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Some Submerged Views 97 y Captain W. J. Holland Jr., U. S. Navy h~&u>ay, A Salvage Concept for Today’s Navy 100 y Commander W. I. Milwee, Jr., U. S. Navy
F*e^d: An "Operational Requirement” for e Resistant Materials 102
y Captain Joseph K. Taussig, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)
‘A
press time printer’s error in the August issue of the Proceedings y ln Professional Notes by Commander Milwee and Captain Uss*g being listed incorrectly as appearing in that issue.
some Submerged
Views
Na Captain W. J. Holland, Jr., U. S. th V^' ^°rmcr Commanding Officer of e USS Pintado (SSN-672)
ee aircraft should be more than dou-
ecent comments, discussions, and As^es about antisubmarine warfare and Escorts have lacked an input from rC ear submarine officers. Part of the ^as°n may be the "silent service” syn- 0rr'e, or perhaps it is a natural reluc- off C •t0 aPPear overly parochial and t^ns*ve- But, the truth will out; and us tfUtk °*r matter is that many of who have served in nuclear subma- pnts believe surface and airborne ASW 0r<-es have little utility, g aPtain Ruhe, who wrote "Nuclear aU rnarme: Riding High,” might not fi e. pje makes assumptions on the anjCt‘veness of conventional ASW tactics then proceeds to develop argu- nts concerning ASW from there. Too ny people accept these unacceptable assumptions.
th ^°r example> Captain Ruhe states t two aircraft increase the kill ratio t^ect'vcness by a multiple of six, "And t,e che effectiveness of two.” As one of °Se who operated against such odds, y own shallow opinion is that 12 times 0 ls still a very small number. Cocky n°ugh this may sound, it represents a ^ C*w °f fixed-wing ASW aircraft shared y many fellow nuclear submarine offi-
p h Ruhe, "Nuclear Submarine: Riding High,” 55~62, February 1975 Proceedings.
cers. Someday helicopters and, perhaps, V/STOL aircraft may present more of a threat to the submarine, but only in the close-in environment which long-range torpedoes and missiles are slowly eliminating. A submariner need not close the escort for a visual look unless he desires to do so, and, if he does, he will surely select the most propitious time and method to do so. While there is no method of identification and classification more comforting than taking a look for oneself, ever more sophisticated sensors are reducing that necessity.
Weapons now available to the submariner are only alluded to in Captain Ruhe’s article. But modern submarine weapons (later than 1970) are stand-off in nature with homing capabilities which reduce the submarine’s need to approach the target in the manner which traditionally had been required for an accurate fire control solution. The days of taking station under the carrier to shoot it out with the escorts in a sort of "O.K. Corral” gunfight are now outdated. Even the "up the Kilt” shot no longer requires closing up tight in order to give the weapon a realistic speed advantage.
Past close or tight formations common to merchant convoy and carrier task force protection schemes are based on the premise that the submarine has to close the formation to launch a short-ranged weapon or to identify the high-value targets. In tight formations, the hit probability for any weapon launched at the formation increases since the concentration of shipping will provide plenty of targets. In such an environment, homing weapons, either subsurface or air transported, increase the overall hit probability even more: the weapon is bound to hit something. Tight formations allow the submarine to attain tracking stations at longer ranges, since the pure amplitude of sound in the water magnified when the units in the formation are radiating their powerful sonars, will be greater. These formations also provide the ultimate conditions for identification. However, once in close, multiple active sonars tend to confuse the submarine sensors if they have nearly identical characteristics.
