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Contents
‘T’l
e Knosr-Class Frigate—A Reassessment 93 y Commander Thomas B. Buell, U. S. Navy Atr ' ■
lining Command at Sea—Soviet Style 97
y Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., U. S. Navy
The U. S. Navy has 46 Knox-class ;r*gates in commission. They have )°>ned the fleet in recent years accompanied with controversy and notoriety, ^acerbated when the Knox frigates ^came a cause celebre on the pages of che Proceedings as a prize essay. The most filing indictments were the ships’ want firepower and engineering redundancy. Whatever the misgivings, there are ^nte Knox-class frigates than there are uhits of any other single class of warship ^thin the active fleet, a distinction "’hich will be true for many years. Thus, an appreciation of the class’ capabilities, 'nutations, and potential is both timely anfl appropriate.
A Knox-class frigate is neither a beau- nful nor graceful ship; rather, she has a ^arge, box-shaped superstructure surmounted with an incongruous "mayPole” mack (mast and stack) amidships. ^Chen seen at a distance at sea, it often ls difficult to distinguish bow from stern. ^"et this unique shape is one of her assets, for she is a roomy ship. Equipment spaces are large and cool, allowing access for repairs and maintenance. Cop- *°us, well-located storerooms, refrigerators, and freezers allow the ship to be Self-sustaining for unusually long Periods. For example, a Knox frigate can ke provisioned for a six-month Middle East deployment without using fan- r°oms or hangar, with but one midterm replenishment. Offices, work shops, ship’s store, messing areas, barbershop, and laundry are also well planned and in logical locations. ASW weapon magazines have large capacities, although the gun magazine is small. Finally, her volume provides space and weight reservations for future equipment and systems.
Another feature of her boxy superstructure is that it encloses most of the main deck. Thus equipment—such as life jacket lockers, portable booms, portable ladders, brows, fuel oil hoses, and compressed gas bottles—is inside and protected from sea and weather.
The author’s assessment of the class, developed from commanding the USS Joseph Hewes (FF-1078) and talking to other Knox commanders and those who have operated with units of the class, is that the design is generally well conceived in the areas of deck, hull, habitability, supply, and medical. Some individual ships of the class suffer from inferior material and poor workmanship employed during their construction.
The frigate’s much talked-about single engine is both an asset and a liability. The engine is economical and efficient, requiring fewer gallons per mile than twin-screw ships of equivalent displacement. A Knox also has greater fuel capacity than twin-screw ships of equivalent or slightly greater displacement. Consequently she has greater endurance than her two-engined sisters.
As to reliability, she has adequate redundancy with respect to numbers of pumps and other auxiliary machinery. Her main propulsion plant, when properly maintained and operated by trained personnel, is safe and reliable. Today, Knox-class frigates routinely deploy for long periods overseas, such as Middle East deployments where they excel. Nevertheless there are engineering casualties which will stop the K#ax-class frigate dead in the water, casualties which a twin-screw ship could sustain by cross connecting without losing steerageway. The class’ 750 kw. ship’s service diesel generator, fortunately, provides enough electrical power should the engineers need to secure steam underway for repairs. "Be prepared to stop and fix her,” must be the philosophy of a Knox frigate commanding officer when certain casualties occur. Good maintenance and training will minimize casualties—a well-maintained main propulsion plant rarely fails.
It is the opinion of the author that two-boiler operation does not provide any greater degree of safety or reliability than one boiler. The two boilers cannot be split; a casualty to one is frequently a casualty to both. Furthermore, it is more demanding on fireroom personnel to operate two boilers than one. Two boilers tend to interact owing to their commonality; for example, feedwater pumps cannot be split between the two
and
engine and rudder, and the use
boilers, and both boilers discharge steam into a common line. Thus boiler technicians can control impending casualties more readily on one boiler than two. The rationale for two-boiler operation is to sustain flank speeds when required and to provide faster engine response.
It has been argued that the Knox-class frigate is too slow when combating a high-speed nuclear submarine. That argument is fallacious. ASW operations rarely are conducted at flank speed because self-noise blinds both submarine and frigate. It also has been said that a Knox is slower than her twin-screw sisters. However, a Knox frigate on one boiler can make 22 knots and, as a result, is many knots faster than a twin-screw ship on one boiler. A Knox on two boilers is several knots faster than a twin-screw ship on two boilers. Only when the twin-screw combatant uses four boilers can she outrun a Knox, and then by only a small margin. But a Knox frigate can easily steam on two boilers for extended periods of time, while sustained four-boiler operation on twin- screw ships is uncommon. Thus a Knox can keep pace with the twin-screw ships under most circumstances while burning less fuel.
