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The design of current Soviet warships seems to give top priority to the same characteristics— firepower and mobility—that the United States did in World War II. Modern U. S. warship designs, however, stress electronics and habitability and give the lowest priority to those characteristics the Soviets rate highest: weapons and propulsion. We and they may both be right. A strategist/statesman of Admiral Gorshkov’s stature ought to know what he wants of his ships—just as we ought to know what we want of ours.
Increasingly, over the past decade, American nav3
officers have been asking why Soviet surface co*
batants appear to be smaller, faster, and yet more he3'
ily armed than those of the U. S. Navy. And, why “
they appear to have better seakeeping ability? Have c^c
Soviets learned something about designing ships
we don’t know about? Why can’t we build ships 1*
the Soviets? . 1
hlC
In an effort to answer these questions in a reasons^ and quantitative manner, the Naval Ship Engineering Center, Hyattsville, Maryland, conducted an engine* ing analysis of selected U. S. and Soviet frigates, stroyers, and cruisers, with the objective of identify'0^ and quantifying the differences in U. S. and Sov design practices in the major ship subsystem areas hull, propulsion, endurance, habitability, electron!* and weapons. .
U. S. Navy ships are designed to satisfy specific3 stated mission requirements in terms of payload caff*^ and platform performance attained. Payload identi the equipment carried by a ship to fulfill her mil* mission, i.e., weapons, ammunition, aircraft, detecting control, and communications equipment. While term "load” denotes "weight,” the ship design* equally concerned about the other physical cha teristics of this equipment, such as internal volume 3 support requirements. Platform performance is define maximum and sustained speed, cruising range and ** ciated cruising speed, stores endurance, and the qu* of the environment provided for the payload and c
'Kresta II
Figure
—u. s.
— USSR
personnel on board. The latter characteristic includes such diverse considerations as safety, comfort, availability of repair parts, ease of access, vulnerability, noise, and electromagnetic interference problems.
Mission requirements are derived from task and mission statements which in turn are related to potential enemy threats. The magnitude and priority of these requirements have a great influence on the size and cost of a ship’s design. Also, for a given fixed value of size or cost, it is possible to realize a variation in performance by trading off capability among and between the elements of payload and platform performance.
Therefore, early in the conceptual phase of ship design, a series of trade-off studies are conducted to determine the combination of characteristics which can best fulfill operational requirements, optimize effectiveness, and keep the cost and size of a ship within limits dictated by both budgetary and performance considerations. Within such limits various combinations of endurance, armament, and other features are possible. For example, if the space provided for one function is increased, the space for another function must be reduced, or the ship’s size and cost will be increased.
Because ship size and cost are so dependent on requirements, any valid comparison between U. S. and Soviet warship designs must be made on the basis of all the requirements. This is not always easy to do, particularly for Soviet ships, because the existence of some requirements is not nearly so evident as others. For example, habitability features, shock resistance, and fuel tankage are not outwardly obvious as is a gun mount, missile director, or electronic countermeasures (ECM) antenna. Yet, their implications on ship size and cost are just as real, and their influence on military effectiveness may be just as important.
It is also difficult to make valid comparisons between ships of the U. S. Navy and those of the Soviet Navy
1 Size Trend
FRIGATES
'50 '60 '70 '80
because the missions assigned to U. S. ships are not the same as those assigned to Soviet ships. For example- U. S. surface combatants must meet the demands of escorting fast carrier task forces worldwide, whereas Soviet ships do not have to meet this requirement- Soviet ships, on the other hand, require a much large1 offensive capability against other surface ships which corresponding U. S. surface combatants operating with the support of aircraft carriers have not previously required, i.e., surface-to-surface missile systems. The U. S. Navy, however, is currently planning to enhance the offensive missile capability of its surface combatants to reduce their dependence on carrier air support.
Furthermore, the military effectiveness of a naval ship is determined both by the capability of her payload to detect and destroy the enemy, and by the platforms capability to transport this payload and the personnel who man it to the scene of action, and to suppoi:t it there. In this article, consideration is given only t0 the effectiveness of the platform, and no attempt hjS been made to assess the effectiveness of the paying carried.
Much of the information on Soviet destroyers W eluded in this report was obtained from Jane’s Fightity Ships: 1974-75, Weyer’s Warships of the World: 191$’ Siegfried Breyer’s Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1970), and various other unclassified sources. Additional information on tbe Soviet ships was estimated by a process that is an adaptation of the one used by the U. S. Navy to d° its own design studies.