Loose formations optimize the submarine’s ability to track one or two targets at a time. Such formations allow the submarine a better spread band for identification of the targets available, whereas in the tight formation such discrimination may not be available except by eye. By spreading the targets, the loose formation increases the likelihood that the submarine’s first shot will be at the target of highest value. Fur-
ther, loose formations will permit the pick off of escorts out of range of their mutual support. The old equation seems to remain valid: one destroyer plus one submarine equals one submarine—loose formations make the submarine’s task easier. Captain Ruhe’s thesis that a submarine attack will provide a datum to concentrate further ASW efforts does not concern the submariner operating within the state of the art prevailing today, because the submarine can open that datum before a reasonably efficient cordon can be drawn around it. Finally, the loose formation permits the submarine commander to optimize the selective use of his magazine capacity since he will be able to differentiate among his targets more easily, select the weapon of most economy, and ensure his hit probability is the highest possible. The lone escort in such formations is like a picket destroyer without CAP. Such units will have to be escorted by other vehicles, as Captain Ruhe suggests, perhaps helicopters or V/STOL aircraft. In effect the loose formation will become a band of many tight formations proceeding in the same direction.
The loose formation tactic, as proposed by Captain Ruhe, loses some credibility when the extensive refueling operations for such a plan are analyzed. Much time will be spent with escorts proceeding to and from their stations. In a long duration situation, the submariner is sure to capitalize on this vacant station and to follow an escort to the oiler—a first priority target.
The submarine is by no means invulnerable, nor are all the advantages on her side. However, advantages and initiative are so overwhelmingly in favor of the submarine that most proposed solutions to the ASW problem are "pie in the sky” wishes, or hopes, based on illusions created by exercise conditions. What needs to be done is to examine those vulnerable areas which the submarine does have and to exploit these areas to obtain the best advantages available for ASW forces.
Fast targets are still harder for a submarine to identify, classify, and hit than slow ones. Although speed does not aid the target appreciably after the weapon is launched, it does make the submarine’s task in obtaining a firing solution more difficult.
The fact that the submarine is limited to tracking a small number of potential targets at one time should help the ASW forces. The submarine is best suited to tracking one target, however two can be handled well. While the submarine can follow three or four targets in some situations, additional targets cannot be held by the submarine.
The submarine also has no reliable indicator of when she has been counterdetected. In general, surface units maneuvering randomly do not offer the faintest indication of detection. ASW forces need to make their first shot count because once the weapon lS launched the submarine is going to cle*f the datum faster than the ASW forces can respond to make a cordon unless these forces are prepared for counteraction and in place, or nearly so, before the weapon launch.
The submariner can tell if he faces air opposition only through monitoring of the electronic environment or by visual detection. At present TACAN and communications are dead giveaways' Pilots should be trained to be "Silent Sams” because often their loquaciousness provides information which usually allows submarines to enter their battles knowing where all the opponents be- Some patient skullduggery by the submariners will even permit timing of aircraft escort on and off station periods in order to optimize the selection of attack time and quarter.
The submariner always wants to take a look. However, this look normally will be as far away as sea and weather conditions and expected target parameters will allow to gain the confirmation needed before shooting. The submarine’s limited magazine capacity >n' creases the submarine commander S temptation to make a visual check r° assure that no weapon will be wasted- If the submarine commander can resist the desire for visual confirmation and the use of his own active sensors, his chances for success are extremely high-
As the ASW forces concentrate on potential submarine vulnerabilities they must always maintain an awareness of the bottom and of sound propagation conditions. When a submarine makes a mistake the ASW forces must react immediately—second chances are not usually forthcoming.
There are two fundamental assump' tions made in most ASW situations which are encouraged and enhanced by the structure of fleet exercises, both of which are intrinsically wrong in today s nuclear submarine environment. The first error is based upon World War II experience when sinking shipping was vital; damaging a ship would leave fief for further action another day. Today the submarine’s objective is only to stop the ship, not necessarily to sink it. A
philosophy, no submarine u , at or near the scene of action co tSS C° *ntercept and stop other ships
Th*^.t0 ^ ^rSt tarSet- ,,e second error commonly included
‘n all Ac\vr . . '. .