A hidden advantage in the design is that fewer men are required for one engine and two boilers. A twin-screw ship requires approximately twice the number of boiler technicians and machinist’s mates, and they are hard to get. Thus a Knox is more efficient in terms of engineering personnel needed to take her to sea, especially in an environment where there are not enough enlisted engineers—a situation which
probably will never change.
The Knox class has her disadvantages as well. The worst is vulnerability to battle damage. A Charles F. Adams-chss DDG, for example, can be hit in one fireroom or one engineroom and remain in action. A Knox cannot. This want of redundancy can be fatal in battle. Another disadvantage is her inability to secure her sole fireroom for cold iron maintenance and repair without securing steam to the entire ship. A four- boiler ship can secure one fireroom and still steam on the other. The Garcia- and Brooke-class frigates have a donkey boiler for auxiliary steam and two big diesel- electric generators designed for prolonged full-load operations. A Knox has none of these advantages, so boiler and generator maintenance suffer. Unless someone provides electrical power, a Knox must operate two SSTGs or else operate on reduced power with her single diesel generator. As a result, engineering maintenance during long deployments often cannot be adequately performed.
While a Charles F. Adams-chss DDG is a shiphandler’s dream with her keel- mounted sonar dome, twin screws, and 70,000 horsepower, some may conclude that the Knox-chss frigate, with essentially the same dimensions and displacement, but with half the engineering plant and horsepower and a huge, bulging bow-mounted sonar dome with tender skin, would be logy and difficult to handle. Not so. A Knox engine accelerates powerfully and rapidly; the 15-foot diameter, five-bladed screw creates tremendous thrust; the huge rudder provides a powerful turning
moment; and the underwater hull (in contrast to the superstructure) is l°nS’ narrow, graceful, and streamline • Underway in open waters the frigate 15 fast, responsive, extraordinarily mane verable, and a delight to the conning officer. j
Maneuvering a Knox in restricte waters, during docking and berthing- and getting underway requires tec niques different from those employe with twin-screw ships. Contrary to p°P ular belief, most shiphandling can be done without tugs, or with their minimum assistance. The conning officer o a Knox becomes acutely conscious 0 wind and current, his ship’s reaction to
effects of mooring lines and capstans. He knows how to use his keel anchor, an is not intimidated by his massive sonaf
S^tting wind or current; or it can ease e ship alongside a pier with an on- Setting wind or current. A Knox keel ar>chor is unusually reliable and effective, n°t only for shiphandling but for conditional anchoring as well. (The author prefers it to a standard anchor at 0recastle level.)
But there are two evolutions the %Uc-dass frigate normally cannot do. e cannot twist counter-clockwise ecause she backs to port; and she £annot safely get underway by herself r°m a pier when she is being set on by w'nd or current.
In heavy weather she is stable in roll Ut has difficulties in pitch. The dome Causes her to pound heavily; she will '■hump into swells rather than rise buoy- ar|tly over them. On the reverse slope of a sWell the flat underside of the dome hashes heavily into the water rather ^an entering smoothly, again contributes to pounding. The forecastle is wet, and the gun mount and ASROC launcher are vulnerable to wave damage. A forecastle with much more sheer and more are would have improved the design.
Above all else however, the Knox-chss "gate is a warship. She always has been cavily armed against submarines, but (here is no question that she initially das (and still is in many ships) underarmed against air and surface threats.
r>e single 5-in/54 caliber gun configuration was not enough firepower when tI'e ships were commissioned. Gradually ,c intermediate surface-to-surface mis- Sllc (Standard ISSM) system has been '"stalled on some ships, and Harpoon dfil gradually be installed on others. Standard ISSM is a proven weapon against other ships, but too few frigates Carry them, and those that do, don’t have enough missiles on board. Other pnox ships have been fitted with the Basic point defense surface-to-air missile system (BPDSMS). The Sea Sparrow mis- sfies react quickly to air targets closing rapidly at short range. The target desig- "ation system is rudimentary, indeed almost crude, but it works well enough, Perhaps because of its simplicity. The ^ttftv-class frigate is equipped with the dual purpose Mk 68 gunfire control system which is reliable and remarkably accurate. Knox frigates frequently prove to be the best shooters in the destroyer force during surface gunnery and naval
gunfire support (NGFS) exercises.