Hull: A comparison of the trend in the hull s*ze of the U. S. and Soviet surface combatants built since World War II is shown in Figure 1 in terms of the full-load displacements of U. S. ships and those which were estimated for Soviet ships. It is readily appaf£nt that U. S. Navy Fleet operators are correct in the>r assessment that Soviet ships are generally smaller than their U. S. counterparts.
U. S. Navy frigates (FF), destroyers (DD), and cruisefS (CG) have more than doubled in size since Woo War II.1 The exception to this growth trend is ^ recently designed 3,400-ton guided-missile frigate (FFG-7), formerly called the patrol frigate (PF-109 class)- Soviet frigates and destroyers, which appear to hav£ been designed for a coastal defense and sea denial mlS sion, have remained rather modest in size.
However, from the 5,600-ton "Kynda” in 1962, :^C ‘As reported on pages 106 and 107 of the March 1975 issue of the Pf0Ctt^ ings, as of 1 July 1975, U. S. Navy ships arc now classified to confo*1® terms used by other navies of the world. Generally, and for this study* r changes are as follows: Ships formerly referred to as escort ships (DE) 3 now called frigates (FF); ships formerly referred to as frigates (DLG) 3 now called cruisers (CG); destroyers (DD) remain unchanged.
S12e of Soviet cruisers had grown significantly by 1972, with the introduction of the 8,500-ton "Kara.” This growth in Soviet cruisers is in consonance with the ■ntroduction of the Moskva-class helicopter-cruiser in *967 and the reported construction of two 35-40,000 ton Kiev-class ASW cruisers with a V/STOL aircraft and helicopter capability. Such growth in major ships may °e indicative of a recent expansion in the Soviet Navy’s defensive mission of sea denial to an expanded one of sea control and, perhaps, to one of being able to project military capability ashore.
To provide for the future modification of U. S. Navy ships, it is general policy to include a provision for a certain weight addition of a specified amount and vertical location. The stability, structural and, usually, speed calculations which are performed on the ship delude this margin. Certain systems, notably electrical, are sized on the assumption of a future growth, and Tcse margins are reflected in the ship as designed. In addition to provision for general growth, there have een occasions when design allowances were made for ,UtUre weapons or sensor systems as replacements for *nterim systems with which the ship was initially outfitted.
The compact design and smaller auxiliary systems Situated for Soviet ships appear to make them less ^enable to easy modification than U. S. Navy ships.
. n Ae other hand, the Soviets appear willing to regu- arT update weapons, electronics, propulsion, and other U'pboard systems through major modification during °ng overhaul periods.
,In early 1973, the Naval Ship Engineering Center, 'Vlth support from the Naval Ship Research and Devel- °ptnent Center, Carderock, Maryland, completed a de- tahed comparative study of the slamming, deck wet- jjess, and roll stabilization characteristics of U. S. and . Vlet surface combatants. The results were published n the November 1973 issue of the Proceedings? These j^ults indicated that Soviet warships have better sea- eeping ability than their U. S. counterparts.
he results of slamming comparisons indicated that e average maximum rough water speed of U. S. ships ^ u a relatively fine hull form and an extremely large . ^ sonar dome, is slightly less than Soviet ships of uar length with a relatively full hull form and hout such a large bow dome, he results of deck wetness comparisons demonstrate ^ t che Soviets have built more hulls to designs which jj3Ve good deck wetness characteristics than has the ^nited States. The comparatively poor position of the ' ■ m the deck wetness study was caused by the
M J- W. Kehoe, Jr., "Destroyer Seakeeping: Ours and Theirs,” U. S. institute Proceedings, November 1973, pp. 26-37.
performance of the DD-710, FF-1040, and FF-1052 designs, to which over one-third of all U. S. destroyer type hulls have been built.
The fact that Soviet surface combatants have been fitted with anti-roll fin stabilizers as a standard design practice since the early 1950s was an extremely interesting finding in the 1973 seakeeping study. This accounts for the majority of these Soviet ships having better rolling characteristics than comparable U. S. ships, since only the FF-1037, the FF-io4o, and FF-1052 classes are fitted with fin stabilizers.