exercises is a restriction on
nine anri
Q space. Any such restriction in ;s ’ other than force transit limits, unrealistic. The nuclear submarine’s 0f nent can get away, in the words goj°ne op tny old skippers, "only by hold^ *n port'” The nuclear submarine Uses che initiative and will maximize time* C^at lnitlat've hy selection of the tha^ an<^ manner of attack. Basically, nera^1jneans always from the most vul- tbee Snarter, usually astern, and at Worst possible time, e.g. while re-
rernains
fuelin
the
air-
n have
lflbentrated on their own participation
forces. Submariners
• Oil thCu vyyvn jizai
e Asw role and have left the other
uclear submarine’s endurance and ge, coupled with a limited magazine make it much more economical in ^ aCC °ne ^u^et 'n each target, ensur- «r^e c°tal of targets equals the fi at,°^ ^u^ets’ ^ disabled ship may be be^ at *e'sure or simply left to
to I."111 °n enemy resources if she is \v/- , rescut'd and returned to port. Wl* this g is in progress or at 0330 when slee 'VatC^1 *s ehanging and everyone is subpy- ^fter initial target detection the to f?ar'ne can afford a leisurely period the aSSlfy’ analYze. prepare, and select [ricJn°<^e °f attack. Fleet exercises rarely fin' P°rate such leisure and impose to , tlrne and space limits which lead nia ' S.C conclus‘ons about the sub- of n CS manncr °f action on the part ^ fhe participants.
Un lfne an<^ sPace limitations also create tj 3 Ist'c perceptions of the role decep- ^ Can play in ASW. Deception, in ever form it takes, by whichever Per' jSeS lt’ worhs only for a limited Cat-0 °f time. The greater the sophisti- )ji .11 °f the deception, the longer it is an ’ t0 achieve its goals, but there is Pthnt to all deception methods fj *S not currently being explored in tbeexercises or type training. How long fUn131051 sophisticated devices will be tj 10ual is determined not only by -j.^but also by space constraints.
^ck A Su^mar'ne force has generally Vj^ the assets and inclination to pro- Cal Vhe support necessary for the tacti- h(, evelopment of the surface and
rne asw
con.
portions of the Navy having responsibilities in this area to drift with haphazard assistance provided by whatever submarine might be available. The support structures in squadron and type commands have, up to now, been too diversified in tasks and responsibilities to evaluate ideas, analyze trends, and provide fresh thought or direction for future endeavors. Much of the effort of the development groups and tactical analysis teams is parochially oriented and bogged down in statistical analysis to support particular hardware developments or research. Much, if not most, of the Navy’s intellectual talent is concentrated in equipment research, manpower acquisition, manpower retention and accession, or budget and management manipulations—all to the detriment of tactical development. The interchange of information between the subsurface and surface forces on the unit to unit level is practically nonexistent.
All of these well identified problems require time, as well as management attention, to repair. However, there are some short-term pragmatic approaches which could be implemented immediately and ought to be considered. Most obvious is the restructuring of fleet exercises to be just that—large in area, ship involvement, and time allotted. If the argument that there is not much point
in sending a marginally-ready ship, which will not be "ready” until after type training is completed, on a fleet exercise continues to hold, then we will never have such exercises. However, if a war were to be fought, the ship in question would go and do the best she could, ready or not. As we witnessed in Vietnam, that was often very good indeed. In the fleet exercise environment the results would be a true evaluation of the tactics and capabilities involved and a real learning experience for all participants.
Without returning to the massive structures that went with command ASW schemes or the assignment of specific ships to ASW development as was done in the Task Force Alfa days, it does seem we could devote some assets not only to providing the services and development of tactics in this area but also to evaluate and teach ASW tactics. Formation of older SSNs into squadrons whose primary role would be to develop antishipping tactics on the one hand, and become the portrayers of a hostile opponent on the other, would concentrate some thought on the realistic portrayal of the submarine against existing and proposed tactics and equipment.