Still, the Knox-class frigate is not particularly well equipped for surface and antiair warfare, nor was she originally designed to be. Units equipped with ISSM and BPDSMS have modest selfdefense capabilities, but other ships of the class are particularly vulnerable. Clearly the frigates must rely on carriers and ships with long-range surface-to- surface missile systems for protection against dedicated air or surface threats. Nevertheless, for want of conventional destroyers and missile ships, the Knox frigates have been utilized for screening fast carrier task forces and NGFS. If the frigates cannot do these things quite as well as CGs or DDGs, keep in mind that no one ever expected them to.
What she does do, and does superbly, is ASW, for ASW always has been her primary mission. Her ASW capability is superior to any surface ship in the fleet, and herein lies her strength.
The Knox frigate must be used properly, however, in order to exploit her sensors and weapons. The technique of stationing frigates in a sector screen with sonars transmitting is outmoded and self-defeating, a carryover from the days of World War II. Passive rather than active tactics are needed to defeat a nuclear submarine. The Knox frigate must use stealth and patience and quietness, with her active sonar employed (if at all) only in the last moments before firing if needed for fire control data. There will be times when the convergence zone (CZ) mode can be used profitably in the search phase.
A primary principle of surface ASW is that the Knox frigate must avoid revealing her position to the submarine. She is a quiet ship, especially when below cavitation speed, and difficult for a submarine to detect acoustically. Furthermore, a submarine, when searching, frequently will come to periscope depth to attempt to intercept radar and radio transmissions from the surface ships. So the Knox frigate, capable of employing electronic silence, attempts to deny the submarine all possible inputs as to her position whenever possible.
A Knox frigate searches passively with her tactical towed array system (TACTAS—formerly known as the interim escort towed array system [IETAS]), and her rubber-domed SQS-26 sonar. The array searches below the layer and the SQS-26 within the layer. A Knox works best as a team with fixed-wing P-3 and S-3 aircraft, with which she communicates, exchanges passive information, and coordinates tactics that will identify and locate the submarine passively.
The frigate’s LAMPS helicopter is best used to localize. Its passive sonobuoys can be located precisely and their data monitored and analyzed on board ship; the magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) towed body can be deployed at water level to extend its detection depth and range. On board the frigate the ASW attack team plots the hot buoys and correlates this information with passive bearings from TACTAS and the SQS-26. The sonarmen note passive doppler shift, and operations specialists in CIC compute estimated submarine range, course, and speed using passive plotting techniques. Attack criteria normally can be achieved passively; however, when within assured direct path active sonar range, a Knox can go active on her SQS-26 and then quickly fire an ASROC or tube launch a Mk 46 homing torpedo.
There are two basic ASW tactical situations where the Knox frigate will be
The USS Harold E. Holt (FF-1074), pictured with a SH-2D Seasprite helicopter on board and equipped with the Sea Sparrow BPDSMS, demonstrated the versatility and reliability of a Knox-class frigate during the recent Mayaguez operation.
employed. The first is defensive, wherein she protects other ships. Depending upon its mission, the surface force should try to avoid detection through quietness and deception. For example, it should avoid the classic "opposed refueling,” whereby the destroyers and frigates cluster around the oiler, filling the ocean with sonar transmissions and the air with electronic emissions. The ASW ships’ sensors are smothered by mutual interference while the submarines home in on the welter of noise surrounding the oiler. Better for the oiler to steam below cavitation speed while the combatants silently rendezvous and refuel a few at a time. Meanwhile, one or two frigates separated from the oiler can transmit randomly in CZ to distract the submarines, while other frigates search passively. The surface force can be further protected by S-3s should a carrier be in the force, or by P-3s if near enough to land air bases.