Propulsion: A comparison of the trend in the speed of U. S. and Soviet surface combatants is shown in Figure 2. The speeds of both U. S. and Soviet DDs and CGs show a decrease of about two to three knots since World War II, with the Soviet ships maintaining a two to three knot speed advantage over their U. S. counterparts. On the other hand, there has been an increase of about four to five knots in the speed of both U. S. and Soviet frigates with the Soviet ships maintaining a three to four knot speed advantage. The greater speed of Soviet ships is attributed to a mission requirement for this speed and to their willingness to invest in propulsion plants of substantially greater size and power than are provided for comparable U. S. ships.
A comparison of the estimated specific machinery volume of U. S. and Soviet warships, in terms of cubic feet of main machinery space per horsepower, indicated that Soviet ships require 25-40% less space than U. S. ships. This estimate accounted for the large amount of auxiliary machinery located in the main machinery spaces of U. S. ships but may not properly account for the auxiliary machinery located outside the main machinery spaces of Soviet ships. It is estimated that the volume and weight of Soviet auxiliary machinery is considerably less than that found on board U. S. ships for electrical power, fresh water distillation, and ship-
It is estimated that the space and facilities alfocate
* . /ifi
ate
are
comparable to U. S. practice, while those allocate1
an°
less. Space allocated to administration, recreation,
an°
Summing up, the large amount of volume
wide air conditioning. It is the tremendous increase in auxiliary machinery requirements which accounts for the major portion of the growth in the specific machinery volume of U. S. ships and a large portion of the overall increase in the size of U. S. ships since World War II.
In addition to the Soviet practice of designing propulsion plants with less specific machinery volume and more power than their U. S. counterparts, there are several other differences in Soviet propulsion plant design practice worthy of note.
First, unlike the present U. S. commitment to gas turbine propulsion for FFs and DDs with controllable pitch propellers and nuclear propulsion plants for CGs, the Soviets apparently have not committed themselves to any one type of fossil fuel propulsion plant scheme. Though emphasizing the use of gas turbine plants, the Soviets appear to be continuing the development of both pressure-fired steam plants and diesel plants, including combination gas turbine and diesel plants. However, there is no indication of any Soviet utilization of nuclear power in a surface warship.
Second, the Soviets appear unwilling to commit even small frigates to a single propulsion shaft. They apparently consider that the savings in volume, weight, and costs associated with a single-shaft ship design are outweighed by the increased maneuverability and availability associated with a multi-shaft ship design.
Third, the Soviets are reported to practice considerable standardization in the types of machinery and electrical equipment used in their auxiliary and propulsion plants. They also are believed to use more off-the- shelf mechanical and electrical equipment in new ship designs, as they also appear to do with their electronic and weapon systems. If in fact true, these practices, whether by design intent or as a by-product of their economic system, contribute to the design of ships with very little space and weight margin required for the uncertainties associated with concurrent development and competitive procurement of equipment for ne^ ship designs.
Endurance: The trend in the cruising endurance range of U. S. fossil-fueled surface combatants compared to that estimated for comparable Soviet ships indicates an increase in the endurance of U. S. Soviet ships that is proportionate to their growth in size. While the range of Soviet frigates and destroy#5 is only 55-60% of the U. S. range, the range of Soviet cruisers has grown impressively—at a rate similar to that of conventionally-powered U. S. CGs. Not c°n' sidered in this comparison are U. S. nuclear-power#^ cruisers with their extended operational range.
In addition, the U. S. Navy has emphasized for 3 long time the underway alongside replenishment of3 vessel’s fuel, stores, and ammunition. Clear weathet deck areas are reserved both fore and aft for vertie3 replenishment by helicopter. Wide accesses and passage5 are provided, both topside and below, for strike-down- The Soviet Navy has only recently appeared to be developing a limited capability in this area. .
The added weight and volume requirements asso# ated with this emphasis on endurance account f°r 1 large part of the overall growth in U. S. combatant5 built since World War II.