Present exercise assignments of the submarine role to the various assets available provide little overall improvement in submarine counter techniques. Since all submarines must be prepared to perform their wartime missions this might entail some loss in overall submarine readiness, but the gain for the other forces would be significant within two or three years. The squadron commander would become a focal point for ensuring that the lessons, tactics, and development would be retained, passed to the surface and airborne forces involved, and, in general, could make the fleet exercise concept viable and profitable for all forces. He would become the repository of tactical information and the director of development in a field where such expertise is now lacking or, at best, rests with a few experienced commanding officers who will participate in only two or three such exercises during their command tours and, at most, a dozen in their entire careers. Similar arrangements could be made in fleet and other type commanders’ staffs to improve our knowledge, experience, and memory.
,id
U. S. Navy commitments and operations continue to extend around the world during a period when domestic economy measures have come to mean a reduction in the number of fleet units and in number and size of support elements. The Navy’s ability to operate for extended periods of time in forward areas, such as the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, is, in part, dependent on access to support facilities in foreign countries. Aggravating an already complex situation in this area have been recent cost increases for such access rights and the rise of political issues which may eliminate the Navy’s use of some foreign facilities completely. Operating in today’s economic and political environment requires that the Navy carefully examine traditional policies and procedures and consider new and imaginative concepts to meet immediate and future challenges. One such concept in the marine salvage field is fly-away salvage.
The employment of new concepts in any field can only be successful if the basic technical principles of the field are adhered to and these concepts are developed from an evolutionary process. If new concepts for bringing salvage assistance to marine casualties are to be developed, such consideration must be given to some basic principles of salvage.
While prudent seamen attempt to prepare for the eventuality of their ship becoming a casualty and familiarize themselves with the proper responses in such situations, there is no substitute for the presence of trained and experienced salvors on board a casualty. Experienced salvors are familiar with the unique conditions which prevail on board wrecked ships and can quickly evaluate the situation, then formulate and carry out the most appropriate action. As the situation on board a wreck always deteriorates with time, the sooner experienced salvors with even a small amount of equipment can be put on board, the more probable the success of the salvage. Since quick reaction is the key to successful salvage operations why not place knowledgeable salvors on board a wreck by the fastest means available?
Since the Pacific and Indian Oceans are so vast and salvage stations are few and far between, even when Navy salvage stations are specifically established to support naval operations, a salvage ship may be many days steaming from a casualty. The desirability of getting salvors on board quickly has led to the development of fly-away as a salvage concept for the Pacific. The concept is quite simple—a cadre of professional salvors is maintained at a centralized location with prepared but varied sets of equipment. When a casualty occurs, men and equipment are flown to the nearest airfield for transfer to the wreck by whatever means may be available locally. Flying away salvage teams and equipment is attractive in the Pacific where World War II left a large number of air strips on many islands.
The actual genesis of the fly-away salvage concept was the 1966 establishment of Harbor Clearance Unit One (HCU-ONE) in Subic Bay. HCU-ONE was formed to provide salvage expertise for river and harbor clearance operations, primarily in Vietnam, but also to carry out or assist in all types of salvage throughout the Pacific as required.
As the HCU-ONE efforts increased during our involvement in Vietnam, a salvage station was established at Vung Tau to serve as base for in-country operations. Within a few months the viability of flying salvors from this base to other locations in Vietnam and augmenting deployed forces from those assets remaining in Subic Bay for major salvage jobs had been established. Othe( operations, notable among them ^ deployment of a team to demolish thc wreck of the tanker R. C. Stoner 5t Wake Island in 1967, showed the valnc of rapid response salvage teams for 5(1) type of salvage. HCU-ONE continued t0 operate in this manner for over five ye^(| participating in literally hundreds 0 successful salvage operations. SalvotS gained practical field experience 1,1 effecting maximum economy of force b) using locally available resources and d£ ploying, by whatever means of tran5 portation available, to a job site with i minimum of equipment.