The submarine can no longer ambush the oiler/combatant group with assurance of success. The submarine’s electronic surveillance gear cannot detect electronic emissions because there are none, except for brief cryptic radio transmissions used to coordinate the surface ship tactical deployment. Instead, the submarine moves warily, cautiously, never knowing when she is being tracked or when she may be ambushed by a lurking, silent frigate. If the submarine is unable to boldly seek out and attack the main body, then the defensive role of the frigate is achieved. Defensively, the submarine need not be sunk, but rather the main body kept afloat.
The frigate becomes offensive in ASW operations when the submarine must be sunk. Consider a squadron of frigates employed in a high-probability submarine detection area—perhaps a "Yankee”-class SSBN on patrol off the U. S. Atlantic Coast. Again, passive search progressively refines the submarine’s location as the frigates deploy over a wide area. Once contact is made the submarine is localized as before using cross bearings, LAMPS sonobuoys, and, finally, LAMPS MAD sweeps. Attack criteria is gained either by passive means alone and a LAMPS attack, or by coordinated tactics employed by two or more frigates using active and passive sonar.
There are many possible kinds of attacks and tactics available to the imaginative ASW surface commander, for he has many and varied kinds of sensors and weapons at his disposal. In addition to the frigate’s own resources and coordinated operations with other surface units and aircraft, the frigate can work closely with an American submarine. They can communicate, coordinate their efforts, and complement each other in seeking out and attacking an enemy submarine.
The CNO has changed the designation of the Knox class from escort to frigate in order to emphasize the offensive mission and character of these combatants. While these frigates can best be used aggressively to seek out and attack enemy submarines by utilizing passive techniques and tactics, all the necessary passive equipment has yet to be installed in most of the ships. A program is proceeding which provides for the installation of rubber windows in the bow sonar domes. TACTAS is entering the fl£et at a surprisingly rapid pace, but not nearly fast enough. There are more LAMPS-capable frigates than there are LAMPS available. What is needed rapidl) is the necessary emphasis and money to equip all the frigates with the passive equipment they need; the technology and manufacturing capacity are available. The potential is there, and it must be exploited.
Other improvements in the KnoX class are needed as well. The frigate’s CIC is a rudimentary arrangement with an ancient DRT and slightly less venerable NC-2 the only available means to display the ASW geographical plot. The frigate must be able rapidly and accurately to plot the buoy patterns and buoy status and to display the locations of the fixed- wing and LAMPS aircraft, the submarine, and adjacent surface ships. There must be a high-capacity data link for the exchange of information between the frigates and aircraft. A modified NTDS perhaps called an ASTDS (Anti-Submarine Tactical Data System), is the answer, and the Knox frigate has the weight and space reservations needed to accommodate it.
Realistically, however, there probably will not be a dramatic increase in AS'*’ improvements for the frigates given the lack of money and the historical lag in equipment development within the surface ASW forces. Improvements will come gradually and sporadically" another rubber dome here, a new TAC- TAS there, or another LAMPS ready to come on board. Nevertheless the dedicated officers and men of the frigates, if properly trained to use innovative passive techniques with whatever equip ment they do have, will keep the KnoX class-frigate a vital part of our total ASW effort. And the Knox frigate still will capably fulfill the mission of the general purpose destroyer when needed, and she will steam reliably on long, grueling, distant deployments as she is doing now.
She is a good ship. Those who have served on her appreciate her qualities and tolerate her shortcomings. Given the opportunity—and when directed by enlightened commanders at sea—the Knox-class frigates will continue to be a vital part of our fleet for many years to come.
Attaining Command at Sea—Soviet Style
jry Captain William H. J. Manthorpe,
' Ff S. Navy, former Assistant Naval ^ache in Moscow
So ^r°nt Pa8e r^e ® February 1975 v*et Ministry of Defense newspaper, Star, featured pictures of the Soviet arge ASW ship” Bodry and her com- p1ar*ding officer, Captain-Lieutenant N. rotopopov.
The Bodry is known to NATO coun- ries as a "Krivak”-class guided-missile ^troyer. She is a 5,200-ton, full-load lsplacement ship armed with a quad- surface-to-surface missile (SSM) u richer, two twin surface-to-air missile '™t) launchers, antisubmarine (AS) r°cket launchers, antiaircraft (AA) guns, atl^ torpedo tubes. This type of ship, acc°rding to Jane’s Fighting Ships, was rst observed in 1971 and is powered by 8as turbines. The "Krivaks” are larger and newer than the U. S. converted jDGs, the Mitscher (DDG-35) and the S. McCain (DDG-36), and even the U. S. California- and Virginia-class CgNs cannot match the variety and lumber of weapons found on the
Krivaks.”