Habitability: A comparison of the trend in U. S. ship habitability design practice, and that estimated for viet ships is shown in Figure 3, in terms of cubic fe£t per man. The shipboard spaces associated with persoj3 nel are considered to include those designated for beft ing, medical purposes, sanitation, food preparation, meSS ing, stores, administration, services, and recreation-
The trend in habitability in U. S. surface combatant5 has been dramatic since World War II, increasing fr0pl 210 cubic feet per man in the DD-692 to 695 cubic foet per man in the new FFG-7 (guided-missile frigate)- Tb|S more than three-fold increase was not matched by c Soviets, but on the other hand, their two-fold inct£iSC from 225 cubic feet per man on the "Skoryy” t0 cubic feet per man estimated for the new "Kara”-ch5' cruiser is probably a lot greater than most observe^5 might have expected. In both cases, habitability starlj ards seem to have kept pace with national living stan ards.
to the berthing and medical care of Soviet crews sanitation, messing, food preparation, and stores
personnel services, such as the ship store, laundry, cleaning plant, barber shop, post office, and exet room appears to be minimal in Soviet ships.
tr°nic
suUlTle and require less electrical power and other rt services than comparable U. S. equipment. The
Wei§ht associated with meeting habitability requirements has had a significant impact on the overall §r°wth of U. S. ships since World War II.
Payload: In this comparative study, the term "pay- j has been used to identify the equipment carried a ship to fulfill her military mission; that is, the eapons, ammunition, aircraft, detection, control, and ^^ntunications equipment. When a comparison was e °f the trend in the payload volume as a percent- ^ °f total volume of U. S. and Soviet surface com- jatants as shown in Figure 4, the results were extremely testing. They indicate an increasing trend for both oniric5 an^ t^at> while the Soviets put more weapons their ships than does the U. S., both countries allo- e about 15 to 20% of a ship’s total volume to eapons and electronics.
‘ncreasing trend in specific payload volume is ele Utable t0 r^e evolutionary change in weapons and t|(^tr°n'c systems. Heavy and dense guns and ammuni- and a small quantity of electronic equipment have n way to relatively light and volume demanding of i* C anc^ Punching systems and a larger quantity eectronic equipment.
aj| 1 appears to be U. S. and Soviet design practice to VQ°uCate about the same relative percentage of total ship S(;e^rne fo payload. How is it, then, that the Soviets ^ t0 arm their ships more heavily with weapons Mth an<^ W*tb a comPara^^e electronics suit
tc °ut their ships having grown more in size than ey have?
■H/
q. ectr°nics: The major design characteristic of Soviet p; </°n*c equipment that is thought to differ from Syst ‘ Practice is that, in general, Soviet radar and sonar Crris do not possess the power-demanding perform. similar U. S. equipment. Hence, Soviet elec- v0] *C ecluipment should demand less internal ship
one exception is in electronic warfare, where the Soviets have long employed an extensive variety of equipment. Their latest cruisers, the "Kresta II” and the "Kara,” have been fitted with the new, relatively high performance three-dimensional Top Sail early warning air search radar. This new system may indicate a Soviet trend toward higher performance electronics which will require more space and electrical power in the future.
Weapons: The trend in the relative armament density on board U. S. and Soviet destroyers since World War II, in terms of weapon launchers per 1,000 tons of displacement, is shown in Figure 5. Counted were gun mounts, missile launchers, ASW rocket launchers, torpedo tubes, and helicopters, no matter how many barrels, tubes or launcher arms they had.
Figure 5 highlights the fact that as U. S. warships have grown in size, it has not been because a greater number of weapon systems were provided. The Soviet practice of providing frigates with six weapon launchers per 1,000 tons, compared to two on U. S. frigates is very impressive. Soviet frigates, however, have relatively low endurance and habitability and are not designed for extended open ocean operations.
The decreasing trend in armament on board Soviet destroyers and cruisers and its subsequent reversal in ships completed around 1963 is very apparent. These ships were in the planning stage about the time Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov became Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. The present trend to increase the armament on board Soviet ships appears to be a reflection of his philosophy. In any case, their two-to-one armament ratio certainly justifies U. S. Fleet operators’ observations concerning the well-armed appearance of Soviet warships. This observation is pictorially displayed in Figure 6, which shows a plan view of the 560-foot, 10,000-ton CGN-38 and the 538-foot, 8,500-ton "Kara”-class CG.
Id
-'show the flag” in support of the nation’s policy. This mission has never influenced the visi
r, d
number of visible weapon systems on Soviet ship
the ship system preliminary design process. They asked to use their experience and judgment to eva!
WCfe
luatc
these data and rank them by major design chzriC teristics—that is, propulsion, endurance, electro weapons, and habitability—into an apparent prl° order.