The size of HCU-ONE has been <e' duced since many of those assets d£ signed specifically for operations 1(1 Vietnam were turned over to the Viet namese Navy, or were laid up, and hs home port changed to Pearl Harbor The move to Pearl Harbor and the cot1 current termination of involvement Ilj combat salvage allowed development 0 fly-away as a major peacetime naval vage concept.
The carry over of fly-away to peate time was motivated not only by proven effectiveness in providing rap1 salvage assistance, but by the economl of force accrued by using only a ff'' men and a minimum of equipment Rapid response by professional salvofS can complete many jobs quickly, thereb! reducing the number of salvage opeh tions to which an expensive salvage ship must be committed.
In addition to providing effective sal" vage forces, to augment convention5 forces the concentration of profession5 salvage expertise in a single rapid r£' sponse unit offers a number of othef advantages.
During the Vietnam conflict a harbo( clearance team was often called upon t0 augment a salvage ship, (ARS), or moie often a fleet ocean tug (ATF) for specific
Up^ ^ubic or Singapore, being called War t0 recover an aircraft in northern for m January. Thermal protection v*ded C ^*vers’ greater than can be pro- and standard wet suits, is required, ben jJHderwater television would be of Wr i,1 m determining what parts of the •riv- ^ are ob Interest to the Accident Vatestigatmg Board. A phone call acti- ‘ CS ^CU-ONE in Pearl Harbor; a porta- ot water boiler, associated heated ■ an underwater television, and thibniClans who are trained to employ Sajve<fuipment are dispatched to the shj age s'te by air. These men augment the S ComPany and provide them with eans to complete the recovery in
prVa^j °Perat'ons- This augmentation co ^ S° success^ul that it has become ^tftrnon practice in the Pacific Fleet to °p®ITlent aTFs committed to salvage Potions with HCU-ONE personnel, au C e^ect*veness of the salvage ship is rT'CntC<^ by a dedicated salvage crew alon'UC^* greater than either would be onnC Ybe exPerience with this type of the ?t*°n 'n^uenced the development of pro hSCal Year 1975 T‘ATF Pr°gram- The d ^fam provides for special ATFs to be ttia ^net^ and built which will be aCcnne^ by an MSC crew and will also ass' rnrri0c^ate a Navy salvage team when c0rfne<^ t0 salvage operations. The
Ip. t.racts f°t the first units have been this year.
A •
rcenttalized salvage unit can act as a jj^nt'101^ bor specialized salvage equip- spffi1' ^°r wb‘cb there would not be t°o ^lent demand or which would have to i/^ a value for cost effective issue conc Sa^va8e units. With the fly-away ljeept’ specialized equipment can be job at tbe base and dispatched to the •'Vltb the technicians who have been gaining and operating it.
VaS an example, consider a Navy sal- eratC sb’P> which would normally ope dnring a ■^estpac deployment
b]e h suits ^Ch:
will continue to be integral parts of salvage
a safe and efficient manner. The systems and men augmenting the ARS in the aircraft recovery may well be employed the following week thousands of miles away on a much different job.
Another important advantage is that new salvage and diving equipment procured by the Supervisor of Salvage, or developed by naval laboratories or commercial interests can be tested and evaluated under field conditions. This practical evaluation by experienced salvors under the tugged conditions that exist
operations.
in marine salvage operations can lead to rejection of equipment that is unsuitable prior to fleet issue or before commencing an expensive and lengthy evaluation program.
The utilization of the fly-away concept has led to the development of light, easily handled equipment which is rugged enough to survive in a salvage environment and has sufficient capacity to be useful in this type environment.
The centralized professional salvage organization also allows centralization of training. Standard training curricula emphasizing lessons learned in recent operations can be developed. A limited number of people can be dedicated to provide up-to-date salvage training to the individual ships’ companies, even to deploying to conduct advanced training on operating units.
Historically, salvage forces and their capabilities have been reduced by budget cutbacks that have followed wars. In World War II, Korea, and Vietnam effective salvage forces were developed only by dredging up the few old-timers who had experience in this unusual field of marine operations and using them as the foundation upon which a large and sound salvage organization could be built. The centralized salvage unit concept provides an active organization where a salvage cadre is maintained which can also be the source of hard core professionals needed to develop a wartime salvage organization.
