, Aeroflot, was so high cbat even the reticent press commented on the need improve airline safety and stressed the need for etter repair, maintenance, and inspection practices. n any city one finds the streets clogged with trucks, almost all of them in poor and even dangerous condi- tl0n- It is not at all unusual to find trucks broken °Wn and undergoing repair by the driver in midget after the engine has quit or the axle or transmission has fallen into the street.
it would seem that similar poor repair and maintenance procedures also prevail in the military. After all, the drivers of the broken-down trucks this year were the sailors in those impressive-looking ships one saw last year. On 7 November when the Soviet Union parades its tanks and missiles through Red Square, the equipment is from a special parade-unit and has been specially prepared, painted, and practiced for this annual great event to ensure that all goes smoothly. Yet, for each group of 8 or 12 vehicles in the parade there is always one spare standing by in case of a breakdown, which happens commonly enough.
Likewise, our frequent observations of the same naval units repeatedly deploying out of their home waters, and the paucity of sightings of the others suggests that those deployed are the first-line units specially prepared for such deployment. Yet we observe that even those deployed first-line surface ships and diesel submarines seem to spend days, or even weeks, inactive at anchor or at buoys. Is this because their equipment has finally broken down, because it is being conserved to assure reliability, or because preventive maintenance is an unfamiliar concept and thus takes long to accomplish? Regardless, the low level of activity of deployed Soviet naval forces is likely related to the characteristics of reliability and repair which the Soviet Navy shares with the system and which must affect its operational readiness and combat effectiveness.
Availability and Use of Resources
The Russians have long had an inferiority complex about the modernity and degree of mechanization of their system in comparison to that of the West. To a Soviet manager and worker the machine has become a symbol of progress or a mark of equality with the West, and a status symbol not only for himself but for his enterprise and his nation. Thus, in planning, the emphasis is on capital investment in plant and machinery and on the production and acquisition of heavy equipment. The number of pieces of equipment which an organization possesses is a mark of its importance. Ports and shipyards are lined with impressive looking but perpetually idle cranes. Cities are overly equipped with street-sweeping trucks, street-light-changing trucks, snow plows, and water-spraying trucks. In general, enterprises have an overabundance of trucks assigned for the job at hand.
The efficient use of these abundant resources is another matter. Again the airline and trucking systems can serve as illustrations. Aeroflot scheduling is elementary. Most cities are served by a number of flights from Moscow and an equal number back to Moscow each day, with a lesser number of pairs of flights to and from other cities each day. If a city is served by five flights, then five airplanes can be found on the airport parking apron. It seems that there are two planes dedicated to every round trip flight between cities in the Soviet Union. Each moves only once in 24 hours for a single flight to its destination, where it then sits for another 24 hours until the flight back.
Centralized truck parks also look impressive, with row upon row of trucks. Nevertheless, such parks and centralized dispatch and control points have their drawbacks. Because of the need to move to and from these points at the beginning and end of the day and, often, between working trips, most trucks carry a daily payload of only about 25 to 30 percent of their potential.
Likewise, in the navy there also seems to be an abundance of under-used equipment. The large force of older diesel submarines is one case in point, and the apparent redundancy of sensors and weapons on the newest ships is another.
But an overabundance of combat equipment and inefficient use of it in peacetime is not necessarily a bad thing for a military organization. It should insure that the navy is well equipped and ready for immediate wartime employment with the most favorable combination of forces on any type of mission required. This is what Admiral Gorshkov means when he speaks of the “balanced fleet” which he has been building.
Supply and Distribution
The many influences which have denied the Russians the ability to exercise initiative, to act spontaneously without direction, or to cooperate efficiently and willingly have created a chaotic civil supply and distribution system.
Stories of the snafus in the Soviet supply system are legendary. The production of goods no one wants, the absence of those everyone wants, the presence in warehouses of goods no one knows about, the shortages of an item in one area while another area has too many of the same thing, the lack of spare parts for important machines, and the inability to move things from the producer to the consumer are daily topics in the Soviet press. Cannibalization and jury-rigging are common on the Soviet farm and in the factory.