The answer to the question of how the Soviets have managed to arm their ships more heavily than has the United States without enlarging their ships more than they have, appears attributable to several major differences in weapon design practice. To begin with, the Soviets seem to prefer the redundancy and firepower provided by more than one weapon system of a given type, even though:
► The combined ammunition magazine load of two Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems may be little more than that provided for a single U. S. multipurpose SAM system.
► The weapon systems may have to be located so that the arcs of fire covered by two systems are no greater than that which could have been provided by a single system more optimally located.
► The location of these multiple weapon systems along both sides of the main deck precludes a clear fore-and- aft topside access needed to facilitate the expeditious strike-down of underway replenishment stores and ammunition.
Another point is that, for weapon systems which are difficult to reload, such as surface-to-surface missile launchers and torpedo tubes, the Soviets seem to prefer multi-tubed launchers topside with no provision for carrying reloads on board ship in magazines below the main deck for protection.
A third facet is that, for other relatively small weapon systems, such as the close-in-weapon system (CIWS) and the surface-to-air missile launcher (SA-N-4), on board the "Kara”-class cruiser, the Soviets locate these systems on the weather deck with their ammunition magazines incorporated in and limited to the capacity of the deckhouse or the canister of the missile launcher.
In addition to carrying at least twice as many weapon systems on a ship as is typical of the U. S.
Navy, they are estimated to carry one-third more total weight of ammunition in their smaller ships and one- fifth more in their larger ships. The Soviets are estimated to carry fewer reloads of medium range surface- to-air missiles than comparable U. S. ships but mote gun and ASW ammunition.
Finally, the Soviets appear more willing to accept the increased vulnerability associated with storing lar$e amounts of ammunition in weapon launchers and magazines topside than is acceptable under U. S. design practice.
As a result of these overall differences in weap°n design practice, the Soviets devote more topside deck area to weapons and associated magazines and relative!) little more internal volume to weapon systems th-"1 is typical of U. S. practice. As a consequence, Soviet ships appear to have a main deck area and weigh' limitation as a design constraint as compared to the internal volume limitation of U. S. ships. Therefore, the installation of one weapon system using Soviet desig'j practice has less influence on ship size than it won' following U. S. design practice.
Two additional observations are worthy of n°'e about Soviet weapon design compared to U. S. practice-
► First, the Soviets emphasize higher firepower in the'j
warships, with either no reload or only a modest relo3 capability for their major missile and torpedo system5' This design philosophy suggests that these ships 3te being configured for a preemptive first strike in a shot'- intense conflict. ,
► Secondly, a mission of both the U. S. and S°vl.et warships is to provide peacetime presence, that ^
° at*
design characteristics of U. S. warships. However, the
- - . \l
makes them appear ominous, irrespective of their actu
combat effectiveness.
Design Priorities: The ship design data that have beeI’ previously discussed were reviewed by several sen naval architects who have had extensive experience
nicSi
.rity
The relative priority of ship subsystems was ju<^Cj in terms of their comparative volume, weight, * capability impact on U. S. surface combatant ^ during World War II and, then, on present-day desig^ In other words, which of these design characteris ^ appeared to "get the biggest piece of the cake” i°
ship design process? In conducting this evaluation, fhese naval architects looked only at the ships as they Were finally designed and built, not at the original m>ssion requirements that gave them birth. The results this effort are shown in column one of Figure 7. It was their opinion that, during World War II, • S. frigates and destroyers were designed around a specified weapon suit and propulsion plant. Their size Was determined primarily by the buoyancy required to ac*equately support the weight of this weapon suit and PtQpulsion plant and their associated load of ammu- n'tt°n and fuel. The remaining volume in the fore and a c ends of the ship, and in the superstructure, was then a °cated to electronics, habitability, and other features, entially, the philosophy was to design ships with
firepower and mobility, but of modest size, so we could afford to build large numbers of rela-
ELeCTRomics
EN|DuRANce Habitabiuty
Essi good that
tlVely inexpensive ships for our wartime Navy. The r|aval architects used these same criteria in evaluating e design data applicable to recent U. S. designs, namely, the FFG.7; FF.1052, DD-963, and CGN-38. The esults are shown in column two of Figure 7.