Fly-away salvage would seem to be J viable rapid response to Pacific and In' dian Ocean maritime casualties today-1° other areas, such as the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, fly-away salvage currently offers a backup system to l°ca facilities available to U. S. naval unit5- However, if political issues develop which terminate, or reduce, the Navy5 access to foreign facilities then the p0' tential of fly-away salvage should be realized in these areas also.
be successfully met varies by ship an*1
In peacetime, shipboard fires are a major cause of personnel and materiel casualties. In war, the secondary effects of fires started by ordnance explosions are the major reasons that ships are actually lost, and are responsible for the majority of personnel casualties. While fire prevention and its suppression when it occurs are two major problems implicit in the operational function of command known as damage control, why is there no "operational requirement” for fire resistant materials to help engineering people attain greater shipboard safety?
Fire is such a common, yet complex phenomenon, that while we know a great deal about it in many respects, there is much that even the scientist does not understand. Most people recognize that once a fire starts, there are numerous factors associated with the oxidation of materials, convection currents, radiation, conduction, the generation of smoke and gases, and the attendant physical effects of visibility and toxicity.
Ideally, we would like all shipboard materials to have zero chance of burning, smoking, and off-gassing when exposed to a source of ignition, or when exposed to a fire that started elsewhere. But such standards would be difficult to attain in a shipboard environment where potential types of fires are so numerous and varied. However, there is a middle ground, an area where we can begin to reduce the fire hazards on board ships.
We know from numerous "full-scale burn tests,” and indeed some accidental fires in which thermocouples were fortuitously involved, that temperatures normally range between 1,500°F and 1,800°F. Occasionally, the temperatures will be greater. Indeed, with such threats as propane torches or oxyacet- ylene torches, the ignition threat may be higher than 2,300°F.
Since we cannot efficiently engineer to the maximum threat, it is suggested that an analogy to the concept developed for "armor” be postulated in generating the "operational requirement” for fire resistant materials. Armor is a recognized compromise. Since every ordnance projectile cannot be stopped, the majority of the armor that is purchased is designed to stop a .30 caliber armor piercing projectile. Other armor is designed to meet special requirements. Nevertheless, all of this engineered effort is in response to an "operational requirement” spelling out the threat, and often delineating weight and configuration parameters. Testing the product in this situation is easy—in the case of normal armor, a .30 caliber armor piercing projectile is fired at one of the engineered plates.
Using this analogy for fire resistant materials, in the absence of any articulated operational requirement, the eng1" neer does not know what to aim for in fire safety. Should the engineer direct hi5 efforts toward such threats as matched cigarettes, cigarette lighters, and lighter fluids ("common” ignition threat5 found in the possession of many personnel)? Or, should he be concerned with other volatiles, such as gasoline and various lubricating or fuel oils?
The evaluation of potential hre threats and the degree which they can with the training and backgrounds of the men on these ships responsible for damage control.
A mundane item such as ceiling tile5 graphically demonstrates what shipboard personnel are faced with in the area of fire resistant materials. The primary reason ships even have ceiling tiles is to meet "habitability” requirements. Living compartments are traditionally less than attractive, and covering up all the pipe5> conduits, cables, and angle irons found under the overheads, does "square out a compartment and makes it look better.