Recently, the automobile has been making its appearance on the Soviet scene in more than token numbers. Its introduction is the result of planning on the part of the Party and government. The wide discussion of the subject beforehand, the prolonged period of negotiation and industrial plant construction before production began, and the modest numbers available have all provided ample time and opportunity to make preparations. Yet when the vehicles began to appear on the roads, no maintenance facilities had been provided and no spare parts were available. It soon became clear that theft was the only way to obtain spare parts, and the cannibal^2' tion of vehicles belonging to others became commonplace. The alternative was one’s own immobih zation. The absence of spare parts for the tractors an trucks required to bring in the harvest has been cite as among the causes of recent agricultural disasters- The navy must operate its own supply and distrr bution system. While we know little about it, we can see that Soviet ships on deployment are not supported by a large supply train. We know from the military press that commanders are urged to limir the hours they operate engines and equipment. these clues indicate a naval supply system which shares with the rest of the country the ability to pr°' duce goods but not to distribute them? It could be-
Command and Implementation
The Soviet system suffers from a significant gap t>e' tween giving a command and insuring its implemem tation. The autocratic and bureaucratic tradition originated during the period centuries ago when the “Tartar Yoke” was imposed upon the ancient Slavic peoples. It was later adopted and perfected by ^e tsars. The Communist concepts of “democratic cen tralism” and of the Party as the “vanguard of the proletariat” have further centralized and bureau cratized the state. These features of administration have contributed to the lack of initiative, innovation- or feelings of personal responsibility or accountability among Soviet officials today. ^
Decision-making authority resides at the top 0 the state and likewise, at the top of all subordim‘te organs, where it is strictly limited and carefully clf' cumscribed. While the authority for decision exiscS only at the top, the responsibility for implement!1' tion is widely spread through a vast bureaucracy which has not participated in the decision-makinf process and, thus, feels little responsibility for lt5 success. Furthermore, there are overlapping Pad! and governmental bureaucracies. Within each the managerial, administrative, scientific, industrial, at1 educational organizations are “centralized” by fu°c tion. Since rarely is a decision limited to simply ‘‘ Party or a governmental matter, or affecting only °ne function of the system, there usually are bureaucracies vigorously competing to shape the decision before it is made, or to control its implementation after it is made. Having no part in the decision' taking process itself, they seek to shape and control lts implementation to protect their own interests rather than to insure carrying out the decision. Even rnajor decisions are subjected to this process. The result is continuous failure to implement planned goals.
For example, the high growth rate of the Soviet economy has long been maintained by providing incasing amounts of capital investment and labor.
hese are not endless resources, and several decades ago the Party and government settled on the “science and technical revolution” as the means to inCrease productivity and sustain Soviet economic growth. Both the ninth and tenth five year plans called for more productivity based on increased emphasis on science and technology in industry. Yet each plan ended with a diminishing, rather than an ■ocreasing, growth rate for the Soviet economy.
Obviously the decision has been made at the highest levels. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Soviet Union is a dictatorship with a “command economy,” the implementation has been unsuccessful s° far.
The bluewater portion of the navy, like the econ- 0rr>y in general, has experienced sustained growth by 'Te continued input of capital investment and increased manpower. Also, like the economy there has eer> the recognition that the input of such resources Cannot continue indefinitely. Indeed, a shortage of JT'anpower may be begun to be felt in about 1983.
^ns, like the economy, the increased introduction °f new technology has become the key to continued rraval progress. For the past several years naval writ- 'ngs, including the recent books of Admiral Gorsh- 0vi have stressed the role of the “scientific and technical revolution” in the development of the navy ar)d the need for the mastery of science and technology as the key to increasing the capabilities of the fleet.
F^oes the navy share with the other parts of the sVstem the ability to make decisions but the inability to implement them? The question as to whether the navy can sustain growth by the introduction of new technology when the civil sector has failed to do so espite support at the highest levels is an issue vital to any evaluation of Soviet naval operational readiness a°d combat effectiveness.
Like all Soviet decision-making, naval operational c°mmand is highly centralized, carefully limited, a°d closely monitored by the Party. It shares with system in general the relationship in which the Senior is reluctant to delegate authority and the sub- 0rdinate is unwilling to accept responsibility. Arties in the press criticize both senior officers for not
permitting subordinate commanders more latitude and junior officers for not assigning more responsibility to warrant officers and enlisted men. Repeatedly articles also stress the need for decisiveness, initiative, and innovation on the part of junior commanders. There is enough evidence to suggest a reluctance on the part of junior commanders to operate beyond the letter of the orders received or to act in absence of orders.
Conclusion
If we consider the Soviet Navy in the context of the Russian people, their training, and the system, we will recognize that it, like all other navies, is performing as best it can under the circumstances imposed by the nature of its personnel, the training they receive, and the characteristics of the system upon which it is based. These impart to the Soviet Navy characteristics which both advance and detract from operational readiness and combat effectiveness. Beneficial characteristics include the patriotism, strength, endurance, and heroism of the enlisted ranks, the long specialized training and technical competence of the officers, the inherent ability of the Russians to achieve despite all odds, and the abundance of well-designed, reliable (but not necessarily adequate) equipment. Among the factors working to the detriment of the navy are the poor motivation and limited competence of its sailors, the restrictions on the initiative of its officers as well as the poor construction, maintenance, and supply practices, and the general inefficiency of the Soviet system.
When assessing Soviet naval capabilities we must, of course, continue to do so on the basis of the number of warships, the characteristics of weapon systems, and the extent of the operations we observe. We must not, however, attribute to that force a degree of operational readiness and combat effectiveness based on a “mirror image” of U.S. personnel, training, and support systems. Rather, we must evaluate these things in the context of an understanding of the suitability of the Russian people for naval duty, the quality of the training they receive, and a knowledge of the characteristics of the system which supports those naval operations.