,, ^ review of the estimated design data for recent ,.?.Vlet surface combatant designs, namely the "Krivak,” , resta I,” and "Kara,” resulted in the priority order °Wn in column three of Figure 7. It seems that the Priority with which the Sdviets are designing their !?Sent warships is reminiscent of U. S. design priorities g World War II. That is, the Soviets are emphasizing s^eP°wer and mobility in ships of relatively modest a They then appear to restrict electronics, endurance, habitability charactefistics to those which are barely Equate.
Th •
g nus> it appears reasonable to conclude that the °Vlet philosophy is to design warships of modest size, a/r 1 g°od firepower and mobility, so that they can f r<a t0 build a number of relatively inexpensive assets ^h ever'grow‘ng Soviet Navy. This may explain y they have not yet used nuclear power in their
larger cruisers.
^ffect of Mission Requirements: At this point, a reader g t logically ask to be shown by example the impact
fpparent Design Priorities
U. S. 1974 | SOVIETS 1974 |
ELECTRONICS | WEAPONS |
HABITABILITY | PROPULSION |
ENDURANCE | ELECTRONICS |
WEAPONS | ENDURANCE |
PROPULSION | HABITABILITY |
of present U. S. mission requirements in a specific U. S. ship design in contrast to a similar sized Soviet ship. By way of example, the impact of present U. S. mission requirements is shown in Figure 8, for the 7,900-ton CG-26 with seven weapon systems compared to the 6,700-ton "Kresta I” with 13 weapon systems.
Immediately obvious was that, in lieu of the multipurpose Mk 10 Terrier/ASROC launcher, a ship designer could have alternatively fitted the CG-26 with two missile launchers similar in size to the SA-N-i launchers on the "Kresta.” If he had done this, and the total missile load were reduced by 20%, it would not haVe required any increase in ship size.
Another obvious item was the SQS-26 sonar. A ship designer could have fitted the CG-26 with a sonar roughly equivalent in size to the sonar estimated on the "Kresta I.” With the resultant saving in volume and weight, he could have alternatively fitted the ship with three 5-inch lightweight guns and 600 rounds of ammunition each. The 5-inch lightweight gun was used as a medium of exchange in this example because it is a highly visible item, the addition of which tends to make a U. S. ship look more like a Soviet ship from the standpoint of visible firepower.
An examination was made of the propulsion, endurance, and habitability requirements for the CG-26 compared to those estimated for the "Kresta I.” Had these U. S. requirements been reduced to the equivalent level of Soviet requirements, the ship designer would have been able to alternatively fit the CG-26 with five more 5-inch lightweight guns and 600 rounds of ammunition each. With this previous example in mind, what would the 4,100-ton FF-1052 look like if she had been designed to estimated Soviet mission requirements and design practices? A possible answer is shown in Figure 9. A Sovietized version of the FF-1052 was designed as follows:
► The maximum speed was increased to 33 knots by replacing two conventional boilers driving one screw, with four pressure-fired boilers driving two screws. This caused an increase in the overall size of the machinery spaces. However, by arranging the four boilers in one fireroom, rather than a less vulnerable two-fireroom arrangement, and reducing the auxiliary machinery, the specific machinery volume was reduced 35% to Soviet standards.
► The increased size of the machinery spaces was further compensated for by reducing the ship’s endurance by 1,000 miles and reducing the habitability space by 40%.
The radar and sonar suits were replaced with other less volume- and weight-demanding U. S. equipment that reflect lower Soviet performance and support requirements. However, missile defense was upgraded by the addition of an antiship missile defense (ASMD) electronic warfare package.
► The weapon suit was doubled from six to 12 by the substitution and addition of "low ship impact” weapons topside. These weapons were placed without providing magazines below deck for reloads or concern for their arc-of-fire, vulnerability, or their hindrance of a clear fore-and-aft topside passageway for replenishment strike-down. Moreover, existing belowdeck magazine capacities were reduced to reflect Soviet practice.
The Sovietized FF-1052 is a feasible ship. She would cost an estimated 20% more than the original ship, primarily for the additional weapon systems. But, if U. S. Navy mission requirements called for more firepower and speed on ships of modest size—and engineering design practices were modified to meet minimum requirements—it is feasible for U. S. ship designers to provide them. However, it would obviously be necessary to compromise other features of these ships if they were not to grow in size and cost.