The "approved” ceiling tiles allowed on board ships today may have a max1' mum fire spread of 25* and a maximum
create an environment in which
tttcians would not settle for a habit-
a ° e Seneration of 25* when tested in a b^L^’ at °ne Cn<^ wbicb are located con0 °^as iets' Obviously for damage ''van^0^ PUrPoses’ any operator would sa tHe with zero flame spread, J generation, and off-gassing Un ,°'0 *n<^ex^ characteristics, and tested co Cr m°re r*gorous conditions. It be- "j0165 apparent that if ceiling tile, as a amage control” item, could meet the • /o/0 lndex of a more stringent test, theV°U^ aCt 3S a bre harrier, isolating uC, cabI«, conduits, pipes, and paints er tbe overhead from becoming can-
ad' 3teS ^°r ^res an^ carrYing tbe bres to ba aCent compartments, as well as a heat ^ ler t0 keep the fire from igniting ^ r'al in the compartment above.
stmpjg unscientific
experiment was ced^n W*t^1 a telephone call to a fiber t; & tile manufacturer. His cooperated WaS securecb A second call was fib C° a bber tuanufacturer, whose /■ CrS are widely used in the Navy today ^ ten different end-product forms) ^ very high operational tempera- [jj environments, for his assistance in tjjeexPeriment. In six days, a "new”
~> 3 „'Vas delivered which could withstand ■‘■300 p ^test) indefinitely. eriv.rans^ating this example into the rnen °)nrnent of "operational require. s readily exposes why such a re- etrient is needed for fire resistant trials.
attf C°u^ define an item with obviously
etive damage control attributes. It tvould tech:
«L ...
inde^ *tem w‘tb a > flame/smoke, tiv X Us‘nS the tunnel test. The objec- t'dtV^cdd be a "damage control” item, in[j a °/o/o, flame/smoke/off-gassing, Ho X’ at 3 temperature well above the \ a* compartment fire temperatures.
no "technical effort” is really the ^ tQ atta'n this capability, under present rules and organizational nures, some engineer must be for ° t0 wr'te the new specification t^tbe new tile. Under the rules, since Would cost money, the engineer
for ln^CX ‘s set at 0/0 for asbestos, and 100/100 -stab,Standard Panel of red oak wood. The standard ari(j lnfS this index is silent on off-gasing. Csts are conducted with maximum 1,800°F mNtatures.
must charge his time to some "approved” program—no requirement, no approved program.
► Because budgets and approved programs are planned well in advance of the time when the money is spent, if there is an engineer capable of writing the new specification, the chances are that he is busy on a program that was "started and justified” at least 18-24 months before.
► Assuming there is an engineer already assigned cognizance over such a mundane item as a ceiling tile, the chances are that he is not a materials engineer, conscious of, and trained in the type of fibers that must be used to attain the capability. Thus, he must coordinate with at least one other engineer who, again, must be tasked and is probably working on something else.
► The "test” procedure normally followed is the tunnel test. Yet, this is deficient in meeting shipboard requirements since the tunnel test system has a 1,800°F "hot point” only at the gas jets, and we are contemplating an overall temperature of 1,800°F in the compartment.
An operational requirement would impose a sense of urgency above and beyond the normal "task and justification” rules. The funding could be assigned or reprogrammed to meet the requirement, and the technical echelons would be encouraged to embark on the program with dispatch.
From another point of view, the absence of an operational requirement can lead to some rather unusual operational situations. For example, "curtains” are an important "habitability” item today, and are a demonstrably important item to damage control, as it was the ignition of a curtain in the USS Forrestal (CVA-59) on 10 July 1972, which led to a blaze that took eight hours to extinguish, caused some $15 million in damage, and put the ship out of service for a prolonged period.
The Forrestal fire actually inspired the military standard (MIL-STD 1623) which recognizes the military specification (MIL-C-24500) for materials approved for shipboard curtains, draperies, and slip covers. Curiously, this specification does not cover bed spreads, tablecloths, and similar other habitability fabrics although there is little difference between the two sets of items. The explanation for this inconsistency is that respon-
sibility for these items is divided between two commands. Supply Systems Command has the cognizance for bed spreads, table cloths, and so forth. Following the Forrestal fire, all of the "tasks and money” assigned to generate MIL-STD 1623 and related specifications was placed under the cognizance of the Naval Ships (now "Sea”) Systems Command. Indeed, MIL-STD 1623 was not actually in response to an articulated operational requirement, but to a high- level command to "get those flammable materials off the ships.”