. Captain-Lieutenant Protopopov, wear- lng two and a half stripes on his sleeve, Probably has from six to nine years in rhe navy and is less than 30 years old. He Can be considered equivalent in rank to a Senior lieutenant or junior lieutenant Co,nmander in the U. S. Navy.
The text accompanying the photos stated that "for a long time” large ASW sbips were commanded by captains third |ank and second rank, the equivalent of u- S. Navy lieutenant commanders and comrnanders respectively. During that Period the Bodry performed well. The arricle went on to say that the Bodry r>°w goes to sea under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Protopopov and per- °rrns with equally outstanding results.
This account is the first known refer- er>ce to a captain-lieutenant gaining command of one of the newer destroyer-size ships. Over the past several years, however, captains-lieutenant have been
identified as commanding officers of three of the 18 older "Kashin”-class ASW units. (Reportedly, one "Kashin”- class destroyer, Otvazhny, sunk in the Black Sea last year.) One of these, Captain-Lieutenant A. Kolesnikov, commander of the Sposobny, achieved command at age 28, according to a 23 March 1975 article in Red Star. When this occurred, some Soviets skeptically corn- pained saying, "Young! So very young . . and "such a sin” for him to be commander of a "modern powerful ship.” On the other hand, the Soviet press has indicated that at least ten of the "Kashins” are still commanded by captains third rank or second rank. Likewise, 14 of the 18 older and smaller "Kotlin”-class conventional destroyers are reportedly commanded by captains third rank and second rank.
Thus, it appears that Captain- Lieutenant Protopopov is a member of a very small and select group of young and junior officers. These men have made exceptional progress within the Soviet Navy system to qualify for command at sea of large modern combatants.
Several articles which appeared during the summer of 1973 in the monthly magazine of the Soviet Navy, Naval Digest, provided insight into this Soviet system for attaining command at sea. A June article, entitled "The Commander Prepares the Commander,” by Vice Admiral Nevolin began by mentioning the factors which limit whether an officer will have the opportunity to prepare for command at sea.
Admiral Nevolin noted that because of technical developments in ship control and weapon systems not all officers are now suited for service on all types of ships. For example, he stated that not all officers can serve with success on board a modern submarine.
The admiral also remarked that increased specialization plays a role in limiting the opportunity for an officer to become a ship commander. He pointed out that the Soviet higher naval schools, the university level schools which graduate naval officers, no longer turn out watch officers but, rather, "specialists of a very narrow profile.” An officer, he said, now displays himself first and foremost in this narrow professional sphere and devotes considerably more energy, time, and effort to work within his specialty than was true in the past. Thus, according to the admiral, it is now far more difficult to discover in an officer the attributes of a future ship commanding officer. Conversely, he said a commanding officer is not a narrow specialist, but a leader and tutor of large groups; he must be able to resolve a wide range of issues.
The admiral emphasized the value of future service—after the higher naval school and the initial at sea specialist period—as the determining factor in the development of an officer. This is when the officer exposes his strengths and weaknesses and can develop the needed command qualities. The key individual during this period is the commanding officer who not only imparts his knowledge to the young officer, but who also evaluates him. Since, as the admiral pointed out, it is often difficult for a young officer to objectively evaluate his own ability, his personal desires cannot be the primary and decisive criteria which determine his route of career advancement, whether it be in the command line or by remaining a specialist.
The admiral elaborated by stating that officers who have attained the qualifications of "specialist first class” or "master of military affairs,” and handle their own work in the divisions well, normally are selected for progress up the command line. An officer’s attitude toward his work, his diligence, purposefulness, and strength of will are qualities
al
"Krivak”-class guided-missile destroyer
also considered important for command. Possessing such qualifications and qualities, an officer should manage to show himself well in the post of senior assistant commander (Soviet term for executive officer) and be able to pass the command at sea test, both of which are steps to attaining command at sea. The admiral suggested that this is why officers who are masters or specialists first class, "irrespective of their term of service, have a green light for advancement.”