Summary: The Soviets have not made any break' throughs in extending the state of the art in ship design. Rather, as competent ship designers and ship builders, they are building large numbers of relatively small, fast warships with impressive firepower to satisfy mission requirements and design priorities different from those of the United States. Other ship system* of lesser priority seem to be "fitted in” whatever spa# is available without allowing additional ship growth to accommodate them. This indicates a Soviet design practice to select subsystems which, if barely ade j quate, are accepted in preference to the ship growth that might be associated with additional improvement* to optimize the subsystem design.
Soviet mission requirements account for the charat' j ter of Soviet warship designs. Their sea denial missit>n is intended to deny other nations certain uses of the sea. The recent growth in size of Soviet cruisers, hofl ever, along with the building of 35-40,000 ton ait capable ASW cruisers, appears to indicate an extension ; of their ability to limit the use of world’s oceans, °r it could mean the emergence of a sea control capabihff' I Their sea denial mission requires a design emphasis °n j a heavy firepower, first strike capability against a muff1 pie air, sea and submarine threat, rather than an *n herent shipboard self-sufficiency for extended depM ments with limited dependency on shore base^ maintenance and resupply and the combat support 0 aircraft carriers. Finally, their sea denial mission requireS emphasis on high speed and good seakeeping abil‘P in all weather, rather than on endurance.
The principal design practices which also appear c account for the character of Soviet warships are: ( topside "low ship impact” weapons, with either re tively modest sized magazines or no reloads at all, (j high-power propulsion plants for high speed, designe with a relatively low specific machinery volume, l- radar and sonar equipment of modest size, performs11^ capability, and impact on auxiliary plant support re quirements, (4) relatively low endurance, (5) habi^ bility standards which reflect the modest standard 0 living in the Soviet Union, and (6) minimum provis*011 for future payload modifications and equipment malfl tenance.
In addition, Soviet design philosophy does not aP^ pear to emphasize the concurrent development :in multiple source procurement of weapon, electron1^ propulsion, and aircraft systems to the degree that is practiced by the United States. While the use off-the-shelf systems often results in built-in obso cence, it, along with equipment standardization, ® nificantly reduces the design margins which must allowed for the uncertainties associated with devel°P
1.
mental or competitively procured systems. On the ot
^nd
tcs,
15
of
Ptoo
relatively consistent and strong design control ess. One can almost visualize, by studying the naval
°V' |r is from him that Soviet ship designers receive d^CCt*0n regarding mission requirements for warship a^.8ns- And, it has been variously reported that his j ltu<^e toward the ship design process is summed up wor<^s on a sign, prominently displayed in 0f office, which reads, "Comrade, fbetter’ is the enemy g°°d enough’!”
Soviets do appear willing to regularly update caP°n, electronic propulsion, and other shipboard ems through major modification during extensive Verhaul periods.
, ^hile Soviet ships are now generally smaller than eir U. S. counterparts, there is a very definite growth ln their size, endurance, habitability, and electron'> particularly in their cruisers. This growth is ex- I te<a to continue as the Soviets experience the prob- 1115 associated with extended operational deployments. Finally, a review of Soviet warships built in the past years seems to indicate that they are the product
c ‘tectural features of Soviet ships, the stamp of J Pr°val of a single design agent who has put his 6 ature on each new destroyer design we have seen sh'CC a°0ut I960. This suggests a stability in the Soviet r.]'P procurement process that appears to be directly j ec* fo the 20-year incumbency of the Commander- ko °F tFie Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei G. Gorsh-
d
The opinions or assertions in this article are the personal ones of the author and are not to he construed as official. They do not necessarily reflect the view of the Department of Defense.
Commissioned through the ROC program in 1952 after receiving a B.S. in mathematics from Stonehill College, Massachusetts, Captain Kehoe holds an M.A. in education from San Diego State College. He has served in three aircraft carriers, most recently, as engineering officer of the USS Wasp (CVS-18), and on board three destroyers, most recently commanding the USS John R. Pierce (DD-753). Ashore, he has had duty in nuclear weapons, the Polaris missile program, and instructing in project management. He is currently serving at the Nava! Ship Engineering Center, Hyattsville, Maryland.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dt. R. S. Johnson, H. A. Meier, J. D. Raber, J. L. Mills, Jr., V. W. Puleo, and N. T. Yannarell of the Naval Ship Engineering Center, Hyattsville, Maryland; K. Brower of J. J. McMullen, Inc., New York; and Lieutenant Commander C. Graham of M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts, in conducting this study.