On some ships, samples of the Type I and Type II materials "approved” by MIL-C-24500 have been obtained prior to purchasing new curtains. Some individuals have fire-tested these sample materials. To the consternation of these observers, Type I materials actually ignite, flame, and curl into a hard, friable char, while Type II materials (composed of 50% Type I fibers) will curl somewhat, but they will not flame or shrink to a little charred ash.
The reason that both types are "approved” is that the tests used in laboratories for testing fabrics simply do not reflect shipboard operational realities, and the maximum test limits allowed by MIL-STD 1623 are so great that the simple "sailorman threat” of a match can destroy Type I materials. Yet, without more operational guidance, the technicians are constrained to adhere to their standard tests which often mislead the operators. For example, the opening words of MIL-C-24500 are: "This is the specification for firesafe . . . fabrics . . . for curtains, draperies, and slip covers. . . .” No material is absolutely firesafe. However, some "approved” types are far safer against normal threats, than others.
Most ships continue to buy Type I, MIL-C-24500 curtains because they are offered in lighter weights than Type II curtains, and cost about $1.00 a yard less. Since both are approved, the purchase of the least expensive is required if normal purchasing procedures are followed. Even when a command uses its prerogative to say what it wants, it is very tempting with the limited funds available to buy the least expensive materials offered.
In the "ceiling tile” example, the situation is more complex. First, no ceiling tile manufacturer would likely be very interested in undertaking a government research and development program from which he can gain no competitive advantage. Since the fibers used in the sample described are on the open market, any tile manufacturer can buy them, and make the tiles. The price of a ceiling tile is determined by a combination of costs—raw materials, machinery and its operation, and the volume of the order. Hence, in large quantities, the tiles should cost no more than the differential between the costs of the fibers used in making different tiles— but where is the demand? Without an operational requirement for fire resistant materials, most of this is either academic or far from coming into fruition.
An operational requirement would, at least, get things moving and should:
► State that the Navy needs materials which can withstand at least 1,800°F for an indefinite period, and compromises
for less resistant materials will be ac cepted only if they buy enough time t0 bring active fire fighting equipment bear.
► Set forth the degree of urgency, an instruct that industrially available state of-the-art be adopted as soon as pract* cable. (This to avoid re-inventing wheel at the laboratory level.)
► Cut across bureaucratic lines. C0111 mands with overlapping responsibility must coordinate their efforts. In add'" tion, technical commands should utilize the facilities of the Navy’s fire fighting schools, which have the best "op£ra' tional fires” with which to work. Th^ problem in this area involves the fut>^ ing, scheduling, and curricula of thesC^ schools which are under the Bureau 0 Naval Personnel, not the Chief of Nav3 Material. The transfer of funds, thc shifts in curricula (such as might be needed, since one can put all sorts 0 things in a fire, without upsetting ,l schedule), and similar related mattef must have a common command strut ture in order to overcome the "normal rules.
► Recognize its imperfections. It is f>ot going to meet every bell, but if propel) worded and promulgated, it will staft to exploit what is now so easily explolt” able without any involved technical te search and development effort.
► Be couched in terms to relieve tbe problems now encountered by the ind1' vidual ships in obtaining their "habit' ability” (and hopefully, their "damage control”) materials. Today, these mate' rials must be purchased from available funds in an environment in which tbe original planning and justification f°f the ship’s financial resources did not anticipate the purchase of such luxuO items. Thus, many ships today are stu "bare.” Other units display variouS degrees of nonconformity to the f°r' mal guidelines.
In this day of supersonic aircraft cC' quirements, over the horizon radar re' quirements, and a thousand and one other requirements, it is tragic that tbe Navy has not addressed itself to th>s "damage control” requirement. For & the final analysis if the ship burns, the personnel who operate all the in1' portant and fancy equipment and sy5' terns are routed from their stations by fire, it all becomes quite academic.