The admiral stated that, by longstanding tradition, the commanding officer of a ship prepares his own executive officer. The admiral, however, pointed out the difficulty in preparing for command at sea while serving as an assistant commander, equivalent to a department head on a U. S. ship, or as a division officer. He noted that in order to prepare for the command test and pass it, an officer must work with special effort and there is not really enough time for that when an officer has other duties which require a full day’s work. During his preparation, an officer must receive help from all qualified officers on board the ship. The leading roles, however, are played by the commanding officer, the political officer, and the group commander who will eventually interview the prospective candidate. Practice, said the admiral, confirms that only executive officers and some department heads pass the test for command at sea. Division officers find that this task, as a rule, is beyond their capabilities.
In summary, the admiral expressed the essence of the situation in the officer corps by declaring that "the commanding officer prepares the commanding officer. . . . Each commander prepares his own assistant, his reliable replacement. Every commanding officer is committed to this in the interest of high military readiness of the fleet.”
Subsequently, the August 1973 Naval Digest carried an article, entitled "Who Will be a Commander,” by Captain Second Rank Gvadzaviya which was
U. S. NAVY
described as a follow-up to Vice Admiral Nevolin’s. Captain Gvadzaviya agreed with Admiral Nevolin that it was difficult to discover the command potential of an officer. Furthermore, Captain Gvadzaviya stressed the dangers of prematurely promoting an officer to department head, executive officer, or commanding officer, both for the Navy and the officer. He concluded that a mistake in the advancement of a young officer along the command line is intolerable.
In giving examples from his own experience, the captain provided some additional insight into the Soviet system. He said that as the commanding officer of a submarine he had to select a replacement executive officer several times. Once he picked his best division officer. That man did a poor job as executive officer but, nevertheless, has gone on to command. Another time he selected an officer with only two-and-a-half years’ experience and that officer did a fine job. He too has gone on to command.
The actual command at sea test, according to Soviet press articles over the years, consists of a number of practical examinations in the various phases of naval professionalism, administered by the staff officers of the command to which the ship is attached. It also includes, as indicated by Admiral Nevolin, an interview with the group commander. The examinations are obviously rigorous and apparently must be taken to qualify for command of each type of ship. In an 8 March 1975 article, a staff navigator wrote of failing several candidates, including an officer who had already had command. The staff officer said now that "youth” is being advanced to responsible duties, the education and instruction of "young commanders” needs special attention.
The Soviet press coverage devoted to the young commanders is, in itself, as interesting as the significant differences in the U. S. and Soviet processes for attaining command at sea. The front page coverage afforded Captain-Lieutenant Protopopov and his command in the Ministry of Defense press did n0t occur by accident or through the inveS tigation or initiative of some repofter' Rather, it most likely was designed as favorable publicity for, and an indication of approval of, the Soviet Navy program which offers the opportunity for young officers to rise to command of major naval combatants.
Likewise, the earlier articles in rhe Naval Digest obviously had a purp°5e behind their publication. The first, . Admiral Nevolin, was seemingly defen sive in nature. It explained the various reasons why some officers were not se lected for the opportunity to prepare f°r command at sea and why other officers- "regardless of their term of service,” ha the opportunity to do so. It further reiterated the correctness of the Soviet
system in which the ships’ commanding officers prepare future commanding officers. This article, then, may ha'C been published by senior Soviet na' authorities as a reaction to some uneasi ness or discontent perceived among Aeet officers and as an indication that the system, as it was working, had high-lev approval. The later article by Capra* Second Rank Gvadzaviya may have beer* subsequently approved by senior nav- authorities to indicate that they, too, shared the need for caution expressed b) the captain and as a concession to the uneasiness in the fleet. However, base on the ranks of the authors of the tv,’0 articles, things like this have s,S nificance; there can be little doubt where the sympathies of the naval high command lie.
In summary, a small number 0 young and junior Soviet naval officer5 have begun to rise to command of large- modern, and powerful warships which are normally commanded by more senior officers. This is being accomplished within the traditional Soviet Navy system wherein ship commanding officers select and prepare future commanding officers. While some fleet uneasiness or discontent over the rapid rise of junior officers to command and the lack of opportunity for other officers to rise to command may well have surfaced, senior Soviet naval authorities have explained the reasons for the practice while endorsing the traditional system. They have, however, mildly advocated the need for caution.